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Abstract
This thesis is a commentary on Xenophon the Athenian's ’ATUoXoyia ZcoKpatons 
(Apology of Socrates)y a work written in the first half of the 4th century B.C. with the 
express purpose of explaining Socrates' self-aggrandizing behavior during his trial in 
399. The commentary is prefaced by three essays which treat the issues of 
authenticity, dating, and possible non-Platonic influences on the work, while the four appendices contain comparisons with Xenophon's Memorabilia and Plato's Apology 
as well as tmatments of Socrates' daimonic sign and his aiTogant behavior during the 
trial as described by Xenophon. Based on the 1919 Oxford Classical Text edited by 
E. C. Marchant, the commentary itself is a Hne-by-line analysis concerned primarily 
with providing a social, historical, and literary context for each passage under consideration.
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A Few Prolegomena
The bulk of twentieth-century scholarship has now come to recognize 
Xenophon's ’AîtoA/Oyla ZcoKpdtoos (Xen. Ap.) as a genuine part of the Xenophontic 
corpus, and because of the stature of its Platonic counterpart a full English 
commentary on this neglected opusculum is long overdue. Since an introduction is 
the best of all places to be sparing of words, I will limit these prolegomena to the 
following remarks:
• As the basis of this dissertation I have focused primarily on Xenophon's Socratica 
(Marchant éd.), the four Platonic Socratica connected directly with the trial (Burnet 
ed.), Aristophanes' Clouds (Dover ed.), and Libanius' Apology (Foerster ed.). All 
abbreviations of these and other works by Xenophon and Plato will appear without 
the authors' names unless there is danger of confusion (as in the case of Xen, Ap, and 
PL Ap.y for example). Clouds will appear- simply as Nu., and Libanius' work as Lib. 
Ap. The Ger-man ter-m Schutzschrift refers to Comm. 1.1-2.
• With the exception of the abbreviations Comm. (= Mem.) and Xen. (= Xenophon), I 
have used those listed in Liddell-Scott-Jones' A Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed.) and 
the Oxford Latin Dictionaty; where abbreviations for specific titles have not been 
provided, I have improvised freely. PA indicates the numbering used in Kirchner's 
Prosopographia Attica.
• All Greek proper nouns (e.g. "Diopithes") appear in their Latinized for-ms, and all 
English spellings and idioms (e.g. "fulfillment...at etc." on the title page) are 
American.
• Throughout the dissertation, I have chosen to use the Greek word 07to%oyl(% in place 
of the English "apology" since the latter is not commonly used in English in any sense 
approximating the Greek usage. (Unfortunately, the English word "apologia" also 
tends to evoke unwelcome connotations associated with Christian writings.) The title 
itself (in abbreviated form) is excepted.
• Marchant's text and the information about the manuscript tradition have been 
included in this thesis solely for the convenience of the examiner/reader.
Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Harry Hine and the School of 
Greek, Latin and Ancient History at the University of St. Andrews for having given 
me the opportunity to complete my post-graduate studies here, and I am especially 
grateful to Professor Stephen Halliwell for his many useful suggestions, for his 
accessibility as a supervisor, and for his war mth and kindness as a human being. I 
would also like to thank Professor Lawrence Okamura of the University of Missouri 
in Columbia, whose singulai-ly humane approach to the humanities still stands out like 
a strong beacon to me after so many years. My thanks to you all.
Essay A : The Issue of Authenticity
The Ap. was considered genuine in antiquity,  ^ and it was only with the 
comments of Valckenaer in the late eighteenth centuiy^ that its authenticity came to 
be questioned. Since then, it has been predominantly the classicists of the nineteenth 
century, most notably Wilamowitz,^ who have considered it spurious, while the 
majority of twentieth-century classicists concerned with the question have returned to 
the position of the ancients in accepting it as genuine. Opponents of its authenticity 
usually call it a pastiche made up of pieces from PI. Ap. and the Comm, and refer in 
pai'ticular to its insignificance and mediocrity as weU as to a characterization of 
Socrates which does not seem worthy of him.  ^ A more balanced approach is called
^The sources are admittedly late: Demetrius of Magnesia (first century BC) ap. D.L. 2.57, Herodicus of 
Babylon (first or second century AD) ap. Ath. 218E-F, and the Schol. ad PI. Ap. 18B (see Breitenbach 
1894, Frick 7-8, and Hackforth 42 n. 3: for the Herodicus attribution, see Wilamowitz [1897] 99 n. 1). 
^In I. A. Emesti, ed., Apomnemoneumata (Cornmentarii), sen Metnorabilium Socratis dictorum libri FV 
(5th ed.), Leipzig, 1772. Valckenaefs seminal remarks (ap. Frick 86-87) deserve to be quoted in full:
On Comm. 1.1.1: Sed illud imprimis notabile, quod [Xenophon] scribit in Epist. 15, p. 38 ,10: 
A okei xphvai ngcts otryYpa<j)eiv d Tcote elîtev àvTip koi ETcpa^ev k oi anxri àîtoX,OYia yévoit’ âv 
aùxoû pEA,xi0Tn Kat eis to vûv te  k oi eIs to  EîiEua* Haec âTüopvniiovE'üfxaTa praebent 
Xenophonteam Socratis Apologiam: respondet enim in his Xenophon ad  singula accusationis 
capita: praeterea in Arte Rhetor, inter Opera Dionys. Halic. 2, p. 103, 34, Socratis EYKCopiov 
scripsisse dicitur Plato èv àïcoA,oYias o%iipaxv Xenophon autem  ev xois àTtofxv'npovEÛpaaiv 6s 
yap àîioA.OYO'üixEvos Uïtèp ZcoKpdxous êyk6|iigv ZmKpdxous iiepaivEi. Quae vulgata prostat ut 
Xenophontis ZcoKpaxous dmXoYia, est ilia hoc ingenio capitali si quid iudico prorsus indigna, ab 
eodem conflata, cui finem Cyropaediae debemus et alia quaedam, quae vulgo leguntur ut 
Xenophontea.
On Comm, in.3.9: Eadem, verbis tamen divers is usus, tradiderat in K.FI. Ip . 19.7, legunturque 
talia in his Socraticis longe plurima, eorum similia, quae prostant in K.IJ. nec tamen iisdem verbis 
narrata. Et crederemus Xenophontem sua ipsius, quae dederat in Hist. Graeca, centena continua 
inA gesilai encomio transscripsisse? aut Apologiam scripsisse Socratis, in qua nihil alicuius 
inveniatur momenti, quod non legatur in his commentariis?
Frick (pp. 84-85) prefaces these quotations by noting that it was actually C. Heumann (Acta 
Philosophorum, Halle, 1715-27, vol. 1 pp. 497-98), not Valckenaer, who was tlie first modem to 
question the authenticity o f the Ap.
^Wilamowitz (1897) passim  (see too Derenne 158); for an exhaustive review of scholars' remarks on 
the Ap. since Heumann, see Frick 83-166. Wilamowitz, who began to write his article with entirely 
different intentions, decided to change his focus when he perceived that a new generation o f classicists 
was coming to consider the Ap. a legitimate work (p. 106), though he seems to have altered his own 
opinion years later ([1919] 2:50) and even originally admits ([1897] 1(X)) that its style and the 
repetition o f Xenophontic passages give the work its distinct flavor. In partial response to 
Wilamowitz, Menzel (p. 5 n. 3) believes that the Ap. 's authenticity is actually o f  secondary importance 
when comparied to its possible historical value: [Die Apologie] kônnte von Xenophon herrUhren und 
dennoch historisch wertlos sein und umgekehrt. Marchant ([1919] Add. et Corr. s.v. Ap.) is not swayed 
by Wilamowitz' arguments: Ne Wilatnowitzius quidem mihi persuadere potuit hoc opusculum ab 
imitatore esse conscriptum.
“^ See, for example. Oilier 84 and Vrijlandt xviii. To be suie, any conscious or unconscious comparison 
with the Platonic dialogues will naturally find this more cursory work lacking in many respects. For 
considerations of Platonic influence, see Essay C and the comment on §1.
for, and it is appropriate to begin this essay with Vrijlandt's remarks (p. xvii) directed 
towards those who have questioned the authenticity of the work:
Non ignoramus raro in nostra arte pro certo, sicut apud mathematicos, aliquid demonstrari posse. Probabilitatem et verisimilitudinem plerumque tanquam summas deas veneramur. Contra procul habendi sunt ei quorum unica libido esse videtur omnia in dubium vocare. Quibus adnumerandi sunt viri docti qui 
Apologiam Xenophonteam Xenophonti abiudicant.
In what follows I will reproduce a representative, chronologically arranged sampling 
of opinions on the matter, then consider the results collectively in arriving at my own 
conclusions.
Schmitz (pp. 221-22) begins his examination by asserting that Ath. 218E-F 
(see n. 1 above) is a misquoted version of Ap. 14 (on Delphi), and it follows that the 
surviving version of the Ap. cannot resemble the one he read.  ^ Diogenes Laertius 
mentions the work twice (in 2.57 & 3.34), and it is likely that he is referring to the 
extant version since Stobaeus quotes at length from §§25-29 (pp. 222-223).^
Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus were not very critical writers, however, and the fact 
that any reference to the Ap. is conspicuously missing in other writers leads one to 
question their ascription of the work to Xen. (p. 223). The author of Socratic. Ep. 15 
does not mention the Ap. per se but considers the Comm, to be an àTCOÀoyia, hence he 
must have lived prior to the appearance of the manuscripts in their present form (pp. 
223-34). Note too that the first editions of Xenophon (the Juntina and Aldina) do not 
contain this opusculum, and it is only since Reuchlin’s edition that it has regularly 
appeared as part of the corpus (p. 224).
Schmitz refers to Valckenaer's observations and agrees that the extant Ap. 
does not contain anything substantially different from what appears in the Comm. He 
also refers to the opinions of contemporaiy German scholars (e.g. Schneider) who 
believe that the Ap. originally foimed the conclusion of the Comm., from which it was 
eventually severed and altered by a grammarian (p. 225). The peyaJiTiYopla evident 
in the Ap. is quite different from the characterization of Socrates in other Socratica, 
including the Comm, and PI. Ap. (p. 226), and points to be found that are not brought
^The Athenaeus passage substitutes èirepwxfiaavTOS and ÙTtép for éîiepcoxôvxos and Tiepi, respectively, 
shifts the position o f rn X km  napovxcov, and omits eXeuBepicoxepov.
^See Stob. IIt.1.81 & III.7.58 Hense. Professor Halliwell notes that Stobaeus also quoted from earUer 
anthologies, not necessarily from original works. The fact that Demetrius Magnes (ap. Diogenes 
Laertius) numbers the Ap. among the autlientic works of Xen. is for Chroust a crucial factor in favor of  
its authenticity ([1955] 1 n. 1 & [1957] 17).
up in the Comm, appear in §§7-9, 14, 23,26, 28-30. This additional information has 
little or nothing to do with Xen.’s professed purpose, which is a consideration of 
Socrates' peyaA/TiYopta, and all that is truly important must therefore be derived from 
the Comm. The opening statement of the Ap. seems to indicate 1) that much time has 
passed since the death of Socrates, 2) that the author derived his information 
exclusively from books, and 3) that Socrates had actually been guilty of 
jiEyaA/TiYOpia, something which Xen. himself would never have said (p. 227). The 
language of the work is admittedly worthy of Xen. and his age, though it could have 
been imitated beyond detection by a gifted author, a phenomenon observed, for 
example, in the writings of Quintus Cuitius and Dio Chrysostom (p. 228). Such 
imitators betray themselves through rhetorical exaggeration, of which there is an 
abundance in this work, most notably in the treatment of Socrates' aiTogance.^
Schmitz draws the following conclusions: 1) The Ap. was written by a sophist 
or grammarian in the 1st or 2nd century AD (i.e. sometime between Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus and Athenaeus), 2) the author used portions of the Comm., either 
literally or in an abridged form, to explain Socrates' pEYaXTiYOpia, and 3) he added 
other information from other sources as he saw fit, including anecdotal material (p.
229X
In a collaborative effort, Wetzel and Iramisch respectively present arguments 
in support of the Ap.'s authenticity as follows: 1) The Comm. boiTOw extensively from 
the Ap., hence the latter is necessarily from Xenophon's hand,  ^and 2) hnguistic 
considerations make its authenticity all but certain. Immisch introduces his linguistic 
analysis of the work by considering what constitutes Attic Greek in general and 
Xenophontic Greek in particular (p. 405), and related considerations include 1) the 
fact that there was no universal lexical nonn for the Greek language in the early 
fourth century, 2) the lack of any strict rhetorical schooling at the time, 3) personal 
elements in the lives of individual writers, and 4) the considerable differences among 
the various dialects (pp. 405-406). Xen. has always been known, and was known 
even in antiquity, for the poetic elements in his lexis, and these elements are difficult 
to distinguish from the lonisms that seem to have crept into his language as the result 
of his wanderings in Ionian-speaking regions in the East, influences which signal the 
beginnings of Koine (p. 407).^ Immisch does not rule out the possibility of a forgery,
^Gray (pp. 139-40: see too W etzel 71) believes tbat Xen.'s interest in rhetorical considerations might 
well undermine the historical value o f the work as a whole.
^Wetzel 392. For Wetzel's specific observations, see Appendix A.
9 It is interesting to note that Xen. shows similarities with Ctesias, who wrote a sort o f inchoate Koine 
(pp. 408-409).
but if the Ap. is in fact an imitation of some kind, one would be compelled, as he puts 
it, ...ein Raffinement der Stilnachahmung [anzunehmen], das ebensofUr die 
verhaltnismafiig frUhe Zeit unwahrscheinlich ist, in welche das Schriftchen 
zugestandenermafien gehort, wie es aiich aufier allem Verhaltnis zu der inhaltlichen 
DUrftigkeit der Arbeit stehen wUrde (p. 410). In the remainder of his article, Immisch 
examines specific examples of words appealing in the Ap. and concludes by declaring 
it to be authentic on the basis of their similarities to the general Xenophontic lexis.
Beyschlag subsequently published a lengthy and well-considered argument 
against the authenticity of the Ap. as follows: There are definite references to Xen.'s 
style in Heimogenes and Photius, and we are aware of others, from all of which we 
can assume that there were philological studies of the "Attic Bee" made as early as 
Alexandrian times (p. 496). It is not implausible, then, that a later imitator might 
have used such sources as well as excerpts from the Comm, to create a pseudo- 
Xenophontic Ap. Isocrates' rhetorical school, founded ca. 390, concerned itself with 
Musterbeispiele, an activity already tending towards direct imitation, and with the 
death of Demosthenes and the loss of freedom an archaizing tendency set in.
Students of rhetorical schools consequently looked towards the past masters foi- 
inspiration and wrote Seitenstilcke based on famous models as school exercises (p. 
497), and beginning in the 2nd century BC the better of these eventually found their 
way into the genuine coipora (pp. 497-98).
Therefore the Ap., which Beyschlag describes as ...keine bewufite Falschung, 
sondem ein spdteres Exercitiim, ein rhetorisches Schidthema, originates in the 
author's intention to offer a counterpait to PI. Ap., as Xen. Smp. mirrors Plato's work 
of the same name, a fact which also becomes evident by comparing the similai* 
openings of Xen. Ap. and Smp. (p. 4 9 8 ) . Beyschlag notes that the citing of 
Hermogenes as a principal source for his argument is not entirely convincing (p. 498), 
and the fact that the Ap. appears separately from the other Socratica in D.L. 2.57 and 
also in the exemplaiy Vatic. B 1335 manuscript means that it indeed found 
acceptance but was incoiporated late into the corpus (p. 499: see too Wilamowitz 
[1897] 99 n. 1). Immisch's list of Xenophontic usages is not persuasive, since a 
clever imitator could have simply reproduced them, and the meagemess of the
i®Namely, according to Beyschlag, in Harpocration, Hero, Zeno, Metrophanes, Theon, Tiberius, 
Longinus, Phrynichus, and Helladius.
llS e e  too Derenne 181. For the use of Socrates’ case as an exercise in the rhetorical schools, see Prod. 
in Ti. 21A-B (= 1.65.22 Diehl) and Max.Tyr. 3.1.
1 ^ Beyschlag respectively compares, for example, 5é and )ie|xvfio0ai o f tiie former with aXX and 
à^ioirvriirôveuxa o f the latter.
linguistic evidence in general renders any analysis of Xenophon's language futile (pp. 
499-500). An example of definitely un-Socratic usages in the Ap. are ôokeÎv and 
(jialveaOai versus the fai* more Socratic KivSuveueiv used elsewhere by Xen.: This is 
due to the fact that the ancient grammarians falsely considered the usage to be a Xé^is 
nX,aT(DviKfi, not a Xé^is XcoKpaTiKfi (p. 499), and one should also ask oneself why, as 
Immisch holds, there are so many Xenophontisms in what purports to be a speech 
delivered by Socrates (p. 501).
Beyschlag (p. 501 ff.) believes that two passages in particular reveal the 
inauthenticity of the Ap., i.e. §26 (on education) and §30 (on pavancha):
1) On Education: Note that all passages in which Socrates is described as a 
teacher are spoken by his detractors, e.g. by Polycrates in Isoc. Bus. 5 (|xa0r|Tfjs), 
by Critias ap. Comm. 1.2.31 (SiôàcncEiv), and Antiphon ap. Comm. 1.6.3 
(§i0otaKaA,os KaKoôaipovias); otherwise the issue of teaching is avoided by Xen., 
who generally uses more innocuous wording.
2) On pavaucna: Beyschlag considers a number of passages and concludes that 
Socrates was in fact p r o - b a n a u s i c .  Note too that Plato's Socrates says that, of all 
the people he has examined, it is only the craftsmen who surpass the others in 
knowledge (see PI. Ap. 22D), and it is in fact only later (e.g. in R. 590C) that 
Plato's philosophy takes on an anti-banausic quality. It is only natural that 
Socrates would speak fondly of craftsmen since he was the son of a stoneworker, 
whereas Xen. and Plato came from a more elitist background. It is therefore 
Xenophon, not Socrates, whose views are represented in the relevant passages in 
the Comm, and Oec.
Beyschlag concludes his comments on these two issues as follows: Bei diesen 
Ergebnissen bleibt immer wieder zu betonen, dafi auch Xenophon in einer Apologie 
seines Meisters ihm keine Lehren aus dem Eigenen imputieren darf die in diesem 
Zusammenhang der Anklage nur Wasser aufdie MUhle gefllhrt hatten.^^
^^Namely, Comm. 1.2.37,1.2.56, III. 10, IV.4.5 and Grg. 491 A. I remain unconvinced (see the 
comment on §14).
'^^For remarks on Plato's aristocratic bias, see Vrijlandt 27-28.
Additional points include the following: 1) How can one account for the discrepancy between the 
Anytus portrayals in the Men. and A p.l According to Beyschlag, the forger was familiar with the 
former (cp. alpohvxai yonv anxov èm  xàs peyioTas étp%âs in Men. 90B with aùxôv xwv peyiaxcov ùno 
xns noXem  ôpôv d^ioupevov in Ap. 29) but misunderstood the description of the failed father/son 
relationships in Plato as referring to the bad relationship between Anytus and his own son (p. 506). 2) 
Contrary to Immisch’s opinion, the last sentence in §31 can be retained since a contrast does in fact 
exist when one looks at the larger context, i.e. k o i xexeXenxTiKœs xny%(%vet KaxoSo^ias vs. 0eo(j)iA,oûs
Like Immisch before him, Feddersen believes that only an exhaustive word 
analysis can deteimine the authenticity of the Ap. (p. 12). On the basis of ear lier 
s tud ies ,he  (pp. 13-24) conducts a lengthy grammatical, syntactical, and rhetorical 
analysis of the Ap. and concludes that it is indeed genuine. He further maintains (p. 
32) that the fact that the Ap. contains so many rhetorical elements indicates that it was 
intended to be recited: This is reflected in the verba declarandi, e.g. of) xà rcdvxa 
8ljü8Îv...è<jn:o'i)6aaa (§22), p,8|rvha0ai (§§1 & 34), ôiaaa(j)TiviÇû) (§1), and ôiiÀmoar 
(§22).^^ According to Feddersen (pp. 33-34), Diogenes Laertius (2.57) separated the 
Ap. from the other Socratica because he wanted to group it with other works that 
would have been suitable for recitation (e.g. the Vect. and Hier.).^^
Flick also subjects the Ap. to a careful word analysis (pp. 9-15) and rinds it 
compatible with Xen.'s writing in general, adding that, if in fact the work is not 
authentic, it must have found its way into the Xenophontic corpus at least by the 2nd
polpas xexuxTiKevai (p. 507: see the comment on this section ad lo c ). 3) It is clear that the Ap. 
appeared after the Euthphr. (cp. k o u o i èïtioxdpEGa pèv SfiTion xIves eIo i vecov 6ia<t>0opal in §19 witli 
Euthphr. 2C: xlva xpôîtov o l véo i ôia<j>0Eipovxai xa i xivES o i 5ia^0EipovxES aùxohs), and certain 
inconsistencies (e.g. Comn. IV.8.9-10 vs. Ap. 26) show that tlie A p was written after the Comm. (pp. 
510-12). §28 is also clearly borrowed from Phd. 89B, and §32 from Phd. 58E. Since the latter is 
generally dated to ca. 367, all o f tliese considerations place the writing o f the Ap. to some time after 
367, over thirty years after the trial. Since this seems unimaginable, the work must be spurious (p. 
515). 4) Finally, the borrowing o f loci in the Ap. (e.g. Apollodorus, Palamedes, etc.) can be attributed 
to the Greek literary practice o f mimesis, i.e. die Weiterbildung eines einmal gepragten literarischen 
Typus (pp. 515-16).
1 ^ Namely, those of K. Schulze ("Quaestiones grammaticae ad Xenophontem pertinentes", progr.
Berol. 1888), F. Wissmann ("De genere dicendi Xenophonteo", diss. Giess. 1888), H. Schacht ("De 
Xenophontis studiis rhetoricis", diss. Berol. 1890), and A. Zucker, ("Beobachtungen iiber den 
Gebrauch des Artikels bei Personennamen in Xenophons Anabasis", progr. Norense, 1899); Frick (see 
below) also refers to these same groundbreaking studies. See too Feddersen's contemporary Richards 
(see bibl.), who believes that the consideration o f individual words tells very much in favor o f the Ap. 's 
authenticity. L. Gautier (p. 130 n. 1) is inclined to follow Immisch, Richards, Frick, and Feddersen 
while observing that the Ap. is ,..de trop peu d'étendue pour que les arguments linguistiques soient 
décisifs.
^^Feddersen also addresses Beyschlag's remarks concerning tlie work’s un-Socratic language and 
sentiments as well as th&falsarius issue (pp. 24-28). Vrijlandt (p. 144) also rules out a forgery on the 
following grounds: 1) The language and style of writing are Xenophontic. 2) The ancient testimonies 
attribute the work to Xen. 3) There are too many inconsistencies in Plato's Socratica to appeal to an 
imitator attempting to piece them together into an intelligible whole (note Vrijlandt's assumption 
concerning Xen.'s sources). 4) Similia saepe dissimilia sunt. Saepe prorsus contrarium apud 
Xenophontem legitur atque apud Platonem. Hoc imitatoris non est. 5) The Socrates in Xen. Ap. has a 
totally different behavior from that o f the Platonic Socrates, a difference more indicative of a writer 
like Xen. who has his own source (i.e. Hermogenes). Menzel (p. 5) also notes that the procedural 
deviations from the potential Platonic and Xenophontic sources (e.g. Socrates' refusal to propose a 
counter-penalty) make it  impossible that the Ap. is a mere compilation.
^^See the comment on §34 for Feddersen's rhetorical analysis o f that section.
^^Feddersen’s argument is not particularly persuasive since most ancient writings were intended for 
recitation and since any speech, fictive or otherwise, would necessarily contain rhetorical elements to 
some extbnt.
8century BC (p. 8).^° In general, the Ap. is too Xenophontic in style and diction to 
allow for an interpolator, and who would have expended so much effort on such a 
minor work?^  ^ Frick concludes his remarks by stating that, while the Ap. is to be 
ascribed to Xen., his account of the trial certainly detracts from the traditional view of 
him as representing a reliable Socratic source (pp. 80-82).
In his remarks on the authenticity of the Ap., Fritz ([1931] 37-38) begins by 
considering if it is to be understood as a Mosaikarbeit made up of Platonic and 
Xenophontic p i e c e s , ^ ^  then responds in paiticular to the previous work of Immisch, 
Wetzel, and Arnim.23 in response to these approaches, Fritz (p. 40 ff.) focuses on 
four points in the remainder of his aiticle - the counter-penalty, Anytus, the daimonic 
sign, and considerations of possible sources - and concludes his comments (p. 68) by 
stating the following in favor of its inauthenticity: Ein zusammenfassendes 
Argument...fUr die Unechtheit [der xenophontischen Apologie]...besteht...darin, dafi 
sich - abgesehen von ganz nichtssagenden Stellen -filr alle ihre Teile Berilhrungen 
mit verschiedenen anderen Schriften nachweisen lassen, und dies gerade auch in 
solchen Dingen, die sicher nicht historisch sind.
Individual points in favor of the Ap.'s authenticity include the following: A 
number of scholais have found its cohesiveness to be a convincing factor,and
particular, around tlie time of Herodicus ap. Stob. 111.7.58 Hense. Although some problems arise 
in that certain words appear in the Ap. which are rare or non-existent in other writers and which 
anticipate Koine, Frick is inclined to accept its authenticity, citing among other pieces o f evidence the 
similarity o f D.Chiys. 28.13 to Ap. 6 (pp. 9-16), a tenuous comparison at best. For the use o f poetic 
vocabulary in the Ap., see Frick 11-13.
^^See p. 8: quod tandem consilium secutus tantam ingeniosus ille homo operam in libello collocavit 
tam mediocri? Cp. Immisch's conunent above.
^^Fritz (p. 64) believes tliat the Ap. consists o f the following pieces taken from various Socratic 
writings; the defense (§§10-21), the conclusion (§§24-27), additional remarks (§§22-23), the 
Apollodorus episode (§28), and the Anytus episode (§§28-31), none o f which has anything to do with 
peya^Ttyopia, and all of which were consequently synchronized by the author and added to those 
sections which treat the arrogance theme.
23According to Fritz (pp. 38-40), one cannot, like Immisch, prove its authenticity on linguistic grounds 
alone since so much depends on the motives of tlie forger: If philosophical, the language will vary 
considerably; if literary, the language can closely resemble the original. Wetzel treats the dating issue 
separately from the autlienticity issue, while Amim takes its autlienticity as already having been proved 
by Immisch and Wetzel and consequently draws conclusions about its dating by using these results to 
re-confirm its authenticity. Wetzel believes that the Ap. contains correct information from 
Hermogenes, which Xen. later misinterpreted in the Comm., while Amim sees in the latter allenthalben 
Verbesserungen der noch undeutlichen Angaben der Apologie. This reversability o f arguments used to 
establish the same sequence (i.e. Ap. —> Comm.) is problematical, especially when the question of 
autlienticity is left open. Any deviations from, or degeneration of, the original text could in fact be 
attributed to a writer who was not well acquainted witli the information. Wetzel's idea, though 
believable, perhaps, if  applied to isolated examples, therefore becomes untenable when applied to an 
entire work.
24See Schmid 224 n. 1, Nickel 81, Edelstein 149, Oilier 85-89, and P. Meyer 716. Gigon ([1946] 220) 
observes that, while it is the supposedly weak structure of the Ap. which has caused scholars to
related to this ai*e considerations of style: Ollier^  ^holds that the Ap. is authentic not 
only in diction and style but also in content, while Breitenbach (col. 1893) observes 
that there are no anachronisms or irregularities that would mark the work as 
belonging to another author. Scholars have countered the conflation aigument by 
referring to Xen.’s penchant for internal boiTOwing: In particulai’, the fact that the Ap. 
shares passages with the Comm, proves nothing since Xen. borrows freely from 
himself elsewhere (e.g. from the Ages, for use in the HG).^^
Besides the various criticisms directed against the cohesiveness and style of 
the Ap. (see too Beyschlag's and Fritz' argumentation above), the following arguments 
against its authenticity have also been advanced: Although it refers specifically to PI. 
Ap., A. E. Taylor's statement that “Plato has no doubt done for Socrates what men like 
Demosthenes did for their own speeches before giving them to the world” ([1926]
156) could just as easily apply to Xen.'s work of the same name: In other words, some 
element of fictionalizing cannot, of course, be mled out in the case of either author, 
and in the case of Xen. Ap. this causes the distinction between authenticity and 
historicity to become quite blurred. Lincke (p. 711) believes that the Ap. is spurious 
and that its author has attempted to reconcile the iiTeconcüable, namely, Hennogenes' 
report that Socrates did not intend to defend himself and the Academic tradition that 
he did in fact hold a speech. Kaibel (p. 5&1 n. 1) summarily dismisses it for two 
reasons, i.e. die absurde Erweiterung des Gesprachs zwischen Sokrates und 
Hermogenes and die klagliche Parodie auf [die platonische Apologie], besonders die 
niedertrachtige Prophezeiung am Schlusse (§30). Finally, Wilamowitz ([1897] 102-
105) weighs in with the following observations: 1) Xen. cannot possibly be the author 
of the Ap. since the apologetic part of the Comm, which influenced the Ap. was 
written in reaction to Poly crates, and the only way to salvage the authenticity
question its authenticity, this could also be said o f the Comm. Note too that any disjointedness that 
appears in the Ap. could well be due to the disjointedness of Socrates' actual speech in court.
2^011ier 84. In contrast to Schmitz et al. (see above). Oilier notes that the rhetorical element is almost 
entirely missing, something which would no doubt characterize a later forgery.
2^See Breitenbach 1776 & 1893, Delebecque 218-19, Amim 21, and Chroust (1955) 1 n. 1 & (1957)
17. Oilier (pp. 84-85) also alludes to this practice in such authors as Isocrates and Demostlienes. The 
authenticity o f tlie work has also been questioned because of discrepancies between Ap. 12 ff. and 
Comm. 1.1.2-4 in the description of the daimonic sign, but this has been countered by Gigon’s argument 
that the matter rests on the intention, not on the precise language of the passages in question, that is, 
Xen. is not accustomed to use the same terminology twice for the same subject (see Gigon [1946] 221 
ff.. Nickel 80, Fritz [1931] 56 ff., and Breitenbach 1889). (The problem centers on the use of the word 
<j»0)vfi in the Ap. and its omission in the Comm.) Schanz' argument for authenticity (pp. 83-84) seems to 
beg the question through his assertion that, since the Ap. does not respond to Polycrates, it must have 
been written before the appearance of the Kaxnyopla, and since it was written before the Kaxriyopia, it 
must have been written by Xen., who otlierwise would have responded to Polycrates’ charges (see 
Essay C).
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argument would be to place the Ap. before the Comm, and Polycrates' writing, which 
is impossible. 2) The Ap. shows some of the growing accretions to the Socrates 
legend, e.g. in the reference to the speakers in his defense (§22), and in Socrates' 
Pythia-like inspiration vouched for by his friends (§13). The Ap. also increases the 
godliness of Socrates in that he possesses the apocryphal ability to prophesy, a point 
reinforced by the fact that the Anytus prophecy had supposedly already been realized 
by the time of its writing, 3) In general, then, the work was intended to serve both as 
a fictional epilogue to the Comm, and as an explanation of Socrates' peyaXniYopia as 
represented in PL Ap.27
The major arguments against the authenticity of the Ap. can be disposed of 
rather quickly as follows:
1) The Ap. is mentioned only m late sources. It was a minor work which was perhaps 
not even intended for publication, and even if it had a fairly lai*ge readership, it 
naturally paled in the withering light of its Platonic counterpait.
2) It appears separately fivm  the other Socratic works of Xenophon in Diogenes 
Laertius and the Vatican MS. In both cases it was naturally categorized with other 
opuscula.
3) The Comm, can also be considered an anoXoyia of sorts, and ancient references 
to an 'AnoXoyia XmKpdxous might in fact refer to the Schutzschrift. Although the 
title ’ATCoA/Oyla can certainly be considered a misnomer in many ways (see the 
comment ad loc.), it nevertheless fulfills the more technical meaning of the word 
more satisfactorily than does the coiTesponding Comm, section, which can also, of 
course, be considered an anoXofia in a more figurative sense.
4) The fact that the Ap. contains passages that correspond almost verbatim with 
certain passages in the Comm, shows that it is a compilation of some kind. The 
overlap makes up a small portion of the total work, and Xen. was given to internal 
borrowing, as we see in the case of the HG and Ages.
5) The author of the Ap. also seems to have borrowed heavily from Platonic sources, 
Le.yfi’om the Ap. and Phd. If true, this does not figure in the authenticity question 
since Xen. himself could have boiTOwed from Plato as easily as a later writer. This 
objection also does not take into account overlapping references to actual historical 
events or to a common written source. Moreover, even if the Ap. is a conglomerate of
22wilamowitz' more specific observations appear ad loc. throughout the commentary.
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other Socratica, including Plato's, that does not necessarily diminish its historical 
value if it was composed around the time of Socrates' execution (see n. 3 above).
6) The discrepancies between the two accounts of the trial are due to the 
interpolations of a later author. This does not take into account the possibility of 
fictionalizing on the part of Plato, a characteristic of the A,6yoi XmKpaxiKot in 
general, and the beginnings of the Socrates myth (e.g. the gradual transfoimation of 
his daimonic voice into a distinct entity and his prophecy concerning Anytus and son) 
might well have have been undeiway as early as his own lifetime. 28
7) The mediocre style and exceptional characterization of Socrates in the Ap. are 
decidedly un-Xenophontic. The first part of this objection is too subjective for 
comment,29 while the characterization question hinges on Socrates' peyaXriyopia, a 
trait which, while certainly represented to an extreme in the Ap., is not wholly 
unchar acteristic of the Socratic figures in both Xen. and Plato.3® As regar ds teaching 
and pavaDcna, the teaching question is equally vexed in Plato, and Beyschlag's 
suggestion that Socrates was in fact pro-banausic is ill considered, even if we do 
allow for an aristocratic bias in Plato and Xen.
8) The language is also un~Xenophontic. Only a few scholar s (e.g. Beyschlag) have 
raised this objection, and their opinions have remained in the minority for good 
reason: Although no one has yet subjected the text of the Ap. to a complete 
stylometric analysis, the results of the extensive pre-computer analyses summarized 
above are decisive and unanimous in favor of its authenticity.
9) The Ap. is to be understood as a clever forgery. This cannot, of course, be ruled 
out, but such a forger would have had to be thoroughly steeped in Xenophon's 
language and thoroughly acquainted with the other Xenophontic Socratica, especially 
the Comm, in general, with which the Ap. shares countless thematic similarities.
These shared thematic elements have alone sufficed to convince me of its 
authenticity.
In sum, the burden of proof continues to rest on those who would challenge 
the Ap.'s place among the other Xenophontic writings, and no convincing ar-gument 
for its spuriousness has yet been advanced. Croiset (vol. 4 p. 365) nicely sums up his
28Modem examples of similar, near-contemporary historical fiction would be such films as Oliver 
Stone’s JFK. hr general, the Bumet-Taylor thesis concerning historical accuracy (see Appendix B) is 
seriously weakened by the inherently fictive nature o f the Xdyoi ZcoKpaxiKoi and by the expectations 
o f Plato's and Xen.'s readers, which cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
290n Fritz' subjectivity, for example, see Breitenbach 1891.
39See Vrijlandt’s remarks in Appendix D.
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short treatment of the question as follows: II est plus simple et plus conforme à la 
vraisemblance de laisser /'Apologie à Xénophon, dont la gloire n'en sera d'ailleurs ni 
accrue ni diminuée sensiblement.
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Essay B: The Issue of Dating
The dating of the Ap. is a particularly vexed question which, like the 
authenticity problem (see Essay A), has involved considering its sequential relation to 
Xen.'s other Socratica as well as fitting it into a constellation formed by Xen.'s 
Socratica, PI. Ap., and Polycrates' diatribe. What follows is a relatively brief review 
of the various opinions on these matters, followed in turn by my own observations. ^
I shall begin, however, with a brief presentation of Delebecque's proposed 
dating of the Xenophontic corpus. His conclusions (pp. 506-509: see Nickel 6-8 for a 
synopsis), based on the stations in Xen.'s life as related in his works and on his 
changing attitude towar ds Sparta, appear below in tabular* form:
Stimuli Resulting Works
1) Acquaintance with, and influence of. First two books of HG (402 BC)Thucydides (Athens)2) Military service with Spartans Lac. begun (387)
3) Stint as landholder in Scillus; criticism of An. (including criticism against
former Cyreans against him Sparta) & "Parabasis" (An. V.3.7 to
end): self-justification and more 
criticism against Sparta (ca. 385-377)4) Education of sons and justification of Cyn. (391/90)
Socrates’ actions Ap. (385-82: unpublished)
Eq. (ca. 380: unpublished)
5) Socratic works underway Preliminary work on Comm & Oec.
(ca. 381)6) Praise of Agesilaus Continuation of HG (379/8)7) Expulsion from Scillus after Leuctra; sojourm Last chapter of Lac. & ch. V.4 of
in Corinth HG, both anti-Spartan (369)
8) Recall to Athens (last 10-12 years of life) with Eq., Dec., HG, and Comm.a larger reading audience (see n. 10 below) completed
Smp., Cyr. 8c Hier. (365-754)9) Death of Agesilaus (and Persian threat) Ages. (355)
10) Writing continued (Xen. addresses pressing Eq.Mag. & Vect. (357-54) 
political questions of the day)
11) Last work Comm. Ill & IV (355/4)
The question of the relationship of PI. Ap. to Xen. Ap. is rather thortiy,  ^with 
most scholars assuming (not without some literary bias) that the former precedes the
^Guthrie ([1978] 3:340 n. 1) provides a shorter summary o f the various positions on the question. For 
more remarks on the various sequence-of-publication problems mentioned below, see Appendices A, 
B, andD .
2See my remarks in Appendix B, which allows for at least the possibility that Xen. was influenced in 
some way by Plato. Feddersen (p. 37) offers the following caveat concerning the priority issue: Sed  
licet Platonis Apologia antecedat Xenophontis Apologiae, tamen utriusque consilium ab alterius 
multum differre non obliti concedemus sane ultra illud hac illius rationem haberi non esse 
consentaneum. Oilier (p. 92) correctly observes that priority can only be established, if  it can be 
established at all, through internal evidence (see my conclusions below).
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latter. It is common to suppose that Xen. Ap. was intended to stand as a corrective to 
Plato's account, a view based on the assumption that Xen. is also refeiiing to Plato 
when he refers to dXlot in §1 (see the comment ad loc.): In this view, any significant 
discrepancies between the two works (e.g. Socrates’ refusal to propose a counter­
penalty) as well as Xen.'s professed puipose in writing his version of events can be 
seen as being a reaction to Plato, among other writers.3 A minority of scholars prefer 
to place Xen. Ap. before PI. Ap.: Wetzel (p. 397), for example, feels that the influence 
of PL Ap. on the Comm., not evident in Xen. Ap., indicates the priority of Xen. Ap. 
and the probability that Xen. did not read Plato's account before writing his own.
Dies (1:222) believes that Xen.'s work was superseded by Plato's, which awakened 
additional memories of Socrates in Xen.: This, combined with the appearance of 
Polycrates' work, would have then prompted Xen. to write the Comm. Vrijlandt's 
thesis (p. 147 ff.) also deserves some mention: According to Xen. himself, the 
information in §§2-10 had never been brought up before in previous Socratic 
writmgs. Since, however, it does appear in one form or another in PL Ap., it follows 
that, provided that Socrates did not say the same things twice,"^  Plato had not yet 
written his «TcoXoyia and consequently used Xen. as a source. Vrijlandt believes that 
in composing his own version Plato came upon Xen. Ap. and borrowed from it 
several things to embellish his account, i.e. the content of the conversation with 
Hermogenes and what Socrates said as he was leaving the proceedings (p. 150).^
3This raises the further problem of dating PI. Ap., a work which can be grouped quite comfortably with 
Plato's earlier dialogues while its precise dating remains an open question (see Guthrie [1978] 4:71- 
72). Vander Waerdt (pp. 13-14) believes that no firm date can be established for either dnroA.oyla, 
while most scholars want to date PI. Ap. soon after the trial, and some (for example, Guthrie idem) after 
394, most likely the earliest possible year for the composition o f Xen. Ap. (see my conclusion below). 
Amim (pp. 68-69) observes that nearly everyone has assumed that the former was written shortly after 
Socrates' death, but without reason: Plato could not hope to change the Athenians' minds directly after 
the trial, and the provocative language in tire speech certainly has not been softened in any effort to win 
over the public. Delebecque (p. 215) believes that PI. Ap. was written ca. 396 and the Cri. shortly 
afterwards. Beyschlag (p. 508) feels that PI. Ap. was written ca. 399 and adds that it is highly unlikely 
that Xen. would have been unaware o f its existence after 387, the year o f Anytus' death (mentioned in 
§31) and a possible terminus post quern for Xen. Ap. (see below). Such divergent opinions could be 
multiplied infinitely, though most scholars agree that PI. Ap. was a relatively early work. The possible 
references to Phd. 58E & 89B (see §§32 & 28, respectively) would provide another possible terminus 
post quem  for the composition of Xen. Ap. (see Wilamowitz [1897] 102, Busse 229, and Beyschlag 
515), and by Beyschlag's reckoning (idem), Xen. Ap. as written could only have appeared after 367, 
over thirty years after the trial, a conclusion which he uses to declare it spurious. Delebecque (p. 218) 
suggests the appearances o f the Men. and perhaps the Cra. as additional teimini post quos in 
connection with the mention o f Anytus' death in §31 (see below).
"^See p. 148: Xenophon enim ridiculus fieret, si denuo iteraret quae in alio scripto (Apol. Plat. ) iam 
legerentur, quamquam in praefatione praedixerat nova se collaturum esse.
^See below for Amim’s remarks on the priority issue.
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Since the issue of priority between Xen. Ap. and the Comm, cannot be 
completely resolved (see Appendix A), a sequence of publication cannot be used as a 
criterion in dating the former. Both works were composed with different, though not 
unrelated, intentions, and the question becomes one of each scholar’s perspective: Did 
Xen. "pirate" the Ap. for the Comm., or vice versa? Are the Comm, an expansion of 
ideas contained in the Ap., or does the Ap. represent a distillation of ideas contained in 
the Comm.I Although the former alternative seems far more likely, these questions 
simply cannot be answered with a complete sense of certainty.^
Frick (pp. 52-64) lists and considers four criteria for dating Xen. Ap., from 
which he eventually concludes that it was written sometime between 390 and 370. 
These are 1) §1, in which Xen. refers to other, unknown writers of aitoXoylai and sets 
forth his reasons for writing his own (pp. 52-53); 2) §31, in which Anytus' death is 
mentioned (pp. 53-57); 3) the work's relation, if any, to Polycrates' KaTqyopia (pp. 
57-70); and 4) the unusual characterization of Socrates' response to the charges and 
his pre-trial efforts to win an acquittal (pp. 60-64). It would be best to address these 
points one by one:
1) Vander Waerdt narrows aXXoi in §1 down to Plato, interpreting the plural as a 
singular in the process (pp. 14-15), but the reference must necessarily remain unclear 
(see the comment ad loc.).
2) Obviously, if the Anytus in §31 is identical with the cnxo(|)uXa  ^mentioned in Lys. 
22.8 (see the comment ad loc.), then this would provide a terminus post quem of 
385/4 for the composition of Xen. Ap.’^
3) Delebecque (pp. 215-16), among others, believes that Polycrates wrote his 
KaxriYOpia ca. 393 in reaction to the eulogistic treatment of Socrates by the Socratics, 
who were beginning to re-assert themselves, and that the tract glorifies the 
undertakings of the democrats. Delebecque's dating of Xen. Ap. would therefore 
place it within the cuiTent literary climate stirred up by the publication of the 
Karriyopia around this time in 393/2. Any corresponding attempt to date Xen. Ap. in 
relation to Polycrates' work rests on the assumption that Xen. would have reacted in 
some way to Polycrates' accusations, as he did in the Comm.: On this assumption, the
®See Appendix A. Breitenbach (col. 1893), for example, feels limited to remarking only that tlie two 
works show a typically Xenophontic Arbeitsweise and were written around the same time and 
relatively late.
2See too Busse 229, Oilier 89, Delebecque 218, Montuori 74, and Breitenbach 1891. Toole (p. 4) feels 
that the publications of Xen. Ap. and Comm, are directly linked with Anytus' death: Toûxo Sé, Siôxi 
xaxà xqv âpxaiôxnxa èGecopeîxo 6s dpGes và àitoôlSoivxai eIkovikoi X-oyoi e is  Ç6vxa KpôocoTta.
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lack of any response in Xen. Ap. would indicate that it was written beforehand; 
conversely, any trace of Polycratean influence (e.g. in the 6i0daKaA<os charge in §20) 
would show that it was written afterwards.  ^ The weakness of this argument is the 
likelihood that Xen. intended to tieat Polycrates' charges in full in the Comm, while 
reserving the Ap. for a treatment of Socrates' peya^TiYopia only (see §1), a view 
supported by his own statement of purpose in §22, where he also reveals that his 
account of events is by no means a full one (èppf|0r| jièv 5f|X,ov oxr toutcov TcXelco
\ ) 7 t Ô . . . a \ ) T 0 'Û ) .
4) The characterization of Socrates in Xen. Ap. cannot be considered a legitimate 
criterion because of its necessaiily conjectural basis. It would be possible, for 
example, to say that the poitrayal of Socrates' aiTogance makes a later dating more 
likely since such a characterization would have been repellent to the Athenian public 
immediately after the trial. We are in no position, however, to judge how the 
Athenians reacted to Socrates' execution in the intervening year's, nor do we know 
against whom, if anyone, Xen. directed his Ap. (It could just as easily be argued, for 
example, that Xen. wrote the work in anger as soon as he learned that his friend had 
been put to death by the Athenians, who in addition had no doubt compelled him to 
leave Athens because of the cavalry's complicity with the Thiity.)^
Using these and other criteria (in particular*, the supposed references in Xen. 
Ap. to Platonic works other than the Ap. ), various scholars have suggested various 
sequences of events sunounding the writing of Xen. Ap., each of which has its own 
particular* charm yet nothing to raise it from the murky nether-regions of the merely 
plausible into the limpid light of the highly probable. I have reproduced some of 
these sequences below for the reader's edification:
• Xen. takes part in the expedition of Cyrus.
• The rhetoricians meanwhile begin to publish fictitious accounts of the trial.
• Xen. returns to Athens and hears Hei*mogenes' r e p o r t .
8 Schanz (p. 83) prefers the former view because he sees no such influence in Xen. Ap. (including §20, 
which he believes formed part o f the original indictment). For thoughts on the Plato-Xenophon- 
Polycrates triangle, see Guthrie (1978) 4:71-72; for a fuller treatment o f possible Polycratean influence 
on Xen. Ap., see Essay C.
9Two opposing opinions are illustrative o f this point: Dibs (1:221) believes that a late publication of 
Xen. Ap. would be pointless and that the Hermogenes testimony is o f value only if  Xen. Ap. precedes 
the Comm, and PI. Ap. Amim (pp. 9-10) similarly states that Xen. Ap. will appear as a strong wimess 
only if  it was written before the Schutzschrift and PI. Ap.
^^Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Xen. returned to Greece before 394, the implications o f An. 
VII.7.57 notwithstanding.
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• He publishes his Ap. to emphasize Socrates' Todesverachtung and to counter the 
rhetoricians' versions.
• Xen. then reads PL Ap. and other accounts, from which he learns of the 
Polycratean charges brought up at the trial.
• He consequently writes Comm. LI, L2.1-8,1.2.62-64 & IV.8. Sections 1.2.9-61 
are added after Xen. reads Polycrates, while the rest of the Comm, can be 
attributed to the presence of the many contemporary Xdyoi ZcoKpaxiKol.^^
• Polycrates' Kaxriyopia is published in 393/2.
• The Schutzschrift is published as a response and separ ate essay between 392 and 
390.
• The Ap. (written paiticulaily on Socrates' behavior at the trial with a brief 
response to Polycrates) is published sometime after 386/5.
• The remainder of the Comm, appear s sometime after 3 7 0 .^ 2
• The Ap. appear s within ten years of the trial as a sketch, followed by the 
Kaxriyopia, then by the Comm., previously conceived as memoirs and as an 
explanation of Socrates' singular behavior in c o u r t .  3^
• Anytus dies, and the relevant works are published in the following order: Xen. 
Ap., PL Ap., Polycrates' Kaxriyopia, and the Comm, (meant to replace the Ap.). 
The Ap. itself can be dated to 392, that is, after Xen.'s return from Asia Minor and 
during the Olympics, when he could conveniently gather the relevant information 
from Hermogenes.
• The Ap. can be dated to Xen.’s Scillus period, when he was particularly 
interested in the upbringing of his sons. It is therefore appropriate to date the 
work to the period 384-82, that is, when his sons were in mid-adolescence, shortly 
after the An., and before the first two books of the Comm, (written ca. 381).^^
 ^^ Wetzel 404-405. 
l2chroust [1955] 3 n. 6 & 5 n. 10.
^3oUier 91. Stokes ([1997] 3-4) proposes a similar sequence, with PL Ap. appearing first and Xen. Ap. 
at any point afterwards. Stokes places too much emphasis in his dating on the supposedly literary 
nature of Polycrates' charge regarding Critias and Alcibiades, however, since public indignation against 
the two may well have been historical.
^'^Diès 1:222. Note that Dibs does not accept the Anytus/grain-official identification, a refreshing 
show o f dissent from the usual dogmatic approach to this problem.
l^Delebecque 218. Frick (34 n. 120) also favors dating the Ap. to the late 80's. Breitenbach (col.
1893) disagrees with Delebecque's proposed dating and wants to make it later.
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• Since parts of the Ap. appear in the Schutzschrift, the oldest part of the Comm., it 
follows that the Ap. not only precedes this and Polycrates' work, but also PL Ap.
• On the other hand, two things speak against an early date for Xen. Ap.: the 
mention of Anytus' death and the apparent borrowing from Phd. 89B in Ap. 28.
• The Ap. therefore could have appeared between the death of Anytus and the 
composing of the Schutzschrift, which was written in response to Polycrates, and 
must have appeared shortly after Anytus' death since his death would have 
quickly lost any relevance to the public A ^
Arnim's arguments above deserve to be treated in some detail as being 
representative of the controversy suiTounding the entire issue. In his exhaustive 
comparison of the Ap. and Comm., he (p. 66) makes the Ap. the earliest of Xen.'s 
Socratica to appear in a completed form. He points out that, since the Schutzschrift is 
considered by some scholars to be the oldest part of the Comm., the following 
sequence has been traditionally favored: Schutzschrift—> Ap. —> Comm. IV. 8.1-11 
(pp. 54-55). By carefully comparing all three of these "aTtoXoyiai", Amim ariives at 
the conclusion that the corresponding passages in Comm. I.l ff. & IV.8 are based on 
the Ap., not vice versa, with Comm. IV.8 ff. (excluding §11) depending entirely on 
the Ap. (p. 26). He also observes the following:
1) Since par ts of the Ap. appear in the Schutzschrift, the oldest part of the Comm., 
it is clear that the Ap. not only precedes this and Polycrates' Kaxriyopia, but also 
PL Ap. (pp. 21-22).
2) Two things speak against an early date for Xen. Ap.: the mention of Anytus' 
death and the apparent borTowing from Phd. 89B in Ap. 28 (p. 22).
3) Xen. Ap. could have appeared between the death of Anytus and the 
Schutzschrift, which was written in response to Polycrates' pamphlet (p. 23).
4) Xen. Ap. must have appeared shortly after Anytus' death since no one would 
have remained interested in him for very long afterwards (p. 23).
5) To call Comm. I.l ff. & IV.8 spurious because of their similarities with the Ap. 
is unjustified since Xen. borrowed internally on other occasions, e.g. from the HG 
for his Ages. (idem). Furthermore, the same material was used for two different
l^See Amim (pp. 21-23), who comments elsewhere (p. 12) that, since Plato also goes into the reasons 
behind Socrates' ixeya^Tiyopia, it does not necessarily follow that PI. Ap. preceded Xen. Ap. For a 
lengthy response to Amim's argument, see Hackforth (p. 13 ff.), who also favors an early date for Xen. 
Ap. and its priority over Plato’s work.
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purposes: In Comm. IV.8 Xen. wanted to show that the fact that Socrates' actions 
resulted in death did not belie the existence of the daimonic voice, while in the 
Ap. he wanted to emphasize Socrates’ willingness to die, the point in common 
being Hermogenes' report that the voice discouraged Socrates from defending 
himself (pp. 26-27).
6) On the other hand, Xen. wrote the Schutzschrift to replace the flawed Ap., and 
the fact that he plundered the previous work shows that he meant to abandon it (p. 
66: see too Gomperz [1924] 173).
7) Since the Comm, and Ap. were written for the same overall purpose, the Ap. 
faded in comparison with the updated version (pp. 53-54), though Xen. was not 
successful in suppressing his Ap., as shown by its inclusion in Diogenes Laertius' 
register of Xenophontic works (2 .5 7 ).
8) The Ap. was intended only to explain Socrates' à(j)pcûv peyaA.Tiyopia, while the 
Comm, (in particular, the Schutzschrift) was intended as a rebuttal to Polycrates' 
attack in particular and to anti-Socratic sentiments in general (pp. 67-69).
In comparing Xen.'s aTcoloyia with Plato's, Amim makes the following points:
1) Xen. Ap. will appear as a strong witness only if it was written before the 
Schutzschrift and PI. Ap. (pp. 9-10).
2) Since Plato goes into the reasons behind Socrates' p.eya%T|yopta even more so 
than Xen., Xen. Ap. must come earlier in view of his statement about other 
authors not having treated this theme adequately (p. 12 ff.).
3) Xen. knew about the oracle (Ap. 14) but was not aware of the Platonic 
connection between it and Socrates' mission, hence the priority of Xen. Ap. over 
Plato's work (p. 44).
4) Everyone has assumed that PI, Ap. was written shortly after Socrates’ death, but 
without sufficient proof: Plato could not hope to change the Athenians’ minds 
directly after the trial, and the provocative language in the speech certainly has not 
been softened (pp. 68-69).
5) The publication of PL Ap. caused Xen. to revise in the Comm, what he had said 
in the Ap. (p. 66), and Plato's work also caused him to reassess the reliability of
^^Amim further points out here that the Ap. does not appear among Xen.'s Socratica in Diogenes' list 
(p. 54), tiiough this seems to have had more to do with its length than with its subject matter (see Essay 
A).
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Hermogenes' report while re-awakening half-forgotten memories of Socrates (pp. 
66-67).
6) Finally, it is inconceivable that Xen. wrote his ÔTCo^ toyla after Plato's since 
Plato ...durch die Verojfentlichung seiner Reconstruction der Rede Xenophons 
kUmmerlichen Versuch wUrde verbleichen lassen, wie die Sterne vor der 
aufgehenden Sonne verbleichen (p. 74). The publication of Xen. Ap. can therefore 
be placed at the end of the 90's after the publication of Polycrates' diatribe (p. 44).
The preceding represents one scholar's approach to placing Xen. Ap. within a 
literary context. In general, any attempt to contextualize the work must take the 
following into consideration: 1) the purpose of the Ap., 2) its nature, particularly its 
brevity, 3) its relationship to the Comm., with which it shares nearly identical 
passages and a similar purpose, 4) its relationship to PI. Ap., which represents the 
only contemporary example of the dTCoXoyia genre, and 5) the mention of Anytus' 
death in §31. I have reproduced Arnim's tedious argumentation above to demonstrate 
the pitfalls inherent in over-intellectualizing what can only be considered meager 
evidence. Let us examine these five points one by one:
1) Xen. states explicitly in §1 of the Ap. that his purpose is to explain Socrates' 
IxeyaXriyopia. This he does amply, as shown by the insufferably arrogant tone of 
Socrates' speeches throughout the work. There is no reason to assume that he intends 
to rebut Polycrates' attack, nor is it necessary to assume that his reference to other 
writers in §1 includes Plato. Wilamowitz ([1897] 102), for one, holds that the Ap. 
was written in the 70's, long after Poly crates' attack had appeared. His basis for this 
conclusion is the similarity of Ap. 28 (i.e. the Apollodorus scene) to Phd. 89B &
117D, and this later date would also explain why the Ap. contains no demonstrable 
reaction to Polycrates' accusations. According to his view, the question of Socrates' 
innocence had long been settled in the author's estimation, hence the cursory 
treatment of the trial and the effort to make Socrates seem more erhaben through his 
peyaXTiyopia: In shonjede spatere Darstellung steigert den Helden.^^ Again, there 
is no reason to suppose that Xen. Ap. would have necessaiily contained any response
should add that there seems to be a widespread assumption among scholars tliat works of ancient 
authors were readily available to the far-flung Greek reading public immediately after "publication". 
This is certainly open to question (see Dover Lysias 151-54), and I consequently use the word 
"publication" in reference to any ancient work to mean any effort on the author's part to make his work 
known to the "public", under which I include friends and family members.
^^See Wilamowitz ([1897] 102 n. 2), who also points out the similar treatment o f Christ in the 
relatively late Gospel o f John.
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to Polycrates, especially since Polycrates' work supposedly contained many 
accusations that were not brought up at the original trial because of the amnesty, and 
the view that Xen. Ap. does not respond to Polycrates' accusations also would not 
prove a pre-393 date since the subject had already been amply tieated in the 
Schutzschrift.'^^
2) This limited purpose might account for the brief and sketchy nature of the Ap., an 
opinion which is at least paitly the result of the reader’s automatic tendency to 
compare it with its lengthier Platonic counterpart. No matter when it was written or 
whether or not its contents were pirated for parts of the Comm., it is important to 
remember that, given the professed scope of Xen. Ap. (see §22), it could easily and 
successfully exist in vacuo, as its inclusion in Diogenes' list of Xenophontic works 
seems to indicate.
3) The relationship of Xen. Ap. to the relevant passages in the Comm, cannot be 
ignored, though the sequence of writing, in spite of Arnim's thoughtful and often 
ingenious analysis, cannot be established with any certainty. It seems likely, 
however, 1) that Comm. IV.8 ff., because of the appearance of passages nearly 
identical to certain passages in the Ap. and because of its polished nature generally, 
was probably written afterwards, and 2) that the same must hold trire for the 
Schutzschrift, which constitutes a far better defense than the
4) The relationship of Xen.'s arroloyia to Plato's is also difficult to ascertain since 
there is no direct evidence of mutual or even uni-directional influence which would 
assist in placing the former within a certain sequence or time frame (see Hackforth 
28). Gomperz ([1924] 170-71) argues that Xen. Ap. 1 (yeypà(j)aai pev ouv Tcepl 
Towou [Tcepl Tijs ànoXoyxas koI xx\s TeXeurfis toû piou] xal aXkoi) must refer to PI. 
Ap. since no ànoloyta is ascribed to any other Socratic, a point which would 
certainly lend support to the argument that Xen. intended to present his own rationale 
for Socrates' attitude in court and did not intend to offer his work as a "serious" piece 
of literature. On the other hand, such an argument does not take into account the 
possibility that other authors, Socratic or otherwise, might have dealt with Socrates' 
megalegorical attitude in court in a different context, or simply that the lack of any 
citations is due to happenstance.
^^See Chroust (1957) 74 and Breitenbach 1893. Wilamowitz' argument ([1897] 103 n. 2) that the 
similarity with Ps.-Pl. Theages witli respect to the daimonic voice places Xen. Ap. around tlie same 
time period (i.e. after 370) is equally tenuous.
21See Appendix A. For general arguments concerning the sequence o f publication, see Gomperz 
(1924) 171 and Chroust (1957) 45.
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5) Finally, the reference to Anytus in Ap. 31 is only problematical if this Anytus is to 
be identified with the grain inspector named Anytus who is mentioned in Lys. 22.8. 
This too is open to question (see the comment on §29).
As in the case of the authenticity essay (q.v.), I feel compelled out of a simple 
sense of dismay to apply a critical blade to the tumescent growth of unnecessary and 
largely unjustified speculation and dogmatism which also surrounds the dating 
question. In general, we aie left with several possible teiinini post quos for the 
composition of theAp.:
1) It is possible, though probably unlikely, that Xen. began the work while he was on 
campaign with the Spartans in Asia Minor, where he undoubtedly would have come 
in contact with Athenians who were at least indirectly familiar with the events at the 
trial.22 I am quite willing to admit that PI. Ap. exerted some sort of influence on 
Xen.'s writing (see Appendix B), but this is of little use in dating the latter since the 
former has been dated to as eaiiy as 399 or somewhat later. 3^ I also see no 
convincing evidence for the influence of any other Platonic dialogue on the Ap., and 
any consideration of Platonic influence on Xen.'s writings must take into account the 
question of the circulation of "published" works at the time, Xen.'s itinerant life as a 
soldier of fortune, and his eventual retirement at Scillus, a remote corner of the 
Peloponnese.^*^
2) It is far more likely that Xen. began writing the work after his return to Greece in 
394, where, despite his likely participation on the Spartan side in the Battle of 
Coronea and despite his banishment from Athens, he would have had ample 
opportunity to meet and discuss the trial with his compatriots. Since Hennogenes 
may simply serve as a literary foil in the Ap., his appearance there can be of no use to 
us in dating the work, and even if his testimony can be considered legitimate, there is 
of course no way of determining when Xen. might have received it.^ ^
^^See HG  III. 1.4, where Xen. states that Athens dispatched 300 cavalrymen to the Spartan army under 
Thibron to be rid o f them. There is nothing to have prevented Xen. from writing the Ap. while on 
campaign (cp. similar works by Julius Caesar and Marcus Aurelius, and, in our century o f "total war", 
by Owen and Wittgenstein), a circumstance which may, in fact, account for its sketchiness. Tuplin (p. 
1630) describes Xen. Ap. as "a brief (perhaps very early) work" but provides no reason for his 
supposition.
23See, for example, Beyschlag 510 and Gutlirie (1978) 4:72. If Xen. Ap. was in fact written before the 
Schutzschrift, a possible terminus ante quem would be the period in wMch Polycrates' tract was 
supposedly composed.
24Qn this last point see Delebecque 208.
2^See the comment on §2. It would be interesting to know what sort of relationship, if  any, existed 
between Xen. and Callias, Hermogenes' half-brother, who, having the financial means to travel freely.
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3) There are few, if any, traces of a response to Polycrates in the Ap., but since 
Polycrates' work is usually dated between 394 and 390,^  ^we return to the provisional 
terminus post quem of 394 suggested above.
4) The Anytus identification remains indeterminate. If it could be made, however, it 
would provide a definite terminus post quem of 385/4 that would coincide nicely with 
the beginning of Xen.'s retirement at Scillus, presumed to have begun with the 
conclusion of the King's Peace in 387/%
5) Delebecque's notion (see above) that Xen. began the Ap. and his Socratic writings 
at Scillus is appealing for the simple reason that he would have had the leisure there 
to compile information and to become better acquainted with the work of his 
predecessors (see §1).^  ^ If the Ap. was in fact written before the Comm., this would 
push the date of its composition back towards the beginning of this period.
6) Finally, it is possible, though far less likely, that Xen. wrote the work after the 
Spartan defeat at Leuctra forced him to abandon his estate at Scillus. However, a 
later dating would explain Xenophon/Socrates' at times vituperative tone directed 
towards a degenerate Athenian democracy for which Socrates had become merely a 
public icon and, in this case, a convenient vehicle for Xen.'s moralizing, who was 
motivated, perhaps, by the same public spirit which drove him to write the Vect. and 
Eq.Mag.
I conclude, then, that the Ap. could have been written anytime after 394, more likely 
after 392, and most likely after 385.
might possibly have relayed Hermogenes' account to Xen. at Scillus or elsewhere (see Delebecque 
214). Diès' suggestion (p. 222) that Xen. received his information about Socrates' trial at die Olympics 
of 392 is quite attractive. See too Amim (p. 69) and Toole (p. 4), the latter o f whom places the 
composition o f die Ap. anytime between this year and 363.
^^See Guthrie (1978) 4:72 and Essay C.
^^The year of Anytus' tenure as a grain official is variously given (see die comment on §29).
2^1n this respect I agree wholeheartedly with Frick (p. 80), Fritz ([1931] 40-41), and Kahn (p. 30). 
Kahn's short argument in favor o f dating Xen.'s Soaatica to the 60's is not persuasive, however.
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Essay C: Possible Non-Platonic Influences on Xenophon
Vrijlandt (pp. 143-51) specifies and treats three distinct schools of thought 
regarding the Ap.’s genesis, i.e. those scholars who maintain 1) that it is spurious and 
consists of material from other Socratica, especially Plato's, 2) that Xen. wrote it 
specifically as a corrective to PI. Ap., or 3) that both Xen. and Plato drew 
independently from a common source and altered the information for their own 
purposes. 1 The first two issues aie treated in Essay A and Appendix B, respectively, 
while the following remarks will concern themselves with a consideration of other 
possible influences on Xen. in his writing of the Ap.^
Chroust ([1957] 220-22) believes that both Xen. and Plato might have been 
influenced by accounts of Anaxagoras' trial for impiety (see Feddersen 13-24 and 
Usher 70),3 and the case of Antiphon, the anti-democrat implicated in the putsch of 
411 and executed after a brilliant defense speech (see Th. VIII.68.1-2), also bore 
characteristics in common with Socrates' trial. In any case, we can safely imagine that 
Xen., like many Athenians, was well acquainted with his polis' judicial system and 
contemporai-y trials for capital crimes, an assumption coiToborated to some extent by 
the abundance of rhetorical figures and vocabulaiy in the Ap. In general, Xen. 
probably felt compelled, if he followed Thucydides' precedent, to question the 
remaining Socratic witnesses, to read all available Socratica, and to take notes,"^  and 
his account of the perusal of GKloycd by Socrates and his associates in Comm. 1.6.14 
may well describe his own reseaich techniques (see Nickel 124 and Chroust [1957]
106).
Isocrates' Euagoras (a work dated to ca. 365) represents one of the first prose 
encomia written by a contemporaiy of the subject. This was soon followed by Xen. 
Ages. (ca. 360), and whereas the fomier work had been a mixture of static eulogy and 
chronological account, the latter was a more factual chronology combined with a non- 
chronological, systematic review of the king’s virtues, a soit of Life and Works of 
Agesilaus.^ Xen. admired Agesilaus for his attention to religious observance, his
1 An obvious question is, To what extent was Xen. influenced by Socrates himself in his writing? 
Socrates becomes in a sense another oral source of Xen.'s Socratica (see Nickel 107), but to disentangle 
what is essentially Socratic from Xen.'s Socratic writings obviously lies far beyond the scope o f this 
dissertation (see Joël passim  for his Herculean effort to do so).
^See the comment on §1 for the possible influence of other anoXoyiai on Xen.
^See D.L. 2.12-14, D.S. XII.39.2, and Plu. Per. 49, Chroust (ibid., p. 221) adds that Anaxagoras would 
have served as a suitable model in that he also had a reputation for not having troubled himself with 
worldly affairs.
“^ See Delebecque 211, Amim (p. 71) boldly concludes from his analysis o f the text 1) tliat Xen. did not 
work from his own notes, 2) that his information from Hermogenes, whether written or not, was 
unreliable, and 3) that Xen., while not fully acquainted with Socrates’ way of thinking, nevertheless 
tried to deliver a stylistically accurate piece o f work, the result o f which was something that resembles 
modem newspaper reports on scientific lectures.
^Momigliano 49-51 (see too Leo 94 and Grant 134). Leo (pp. 91-92) remarks that Xen. developed his 
antecedents by separating the description o f virtues from the subject's deeds, a characteristic o f ancient
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dealings with other men, and his sense of duty, and this encomiastic treatment of the 
Spartan king is similar in many ways to his shorter treatment of Socrates in the ApA 
An encomium of Timotheus appears in Isocrates' Antidosis (ca. 355), another 
contemporary example of the genre which also bears many resemblances to PL Ap. 
and which inspired many other encomia.^ Ion of Chios and Stesimbrotus of Thasos 
also wrote prose memoirs and sketches of politicians,^ while Euripides, Thucydides, 
and the sophists focused on the individual personality. Any or all of these literary 
developments might have had some effect on Xen. as he composed the Ap.^
Delebecque (208 ff.) speculates that Xen. probably came into contact with 
Phaedo, Echecrates, and possibly Euclides during his years at Scillus, while Wetzel 
(pp. 72-73) feels that Xen.'s affiliation with the Spartans would have caused him to 
remain estranged from the other Socratics. In any case, Xen. seems to have been 
influenced to vaiying degrees by the A,ôyoi XcoKpaTiKol of Antisthenes, Aiistippus, 
Aeschines, and Plato, a genre which Aristotle {Po. 1447B9-13) grouped with mimes 
because of its similai' mimetic quality. In considering these Xoyoi, it is important to 
remember that they represent a type of mimetic literature, that is, they aie by no means 
historical reconstructions but rather fictionalizations of Socratic conversations.^^ The
biography in general, and he states elsewhere (p. 67) that the typical division of the subject's traits into 
virtues and shortcomings can be seen in general as originating with Isocrates and Xen. (It should be 
noted in passing that Isocrates was Xen.'s fellow demesman.)
^See Usher 82-83 (see too Xen.'s necrologies on Proxenus and Meno in An. II.6.16 ff.), Dover ([1974] 
66) defines the encomium as "a genre in which we may find a useful enumeration o f  virtues", and it is 
interesting to note that the qualities which he cites from the Ages. (ôiKaïooûvq, c>ax|)po0 \)VTi, and 
ao({)la) correspond exactly to the Socratic qualities spelled out in Ap. 14-15, while the courage 
(ctvôpeia) ascribed to Agesilaus in Ages. 6.1-3 was considered an essential characteristic o f a free 
(èXeuOepos) man (Ap. 14). It should be remarked that, altliough it contains some elements common to 
ancient biography, e.g. the enumeration of Socrates' virtues, the Ap. cannot by its very nature be 
considered an example o f that genre.
^Leo 92-93. Consider, for example, the many encomia written afteiwards in honor o f Xen.'s son 
Gryllus, who fell in battle against the Thebans (see D T . 2.55). Feddersen (p. 10) bases his monograph 
on the thesis tliat, since aU other Socratic testimonia are inadequate in one way or another, we are in 
fact forced to rely on the Antidosis and Xen. Ap. as our only means o f attempting to reconstruct the 
original speech of Socrates. Although he finds many rhetorical elements in the Ap., Feddersen (p. 34) 
does not think that that provides sufficient cause to identify the author o f the work with a follower of 
Isocrates named Xenophon (PA 11308).
^Grant 134. Leo (p. 90) believes that Xen. specifically used Ion of Chios’ Epidemiae as a model for 
the Comm., though Socrates holds a more central position in Xen.'s memoirs and the emphasis lies 
specifically on recollections.
^Gigon ([1946] 216) suggests that parts of Hermogenes' report in Xen. Ap. (i.e. §§5-7 & 26) are based 
directly on an encomium, and that Xen. drew Hermogenes' name from a list or from a Xoyos 
XtûKpatiKÔs (see following).
^^For Xen.'s reliance on other Socratica, see Comm. IV.3.2. For general references to the X,6yoi, see 
Arise Rh. 1417A20, Isoc. Bus. 6, PI. Ep. 314C, and D.L. 2.64. Stock (p. 6) Usts Alexamenus o f Teos, 
Aeschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Cebes, Crito, Euclides, Glaucon, Phaedo, Simmias, and Simon the 
cobbler as writers o f Socratic dialogues; Kahn (p. 30) believes that Xen. borrowed heavily from 
Antisthenes, Aeschines, and Plato, but that he found the first two authors more congenial for his 
purposes (p. 393). Obviously, tlie more stature Xen. acquires as an independent writer, the more 
difficult it becomes to determine his reliance on Socratic sources (Nickel 107-108). Jaeger ([1954] 26) 
believes that it was in fact the Ap. that first brought Xen. into the circle o f Socratic writers. 
l^Vander Waerdt 7 (see too Maier 27 n. 1, Havelock 285-86, and Chroust [1957] 138). Nickel (p. I l l )  
describes the genre as a cross between a literary portrait and a true portrayal, and Jaeger ([1944] 3:64)
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dialogue form particularly suited the genre since 1) it corresponded to the dialectical 
process and 2) the Socratics wished to add a personal element which was not possible 
in other forms (Bruns 232 ff.); it is therefore not surprising that the symposium, for 
example, became a stock setting for this genre (Waterfield 219).^^
It stands to reason, then, that Xen. would have used other Socratica to make 
his own more convincing, and it is perhaps best to see Xen.'s four Socratic writings as 
part of a new literary development motivated by a belief in having captured the "real" 
Socrates, a pui-pose set out, for example, in the opening sentences of the ApA'  ^ The 
conversational nature of Xen.'s Socratica would allow us to assume that the influence 
of the ^oyoi ZmKpaxiKoi is at least partially evident here, and Chroust ([1957] 178- 
79) cites as one example Comm, ni.7.1-9, where we see the possible influence of the 
contemporary Alcibiades literature.
To what extent was Xen. influenced by the Xoyot ScoKpaxiKoi in writing the 
Ap.? According to Chroust ([1955] 2 n. 4), the Socratics seem to have advanced two 
theories as to the true motive behind the trial and condemnation of Socrates, with both 
groups trying to show that these events did not proceed from any noble motive: The 
first held that Anytus had instigated the trial out of revenge for a personal insult from 
Socrates (see Xen. Ap. 29 ff. and PI. Men. 95A), while the second maintained that 
Aristophanes was ultimately to blame for Socrates' conviction (see PI. Ap. 19C). Be 
that as it may, Chroust is certainly correct in focusing his attention on Ap. 29, since it 
seems at least plausible that it is based on another Socratic writing of some kind, 
perhaps one written by Antisthenes, who is said to have borne paiticularly hostile
considers the Xoyot to be the first examples of individual psychology in Western literature. Isocrates 
indicates in Bus. 6 tliat a considerable number of Socratic writings existed by 390, the probable date of 
the work (see Cliroust [1955] 3 n. 6, [1957] 138, and Hackforth 8), so that they were well established 
by Aristotle's day. The argument that both Xen. and Plato might have based their accounts on other 
Xoyoi carries less weight in light o f Gomperz' observation ([1924] 170-71) that no ajcoXoyta is listed 
among the works o f the Socratics. This remark is not entirely correct, however (see tlie comment on 
Title).
^^This fictionalization and freedom in composition lies at the heart o f the Socratic question, and 
comparing two Adyoi ZtOKpaxiKoi (even Plato's and Xen.'s) does veiy little to help us reconstruct the 
historical Socrates since two fictions, like two lies, do not make one truth (Chroust [1957] 139). See 
Vander Waerdt 5: "Tlie generic conventions o f the ZcDKpaxiKoi lo y o i allowed considerable 
fictionalization in the portrayal o f Socrates' biography and philosophy, such that the historical figure 
himself provided only a minimal control for later Socratics who sought to appropriate his authority in 
expounding their own version o f his philosophy." Chroust ([1957] 138) comments that it had not yet 
become standard practice to write in one's own name or on one's own autliority, hence the practice of  
fictionalizing the historical Socrates.
^3See Nickel 106. Hackforth (pp. 32-33) considers aU of Xen.'s Socratica to be a legitimate part o f the 
genre in that Xen. is interested not so much in accuracy but in presenting a picture of Socrates' 
character. Field (p. 135) remarks that the Cyr. represents a good example o f historical distortion in the 
non-Socratic writings which might also apply to the loyo t ZtoKpaTiKoi in general.
‘^^ Chroust believes that Xen, substituted Charmides for Alcibiades in this passage since he wanted to 
downplay the latter’s association witii Socrates, and sees a similar substitution in Comm. IV.2.1-10, 
where Euthydemus appears. For the possible influence of the Socratics on the writing o f the Comm., 
see Leo 94.
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feelings towards Anytus (see D.L. 6.9-10).^^ In general, anything in the work that 
lends itself to dialogue form (i.e. Socrates' opening conversation with Hennogenes, 
the short exchange with Meletus in court, the post-trial conversations with his 
followers in general and with Apollodorus in particular, and the prophecy concerning 
Anytus and his son) may be considered to have a Xoyos ZtOKpaxiKos as a possible 
basis, and this may even hold true for much of the content of Socrates' speeches 
delivered before the jury. To claim anything more without sufficient evidence is 
iiTesponsible and ultimately counter-productive.
The specificity of the charges leveled at Socrates by Meletus in §20 and 
elsewhere (see below) may indicate a possible reaction by Xen. to an anti-Socratic 
work written by a certain rhetorician named Polycrates after Socrates’ trial and 
execution. According to the primary sources, this Polycrates 1) was a contemporary 
of Isocrates (Isoc. Bus. 50) and an Athenian citizen (Suid. s.v. Polycrates), 2) was 
connected directly with the trial (Suid. loc. cit.. Them. Or. 269C, and Heimippus ap. 
D.L. 2.38), and 3) was responsible for forging a scandalous tieatise on love to 
discredit Philenis (Ath. 335CD, where he is also described as sly and evil-tongued).^^ 
Demetrius {Eloc. 120) takes issue with his lack of earnestness, and Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus {Is. 20) mentions him in the same breath as Antiphon, Critias, 
Thrasymachus et al. while deploring his frigidity, vulgarity, and lack of grace. He 
supposedly became a sophist due to a serious, undeserved misfortune (Isoc. Bus. 1, 
the hypothesis to which states that he also taught in Cyprus), and Pausanias (VI. 17.9) 
connects him with the court of Jason of Pherae, where he supposedly vied with the 
aging Gorgias. Almost all ancient sources seem to hold that Poly crates' Kaxnyopia 
Zmxpdxons was actually connected with Socrates’ trial, an opinion which Favorinus 
(ap. D.L. 2.39) calls into question because of Polycrates’ reference to the subsequent 
re-building of the Long Walls. Lysias, Theodectes, Demetrius, and Isocrates (Isoc. 
Bus. 4-6) all wrote rebuttals to Polycrates’ pamphlet, and the Schutzschrift portion of 
the Comm., where Polycrates is perhaps refened to as 6 Koxfiyopos, has also been 
considered by many since Cobet’s rem arksto be a response to the Kaxriyopia, a 
conclusion based on two scholia on Aristid. 3.320 & 3.480.
^^This could no doubt be said o f many o f the other Socratics, however.
^^Busse (p. 222) takes a refreshingly balanced, comprehensive, and sober view o f the matter: Bine 
wiederholte Analyse [der xenophontischen Apologie] lehrt indessen, dafi hier ein Geistesprodukt ganz 
eigener Art vorliegt, ein Mosaik entlehnter Ausdriicke, Sütze, Gedanken, die vom Verfasser teils 
eigenen, teils fremden Schriften entnomtnen sind.
l^For references to the pertinent scholarship on Polycrates, see Chroust (1955) 4 n. 9 and Edelstein 84 
n. 17; for a list o f references in the primary literature, see Guthrie (1978) 3:331 n. 1; and for general 
treatments o f Polycrates, see Schanz 23-45, Wilamowitz (1919) 98-105, and Chroust (1957) ch. 4. 
^^See C. Cobet, Novae Lectiones, Brill, Leiden, 1858, p. 662 ff. Grillnberger (passim) carefully 
reviews the history of the Polycrates attribution and responds negatively to a number of selected 
objections to Cobet's thesis; Toole (p. 8) expresses enthusiasm for it but provides little argumentation. 
Rutherford (p. 49), citing N. R. Livingstone, observes that there are a number o f difficulties with the 
Kaxnyopos/Polycrates identification, and if there are, in fact, any grounds for identifying the two
28
That Polycrates was the author of a KaTrjyopia XcoKpaxo-us is mentioned in 
D.L. 2.38-39, Them. Or. 269C, Isoc. Bus. 4, Ael. VH 11.10, Schol. ad Arist. 3.320 & 
3.480, Quint. Inst. II. 17.4, and Suid. (s.v. Polycrates, where two Xoyoi K a x à  
ZcùKpàxoos are mentioned). Scholars have not only turned to the Comm, to 
reconstruct Polycrates’ tract but also to Libanius, who apparently relied heavily on the 
Kaxriyopta for the writing of his Ap., an observation first made in 1697 by R. Bentley 
in his Diss. de Ep. Soc. V I . Libanius’ work is cast in the form of a forensic (or 
possibly epideictic) speech meant to rebut Anytus, which speaks for its validity as a 
response to Polycrates since the latter used Anytus as his mouthpiece.^^ Xen. seems 
to have arranged his rebuttal logically, while Libanius was more interested in 
oratorical effect, a quality perhaps reflecting Polycrates’ own oratorical skills (see 
Isoc. Bus. 4-5 and Chroust [1957] 84). Of course, to what extent Polycrates’ polemic 
can be accurately reconstructed from, or even convincingly connected with, Xen. and 
Libanius remains an open question, but it is worthwhile to consider the possibility that 
at least some of the seemingly stray remarks which appear in our three extant Socratic 
aTcoXoylai might refer ultimately to the many unofficial ‘charges’ which undoubtedly 
were being bruited about during the tune of Socrates’ trial. In any event, the 
Kaxnyopia as reconstructed from Xen. and Libanius cannot possibly be based upon 
actual events at the trial of Socrates and could not have been delivered at that time 
since it contains specific political charges ruled out by the very amnesty which 
Anytus himself had done so much to promote.^  ^ The reference in Polycrates’ speech 
to the re-building of the Long Walls (see above) provides a terminus post quem of 
393, and the fact that Conon and Thrasybulus are looked to as leading statesmen in 
Lib. Ap. 160 indicates that the Kaxnyopia was possibly composed before 391.^2 It 
would be justified to suimise that the work was motivated by professional ambition 
and/or by Anytus himself (Chroust [1957] 198-99), but far-fetched to conjecture that 
Polycrates’ speech was discovered as part of Anytus’ Nachlafi (Amim 23).
On the assumption that Comm. 1.2.9 ff. is in fact written in response to 
Polycrates, his four basic charges against Socrates can be summed up briefly as
figures, I would only conunent that Xen.’s word Kaxnyopos refers far more naturally to Polycrates' 
Anytus-persona than to Polycrates himself.
^^See Russell (pp. 17-18) for his conunents on Polycrates' possible influence on Libanius.
2®See Chroust ([1957] 46 ,72-74  and Hirzel 239-41. Russell (p. 17) notes, however, that the author of 
Socratic. Ep. 14 makes Meletus the deliverer o f a speech written by Polycrates.
21 Again, it is quite possible that these issues were at least intimated in some form by the prosecution, 
but by no means could they have formed the basis o f the actual case against the philosopher (see the 
comment on §11).
22See Chroust ([1957] 73), who comments elsewhere (pp. 139 & 161) that a relatively early date for 
the work would make it unlikely that Polycrates used Xen. or Plato as a source, hence one of the other 
Socratics, perhaps Antisthenes, becomes a likely candidate. An early date also makes it more likely 
that Polycrates influenced Xen. when he composed his dnoXoyia (see below), Dodds ([1959] 29), who 
considers the Kaxnyopia's relationship to PI. Grg., does not believe that any firm terminus ante quem 
for Polycrates’ work can be established.
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follows: Socrates was accused of harboring a disrespect for the democratic institutions 
of Athens (1.2.9 ff.), of exerting a pernicious influence on Critias and Alcibiades 
(1.2.12 ff-), of instilling in the young a disrespect towards their elders (1.2.49 ff.), and 
of capriciously interpreting the words of poets to suit his own purposes (1.2.56 ff.).23 
Xen. does not take up all the charges mentioned by Libanius, who therefore seems 
overall to be a richer source for any reconstruction, and Xen. also omits Polycrates’ 
specific evidence, which Libanius treats more fully (Chroust [1957] 74). The tone of 
the reconstructed Kaxiyyopta seems to indicate that the late sophists did not feel any 
compunction about disregarding the spirit of the general amnesty {ibid., p. 182), and 
there was obviously no restriction on Polycrates to imply, for example, that Socrates 
was the intellectual leader of the oligarchs and had sided with them in 404 {Comm. 
1.2.63). In short. Polycrates was able to include all the extra-legal accusations that 
Meletus and the other prosecutors had been forced either to omit or to treat in a more 
cursory fashion.
In considering the possible influence of Polycrates on the Ap., I will be relying 
on Markowski’s reconstruction of the Kaxnyopia, which appears as follows:
1. Socrates undermines the democratic institutions of Athens
a. by inducing young men to despise the existing laws,
b. by hating the democratic constitution of Athens as well as by
seeking to establish a tyranny,
c. by doing all possible harm to the city, and
d. by abolishing the rule of the people;
2. Socrates teaches neglect of the gods worshipped by the city;
3. Socrates cormpts the youths of the city;
4. Socrates objects to the most highly respected poets and abuses their
authoritative sayings
a. by criticizing them and
b. by quoting them in support of his abominable teachings;
5. Socrates induces people to commit serious crimes such as theft, fraud, sacrilege,
acts of violence, and peijury;
6. Socrates practices vices in secret which are even worse than those he practices
openly;
7. Socrates leads the citizens to idleness
Since all of Polycrates’ charges in his Kaxnyopia appear to have been connected in some way to the 
original corruption-of-the-youth charge, it seems fairly certain tliat all attempts to justify the original 
impiety charge had collapsed by the time o f its composition (Hackforth 85: see, however, Ep. 325B, 
where Plato [or Pseudo-Plato] gives impiety alone as the reason for the accusation).
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a. by inducing them to abstain from all types of economic pursuits, 
including the tilling of the land,
b. by being not only himself averse to all participation in active public 
life, but also by preventing others from doing so, and
c. by spuming the quest for money and remaining a pauper who gives 
no consideration to the problem of taxes and public revenues;
8. Socrates is the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades; and
9. Socrates is a dangerous sophist, and the Athenians have severely punished 
certain sophists in the past. 24
The KaTrjyopia seems to have unleashed a fluiTy of Socratic arcoXoyiai, and it 
is possible (see D.L. 2.38) that in responding to it Xen. might have interpreted the 
work as a record of the actual court proceedings. As for possible responses in the 
Ap. to Poly crates’ anti-Socratic charges as they appear above,^  ^the following areas of 
potential influence can be discerned (a matter which should be approached, of course, 
with an appropriate measure of circumspection):
1) Misodemy: A disavowal of any potential identification of Socrates with 
Lycurgus and the Spartan fonn of government might lie at the basis of Socrates’ 
reference to the former in §15, and in §20 he explains his belief in expert teachers 
by referring to the preeminent position of qualified military leaders in the 
Athenian democracy.
2) Teaching Neglect of the Gods: See §19: on ôè eÎTiè et xiva oioOa \m èpoû 
yEyevT|pévov...è^ enoepons àvôoiov.
^^See H. Maikowski, "De Libanio Socratis defensore" in Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 40  
(1910), pp. 5-20; the outline above is based on Chroust's synopsis ([1957] 76). For other attempts at 
reconstructing Polycrates' charges, see ibid. 99-100, Wilamowitz (1919) 2:98-105, and Humbert 29-31. 
25That Xen. generally uses the formulation 6 Kaxnyopos E(1)T1, for example, seems to indicate that he 
considered these charges historical; on the other hand, the fact that he uses the present tense in Comm.
1.2.26 and leaves Polycrates anonymous throughout indicates, perhaps, that he was w ell aware o f  the 
fictional nature of the indictment (Cliroust [1957] 136). Grillnberger (pp. 8-9) feels that, since forms 
like erne, ë(j>Ti etc. did not always refer to spoken utterances, there is in fact no tense problem and that 
Xen. was in fact unaware o f the fictional nature of the Kaxnyopia. Edelstein (p. 91 n. 30) is sure of 
Xen.'s belief that Polycrates’ accusations were brought up in court (see Comm. 1.1.1), which does not 
necessarily mean that Xen. mistook Polycrates' work for the actual speech o f the prosecution. 
Beyschlag (p. 510) presents a good argument against Xen.'s possible reliance on Polycrates; Xenophon 
kann unmôglich...die Anklageschrifi des Sophisten fUr eine Wiedergabe der historischen Klagerede des 
Anytos gehalten haben, da diese MOglichkeit durch den in jener Rede enthaltenen Anachronismus vom  
Mauerbau Konons, den zudem Xenophon selbst in den Hell. IV, 8, 9 erzühlt, verhindert wird. 
26wilamowitz ([1897] 102), Amim (pp. 23 & 69), Wetzel (p. 401), Frick (p. 34 n, 120), and Oilier (p. 
91) find no trace of Polycrates in Xen. Ap. Various reasons are offered for this: Frick (idem) suggests 
that it was due to Xen.'s remoteness from Athens. Gigon ([1946] 231-32) thinks that, since the Ap. 
treats the two indictment charges more broadly, and since the work is specifically concerned with 
Socrates' peyaXnyopla, Polycrates’ material would have been ill-suited for it. Chroust ([1955] 5 n. 11 
& [1957] 69: see too Maier 22) bases his remark on a difference in intentions, that is, since Xen. had 
already rebutted Polycrates' charges in the Schutzschrift, there was no need to treat the same issue in 
the Ap. The question depends, o f course, on the sequence of publication.
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3) Corruption of the Youth: Polycrates apparently went beyond the original 
indictment charges in attempting to show, among other things, that Socrates had 
attempted to destroy all feelings of filiopiety in his young followers (see 
especially Comm. 1.2.49). This issue figures quite largely in Ap. 20, where 
Socrates is accused of, and readily admits to, causing young people to follow the 
advice of pedagogical experts over that of their elders, and it seems clear that 
Polycrates in general was quite determined to show how insidious Socrates’ 
teachings had been for the young.27 The most telling example of education gone 
wrong, however, is offered by Xen. in Ap. 29-31, where Anytus is shown to be 
incompetent in raising his own son, a young man who had presumably 
demonsti ated considerable promise under Socrates’ tutelage. This section of the 
Ap., if intended as a reply to Polycrates, would have been all the more scathing 
since it was Anytus who was the impetus behind the indictment of Socrates and 
who served as the actual spokesman for the prosecution in Polycrates’ KaxriYopia.
4) Misuse of Poetry: Libanius (Ap. 62 ff. & 117-126) links the chaige above with 
Socrates’ misuse of poets, hence the original charge might have been presented by 
Polycrates as follows: By undermining traditional values associated with certain 
poets, Socrates undeimines all societal values as well, including filiopiety 
(Chroust [1957] 84-86). The accounts of Xen. and Libanius seem to agree in 
connection with Socrates’ use of quotations from ancient poets (ibid. 74 & 89), 
though Xen. only mentions Homer and Hesiod. Socrates’ well-founded and 
unassailable reference to Palamedes and Odysseus in Xen. Ap. 26 might be 
considered a pointed response to this Polycratean charge.
5) Causing Others to Commit Serious Crimes: Although Socrates in more general 
terms denies exerting a maleficent influence on his followers (§19) and denies 
being guilty of serious crimes himself (§25), there is no direct mention made of 
his causing others to commit such crimes as those mentioned in Markowski’s 
reconstruction above.
6) Practicing Secret Vices: The public nature of Socrates’ behavior, at least as 
regards his religious practices, is strongly emphasized in §11: eTcel Qvovm yé  pe 
èv xals Koivats èoptaîs kqi èm xrôv Sripooicov |3copc5v Kal ol aXXoi oi 
TcapaTuyxdvovTes èmpmv Kal avxos MeXiycos, el èpodXeio.
7) Inducement of Idleness and Contempt for Lowly Occupations: Libanius defends 
Socrates at great length against the charge of preaching idleness (Ap. 21, 84-89,
27See Comm. 1.2.9,1.2.12 ff., 1,2.49 and Lib. Ap. 136 ff. Xen. Ap. 20 (cp. Comm. 1.2.49) has drawn the 
most attention from those who find Polycratean influence in the work (see, for example, Chroust 
[1955] 2-3, [1957] 35 and Maier 15), and Gigon ([1946] 226) sees a possibly direct parallel with 
Polycrates’ work, with Meletus replacing Anytus as Polycrates’ mouthpiece. Breitenbach (col. 1890) 
advises caution, however, since this passage could be considered a response to Nu., while Edelstein (p. 
88 n. 25: see too Schmid 224 n. 1) believes that the correspondence with the Comm, passage may 
indicate that tlie filiopiety charge was actually brought up in court.
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127 ff.), and it would seem that this made up a considerable part of Poly crates’ 
accusation. Precedents existed for this accusation, i.e. an Athenian law called a 
Ypa(j)f| àpyias to which Polycrates might have referred, and Pisistratus had made 
idleness a criminal charge (Chroust [1957] 94). Libanius {Ap. 89-90) suggests 
that Socrates’ interest in self-betterment over amassing wealth was considered 
idleness, and the fact that Xen. and Libanius stress repeatedly that Socrates was a 
frugal person might also be related to Polycrates’ charge {ibid., p. 93). Socrates 
himself speaks out against idleness in Comm. 11.7.1-14, which might better 
represent Xen.’s attitude than Socrates’ {ibid., pp. 94-95).2s in Xen. Ap. 17-18 
Socrates’ self-reliance (which could be constinied as the ability to live without a 
ready source of income) is emphasized, and he issues a direct challenge to his 
accusers in §19 to produce a youth YeY8VT\pévov...èK (jnXoTidvou paXaKOv. There 
seems to be some tmth in the statement that Socrates considered the life of a 
craftsman to be detrimental (see Comm. 111.7.5-7, Oec. 4.1-3, and D.L. 2.31: see 
too the comment on §30), and his disdain for menial labor is brought out clearly in 
the description of Anytus’ trade in Xen. Ap. 30: moxe am ov ènï Tr| 
6ouXo7tp87tEÎ ôiatptj3n ijv 6 Tratfip ctmé jcapEcncEuaKev où Ôiap8V8Îv. The 
distinction is ultimately one between apyta and o%oXf|.
8) Association with Critias and Alcibiades: Both Xen. {Comm. 11.2.12 ff.) and 
Libanius {Ap. 136 ff.) refute the allegation that Socrates was the teacher of Critias 
and A lcib iad es.X en .’s KOTriyopos makes Critias and Alcibiades dkectly 
responsible for inflicting evils on the city, while Libanius’ opponent seems to hold 
Socrates himself directly responsible (Chroust [1957] 82). Lib. Ap. 136 ff. can 
almost be considered a brief ’ATioXoyia ’AXkiPiôôou since the author dwells on 
his more positive achievements, perhaps in response to Polycrates’ exaltation of 
Thrasybulus and Conon, which was delivered to provide an oratorical contrast to 
his denunciation of Critias and Alcibiades {ibid., p. 96). In short, Socrates was 
apparently accused by Polycrates of having groomed the two for theh* later 
misconduct, and the appropriate punishment for such treasonous activity would be 
execution {ibid., p. 97). A response to this might appear" in Xen. Ap. 17-18, where 
Socrates replies to the corinption-of-the-youth allegations by admitting that he 
does, in fact, attract followers of every kind, both citizens and aliens. He 
proceeds, however, to lay special emphasis on his self-restraint and his ability to
^^See Chroust (1957) 94-95, who also notes that, according to Aelian {VH  10.14), Socrates called 
àpyia the “sister of freedom” while alluding to various peoples to prove his point, an attitude which 
would perhaps better accord with the Cynics’ point o f view.
2^For die issue o f teaching, see the comment on §20. Aeschines Orator {contra Timarch. 173) is often 
quoted as evidence for this public perception after the trial.
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rely on the pleasures of his own soul, qualities conspicuously absent in his two 
notorious studentsA®
9) Crime and Punishment: Polycrates seems also to have refeiTed to Anaxagoras, 
Protagoras, and Diagoras of Melos as historical precedents for acting against 
Socrates (see Lib. Ap. 153 ff.), and it is likely that he tried to identify him with 
some of their teachings as well as with those of other sophists and philosophers 
(Lib. Ap. 102). In Xen. Ap. 20 Socrates defends the right of experts to impart their 
special knowledge and in the following section challenges the appropriateness of 
the capital charge in such a case (see too §25).
More generally, Xen. himself seems tacitly to concede the justness of the 
death penalty by at least implying a causation between Socrates’ wilful peyaXTi'yopia 
and his willingness to die. If, then, we understand this term to mean “self- 
aggrandizement”, it becomes most plausible to consider Xen. Ap. with its expressly 
corrective purpose as a response to other megalegorical descriptions of Socrates as 
they appeared in Polycrates’ Kaxriyopia and the other anti-Socratic literature 
mentioned in Xen. Ap. 1.
30Reeve (p. 99 ff.) explains the omission of any direct reference by noting that the relevant issues (i.e. 
politics, ethics, and religion) are sufficiently addressed elsewhere in the Ap.
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The Manuscript Tradition
There are five extant manuscripts of Xen. Ap.: Vaticanus gr. 1335 (10th or 
12th century) = A, Vaticaniis gr. 1950 (14th century) = B, Mutinensis 145 (15th 
century) = C, Harleianus 5724 (15th century) = H, and Vaticanus Palatinus gr. 93 =
P (a 13th-century codex containing only excerpts). ^  The indirect tradition is 
represented by A then. 218E (= Ap. 14) and Stob. IU.7.58 Hense (= excerpts from A/?. 
25-29).2 Johannes Reuchlin's editio princeps (= R) was published by Thomas Anselm 
as a special edition (along with the Ages, and Hier.) in Hagenau in 1520 (see 
Muenschner 236 n. 2), and in writing this dissertation I have used Marchant's Oxford 
Classical Text edition (1901: 2nd ed. 1919)  ^while consulting Lundstrom (1906), 
Thalheim (1913), and Oilier (1961) for variant readings, which appear scattered 
throughout my commentary below."^
Schmoll’s stemma appears as follows:
,2
A'
A‘
H
R
^See Schmoll 314-17. ScbmoU (p. 314), following A. Diller {JWarb 24 [1961] 316), dates Vat. gr.
1335 to the 10th century, while Marchant, Lundstrom, Thalheim, and Oilier place it in the 12th. 
Lundstrom is the only one who includes Vat. Pal. 93 in his apparatus. For other remarks on the 
manuscript tradition, see Marchant (1900) 264-65, Thalheim xi, and Oilier 98-99.
^See OUier 99 and Schmoll 316-17 (see too Lundstrom 6 for references to the various Stobaeus 
codices). Xen. Ap. is also mentioned in Schol. ad PI. Ap. 18B (on Anytus).
3 Marchant no doubt originally ignored 145 because its editorial value is, as Oilier (p. 99) puts it,
très contestable, and it was only with the subsequent publication of E. Kalinka's comments in 
Innsbrucker FestgruB (1909) that it was included in the addenda et corrigenda o f Marchant's second 
edition.
^See D . Morrison (1988) 67 ff. for other editions. Bibliographical references to textual criticism and 
commentary concerning the work appear in Morrison (pp. 71-73) and Thalheim (pp. xii-xvi).
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Schmoll agrees with previous editors in re-asserting the pre-eminent authority of Vat, 
gr. 1335, which, he feels, is in itself sufficient to serve as the basis for a text (p. 321).^ 
Marchant's sigla, which differ from Schmoll's, appear below:
B = Vaticanus 1335, saec. xii
B2 = Vatican! corrector prior, saec. xiv
A = Vaticanus 1950, saec. xiv
HarL = Britannicus Harleianus 5724, saec. xv
C = Mutinensis 145, saec. xv
Reuchlin = editio princeps Reuchliana, a. 1520
For the sake of convenience, I have prefeixed to use these sigla throughout the 
dissertation.
would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Schmoll for having introduced me to Xen. Ap. 
during my post-graduate study at the University o f Missouri.
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A n O A O riA  laK P A T O Y Z  
[nPO X  TOYX AIKAXTAX]
[ 1] ZcoKpdtTODS Ôè c t^ io v  p o i  ô o K e î e l v a i  p e i iv f ja O a t  K a l  © s  èT ieiô 'n  éKA,T|6 Ti 
e l s  TTiv ô I k t iv  é p o u X e u a a t o  Trepl t e  tr is  à T co X o y la s  K a l  t f j s  t e A ^ u r n s  xov p i  o u .  yeypâ^a^  p è v  o u v  T iep l t o u t o u  K a l àXkoi x a l  T cà v te s  ë tu % o v  t f j s  p e y a X t iy o p l a s  
a u to û "  cp K a l ô fiX o v  ô t i  t ^  ô v u  o u tm s  è p p f)0 r( ûtcô Z c o K p d to u s . àA.1 ' ô t i  i iô i i  è a u tc p  
T Îy e ïto  a lp e t c o t e p o v  e i v a i  t o û  p io u  O d v a t o v ,  t o û t o  o ù  ô ie a a c j jù v ia a v *  © o t e  à(j)po- 
v e a t é p a  a ù t o û  < |)a lv e ta i e i v a i  t |  p eY aA ,T |yop la .
[2 ] ’E p |io y é v T |s  j i ié v to i ô  I t t tc o v Ik o u  é t a î p o s  t e  fjv  a ù t ©  K a l  è^ÙYYGiXe jc e p l  
a ù t o û  t o t a û t a  c o a te  u p é i t o u o a v  < j)a lveo6 a i  tr \v  p e y a X iy y o p la v  a ù t o û  t ù  ô ia v o lç t .  
è K e î v o s  y à p  ë(j)T| ô p © v  a ù t o v  îc e p l  Trcxvtœv p â A ,lo v  Ô ia X e y o p e v o v  r\ n e p l  t f j s  Ô Ik îis  
e l î t e i v  [3 ] OÙK è x p f iv  j i ié v to i cncoTreîv, ©  S c ù K p a te s , K a l ô  t i  aîroA^oyiicrp; t ô v  ô è  t o  
p è v  TTpüotov âT coK pivacyO ai* O ù  y à p  ô o k ©  a o i  à T c o X o y e îa O a i p e A ,e t© v  ô i a p e p i © -  
K é v a i;  è î i e l  ô ’ a ù t o v  è p é a S a i '  H © s; " O ti o ù ô è v  d ô iK o v  ô i a y e y é v i i p a i  t t o i ô v  livTcep  
v o p l^ ©  iieA A tn v  e i v a i  K a X l la t n v  â j i o l o y l a s .  [4 ] è n e l  ô è  a ù t o v  n â X w  A é y e i v  Où%  
ô p ç ts  t à  ’A 0 T ]v a l© v  Ô ix a a t r ip ia  cbs TroXXdKis p è v  o ù ô è v  à ô iK O Û v ta s  lo y c p  î t a p a -  
x B é v t e s  à T ié K t e iv a v ,  îioXA^aKis ô è  à ô i K o û v t a s  ù  è x  t o û  X o y o u  o l K t l a a v t e s  ù  
è m x a p l t m s  e lT c ô v ta s  à îc é X u a a v ;  AA.A,à v a l  p à  A l  a ,  <j)ctvai a ù t o v ,  K a l  Ô ls 7|ÔT( 
é m % e ip r |a a v t ô s  p o u  aKOTreîv Tcepl t f j s  à 7to A ,o y la s  è v a v t i o û t a l  p o i  t ô  ô a i p ô v i o v .  
[5 ] © s Ôè a ù t o v  e lT c e tv  O a u p a a t à  X é y e is ,  t ô v  ô ’ a u  à n o K p i v a o Q a v  0 a u p a a t ô v  
v o p lÇ e i s  e l  K a l t ©  0 e ©  ÔOKeî é p è  p é X t io v  e i v a i  t^ôt] t e X e u t â v ;  o ù k  o i a 0 a  ô t i  
p é x p i  p è v  t o û ô e  o ù Ô e v l à v 0 pco7i© v  ù ^ e lp t iv  < d v >  p é X t io v  è p o û  p e P i© K é v a i ;  ÔTcep 
y à p  f i ô i a t ô v  è a t i v ,  ^ Ô e iv  ô a l© s  p o i  K a l Ô iK a l© s à n a v x a  t ô v  p lo v  p e P i © p é v o v  
© O te  la x D p © s  à y à p e v o s  è p a u t ô v  t a ù t à  T jû p ioK ov  K a l t o ù s  è p o l  o u y y iy v o p é v o u s  
y iy v © o K o v t a s  Trepl è p o û .  [6 ] v û v  ô è  e l  ë t i  T r p o p fio e ta i ù  ù ^ iK la ,  o îô '  ô t i  à v à y K t |  
ë a t a i  t à  t o û  x ù p (b s  è 7r i t e l e Î G 0 a i  K a l ô p â v  t e  x e i p o v  K a l  à K o ù e i v  f j t t o v  K a l  ô u a -  
p a 0 é a t e p o v  e i v a i  K a l  © v  ë p a 0 o v  è 7c iX .T ia p o v é a te p o v . â v  ô è  a l o 0 d v © p a i  X G ip© v  
y iy v ô p e v o s  K a l K a ta p é p ( |)h )p a i é p a u t o v ,  tc© s à v ,  e l î r e îv ,  éy co  ë t i  d v  f |Ô é© s P io t e ù -  
o i p i ;  [7 ] i a © s  ô é  t o i ,  ô d v a i  a ù t o v ,  K a l ô  0 e ô s  Ôi’ e ù p é v e i a v  T c p o ^ e v e î p o i  o ù  
p ô v o v  t ô  è v  K aipcp  t f js  f |A ,iK las K a t a l û o a i  t ô v  p lo v ,  àXXà K a l t ô  -fj p d a t a .  d v  y à p  
v û v  K a t a K p i0 ù  p o u , ôfjÀ-ov ô t i  è ^ é a t a i  p o i  t%j t e X e u t f j  xpfjc^Gca fj p d a t q  p è v  ù ttô  
t© v  t o ù t o u  èTripeA,Ti0 é v t © v  K é K p it a i ,  d it  p a y  p o v e a t d t r i  ô è  t o î s  ( | ) l l o i s ,  T rX e îo to v  ô è  
7ro 0 o v  èpT T O ioûoa t© v  t e l e u t © v t © v .  ô t a v  y à p  d o x B p o v  p è v  p r jô è v  pTjôè Ô u a x e p è s  
è v  t d i s  y v © p a is  t© v  T rapôvtrov K a ta X eiT rr jta l < t i s > ,  ù y i è s  ô è  t ô  o © p a  ë x © v  K a l tf ]v  
ij /u x fiy  ô u v a p é v T iv  ( jr iX o ô p o v e îa û a i à îr o p a p a iv r i t a i ,  7r© s o ù k  à v d y K tj t o û t o v  7ro 0 e i -  
v ô v  e i v a i ;  [8 ] ô p 0 © s ô è  o i  0 e o l  t ô t e  p o u  f j v a v t io û v t o ,  ô d v a i  a ù t o v ,  t f j  t o û  A ,ôyou  
éT tio rK év e i ô t e  é ô Ô K e i ù p îv  Ç 'ptTitéa e i v a i  èK T ravtôs tpÔTxou t à  d T io ^ e u K tiK d . e l  
y à p  t o û t o  ô ie îr p a ^ d p t iv ,  ôfjA-ov ô t i  ù t o i p a a d p t iv  d v  d v t l  t o û  fjÔTj X fj^ a i t o û  p io u  fj 
y ô a o i s  à X y u v ô p e v o s  t e X e u t f j c a i  ù  yfjpÇt. e l s  ô  T rd vta  t à  % a X e ,n à  c r u p p e î K a l p d X a  
ëp T jp a  t © v  eù ô p o cru v cù v . [9 ] p à  A l ’, e lT ce îv  a ù t o v ,  ©  'E p p ô y e v e s ,  éyco  t a û t a  o ù ô è  
7r p o 0 u p f |o o p a i ,  àX X ’ ô a © v  v o p lÇ ©  KaXcôv t e t u x B K é v a i  K a l  T capà 0 e © v  K a l  Trap’ 
d v 0 p©Tr©v, K a l i^v èycb Ô ô^ av  e x ©  Trepl è p a u t o û ,  t a ù t r jv  à v a ^ a i v c ù v  e l  p a p u v ©  t o ù s  
ô iK a o t d s ,  a l p ù a o p a i  t e A ,e u td v  p d X X ov fj d v e A e u 0 è p © s  t ô  Çfjv ë t i  T r p o c a it© v  K ep -  
Ô d v a i t ô v  TTOlù x e lp ©  p lo v  d v t l  0 a v d t o u .
[Marchant's sigla appear with the information on the MS tradition; his apparatus appears as follows:]
In tit. Tïpôs TOÙS ÔiKaaxds om. Stob. et Diog. Laert. ii. 57 Demetrium Magneta citans 1.3 oùv om. A  
post TcdvTES fort. GaupdÇovtes vel simile quid excidit 3.1 kqI ô ti]  ô xi kgI Schneider 3.3 èjcei 
Dind.: ETceixa codd. aùxôs cit. Schenkl ôxi om, Harl. 4.1 aùxôs cit. Schenkl 5.1 aùxôs cit. 
Schenkl Aéyeis] Xéyeiv Reuchlin fj] e l  B Harl. 5.3 dv add. Schneider coll. Corn. 4. 8, 6 5.4 poi 
C et Reuchlin: jièv cet. 5.5 xaùxa Harl. 6.2 é7cixeXeîo0ax Corn. 4. 8, 8: dTtoXeiaGai Harl.: dTto- 
xeAeiaGai codd.: fort. dîioxeAécrai 7.2 xô om. Harl. 7.5 x0  xeXeuxmvxx A2C: xôv xeXenxâv cet. 
(xcôv om. Harl.): xoù xeAenxâvxos Gesner 7,6 KaxaAlîtrixai codd.: corr. Stephanus xis add. Schenkl
8.1 pou Reuchlin: pèv codd.: poi cit. Schenkl 8.2 f|plv] ùpîv W eiske 8.5 epppov cit. Schneider
9.2 ôaov Harl. xaAmv xexuxhKévai B: xexu%T|Tcévai xaAôv cet. 9.3 xaùxnv] taux’ Hirschig pa- 
puvô Hirschig: papûvm codd.: xaûx’ ijv dva(t>aivcov [el] Papùvto conicio
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[10] om m  Ôè yvôvta aùtov ê<j)T| [elTieîv], èTceiôf] Katriyopricrav aùtoû ol 
àvtlôiKoi cbs oûs pèv i\ %6A,is voplÇei èeoùs où vopl^oi, ètepa ôè Kaivà ôaipôvia ela(j)époi Kal toùs véous ôia{()0époi, 7cap8X0ôvta eWelv [11] 'AXX èyé, c5 dvôpes, 
toûto pèv Tcpôtov 0ao)pàÇ® MeXfjtou, ôt© Tcotè yvoùs A.éyei ©s éy© oûs r\ tü6A,is vopri^ei 0eoùs où vopiÇ©* ètieI 0ùovtà yé pe èv tdls Kotvois éoptdls Kal èm t®v ÔT|pocl©v P©p©v Kal dXA.oi ol Tcapatuyxdvovtes è©p©v Kal aùtos Méltitos, el èpoùA^to. [12] Kaivà ye pf]v ôaipôvia 7r©s dv èy© ela^epoipi %éy©v ôti 0eoû poi 
(j)©vf) ôalvetai crripaivouoa ô ti XPÙ Tioieîv; Kal yàp ol (j)0ôyyois ol©v©v Kal ol ^ p ais àv0p©7c©v xp©pevoi (j)©vaîs ôfjTcou texpalpovtai. Ppovtàs Ôè àp i^Xé^Gi tis fj pù ô©veîv fj pù péyiatov ol®viotijpiov eîvai; f] Ôè riuèoî èv t<p tplTtoôi lépeia où Kal aùtf\ ô©vù tà Tcapà toû 0eoû ôiayyélXei; [13] à%A,à pévtoi Kal tô Tcpoei- 
ôévai ye tôv 0eôv tô péA,%ov Kal tô Tipocrripaiveiv c5 poùXetai, Kal toûto, ©cmep èy© ôTipi, oût© Tcdvtes Kal A^youai Kal vopl^ouoiv. àXX ol pèv ol©voùs te Kal Ôijpas Kal (TüppôXous te Kal pdvteis ôvopdÇouai toùs %pooT)palvovtas èivai, èy© ôè toûto Ôaipôviov KaX©, Kal oîpai oût©s ôvopd^©v Kal àl-pOeatepa Kal ôai- ©tepa Aéyeiv t©v toîs ôpviaiv àvati0évt©v tf|v t©v 0e©v ôùvapiv. ©s ye pfjv où yeùôopai Katà toû 0eoû Kal toût ex© teKpfjpiov Kal yàp t©v (j)lA.©v jcoXÎoîs ôfj è^ayyelA.as tà toû 0eoû crupPouXeùpata oùÔejrcojcote \|/euaàpevos èôàvrjv.[14] èTcel ôè taûta àKOÙovtes ol ôiKaotal è0opùpouv, ol pèv ÔTciatoûvtes 
toîs Xeyopévois, oi Ôè Kal ô^ovoûvtes, el Kal Tcapà 0e©v peiÇ6v©v fj aùtol tuy- Xdvoi, TrdA.iv elTreîv tôv EmKpdtqv "Aye Ôf] dKOÙaate Kal a lla , îva ëti pdllov ol poulôpevoi ùp©v àTriat©oi t^ èpè tetipijoûai ùttô ôaipôv©v. Xaipeô©vtos ydp Trote èTrep©t©vtos èv Ael^oîs Trepl èpoû Troll©v Trapôvt©v dveîlev ô ’AttôI I wv pTjôeva eivai dv0p©Tr©v èpoû pijte éleu0epi©tepov pijte ÔiKaiôtepov pfjte aœôpovéatepov. [15] ©s ô’ aù taût dKOÙaavtes ol ÔiKaotal ëti pdllov elKÔt©s 
è0opùpouv, aû0is elTreîv tôv X©KpdtT|v* ’A llà  peiÇ© pèv, © dvôpes, eiTtev ô 0eôs èv xPBc^ PO^ s Trepl AuKoùpyou toû AaKeôaipovlois vopo0etf|oavtos fj Trepl èpoû. léyetai ydp els tôv vaôv elaiôvta TrpoàeiTceîv aùtov* <î>povtiÇ© Ttôtepa 0eôv ae eÏTr© fj dv0p©rrov. èpè ôè 0e© pèv oùk eiKaoev, dv0p©Tr©v ôè tcoII©  TtpoéKpivev ÙTrepôépeiv. ôp©s ôè ùpeîs ptjôè taût’ eIkù Trioteùcrrite t^  0e©, d lld  Ka0’ ev eKaatov èTrioKOTreîte ©v eiTrev ô 0eôs. [16] tlva pèv ydp èTrlataa0e fjttov èpoû 
ôouleùovta taîs toû acopatos èTri0uplais; tlva ôè àv0p©rc©v èleuOepicotepov, ôs Trap’ oùôevôs oûte Ô©pa oûte pio0ôv ôéxopai; ôiKaiôtepov Ôè tlva dv elKÔt©s voplcaite toû Trpôs tà rrapôvta auvTippoopevou, cbs tôv dllotpl©v priôevôs Trpoo- ôeî(50ai; a0(|)ôv ôè Tr©s oùk dv tis elKÔt©s dvôpa ôù^ e^iev eîvai ôs è^ ôtomep ^uviévai tà  leyôpeva fjp^dpt]v oÙTrcorrote ÔiéleiTcov Kal Î^ Tjtôv Kal pav0dv©v ô ti éôuvdp'nv àya0ôv; [17] cbs ôè où pdtpv èTCÔvouv où ôoKeî ùpîv Kal tdôe teKpfjpia 
eivai, tô Trolloùs pèv Troll tas tôv dpetfjs è<|)iepév©v, Trolloùs ôè Çév©v, èK Trdv- t©v Trpoaipeîo0ai èpol ^uveîvai; èxelvou ôè u  ôÙ^ o^p^ Ev a’itiov eivai, toû Tcdvtas elôévai ôti èy© fjKiat’ dv ëxoipi xpùpc(ta dvtiôiôôvai, ôp®s Trolloùs èTci0upeîv èpol ti Ô©peÎG0ai; tô ô’ èpè pèv prjô’ ù(j)’ èvôs dTraiteîo0ai eùepyealas, èpol ôè Trolloùs ôpoloyeîv xdpitas ô^elleiv; [18] tô Ô’ èv tfj TroliopKlç toùs pèv dllous 
oiKtlpeiv èautoùs, èpè ôè pT|Ôèv dTropôtepov ôidyeiv fj ôte tà  pdliata ù Tiôlis Tjùôaipôvei; tô Ôè toùs dllous pèv tds eÙTca0elas èK tfjs dyopds Ttoluteleîs Tro- pl^eo0ai, èpè ôè èK tfjs yuxfjs dveu ôaTcdvTis ùôlous èKelv©v ptixocvdaBai; eî ye
10.1 omca A elîteiv del. Leonclavius 10.2 pèv fj C: f] pèv B A  11.2 yvoùs texpriplcp Cobet coll. 
Corn. I. 1, 2: fort, ôtcp îtoxè xpÔTrcp 11.4 kqI dAAoi o i B: k oi o l âAAoi o l cet. altemm k oi] kôv 
Richards 12.1 poi Wyttenbacli: pou codd. 12.3 XEKpalpovxai C et Reuchlin: xEKpalpcovxai cet. 
Ppovxds Gesner: ppovxaîs codd. 12 .4f\] e l  A Bi 13,1 koi om. 13.3 ôvopàÇouai] voplÇouoi 
Voigtlünder 13.7 Kaxà] koi xa (sic) Harl. 14.1 xaûx’ A 14.2 e l Kal] et xis Cobet 14.5 éTtepco- 
xfjaavxos Ath. v, 218 15.2 èôopùpouv elKÔxcos Reuchlin ôAAà C. Harl.: âAAa cet. 15.5 TcoAAôv 
codd.: corr. Reuchlin 16.1 yàp om. Harl. in fine versus 16.4 vopiOTixe vel vop laeixe codd.: corr. 
Schâfer post xoû add. ouxw Cobet 17.2  ^évcov] %évous C 17.3 post Ttàvxas add. pèv et 17.4 post 
ôpcûs add. 5è Schneider el6ôxas cit. Thalheim Tjxiax’ âv Bomemann: fjKiaxa codd. 17.5 eùep- 
yealav Stephanus 18.3 eùSaipôvei A; C: eùSatpovei cet.
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pf]v oaa eipTiKa Tcepl èpautoû priôels Ôûvait’ dv è^eAéy^ai ps cbs xpeûôopai, tcôs OUK dv fjÔT) SiKaicos Kal û%6 0eôv Kal ûtt’ àv0pübïi®v èiiaivolpTiv;
[19] àXX ôpms ou pe <j)fts, © MéXTjte, to ia û ta  èm tnÔ eûovta toùs véous 
ôia(j)0eipeiv; K aitoi èm otd p eèa  pèv ôfiTcou tives e lo l  vé®v Ôia(j)0opai* où Ôè elTcè 
e i t iv a  o io 0 a  ùti’ èpoû yeyevripévov r\ è^ eùoepoûs àvôoiov fj èK ocb^povos ùppi- 
otfjv fj è^ eùÔ iaitou TcoluÔàîiavov fj [cbs] èK petpiOTcôtou oivô(()A,uya fj ek  ôiXottô- 
vou paXaKÔv fj dA,Xris îiovripâs ijSovfjs fj'^tTipévov. [20] 'AXXà v a l pà A i’, ëtfnr) ô 
MéA,T|tos, èKeivous o iô a  oûs où TcéTceiKas oo l 7cel0eo0ai p d l lo v  fj to îs  y e iv a -  
pévois. ‘ O p o loyô , ôàva i tôv ZcùKpàniv, Tiepl ye Tcaiôeîas* toû to  yàp ’îo a o iv  èpol 
pepelTjKÔs. Tcepl ôè ù y ie îa s  to îs  la tp o îs  p d llo v  ol àv0pco7coi 7cel0ovtai fj to îs  
yoveûoi* Kal èv ta îs  èKK ltiolais ye jrdvtes ÔTjTcou o l ’AOqvdioi to îs  (j>povipc6tata 
lé y o u o i 7cel0ovtai p d l lo v  fj to îs  TcpooijKOUoiv. où yàp ôfj Kal otpatriyoùs a l-  
p eîo0e  Kal Tupô Tcatéprov Kal tcpô àôelôcbv, Kal v a l pà Ata ye ù peîs Tcpô ùpcbv 
aù tôv , oûs dv fiyfjo0e Trepl tô v  TrolepiKÔv ôpovipoyràtous eiva i; Oût© ydp, (jràvai 
tôv M éltitov, © ZcbKpates, Kal oup^épei Kal voplÇetai. [21] Oùkoûv, elTreîv tôv  
Z©KpdtT|y, 0aupaotôv Kal toûto  o o i ôoKeî e iv a i, tô  èv pèv ta îs  d l la i s  Trpd^eoi 
PÙ pôvov loopoip las tuyxdveiv toùs K patlotous, d l ld  Kal Trpotetipijo0ai, èpè Ôé, 
< ôti>  Trepl toû peylotou  dya0oû dvOpÔTrois, Trepl Tcaiôelas, p é lt io to s  e îv a i ÙTrô 
tiv©v TcpoKplvopai, toùtou ëveKa 0avdtou ÙTrô ooû ôicoKeo0ai;
[22] ’EppT|0T| pèv Ôfjlov ô ti toùt©v Trlel© ÙTrô te  aùtoû Kal tô v  ouvayopeu- 
ôvt©v (|)ll©v aùtcp. d l l ’ èy© où tà  Trdvta elTreîv tà  èK tfjs ô1kt]S ècrrroùÔaoa, d l l ’ 
HpKeoé poi ÔT)lôoai ô t i  É©Kpdtiis tô  pèv pfjte Trepl 0eoùs doe(3fjoai pijte Trepl 
dv0p(OTrous dôiKos ôotvfjvai Trepl Travtôs èTtoieîto’ [23] tô ôè pij àTco0aveîv oùk 
cpeto liTrapT|téov e îv a i, d l l d  Kal Kaipôv fjôt| évôpi^ev é a u tô  te le u td v . ô t i ôè 
oût©s èylyv©GKe K ataôtilôtepov èyéveto , èTreiôfj ij ÔIkt] Kateij/TiôlcTÛTj. Trpôtov 
pèv ydp K eleuôpevos ÙTrotipdo0ai oûte aùtôs ÙTretipijoato oû te  toùs f i lo u s  
e’ia o ev , d l l d  Kal ë le y e v  ô ti tô  ÙTrotipdc0ai ôpoloyoûvtos eît) dôiKeîv. ëTreita 
tô v  étalp© v èKKlé\|/ai poulopév©v aùtôv oùk è^elTteto, d l l d  Kal èTri<JKÔi|/ai 
éôÔKei épôpevos e î Trou elÔ eîév t i  x©plov ë^© tfjs ’AttiKfjs ëv0a  où rrpoapatôv 
0avdtcp.
[24] 'Qs ôè t é lo s  e îxev  f] ÔIkti, elTceîv a ù tô v  ’A i l ’, © dvôpes, toùs pèv ôi- 
ôdoKovtas toùs pdptupas ©s XPÙ èîciopKoûvtas Kata\|ceuÔopaptupeîv èpoû Kal 
toùs Trei0opévous toù to is  dvdyKt) è a t l  Trollfjv éau to îs  ou veiôéva i à a ép eiav  Kal 
dÔiKlav èpol Ôè t i  Trpo^Kei vûv peîov ôpoveîv fj Ttplv KataKpi0fjvai, pT|Ôèv é le y -  
X0évti ©s TreTroiT)Kd t i  ©v èypd\}/avtô pe; oùÔè ydp ëycoye dvtl Aiôs Kal "Hpas Kal 
tô v  crùv toù to is  0eôv  oûte 0ù©v tien. Kaivoîs Ôalpoaiv oûte ôpvùs oûte vopiÇ©v 
d llo u s  0eoùs dvaTré(j)T|va. [25] toùs ye pfjv véous tcôs dv ôia^Oelpoipi Kapteplav 
Kal e ù té le ia v  Trpoae0iÇ©v; èô’ o îs ye pfjv ëpyoïs K eîtai Bdvatos f| ^ripla, lepo- 
ou llçt, toix©p'üxlçt, àvÔpaTcoôiaei, Tcôle©s Trpoôoola, oùô’ a ù to l o l dvtlôiK oi 
toùt©v Trpd|al t i  Kat’ èpoû ôotcnv. ©ate 0aupaotôv ëpoiye ôoKeî e îv a i ÔTr©s Trotè 
èôdvri ùpîv toû 0avdtou ëpyov d^iov èpol elpyaapévov. [26] d l l ’ oùôè pévtoi ô ti  
dôlK©s dTco0vf|cyK©, ôid  toûto  peîov ôpovqtéov où ydp èpol d l l d  to îs  K atayvoûai 
toû to  alaxpôv [ydp] è a ti. Trapapu0eîtai ô’ ë t i  pe Kal rialapf|ÔT)S ô TrapaTrlT|<ri©s 
èp o l teleutijoas"  ë t i  ydp Kal vûv Trolù K a lllo u s  ûpvous Trapéxetai ’OÔuacré©s 
toû dôÎK©s dîroKteivavtos a ù tô v  oîÔ’ ô ti Kal èpol paptupijoetai ÙTrô te  toû  èTci- 
ôvtos Kal ÙTrô toû Trapelî|lu0ôtos xpôvou ô ti f]ôlKT|aa pèv oùôéva Trcbrrote oùôè
19.4 cbs del. Gesner 2,0.3 acùKpdtn B 20.5 Tudvtos ot àôrivaîoi Tiâvtes ôtitcou Reuchlin 20.7 se­
cundum Tipô om. A 20.8 fiyeîoOe codd. 21.2 acoKpdtnv Harl.: acoKpctxri cet. 21.4 ô tt add. Ste­
phanus e iv a i e l C, fort, recte 22.3 xô Reuchlin: rôte codd. 23.3 éylyvexo A Harl. è7ceiÔf\B: 
éTtetÔù KOI A2: èjcei Kal cet. Sie\|/îi(|)loGri B A 23.4 aùxôs B2: aùxœv Bp aû(ù)xôv cet. 24.3 tigI- 
X.Ù B Harl. 24.5 èypàAjraxo A oùôè Hartung; oùxe codd. 24.6 vopiÇcùv Schhfer: ôvopdÇcov codd.
25.1 Kapxeplçt K a l eùxeAeip Reiske 25.2 lep o a u lla i, xoixcopuxtai, dvôpaTcoôlcns,. .  . itpoôoaia  
codd.: corr. Zeune 25.4 cboxe om. Stob. e îv a i om. Stob. P a w . ôttcùs A et Stob.: ôttou B Harl.
25.5 xoù A et Stob.: xô xoù B Harl.: xoù del. Cobet elpyaapévov Stob.: om. codd. 26.3 ydp om. A  
corr. et Stob. 5’ éxi] ôé xl Dind. 26.5 papxupijaexe codd.: corr. Stephanus
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TcovTipôtepov èTcolTjaa, euripyetouv ôè toùs èpol ôialeyopévous TcpoÎKa ôiÔàoTcœv ô ti éôuvdp'nv dyaOôv.
[27] elTTCOv ôè ta û ta  p d la  ôpoloyoupévm s ôtj to îs  e lp npévois ànr[ei Kal 
ôppacR Kal oxijpati Kal paôlopati (jraiôpôs. ©s ôè fjoBeto dpa toùs TrapEjropévous 
ôaKpùovtas, Tl toûto; elTceîv aùtôv, 'fj dpti ôaKpùete; où ydp Tüdlai la te  ô t i  
ôtouTcep èyevôp'Tjv KatexpnÔi^M-évos fjv pou ù ttô  tfjs ôùae©s Gdvatos; d l l d  pévto i 
81 pèv dya0©v è7iippeôvt©v TcpoaTcôllupai, ôfjlov ô ti èpol Kal to îs  èp o îs  eûvois  
luntiT^éov e l  ôè xaleTcôv 7cpooôoK©pév©v K atalù©  tôv plov, èy© pèv o ip a i ©s 
eùîrpayoûvtos èpoû Tcâaiv ùpîv eùBupntéov e îv a i. [28] Ttapcov ôé t is  ’A ito llô -  
ô©pos, èmOup'rjtns pèv ©v laxuprôs aùtoû, d ll© s  Ô’ eùf|0ns, eÎTcev dpa* 'A l ld  
toû to  ey©ye, © ZÔKpates, xc(^67r©tata ôép© ô ti ôp© ae  dôlK©s dTcoBvfjGKOvta. 
tôv ôè lé y e ta i  Kataij/ficyavta aùtoû tf]v Ke^alnv e m e îv  Xù ôé, © ô H ta te  ’AttoI I ô- 
ô©pe, p d l lo v  èp où lou  pe ôpdv ôiKal©s fj dôÎK©s dTroOvriOKOvta; Kal dpa èm -  
y e ld a a i.
[29] l é y e t a i  ôè Kal "Avutov Tcapiôvta lÔ©v elTreîv ’A i l ’ ô pèv dvfip ôôe  
Kuôpôs, ©s péya t i  Kal K alôv ôiaTreTrpaypévos, e l  ÛTréKtové pe, ô t i  aùtôv  tô v  
peylat© v ÙTrô Tfjs Trôle©s ôpôv d^ioùpevov oùk êôn^ XPÙvcn tôv ulôv Trepl pùpaas 
TraiÔeùeiv. ©s poxOnpôs outos, ëôn, ôs oùk ëoiKev e lôéva i ô ti ÔTrôtepos fjpôv Kal 
aup<j)op©tepa Kal K a lll©  e ls  tôv d e l xpôvov ÔiaTreTrpaKtai, oûtôs è a t i  Kal ô 
viKÔv. [30] d l l d  pévtoi, ôdvai aùtôv, dvé0r|Ke pèv Kal "Opripos ëa tiv  o îs tô v  èv 
K a ta lù a e i toû  piou TrpoyiyvôoKeiv td  p é l lo v ta , P oùlopai ôè Kal èy© xpn^^P^- 
ôfjaal tl. auveyevôpiyv ydp Trote ppaxéa t ô  ’Avùtou u lô ,  Kal ëôo^é poi oùk 
dpp©atos tfiv i|/uxnv eivai" © ate ôûPi aùtôv ÔTrl tfj ôouloTrpeTreî ôiatp iPn fjv ô 
Tcatfjp aùt©  TcapeoKeùaKev où ô ia p e v e îv  ôid ôè tô  pnÔéva ëxe iv  orrouôaîov èTri- 
pelritfjv TTpoaTreaeîaÛai t iv i  a la x p ç  èTri0uplç, Kal Trpopijaea0ai p évto i Trôpp© 
poxOriplcts. [31] ta û ta  ô’ elTrôv oùk è\j/eùaato, d l l ’ ô veavioK os fiaée ls  o’ivcp oûte  
vuKtôs oû te npépas èTcaùeto Triv©v, Kal t é lo s  oûte t[j éau toû  Trôlei oû te  to îs  
Ô llo is oû te aùt® d%ios oùôevôs èyéveto. "Avutos pèv Ôfj Ôid tijv toû  u loû  Trovn- 
pdv Ttaiôelav Kal ô id  tfjv aùtoû àyv©poaùvr|v ë t i  Kal teteleutriK Ô s tu yxd vei 
KaKoôo^las.
[32] X©KpdtT(s ôè ôid tô peyalùveiv èautôv èv tô  ÔiKaatr\pl© ôOôvov èwayôpevos pdllov Katai|/nÔiaaa0ai èautoû èTrolnae toùs ôiKaatds. èpol pèv oùv ôoKeî 0eo(j)iloûs polpas tetuxnKévai* toû pèv ydp piou tô xalsTrôtatov diréliTre, tôv ôè 0avdt©v toû pdatou ëtuxev. [33] èTreôel%ato Ôè tfjs ij/uxfjs t^v pôpnv èTrel ydp ëyv© toû ëti Çfjv tô teûvdvai aùt© Kpeîttov eîvai, ©arrep oùÔè TTpôs td lla  tdya0d Trpoadvtns "fjv, oùôè Trpôs tôv Bdvatov èpalaKiaato, d l l ’ llapôs Kal Trpoaeôéxeto aùtôv Kal èTreteléaato.
[34] èy© pèv ôij Katavoôv toû dvôpôs tijv te ao^lav Kal tf|v yevvaiôtnta 
oûte pù pepvfjaBai ôùvapai aùtoû oûte pepvrjpévos pfi oùk èTcaiveîv. el ôé tis tôv dpetfjs è(|)iepév©v ©ôelip©tép© tivl X©Kpdtous auveyéveto, èKeîvov èy© tôv dvôpa d^iopaKapiatôtatov vopiÇ©.
27.1 6è] Ôfi Stob. om. quod sequitur ôf) 27.2 o%f)patt Stob.: oxifM-atTi codd. 27.3 r\ del. Cobet: fj 
Stephanus ôxi Stob.: ôxi post éyevôixTiv C: om. cet. 27.4 Gdvaxos Stob. et codd.: 6 Gdvaxos
28.2 ê \  add. Stob.: om. codd. dpa et 'A lla  om. Stob, 28.3 ôxi ôpo5 om. Stob. 28.5 p d llo v
Harl.: p d llo v  dv A et Stob.: dv post p d llo v  del. B]: p d l’ dv B fj dôiKtûs om. Stob. 29.1 ôôe ye
Stob. 29.2 Kal om, Harl. 29.4 cbs] cb Stob. ôs Stob.: cbs ccxid. 29.5 ôxi oùxos Harl. éaxi Kal] 
èoxiv Stob. 31.3 aùx^ codd.: corr. Stephanus “Avuxos C (et sic vertit Aretinus): aùxôs cet. 31.4 aù- 
xoù codd.: corr. Stephanus 32.2 ÈTxayayôpevos Cobet 33.2 aùx^] aùxô Harl. 33.3 repos x d l l ’ 
dyaGd Richards 34.2 post prius pù add. où Cobet
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A nO A O riA  XaKPATOTX: Marchant, following Stob. El. 1.81 Hense and D.L. 
2.57, omits the words Tupos toùs ôiKaoTCts from the manuscripts, and since the full 
title is technically inaccurate because of the non-forensic pro- and epilogues, I am 
compelled to agree.  ^ Breitenbach (col. 1888), considering the shorter title which 
appears in D.L. 2.57, feels that these words were an ancient addition and that perhaps 
the inappropriate title was added in consideration of Plato's and Lysias' works of the 
same name,^ while Beyschlag (p. 513) believes that the expanded title is borrowed 
from Comm. IV.8.5.^
Originally, an arcoloyla was a defendant's rebuttal in a heliastic court to 
charges brought against him by the prosecution, and the term refers secondaiüy to a 
real or fictive speech in which the speaker/writer defends actions or ideas (his own or 
someone else’s) against public criticism of any kind. Although Xen. and Plato have 
probably attempted to preserve at least the essence of Socrates' speech in court, their 
works must necessarily be grouped within the latter category. In these two 
contemporary 07coA,oylai, the Socrates figure goes beyond addressing the specific 
charges and uses his final appearance in public to present a justification of his life in 
general, a far more philosophical defense which established a precedent for all later 
examples of the genre: In effect, Socrates' legal defense soon became the literary 
vehicle for the defense of his philosophy in general. Chroust ([1957] 42), basing his 
opinion on Xen. and Plato, divides aU Socratic àTCoXoytai into two groups: 1) those 
that hold that Socrates followed an inner, "tragic" compulsion, i.e. that his mission 
inexorably led to his doom in a corrupt society and that he was prompted to die by a 
divine command, and 2) those that hold that he no longer cared about life, i.e. that his 
death was due to Greek fatalism and to the sort of mysticism found in the Cri. and 
Phd. Chroust is on fumer ground, I believe, when he states elsewhere {ibid., p. 200) 
that the Socratic a7ioA.oyiai can be grouped differently, i.e. into one group occasioned 
by the trial itself (e.g. PI. Ap.) and into another written in response to anti-Socratic 
literature or as a corrective to a prevailing opinion against him (e.g. Xen. Ap.).^
Xen. himself states in Ap. 1 that others had written about Socrates' defense, 
and that, while others had addressed the subject of his |X8yaA,T|yopia, they had not
^See too Wilamowitz ([1897] 99), Feddersen (p. 32), and P. Meyer (col. 716), who also feel that the 
longer title is inappropriate; Thalheim and Lundstrom include them in their editions. Marchant has 
chosen to add Hevo<j)c5vTOS to the title, as it also appears in Reuchlin and Mutin. 145.
^Breitenbach notes in col. 1892 that the very title ’AjcoAoyia StOKpatous immediately puts it in a 
competitive relationship with Plato's ajtoAoyla, and in col. 1888 he suggests restoring the title from §1 
to read as ITEPI THE TOT ZQKPATGYZ AnOAOriAZ KAI THE EKEINOY TEAEYTHX. 
^Feddersen (p. 35) rejects internal borrowing here on tlie basis of priority o f publication but believes 
nevertheless that the title is Xen.'s own.
^It has been argued that Socrates never actually defended himself since his conviction was a foregone 
conclusion (suggested by Maximus o f Tyre [3.5-8]: see too Gomperz [1924] 171 n. 1 and Oldfather 
passim ). If true, this might account for the wide differences in character o f the later aixoAoyiai. It 
should be added that the writing o f an ’ATioAoyia ZcoKpaxous eventually became a universal school 
theme for fledgling rhetoricians (see Essay A).
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adequately explained it. Xen. seems to be referring here to other a7coA,oyiat, a fair 
number of which must have existed by this time. Isocrates (Bus. 6) seems to indicate 
that several Socratic dTioA-oyiai existed ca. 390, and Diogenes Laertius (2.40) states 
that Lysias wrote a defense speech for Socrates which he rejected.^ This story is 
probably a fiction based on the appearance ca. 390 of a Socratic 0TroA,oyia ascribed to 
Lysias which was written in reaction to an anti-Socratic tract published ca. 392 by the 
sophist Polycrates, and to resolve this problem, some scholars have attempted to 
distinguish between an ÔTtoXoyta written by Lysias for the trial and one written as a 
rebuttal to Polycrates.^ Although Aeschines' Alcibiades seems to have been written 
for similar purposes,^ ancient references to other àTcoloyiat are scarce, and there is 
no record of an àTcoloyla having been written by any Socratics other than our two 
sources.^ Aristotle (Rh. 1399A) quotes from a Socratic à7coX.oYta of the fourth- 
century orator and tragedian Theodectes of Phaselis^ and from other similai* passages 
which may have originated in other, anonymous àîioA.o'yiai, and Demetiius of 
Phalerum wrote an aTcoXoyta within several generations after the trial. °^ The latest 
extant Socratic a7roA,oyia was written in the fourth century A.D. by the rhetorician 
Libanius, who draws upon and counters the charges of Polycrates.
Comm. 1.1.1-2.64, the so-called Schutzschrift, should be introduced briefly 
here, a part of the Comm, which can easily be considered as an ctTtoXoyta in its own 
right. This pait of Xen.'s Socratic memoirs seems to have been written in response 
to Polycrates, while the similaily trial-specific Comm. IV.8.1-11 contains passages 
nearly identical with some in the Ap., on which it is apparently based. The 
Schutzschrift itself has a tripartite stiaicture: §§I.l. 1-2.8 deal with the official 
indictment, §§1.2.9-61 address Polycrates' charges, and §§1.2.62-64 return to the trial. 
As a whole, it represents a far more polished defense of Socrates, a fact which would 
seem to place it after the publication of Xen. Ap. (see Appendix A). The Schutzschrift
 ^Also mentioned in Val. Max. VI.4.2, Plu. Vit. dec. orat. 836, Stob. III.7.56 Hense, Quint. Inst.
11.15.30, XI.1.11, and Cic. de Orat. 1.54.231 (see Sauppe & Baiter 2:203-204 for the collected 
fragments).
^Chroust [1955] 3 n. 6 & [1957] 20 (see too Breitenbach 1892, Hackforth 4-5, Blass 1:351, Riddell 
xxvii, and Hirzel passim). For general information on Polycrates, see Essay C.
^See Field (p. 150), who on p. 154 also notes the djtoAoyta-like tone of Alcibiades' speech in PI. Smp. 
^This is the opinion of Gomperz ([1924] 170^71), who seems to have ignored Suidas' reference to one 
written by Crito (s.v. Kpixcov =  Giannantoni VI. B43). Gigon ([1946] 212-13) quite rightly observes, 
however, that the fact that the title ’AitoAoyia does not appear among the lists o f  works attributed to the 
Socratics does not necessarily mean that they did not treat the trial (cp. the non-descriptive title 
Phaedo, for example).
^See Blass 2:447. Aristotle's quotation runs as follows: els Ttoiov lepov ùoéPtikev; xiva 0ewv on 
xexlpTiKev c5v fi noAis vopiÇei; For the meager fragments, see Sauppe and Baiter 246-48.
1 ^ Guthrie (1978) 4:73. Lesky (p. 543) also lists Theon of Antioch and Plutarch (see too Oldfather [p. 
204], who adds Zeno of Sidon). For references to the use of Socrates' case as an exercise in the 
rhetorical schools, see Procl. in Ti. 21A-B (= 1.65.22 Diehl) and Max.Tyr. 3.1.
 ^^ See Chroust (1957) 44-68 for a full treatment.
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will be discussed more fully in dealing with Socrates' response to the indictment 
charges in §11 ffri^
1, ScoKpdxo'os ôè d^iov jioi ôokcI e lv a i nepviî<T0ai Kxl.: The use of the verb 
pE|xvfio0ai is significant for its possible allusion to Xen.'s à7copvT|poveùpaTa.
The pai'ticle ôé after XmKpaxous in the first line has received a lot of attention, 
with the controversy revolving aiound the question of the Ap.'s relationship to the 
Comm., that is, was the Ap. at one time attached to the longer work? Wilamowitz 
([1897] 99-100), who questions the authorship of the Ap., believes that the particle 
does in fact indicate a connection to the Comm., the conclusion of which largely 
corresponds to the contents of the the former work, though this connection was most 
probably due to a publisher, not to the original w r i t e r .  Maier (pp. 21-22: see too 
Breitenbach 1888) notes that the Oec., Smp., and Ap. all begin with connecting 
particles and offers the following explanation: Die wahrscheinlichste Erklarung filr 
diese sprachliche Abnormitat scheint die zu sein, dafi Xenophon die Absicht gehabt 
hat, seine samtlichen sob'atischen Schriften zu einer schriftstellerischen Einheit 
zusammenzufassen, that is, he considered them aU to be of a similar nature, and this is 
reflected in the use of the particles.Arguments against any connection run as 
follows: 1) The very sense of the opening words of the Ap. (excluding Ôé, which is 
surely an editorial addition) shows that it cannot be a continuation of the Comm.^  ^ 2) 
Frick (p. 82: see too Beyschlag 499) observes that Xen. Ap. appears sepaiately in 
Vaticanus gr. 1335, our best manuscript, i.e. not as part of the Comm. 3) Xen. liked 
to begin his works with adversative particles to produce an "archaizing effect" (Busse 
[p. 229], who provides no examples). 4) The ôé, like the ôé in the Oec. and the àXXà 
in the Smp., does not signify any connection with a lai'ger work but introduces a 
casual, conversational tone (Oilier [p. 7 n. 1], citing Denniston's Greek Particles, 2nd 
ed., pp. 21 & 172). Oilier offers the sti'ongest argument, I feel, and the fact that so 
much material is shared between the Ap. and Comm, makes it unlikely that the two
^^See too Appendix A and my remarks on Polycrates in Essay C.
^3por a detailed comparison o f the two works, see Appendix A.
general, Wilamowitz {ibid., p. 105) feels that the work was intended to serve as an epilogue to the 
Comm, and indirectly to PI. Ap. and Phd. (see too Amim 93, Frick 82, and Jaeger [1954] 26). Frick (p. 
82) believes that the Ap. was probably found posthumously among Xen.'s writings, and that the 
publisher must have given the work its title and altered the initial words in this way so that it would 
seem to follow the Comm.
l^Wetzel (p. 400), however, compares the beginnings of the Ap. and Oec. and observes that Socrates is 
mentioned by name in the former. His conclusion: So kann kein Nachtrag bzw. kein BruchstUck einer 
Schrifi anfangen, die nur von Sokrates handelt; kein einziges Kapitel der Memorabilien beginnt mit 
dem Namen des Sokrates, and the 6é therefore must have been inserted by a later editor. 
l^Amim 54 (see too Vrijlandt 151). Feddersen (p. 28) believes that the Ap. must be independent of the 
Comm, on the basis o f stmcture, and tliat it is in fact more likely that, in this sense at least, the Smp. 
supplements the latter work. Feddersen (p. 31) also defends the opening 6É.
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works were ever joined. In general, the opening of the Ap. is quite conventional 
(Stokes [1997] 5).
Edelstein (p. 139 nn. 2-3) believes that èîieiôfi eKXf|0q els Tijv ôlKTjv means 
that the events described in the opening section occuiTcd after the preliminary hearing 
and before the actual trial, an interval of approximately five days; this would have 
provided enough time for the daimonic intervention and for any considerations of 
attempting to win an acquittal. Fritz ([1931] 50-51) disagrees, persuasively 
maintaining that Xen. means to emphasize that the events described did indeed occur 
after the proceedings had begun but in fact immediately before the trial. He supports 
his ai'gument by citing the coixesponding passage in Comm. IV. 8.4 (fjôîi Melfixon 
yeypappevou anxov rijv ypd^Tiv), which simply means that the deposition had been 
submitted. This is confiimed by the use of the imperfect in Hermogenes' question in 
Ap. 3 (o\)K 8XpT\v pévtoi cncoTceîv...;) and by the use of the contemporaneous present- 
tense verb èvavxtoûtai and 81s in Socrates' response (§4), as opposed to the Comm. 
passage, where the present tense is used (cos xpT] okottew kxX.) and the aorist fonn of 
the verb (fivavxicoOri) without 51s in the following section. Fritz (p. 51) also compares 
Comm, rv.8.9 {àXKà pi]v el ye àôlxms àîtoôavoûixai) with Ap. 1 (dv yàp vûv 
KaxaKpiBrj pou) for this contmst between extended time and immediacy.
A relationship between Socrates' defense and his attitude towards death (see 
the comment on §5) is already established in the opening lines (cos...èponleûaotxo 
Tcepl xe xfjs àTtoXoylas K a l xfjs xeXenxfjs xoû piou), as well as a more specific 
connection with Socrates' peyaA,T)yopla, the mention of which in other authors is 
offered as proof of Xen.'s thesis (^ K a l ôfjlov ôxi xcp ovxi ouxros èppqOrj ûtcô 
ZmKpdxous).
yeypd<i)atTt pèv ouv Ttept xouxou Kal a l l o i  Kal TidvxES exnxov xijs peyalx}- 
yoptas aûxoû: Xen.'s historical procedure is evident here in his consideration of 
various sources (cp. Comm. 1.4.1 & IV.3.2), an indication, perhaps, of Thucydidean 
influence. The allo t in this section have also been the subject of much debate since 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the influence of other writers of Socratic 
dialogues on Xen. (see Essay C).^  ^ Kaibel (p. 581 n. 1), who questions the 
Xenophontic authorship of the Ap., suggests that the word a llo t in this section refers 
to the epideictic ÔTcoloylai prompted by Polycrates which Ps.-Xen. seems to have
^^This argument is not contradicted by Ap. 8 (ôpGœs 5è ol Geoi kxX,.) since this statement ...entM lt die 
deutliche Voraussetzung, dafi Sokrates je tzt keine Zeit rnehr hat, seinen Entschlufi noch zu Ondern, die 
Gerichtshandlung also gleich beginnen wird  (pp. 51-52). Fritz' point is also supported by tlie abrupt 
transition in §10.
 ^^ Vander Waerdt (pp. 14-15) comments that the word Tcdvxes in this section should be treated with 
caution since it might in fact refer to a single source (cp. the use o f the plural in the apparent reference 
to PI. cut. in Comm. 1.4.1).
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taken as genuine, and observes that the opening words promise to deal with far more 
than the defense speech alone. Wetzel (p. 397) believes that Xen. cannot be 
referring to PI. Ap. since Plato's Socrates figure cannot be said to be guilty of 
|i£yalT|yopia in spite of such disclaimers as the one that appears in §20E (jiTiôè èàv 
ôô^m XI ùpîv jiéya léyeiv).^® Gigon ([1946] 212) and Schmid (p. 224 n. 2) vote for 
Lysias as being the most likely candidate for consideration,^  ^and Busse (pp. 221-22) 
suggests Antisthenes and Aeschines since Polycrates would not have felt compelled 
to publish his Kaxnyopia in 393 unless works by these two Socratic writers were not 
already available. Vlastos (p. 292 n. 159) boldly names Plato, Lysias, Polycrates and 
possibly Theodectes as "the others". I believe that dXXoi might well refer to Plato, 
among others (see Essay C).
Marchant suggests that a complementai-y participle such as BaupdÇovxes be 
included with exuxov, but Thalheim refers to PI. R. 523B and Th. U.35.3 to justify its 
omission.
2, ‘Epjioyévns pévxoi 6 iTCTtoviKou èxaîpos xe fjv aûx«p: Hermogenes of Athens 
(PA 5123) was the illegitimate son of Hipponicus (PA 7658); the name of his mother 
is unknown. Hipponicus was a nephew of Cimon and husband of Pericles' ex-wife, 
and he served as a successful general during the Peloponnesian Wai*. According to 
many sources, he was also the richest Greek of this time due to his interests in the 
mines at Laurium, a fact which made him the tai*get of contemporaiy comic 
playwrights (Davies [1971] 262 and Swoboda 1908-9). Diogenes Laertius (2.121) 
makes Herm. the son of Crito, an error which seems to be due to Diogenes' huiiied 
reading of PI. Phd. 59B, where the name Hermogenes appears in close conjunction 
with the name Critobulus, Crito's son (Wellmann 2:40:56). Herm. was the half- 
brother of Hipparete, Alcibiades' wife, and of the rich Athenian nobleman Callias, 
whom Plato portrays as a lavish patron of the sophists in the Prt.'^ '^  Herm. himself 
was present at the death of Socrates {Phd. 59B), spoke with Socrates shortly before 
his trial {Comm. IV.8.4-10 & A/?. 2-3), and is mentioned by Xen. as being one of the
further notes (idem) that the author's conclusion concerning geyaXiiyopla and based on the 
writings o f others seems odd since he would have had ample opportunity to consult any o f tliose who 
were actually present at the trial, e.g. Hermogenes and the tons aXXons mentioned in Comm. IV.8.10. 
^®See Appendix D for a full treatment of this question. Wetzel's argument here is simply too 
subjective for serious consideration; For example, P. Meyer (col. 757) reaches the same conclusion 
because he finds so many general similarities between the two works.
Since Socrates supposedly rejected Lysias' speech (D.L. 2.40), it is unlikely, according to Vander 
Waerdt (pp. 16-17), that Xen. is referring to it in this section. This leaves PI. Ap. as the only remaining 
possibility in tlie aTcoXoyia genre referred to here.
2^See too PI. Ap. 20A, where he is described as sparing no expense on them, Ajc. 366C, where he plays 
host to Prodicus, and Xen. Smp. 1.5, where Socrates criticizes Callias for his expensive pursuit o f 
ao(j)ia as opposed to his own and his followers' interest in <|)iA,oao<j)ia.
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best-known followers of Socrates.^  ^ It is plausible that Herm. might have served as 
the Athenian ambassador to Tiribazus in 392 {HG IV.8.13), though this post would 
have pre-supposed some change in his status as a citizen, a change due perhaps to the 
re-enactment of Pericles' citizenship law during the later stages of the Peloponnesian 
War (see Davies [1971] 269-70).
Herm. also appears as an interlocutor in the Cm., which, combined with 
Xen.'s depiction of him in the Smp., provides a glimpse into his character: In the 
foiTuer, Herm. and Cratylus argue about semantics in the context of the vôpos-(})'6cas 
antithesis. Herm. believes that "names" (ôvôpata) are the arbitrary result of 
convention, while Cratylus holds that everything has "one natural and proper name, 
the same for Greeks and foreigners" (Guthrie [1978] 3:206). They refer the question 
to Socrates, who engages Heim, in the first part of the dialogue.^^ in 391C we learn 
that Heim, is not in possession of an inheritance from his father ( o 6 k  èyKpaTfis...'rc5v 
Tuatp c^ùv), the statement on which the assertion that he was a voOos and Callias' half- 
brother is based, a condition which seems also to account for his impoverishment and 
diminished social status in general. It should be added that Diogenes Laertius (3.6) is 
apparently thinking of this dialogue when he states that Heim, was an Eleatic 
philosopher and the teacher of Plato, who became acquainted with Paimenides 
through Hermogenes and with Heraclitus through Cratylus.^^
Xen. also portrays Heim, as being poor and describes his financial need in 
Comm. n.lO, where Diodorus (also described as Socrates' éralpos) is encouraged by 
Socrates to befriend Heim., who indeed proves to be a useful friend in helping 
Diodorus look after his domestic affairs. A Proclus scholion {in Cm. 21 Pasquali) 
seems to indicate that, at least according to Aeschines' characterization in the Socratic
^^Comm. 1.2.48 (see also ibid. II. 10.3-6 and Smp. 1.3,4.46-49, 6.1-4). [Most editors have adopted G. 
van Prinsterer's emendation "Hermogenes" for the manuscript reading "Hermocrates" in Comm. 1.2.48, 
but see Burnet (1911) xix n. 1.] Was Herm. a èxaîpos in the sense o f adhering to specific doctrines 
espoused by Socrates? For evidence of this kind o f following, see, for example, PI. Phd. 11 A , where 
Cebes is described as being reluctant to accept Socrates' arguments (see too PI. Ap. 21 A, where the 
word is used of Chaerephon in a neutral sense: [Xaipe<j)ôv] épôs xe éxaipos r\v èk  véon kqi ùpâv x^ 
7tA.f|8et). Xen. avoids using the word paOrixai for Socrates' followers, preferring instead such 
expressions as myyyiyvdpGvot (§5), aw ovxes {Comm. 1.1.5), èm xiiôeioi {ibid. 1.1.6), o'uvôiaxplpovxes 
{ibid. 1.2.3), ôpiXtixâ {ibid. 1,2.12), and crovfiGes (ibid. IV.8.2) (see Grillnberger 4-6). For comments 
on Sociates' followers, see §17; on his alleged role as a teacher, see §20.
"^^ Cp. Comm. III. 14.2-4 for Socrates' interest in defining terms. Plato's characterization o f Hermogenes 
is summarized by Dittmar (pp. 226-27) as follows: Plato zeichnet im Kratylos Hermogenes' geistige 
art [sic fo r  all capitalization], dieser ist wenig scharfsinnig, Sokrates weist ihn eintnal Jreundschaftlich 
zurecht, dafi er unaujmerksam sei (414B). er zeigt sich im dialog als guter, einfacher, weicher urui 
nachgiebiger mensch. von seiner gemUtsverfassmg, seinen dufieren verhdltnissen eifahren w ir einiges. 
mit einer gewissen animositdt dufiert er, dafi er im leben viel von schlechten menschen zu leiden 
gehabt und wenige gute menschen kennen gelem t habe. Sokrates stellt es so dar, als sei Hermogenes 
keineswegs in sein schicksal ergeben. ein oKoppa des Kratylos, das Hennogenes imverstdndlich 
bleibt, deutet er aus mit den worten: Hermogenes trachte zwar immer nach dem besitze von reichtum, 
ihn zu erlangen mifilinge ihm aber stets.
^^Natorp (1913). Allan (pp. 277-78) demonstrates that "Hermippus" should be substituted here for 
"Hermogenes", an apparent misreading.
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dialogue Telauges, Herm. tended to ignore such indigent (though worthy) 
companions as the fictional Pythagorean Telauges because of his own attraction to 
money: oxi 'Eppoyévps map' Km pm ôeÎTat ms %pT||idTmv p iim w  à p é À e i  t ô v
TTjlauyT) é t a lp o v  ô v x a  K a l x a p ie v x a  m ap em p a àSepdmenxov.^^ In Xen. Smp. 4.35, 
the Antisthenes character's reference to two brothers of different means (oi5a ô è  k o i  
àôsX(j)o6 s, 01 x à  ï a a  X a x ô v x e s  ô  p è v  aùxmv xàp K oû vxa  ë x e i  K a l m ep ix x eu o v x a  xf|S 
Ôamàvrjs, ô  Ôè m avxôs è v ô e îx a i )  applies perhaps to Callias and Herm., though this 
suggestion is admittedly tenuous (see Chroust [1957] 233-34 n. 85). Both brothers 
appear in Xen. Smp., which is set in Callias' house, and this chaiacterization of Herm., 
like Plato's, is also sympathetic: He is concerned about Callias' welfare (§§6.1 ff. & 
8.12), looks to the gods for comfort (§4.47 ff.), and appears to have few friends 
(§3.14). In §8.3 Socrates calls him omouôdtos, péxpios, mpçtos, and iXapos. '^^
Hermogenes is the only source which Xen. quotes by name in his Socratica 
(Chroust [1957] 233 n. 85: see too Hackforth 34), and Herm.'s report at the beginning 
of the Ap. should be closely compared with Comm. IV.8.4 ff., where Socrates raises 
the following points in response to his question, i.e., that his life has been more than a 
sufficient defense against the charges of his prosecutors, that to prepare a formal 
defense would be to act against his daimonic sign, that he will have died with his 
reputation among his friends and followers assured, that he has only the infirmities of 
old age to look forward to, and that shame will rest on his executioners, not on him, 
because of his innocence. It remains uncleai , of course, if, when, and how Herm. 
actually transmitted to Xen. the information given in Ap. 2 ff. and Comm. IV.8.4. ff. 
Was it sent by letter? Did Herm. meet Xen. while the latter was on campaign with the 
Spartans? Did he meet Xen. at his estate in Scillus or after his re-settlement in 
Corinth (or Athens)? Did Callias somehow relay what he had heard from his half- 
brother? These questions must perforce remain open.
Kai è^'nyyEiXe Tcepi anxon xoianxa: To understand the Ap., one must bear in mind 
that it is seen through Herm.’s eyes, whose perspective must somehow be explained: 
If his role in the work is in fact Xen.'s own creation, why would he choose to 
associate Herm. with Socrates in this particular setting? Whether or not he actually 
spoke with Socrates before the trial, were their attitudes nevertheless related in some 
way? Can Herm. be seen as an example of uncorrupted youth or as a model citizen in
2^For more information on this dialogue, see Dittmar 213 ff. Hermogenes’ attraction to money is also 
mentioned in Cra. 384C: o’tex a i yap [KpaxuXos] toms o e  xpnpdxmv è(|)i£|i8vov Kxnoems 
àîiOTuyxâvetv èKdaxoxe.
^^'EpixoyévTi ye pfiv xts nprnv o6k oî5ev ms, ô xt tüox’ èaxtv n KaXoKàya0ia, x^ xaûxns epmxt 
KQxaxTiKexai; où% ôpâxe ms OTto-uSdiat nèv aùxoû ai 6<}»pi!)Es, àxpepès Ôè xo ôppa, péxpiot Ôè ot 
Xôyot, TTpaeia ôè f| (|>rovT|, tlapôv ôè xô n^os; xots ôè aepvoxâxots Ôeots (j)iX.ots xpmpevos onôèv 
Ti|a,âs xots ctvOpmjions ÙKepopçi; See Dittmar 228 and Bruns 399 ff. for more on Xen.'s 
characterization o f Herm.
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general? I agree with Pangle (pp. 27-28) when he states that the two figures as 
presented by Xen. are linked by a strong sense of piety,28 though I begin to feel rather 
uneasy when he remarks 1) that Herm.'s diminished social status was the cause of his 
apparent highmindedness, 2) that Socrates, like Herm., had come to question the 
customary notion of KaXoKayaGla, or 3) that Heim, projected his own feelings onto 
his account of the trial proceedings {idem). Pangle returns to firmer ground when he 
supposes that Herm.’s highmindedness and reputation make him a good choice as a 
witness (p. 29), and that Socrates' speech is calculated to enrage most men but to 
appeal to those like Herm. (p. 33). Shero (p. 107) quite appropriately obseiwes that 
the characterizations of Herm. in PI. Cra. and Xen. Smp. do not give us any reason to 
question his reliability as a reporter.
The use of Heimogenes as a source lends credibility to Xen.'s report through 
its reference to an eye-witness,29 while it also allows the author some additional 
flexibility in his treatment of, and relationship to, the events described: Again, by 
using Hermogenes as his mouthpiece, Xen. is both responsible and, at the same time, 
not entirely responsible for the infoimation conveyed in the body of the Ap. A sort of 
framing device is in use here, with Xen. introducing Hermogenes as his source, who 
in turn relates the actual events of the trial. A similar framing device appears in the 
Comm., where the long series of dialogues is framed at beginning and end by 
references to Socrates' trial and where each dialogue in turn is introduced as being 
either a conversation at which Xen. himself was present or as one heard at second 
hand, with the source not always provided (cp. Plato's approach to composing the 
Phd.). The Smp., on the other hand, purpoits to be Xen.'s direct account of the events 
of a dinner party (§1.1: ots ôè jcapayevopevos xanxa yiyvdxjKco ôq^moat pouXopai), 
an event which took place at the house of Callias ca. 422, when Xen. was little more 
than a boy (see Pomeroy 215 and Waterfield 220). In this case, Xen. briefly 
introduces his personal voice into the text as a way of vouching for the accuracy of its 
contents and of removing any distance between the naiTator and the events related. 
Finally, the Oec. contains an example of a clearly demarcated conversation within a
28Can the Kaivà ôaijiôvia o f the indictment be equated, for example, with Herm.’s unnamed gods in 
Smp. 4.47?
^^Xenophon autem in sua Apologia novam materiem {sc. colloquium cum Hermogene] quae habitum 
Socratis ante indices probabiliorem redderet (Vrijlandt 66-67). See too Busse (p. 229), Sandbach (p. 
479), and Delebecque (p. 214), who suggests a similar purpose for the inclusion o f Hermogenes et td. 
in PI. Phd. Amim (pp. 72-73) supposes that Xen. included Socrates' speeches in the Hermogenes 
report to cover any o f his own variations from his other sources.
^®See Wilamowitz (1897) 100. Xen.'s intention o f distancing himself from his source is also supported 
by his less direct approach towards mtroducing the events to be related (e^nyyetÀe îtepi avxov  
xoiaûxa), as opposed to the more direct wording used in Comm. IV.8.4: ôè Kal d Eppoyévons
xoh ImovtKou TiKowa itepi aw on  (Oilier 95 n. 2). Delebecque (p. 214) believes that this is due to 
the fact that the events related in the latter work are set in a more distant past and were therefore less 
subject to the scrutiny o f Xen.'s contemporaries. Amim (pp. 31-32) wonders if  Xen. had possibly 
queried Hermogenes face-to-face in the interim, an event which would explain the omission in the Ap. 
o f the other wimesses mentioned in Comm. IV.8.10.
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conversation, with Xen. using Socrates' colloquy with Critobulus as a means of 
introducing the practical advice he once received from Ischomachus or, rather, re­
learned through the process of dvdpvriais. The narrative, however, does not return to 
the original conversation.^^
What is the effect of Xen.'s use of such narrative devices? In the case of the 
Ap. and Comm., they serve to lend each work a distinctly anecdotal, story-within-a- 
story quality which brings out the more personal aspect of Socrates' relationships with 
his many followers and which clearly joins the two works together as a distinct group. 
Xen.'s more direct narrative approach in the Smp. quite appropriately causes the 
events described to seem more vivid by ostensibly removing any "fictional" element 
in the narrative, while the structure of the Oec., with its one clearly articulated 
transition, removes the narrative to a more remote, more venerable past when 
upstanding noblemen like Ischomachus formed the backbone of a prosperous 
Athenian state. Again, Xen.'s claims that he was present during certain Socratic 
conversations can be generally disregarded as a nanative device used to lend an air of 
authenticity to the events in q u e s t i o n . ^ 2
It is important to note that, although Xen. does play a naiTative role in the Ap., 
he does not introduce himself as an actual witness to events as he does in the Smp., 
for example,33 ^nd it is perhaps worthwhile to speculate briefly on the nature of 
Hermogenes' actual influence on Xen. There are a number of references to Socrates' 
followers taking notes (see PI. Smp. 172C ff., Tht. 142D ff., Prm. 126C, and D.L. 2.48 
& 122), and Nickel (pp. 125-26) supposes that in some cases Socrates might have 
encouraged his students to write accurate accounts of his conversations by having 
them return to him for proper reconstruction, or that Xen. took notes during lectures 
while he was still in Athens. It is therefore plausible to assume that Xen. constructed
3llt  is tempting to consider here the possibility tiiat Socrates’ conversation with Heim, is based on 
Phaedo's conversation with Echecrates. Gigon ([1946] 216) believes that Xen.'s Socrates is to 
Hermogenes what Plato’s Socrates is to Simmias and Cebes, and suggests a possible connection 
between Herm. and the Thebans through a common belief in Pythagoreanism (recall too his connection 
with the Pytliagorean Telauges mentioned above). Gigon points out elsewhere (ibid. 214) that in PI. 
Cra. Herm. knows something about the doctrines of Protagoras and Euthydemus, while Diogenes 
Laertius (3.6) calls him a follower of Parmenides (see above).
^2See Breitenbach 1771-75,1779-81 & 1888. Opinions, as always, vary: Oilier (p. 95 n. 3) seems to 
belong to die Bumet-Taylor camp (see Appendix B) when he states that, because o f the seriousness o f  
the subject matter, the Herm. component could not possibly be a fiction. Amim (p. 10) describes the 
Hermogenes device as a blofie Einkleidung und Fiction (sic). Hackforth (pp. 37-38) remarks that, 
since three quarters o f the Ap. is in reported speech, we can therefore assume that, like the Comm., it is 
mostly Xen.'s invention. Frick (pp. 65-67) declares the Hermogenes conversation to be fictional 
because it is so un-Socratic, yet why, he asks (p. 67), should we criticize Xen. for what Plato does 
freely? nam cur Xenophonti id juris denegemus, quod sibi sumpsisse constat Platonem, cum sescenta 
colloquia facit Socratem habentem nutnquam ab eo habita?
8 3 a  narrative technique described as a A,oyoTe%viKÔv Té%vaa|xa by Toole (p. 6), and Pomeroy (216) 
observes that Xen. also inserts himself in a semi-narrative capacity into the openings of the Comm., 
Lac., Vect., Ages., and Eq. Vender Waerdt (p. 6) feels that Xen.'s false claims to have been present at 
certain conversations must have been characteristic of the Xoyot ZtoKpaxiKol genre.
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part or all of the Ap. by consulting his own notes and the notes of other Socratics, e.g. 
Hermogenes.34 There also remains the question of the extent to which Hermogenes 
can be considered a Xenophontic persona used to create an air of objectivity: Xen. 
used the third person in the A/i., for example, to offset his subjective approach and 
self-vindicatory tone, and the work was attiibuted to a non-existent Themistogenes of 
Syracuse (see HG III. 1.2).35 Of course, the Hermogenes figure lacks characterization 
in the Ap„ but he could represent Xenophon inasmuch as he fulfills the simple 
function of posing the question in §3 which lies at the basis of the entire work and 
which must have deeply troubled the exiled Xenophon: 0 \ ) k  èxpfjv pévxoi cncoTceîv, 
(S StoKpaxes, xal d xt àTtoA.oyfjcrp;
Xen.'s use of dialogue also bears some consideration. In the Ap. Socrates 
appears speaking successively with Hermogenes (§§3-9), Meletus (§§11-21), and 
Apollodorus (§28), while some sort of interaction is implied in Socrates' addresses to 
the dicasts (§§14-18 & 24-6) and his immediate followers (§§27-30). Again, Xen. 
Ap. differs from PI. Ap. in that dialogues appear both before and after the trial proper, 
and the Meletus dialogue resembles the Platonic version in its brevity of responses 
and would seem to represent, at least to some degree, this verbal exchange as it 
actually occurred. The undeveloped dialogues in Xen. Ap. can be explained by his 
limited purpose in writing it, the dating of which, if written early in Xen.'s career as 
an author, would also perhaps explain its sketchy, discursive nature in general. That 
Xen. Ap. contains dialogues of any kind can be explained by the supreme importance 
of the dialogue for the Adyoi ZcoKpaxiKoi genre (Bruns 232 ff.). The interlocutors in 
Xen. Ap. have a decidedly secondai y role, and their individual characters remain 
largely undeveloped: Hermogenes' youthful incredulity, Meletus' incisive 
questioning, and Apollodorus' unrestrained grief reveal themselves only briefly in the 
course of this short work, and it is only in Xen.'s other Socratica that the 
characterization of the interlocutors is at least somewhat successful. In general, the 
characterization of individuals (including Socrates, whose personality remains 
singulaiiy flat) is conspicuously lacking in Xen., though a few good examples can be 
found in Comm. II. 1 (Aristippus), II.7 (Aristarchus), HI.6 (Glaucon), in. 11 
(Theodote), and IV.2 (Euthydemus). This lack of characterization consigns them to 
the role of acting as mere literaiy devices (Waterfield 57-58).
Again, any use of such narrative tools in the Socratica depends on the author's 
intentions regarding the question of subjectivity vs. objectivity. Xen.'s involvement 
in Socratic conversations appears in Comm. 1.2.53,1.3.8,1.4.2-18,1.6.11-14, II.4.1-7,
34vrijlandt (p. 20) cites Comm. IV.8.10 as evidence that Xen. talked with other Socratics about the 
trial.
35see Momigliano 57. Nickel (pp. 15-18) mentions similar personae: Euthydemus {Comm. 1V.2), 
Ischomachus (Oec. 1 ff.), Tlieopompus {An. U .l .12-13), Tigranes {Cyr. III. 1.38), and Callistratus {HG  
VI.3.10-17).
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IL5.1-5, II.7.1, IL9.1, n.10.1, ni.3.1, IV.3.2-17, IV.4.5, and IV.5.2, while, of the forty 
conversations that occur in this work, five are introduced by iiKouoa and 
mpeyevopTiv, five by oiôa, one by èôÔKei è|ioi Xéymv, and one as a direct report by 
Hennogenes (Field 140 n. 1). In spite of his brief assertions to the contrary, it is 
unlikely that Xen. was present either at the dinner party described in the Smp.
(because of his age) or at the conversation related in the Oec. (because of his presence 
at the Battle of Cunaxa), though it is important to note again that he does not portray 
himself as actually having participated in these dialogues (see Pomeroy 215 & 250).
In general, however, Xen. intioduces himself into the text very rarely (note, for 
example, his single appeaiance in Comm. 1.3.8-15). Although his acknowledged 
presence at a dialogue would seem to entail a greater responsibility for its accuracy 
(Burnet [1911] ix), the fact that the conversations usually remain dialogues, that no 
introductory remarks are made, that the interlocutors are often left unnamed, and that 
Xen. provides few concrete data on Socrates' life, makes it unlikely that Xen. was 
really there, and it would consequently be a mistake to rely on his statements in the 
Ap. and Comm, that he is recording real conversations.^^ it is important to recall that, 
when it came to reports of speeches or conversations, Greek historians allowed 
themselves a considerable degree of latitude (Field 142), and that oral tradition was 
still considered a trustworthy source of infonnation, hence such "subjective" naiTative 
devices in Xen. as TiKouaa etc. (Pomeroy 215). It should be added finally that there 
aie some scholars (see, for example, Taylor [1932] 17) who quite rightly feel that the 
vindicatory purpose of the Ap. and Comm, undermines their historical validity to 
some degree, which in turn undeimines the use of Xen. as a conti ol on the Platonic 
Socrates.
3. OuK éxpTÎv jiévxoi o’K07tsîv...Kat ô tt  àîcoXoyfioTi; Socrates' attitude towards 
preparing a formai defense is echoed in Pl. Ap. 17C (àXX aKOuaea0E eIkt] A^yopEva 
X0ÎS ETCixuxoûcyiv ôvôpacyiv)32 and in the story that he turned down Lysias' speech for 
his defense (D.L. 2.40), while Maximus of Tyre (3.5-8) maintains that he did not even 
bother to defend himself in court, a righteous attitude mirror*ed by the Xenophontic 
Socrates' refusal in §23 to propose a counter-penalty and to kowtow to the dicasts.38
3^See Chroust [1957] 9-10 and Hackforth 33 (see too Kahn 32-33). Chroust, who takes an extreme 
view in these matters {ibid., pp. 10-11), maintains that the interlocutors appearing in the Comm, are 
invented, substituted, or even wantonly connected with the events described.
3'^There is a distinction, however, as Vrijlandt (p. 71) notes: [Apud Xenophontem Socrates] omnia 
causidicorum anificia [spernit].... Socrates [autem] Platonicus non tneditatus est quomodo diceret...; 
quid diceret portasse antea commentatus est. Hoc enim eum nonfecisse disertis verbis non legitur apud 
Platonem. Schanz (p. 80) maintains that, when Xen.'s Socrates says that he has dispensed with any 
preparation, this is an offhanded reference to the superior prose in PI. Ap.
38cp. PI. Ap. 38D. In Grg. 521D ff. Socrates describes how helpless he would be if he ever appeared 
at court.
51
In Comm. IV.4.10 Socrates states that deeds speak more loudly than words (see 
below), and Ischomachus (Oec. 11.22) seems to speak for Socrates when he says that 
being a good citizen serves as the best defense.39 in short, Socrates refuses here to 
dignify the prosecutors' charges with a form ally prepared response."^ ®
0x1 ovÔev ctôtKov 6tay£yévr\\iat jtoiâv; This is offered as an explanation of 
peXsxœv ô ia p e p ic o K é v a i above (see §5 and Comm. IV.8.4-6) and can be seen as a 
general refusal to admit any wrongdoing w hatsoever.X en. takes great pains to 
point out that Socrates instilled virtue in his followers by example and that he not 
only was interested in leading them through the relatively unsophisticated 
Xenophontic dialectic to consider the right course of action but also actively 
encouraged them to act in accordance with these p r i n c i p l e s . "^2 With regard to the 
phrase o ù ô è v  d ô iK o v , it would be worthwhile briefly to summarize the Xenophontic 
Socrates’ views on xo ô iK a ïo v  as set out in Comm. IV.4: Xen. points out that Socrates 
set a public example through his good citizenship, which consisted in being 
considerate in private and law-abiding in public. Xen. brings up Socrates' actions 
during the affairs concerning the prosecution of the Arginusae generals en masse and 
the time when he was ordered by the Thirty to an*est Leon of Salamis and expropriate 
his estate; he also refused to obey the unlawful authority of the Thirty when they 
forbade him to speak with the young (see Comm. 1.2.32-38). That Socrates also 
refused to ingratiate himself with the dicasts by an emotional plea is also mentioned, 
though this type of behavior is not in fact said to be illegal in either of the two 
contemporary a7coA,oylai (but see Comm. IV.4.4). The actual dialogue in Comm.
IV.4 is between Socrates and Hippias of Elis, who presses the former to reveal his 
opinions on what constitutes right behavior. Socrates immediately falls back on the 
position under discussion (§IV.4.10: o\)k iiaSrioai oxi èycb d ôokeî poi ôiKaia eivai 
oùôèv Ttauopai dnoSeiKviJiievos; ...^ oi) 6ok8î aor d^ioxeKpapxoxEpov xob Xoyov
39où yap ÔOKCÔ ao i, e<}>Ti, coZàKpaxes, a m à  xaûxa ÔiaxeXeîv p elexôv , à7EoA,oy8ia0ai pèv ôxi 
oùSéva àôiicœ, eu 6è ï ïo k b  jtoXXoùs ôaov dv Ôûvojiiai, Kaxnyopeiv Ôè o v  ô o k ô  aot pelexâv  
àvGpcwtüov, àôiKoûvxas pèv k o i  lôiçt noXA.ohs Kai xnv ttô X iv  Kaxajxav0âvœv xivds, eu ôè ïïoioûvxas 
oùôéva; In a different vein, Plato's Socrates (Ap. 31C) describes his poverty as being a sufficient 
witness to the fact that he has never accepted a fee, and Toole (p. 6) alludes to Gorg. Pal. 15 as another 
example of t o  è%r%elpiipa xoO Ttpoxèpou àveTtiX-fiTtTOu piou.
40por general remarks on Socrates' unpreparedness, see Guthrie (1978) 4:87-88.
'^^Socrates' righteousness is stressed throughout the Ap., e.g. in §§22 & 25-26 (see too Comm. 1.2.62- 
64 & IV.4.1-2).
^2por fmther examples, see §§17-18 & Comm. 1.4.1 (on his influence on his followers), 1.6 (on 
Socmtes' lifestyle), 1.2.1-8 (on his personal habits), IV.6 (on first principles derived through dialectic), 
IV.7 (on inculcating self-sufficiency in his followers), Smp. 4.56-64 (on Socrates' role as a 
philosophical "procurer"), 8 (on noble vs. ignoble love as a protreptic to induce Callias to take a more 
active part in politics), 9.1 (for Lyco's telling remark on the preceding: Nfi xqv "Hpav, é  Zmxpaxes, 
KaXos ye xayaGos ôoKeis pot dvGpcoitos eiva i, an extraordinary statement if  this Lyco is indeed to be 
identified with the prosecutor: see Waterfield 221 n. 1), Oec. 2.14-18 (on Socrates' hesitation to offer 
advice to Critobulus), and 3.6-7 (on Socrates' view that observation is the best advisor: cp. ibid. 16.3- 
5).
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to epyov elvai;), and his right conduct is corroborated by more examples of not 
having done wrong, i.e. of not having committed perjury, of not having acted as a 
sycophant, and of not having caused dissension of any kind either privately or 
publicly. When challenged by Hippias to define the Right positively instead of 
negatively, Socrates equates it with the Lawful (cp. Comm. IV.6.5-6) and proceeds, 
after a brief objection by Hippias about the instability of human laws, to praise law as 
the basis of civilized society and to put it on a higher footing by establishing the 
divine origins of all human laws, which all men share in common through a divine 
agency which can even transcend language barriers. Hippias must finally yield to 
Socrates' assertion that the Right must be equated with the Lawful, and we can 
therefore interpret the phrase in question as referring in Xen.'s eyes to Socrates’ 
unimpeachable conduct as an Athenian citizen and particularly to his adherence to the 
laws, a quality which he shares to a large degree with Plato's Socrates.
Aristophanes {Nu. 112-18) has the character Strepsiades encourage his son 
Phidippides to learn the àôiKos loyos from the philosopher so that he can prevail 
against Strepsiades' creditors in court. It is indeed difficult to associate the 
conservative, voyeuristic opinions espoused by the SIkoios loyos in 1. 961 ff. with 
anything remotely Socratic, yet the generally anti-democratic tone of the speech 
accords with some statements made by the Socrates figure in Plato and Xen. (see, for 
example, Prt. 319B ff. and Comm, in.7.6). On the other hand, the speech of the 
ctôiKos A.6yos in 1. 1036 ff., which is presented as corresponding to the doctrines 
taught at the ([)povtioTfipiov, endorses a hedonistic lifestyle to be won by rhetorical 
trickery, and in fact the whole exchange resembles a comically distorted version of 
the story of Hercules' choice between ’Apetfi and Kaxia attributed to Prodicus and 
related in Comm. n. 1.21-34. The Cri. should also be considered in discussing 
Socrates' notion of to Sixaiov since, as shown above, Xen.'s Socrates equated the 
Right with the Lawful: After dismissing Crito's objections to his refusal to flee, which 
are based on the opinions and power of the majority, Socrates goes on to utter his 
famous dictum about living well (§48B: où to i^jv Tcepl TtA.elotoo Ttoiritéov àXXà to 
en Çîjv), a life which consists in never wronging anyone else, even in retribution 
(§49C). For Socrates, right action is above all else dictated by the contract between 
the individual and the laws of the polis (as embodied in this dialogue by the 
personified Laws).
4. 6p&s t a  ’AGqvaiov ôiKaortripia KtX.: A reference to the forensic practices 
of the day, which relied far more on rhetorical effect than on hard evidence (see PL 
Ap. 34B-35D & 38D-E). In Comm. IV.4.17 Socrates states that the vopipos (=
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SIkoios: see the comment on §3) will naturally prevail in court, a belief which, in 
addition to his reliance on the daimonic sign, might account for his self-confidence 
before the trial. Vrijlandt (pp. 138-39) notes the choice of the active verb 
aTcoKTEiveiv here (versus the passive use of à7to9vf|oiceiv)^3 ^nd remarks elsewhere 
(pp. 72-73) on Socrates' excited tone in his private conversation with Hermogenes, as 
opposed to the Platonic Socrates' more subdued tone in court. The corrupt practice of 
winning favor with the dicasts by emotional appeals is first mentioned here (see the 
comment on §23), a topic to which Socrates also devotes a considerable portion of his 
speech in PI. Ap. (see the reference above).
In conversation Professor Halliwell has pointed out to me the potentially anti­
democratic tenor of Hermogenes' remarks. I would agree with this insofar as we can 
imagine him feeling deprived of his rightful inheritance under the Athenian 
government, and in light of Xen. and Plato's portrayal of him, it would be possible, 
perhaps, to imagine his remai'ks as resulting from a related sensitivity towai’ds the 
corrupt practices of the democracy in general (see the comment on §2).
jtapax0évTEs: Brylinger (ap. Thalheim) suggests TapaxôévTes as a possible 
emendation.
evavTionxai p,ot x6 ôaipôviov: See Appendices A and C. Perhaps Socrates' 
interrupted preparations for the trial resembled Ischomachus' techniques for keeping 
himself in practice for the law courts (see Oec. 11.23-24).
5. H OanjiacTxov vojit^eis s i  Kat xô  Oeô ôoKet èpè péXxtov etva t t\ôt| 
xelGDx&v; The reasons for this view aie given in §§5-9, which form one of the 
longest sections in the Ap. based on a single theme and are to be understood as an 
explanation for Xen.'s |X8ya?iTiyopla thesis as introduced in §1. The word xai here is 
important in that it indicates divine affirmation of what Socrates himself believes, 
namely, that it would be nobler (pélxiov) for him to die at this point (tîôti) after what 
he and his associates consider to have been a distinguished life. The reasons provided 
for his willingness to die are the following: 1) He has reached the height of his 
reputation among his followers, 2) he is secure in the knowledge that he has led a 
virtuous life, 3) he is at the threshold of decrepitude, 4) his death at this point will be 
easiest for all concerned, 5) the gods have indicated their wishes by preventing him 
from offering a foraial defense, and 6) he would prefer to keep his self-image intact
43See Xen. Ap. 2 6 ,2 9  and PI. Ap. 35A, 38C, 39C-D, 41C. Vrijlandt (p. 139) notes a particularly 
strong tone in Plato's use o f the word: Videor mihi in Apologia Platonis ipsum Platonem audire qui 
iudicibus exprobat quod Socratem interfecerunt.
54
rather than to face the prospect of a prolonged life to be lived in a way innappropriate 
to a free-born citizen. In §10 Xen. specifically points out that these thoughts formed 
the basis of Socrates' speech given in court. His readiness to die is mentioned again 
in §23 with no reference to divine influence (xa'i xaipov qÔT| evopr^Ev èaritô 
TElEDxôv), and this is given as the reason for his refusal to propose a counter-penalty. 
To those who wish to spirit him away after the trial, he jokingly replies that he knows 
of no place outside Attica to which death does not have access (cp. Cri. 53D-E). He 
further states in §26 that his having been put to death wrongly will have its inevitable 
consequences and by comparing his own situation to that of Palamedes implies that 
he will also enjoy a similar sort of mythical immortality after his death. Xen. 
comments on his calm demeanor as he exits the court (§27). To console his 
followers, Socrates points out to them that all mortals ai*e destined to die and that they 
should in fact be rejoicing since he is dying under the best possible circumstances. 
Again, he uses the occasion to tease one of his followers in order to dispel the 
prevailing sense of gloom (§28: cp. §23). On the basis of Homer's belief concerning 
the prophetic powers given to a man about to end his life (see II. 16.851-61 & 22.358 
ff.), Socrates prophesies the fate of Anytus' son in §§29-31, a prophecy which, 
according to Xen., eventually came tme. The conclusion of the Ap. (§§32-34) 
contains Xen.'s opinion that Socrates did indeed die opportunely and that he showed 
great fortitude in the face of death."^ "^
An examination of PI. Ap. yields somewhat different results:
1) In approaching any life-and-death situation, one should consider one thing 
only, whether one is acting rightly or wrongly. Once a man has taken his stand, 
he is bound to remain there, as Socrates did at Potidaea and elsewhere (32A-E & 
38E-39B).
2) The prospect of dying is nothing compared to disobeying one's divine calling 
(29A/D, 30B-C & 37E-38A).
3) Being afraid of death is the same as professing knowledge which one does not 
have, and while to do wrong is certainly dishonorable, death may in fact be a 
blessing (29A-B: cp. Cri. 43D).
4) A better man cannot be banned by a worse, even through death (30C-D & 41C- 
D).
5) Some defendants go to incredible lengths to preseiwe their lives, as though they 
would become immortal somehow if they were not put to death, i.e., death is 
inevitable (35A).
‘^^ Comm. IV.8.1 introduces no new information regarding Socrates' views on death.
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6) Men on the verge of death are said to have the gift of prophecy, and in this case 
Socrates foresees the evil reputation which the Athenians will gain for having put 
an innocent man to death (39C).
7) Death is either an annihilation or a migration of the soul: The former would 
resemble the soundest sleep and therefore something quite pleasant, whereas if the 
latter is true, Socrates will have the opportunity to converse with great figures in 
the underworld (40C-41C & 42A).
Although a willingness to die is not mentioned in PL Ap. per se, it nevertheless 
shares many similarities with Xen. Ap. regarding Socrates' attitude towaids death, 
including his insistence on right action, his refusal to make any effort to save himself 
at all costs, his acquisition of the gift of prophecy, the inevitability of death, the 
benevolent role of the Divine in the outcome of the trial (cp. Cri. 54E), the 
vindication of his life in generations to come, and his levity and calm manner in 
general (cp. ibid. 43A ff.). More specifically, the statements in 34E (on pot ôoKet 
KaXov etvat èpè xomcov oùôèv Tcotetv xat TqXtKovôe ôvxa xal xoùxo xoùvopa 
e%ovxa) and 38C (et yoùv Tceptepetvaxe ôXtyov xpôvov, àno xoù aùxopàxou dv 
ùptv xoùxo èyévexo' ôpâxe yàp ôf] xf\v ùA-tKtav ôxt Tioppco f^ ôx) èaxt xoù pion 
Qavdxou ôè è7yùs)45 seem to echo Xen.'s concerning the opportuneness of Socrates' 
death, though this comparison is somewhat tenuous. In any event, it remains clear 
that Socrates' aiTOgant tone was incomprehensible to Xen., hence his need to discover 
a cause for it, whether real or imagined.
Of all the Socratica, the Phd. provides us with the most specific and extended 
account of Socrates' attitude towards death."^  ^ Common points with Xen.'s Ap. 
include the benevolent influence of the Divine on Socrates' fate (58E) and his calm 
beaiing in general (passim). Additional views include the need to fulfill one's 
religious duties before death (60D-61C & 118A) and the impermissibility on religious 
grounds of committing suicide as a means of accelerating the separation of mind from 
body (61C ff.: cp. Crito's statement concerning paternal obligations in Cri. 45C-D).
A philosopher should not fear death 1) since his life can be seen as a life-long 
endeavor to shun the corporeal side of his nature in favor of a more contemplative 
life-style, which can be seen as a preparation for the permanent separation of soul 
from body (63E-69E),47 and 2) since the soul is immortal (70C-77D, 78C-84B &
45Seealso Cri. 43C, 53D-E 8c Phd. 116E-117A
■^^Tayior ([1949] 177) sums up the main lesson o f this dialogue as being twofold, i.e., that mental Ufe 
is not the effect o f bodily causes and that physical reality is not explicable in purely mechanical terms. 
Metzger (p. 313) describes it as follows: [D ie tnenschliche Existenz] wird [von Sokrates] als Wille zum 
Freisein von der Macht der Sterblichkeit fiber unsere Existenz verstanden, als welche sie identisch mit 
Denken ist.
“^ ^This view is summed up nicely in 67D-E.
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102A-107B). A philosopher should therefore continually strive to free himself from 
this fear (77D-78B & 114D-115A) and to purify his soul (80C-84B)ri^ Finally, the 
vivid myth at the conclusion of the Phd. (107C-115A) describes three levels of 
existence after death: a purgative one in the underworld, a temporary spectral 
existence in the mundane world, and a blessed after-life in the supra-raundane world. 
Nothing in Xen.'s Socratica resembles this myth.
Navia ([1984] 59) has observed that, although Socrates leaves the question of 
the immortality of the soul open in PI. Ap., it is not treated at all in Xen., and that 
contemporary doctrines on this matter seem therefore to have left Xen. 
unconvinced."^  ^ Since it remains unclear, then, to what extent Xen.'s Socrates could 
look forward to an afterlife, pleasant or otherwise, it becomes even more necessaiy to 
consider the thesis that, by approaching his trial as he did, he was essentially 
committing suicide in order to avoid the onset of decrepitude.^  ^ Since Xen.'s main 
purpose in writing the Ap. was to treat Socrates' peyaXriYopia, there can be no doubt 
that, under the circumstances, he considered the verdict to be a foregone conclusion 
and Socrates' approach to his defense to be essentially one of self-destmction (or 
-immolation, as the case may be).5i So much is cleai*. Whether or not this approach 
constituted an actual act of suicide has been the object of much debate. In addressing 
Socrates' problematical statements on suicide in Phd. 61B-69E, Dorter {passim) 
agrees with the traditional inteipretation of Plato's view, that is, that death is indeed 
preferable to life (cp. Lg. 828D), especially for a philosopher, but that suicide is 
nevertheless unacceptable. Dorter (pp. 35-36) draws an interesting compaiison 
between Socrates' refusal to leave his material prison in Athens and his refusal, as 
expressed in the Phd., to leave the corporeal prison represented by his body, both of 
which attitudes seem to stem from his sense of duty to a higher authority. Walton (p.
"^ S^ee also 64A-B and also Nu. 94, where the pliilosopher's peXeTp Gavaion (cp. Phd. 81 A) is the 
object o f ridicule.
"^ S^ee too Dover (1974) 261-68. With the exception of Orphism and philosophy, belief in a dualistic 
eschatology was largely lacking, with the result that the Greeks viewed the prospect o f an afterlife with 
a similar sense of ambivalence (Garland, p. 432). [For the influence o f Orphism on Socrates' belief in 
immortality, see Burnet (1911) 1-li and Taylor (1949) 175.] But consider Comm. IV.3.14 (avSpoMtou 
ye  n, eiTtep t i  Kal aX,A,o xt&v àv0po)7tivo)v, xoD 0eiou jxexexei) and the expansion of this idea in 
Cyr. Vni.7.17 ff., ideas which might have been borrowed from Plato or another Socratic, perhaps even 
from Hermogenes himself (see Bumet [1911] li-ii). Note too that, although Xen. believed in a 
soul/body dichotomy (see Comm. 1.2.53, III.13.1 & El. 14.7), Plato's concept o f an afterlife in which 
the soul is subjected to a continual purgation in preparation for a subsequent corporeal existence is 
entirely lacking in Xen. W hile most scholars conclude that Socrates believed in an afterlife, 
McPherran (pp. 250-71) detects only a tentative, hopeful note in the evidence, and this attitude, 
combined with the notion o f Socratic ignorance, causes him to conclude that Socrates held an agnostic 
position on this issue.
^^Athenian views on suicide were ambivalent (Dover [1974] 168-69: see too the relevant articles by 
Duff, Frey, Lesser, Smith, and Walton in the bibliography). For the problems associated with old age, 
see, for example. Comm. II. 8.2 ff. and Phd. 66C.
5lVlastos (p. 292) believes that, since Xen. found it difficult to believe that Socrates was unable to 
persuade the jury, he had to conclude that he had deliberately provoked it (see too Frick 81 and 
Appendix D).
57
292) concisely states the view traditionally imputed to Xen. in the Ap. : “Xen. would 
apparently have us believe that Socrates was responsible for his own death, and that 
Athens’ judiciary was merely the instrument he chose to achieve his demise.”^^  
Vrijlandt (p. 73), citing PI. Ap. 38C (see above) & 41C (àXXà Kal ùpâs %pÉ, m 
ctvSpes ÔiKaaxai, eùéXmÔas eivai Tcpôs xôv Gdvaxov), concludes that Socrates was 
indeed willing to die, and Hackforth (p. 40) finds the former passage particularly 
convincing. Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 38 & 41) believe that "the Platonic 
Socrates' own moral and religious commitments...require him to undertake a sincere 
and effective defense to his jury." Vlastos (pp. 291-92) dismisses Xen.'s 
peyaA.Ti'yopla theory on similar- grounds, since this would have caused the jui-y to 
commit a grave injustice, i.e. the conviction of an innocent man, and this in 
contradiction to Socrates' well-attested integiity.53 As opposed to Brickhouse and 
Smith, Guardini (pp. 59-60) finds religious convictions to be the very reason for 
Socrates' willingness to die and states elsewhei-e (pp. 68 & 106, respectively) that "in 
a char acter of such a strong vitality and such positive intellectual clarity there can be 
no question of any morbid craving for death" and that "it may well be that an inmost 
'will to die' is at work in him, ....no longer anything ethical, not even the ethos of 
philosophical responsibility, but something metaphysical and religious, which bursts 
all bounds of 'must' and 'may'." In Vander Waerdt's view (p. 20), the behavior of 
Xen.'s Socrates "does not represent an ignoble escape from the debility of old age but 
rather an act of benefaction intended to reveal to the jury and to posterity his 
understanding of justice". Geffcken (p. 41) reminds us quite appropriately of the 
possibility of considerable coloring on the part of our sources.^ "^
I feel that Chroust ([1957] 107) is largely corTect in saying that Xen. was 
probably overreaching the historical Socrates' actual intentions by saying that he was 
actually seeking his own condemnation and execution, and after countless readings of 
the text I continue to differ with the contention that Xen.'s Socrates was seeking a 
type of suicide through judicial process. Xen.'s figure does indeed find death 
preferable to life, and this accounts for the megalegorical tone of his speech in court 
(§1). A distinction needs to be carefully drawn, however, between finding the 
thought of death comforting and actively seeking it out, and this ambivalence towards 
the results of the trial is cleai-ly expressed in §9: Kal ijv èyco ôo^av ë%co Ttepl 
èpauxon, xaùxpv ava^alvmv el papnvô xoùs ÔiKaaxds, alpfjaopai xe%euxâv
^^This view ignores the significance of the daimonic, however. See Appendix C.
^3 Vlastos (p. 291) seems to sit on the fence, however, by writing that Xen.'s Socrates intended to 
"enhance the chances of conviction" by his behavior in court, a guarded statement.
^^Man hat von Sokrates' Todessehnsucht in der [platonischen] 'Apologie'gesprochen, mit Recht. Aber 
aiich diese Stimmung ist nicht 'sokratisch'. D ie poetische Ausmalmg eines zukünftigen 
Forscherdaseins im Jenseits erscheint nicht nur als ein Ausbruch platonischen GefUhlslebens, sondern 
vielmehr als ein Symptom jugendlicher Innerlichkeit, als Nachwirkung von Sokrates' erhabenem Tod. 
Es wdre nicht weniger menschlich als antik empfunden.
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pôtXA-ov T\ dveXeuOépms xô Çf^ v ëxi Tcpoaaixôv Kepôâvai xôv 7coA,ù xelpo) ptov dvxl 
Oavdxou. The role of the daimonic must also be taken into consideration in any 
discussion of Socrates' "suicide".
To what extent can Xen.'s explanation of Socrates' behavior be justified? 
Socrates' words in Xen. Ap. 5-7 closely resemble those of his counterpart in PL Ap. 
41D (à X k à  poi Ôijlôv èaxi xoùxo, ôxi îjôri xeOvdvai Kal d7xn%A,d%6ai Tipaypdxcov 
péXxiov îjv pot), where the word rtpdypaxa can be interpreted more generally as 
referring to the concerns associated with Socrates' advanced age. The Platonic 
Socrates also seems at least to sympathize with the notion of dying when life has 
nothing left to offer,55 but besides a justification in Lg. 873C of suicide under the 
conditions of unrelieved pain or an intolerable sense of shame, there is no direct 
reference in Plato to suicide as a means of ending the sufferings associated with old 
age.^  ^ How, then, are we to understand Xen.'s conclusion? Guthrie ([1978] 3:404) 
explains Xen.'s motives by asserting that he was "bothered by the fear that the divine 
voice might be thought a delusion because Socrates made a point of having received 
no warning from it about his approaching trial, when in fact he was condemned to 
death" (see Comm. IV.8.1), a point which seems to ascribe a certain life-and-death 
nature to the daimonic which cannot be supported by the pre-trial references to it (see 
Appendix C): This argument would only be valid if death were necessarily an 
absolute evil. Oilier (p. 97) believes that Xen. has perhaps arrived at this conclusion 
because of his own youthful outlook and the attitude towards youth among the Greeks 
in g e n e r a l . One should also recall that Xen. stresses throughout his Socratica the 
practical, soldierly virtues of self-discipline, self-sufficiency, and the realization of 
one's potential. Equal value is placed on the correct use of the body, with physical 
health becoming for Xen. a value in itself^  ^and its maintenance the responsibility of a 
good leader (see, for example. Comm. II. 1 and Cyr. H. 1.20 ff.). Finally, the issue of 
cûôé^ta is particularly relevant here: Every object is good only inasmuch as it fulfills 
its intended purpose, and this also holds true for human traits and abilities. This
^^See Cri. 43B, 47E, 48B, 53D-E, Phd. 117A, and Grg. 505A; for aging in general, see Grg. 512D-E  
and/?. 328D-329D.
^^See Dover ([1974] 267), who discusses (he Greeks' perception o f death as the end o f suffering and 
cites relevant passages.
5^See too Dover (1974) 104-105. Joël (2:532-33) cites the following Xenophontic passages on aging 
nobly: Lac. 10.1 ff., Ages. 10.4,11.14-16, Cyr. VIU.7.6, Oec. 7.42-43, and Cyn. 12.1, all o f which, in 
Joël's opinion, smack of Antisthenes. Heinz (ap. Frick 88 n. 1) notes that Socrates' Todessehnsucht 
seems odd in light of the many notable Greeks who had lived well into their nineties (e.g. Solon, 
Thales, Pittacus, Aeschylus, Gorgias, Sophocles et al.). For examples o f Greek views on death, see 
Anacreon 395 and Mimnermus 1 & 2 (Diehl); for a rather quaint, though enjoyable, treaunent o f the 
melancholy side of the Greek temperament, see Butcher 133-76.
58See Comm. III. 12 for a discussion o f ene^ia vs. xaxe^ia.
^^See Oec. 1.1-15, where olKovopia is defined as knowledge o f the 6p0q xpfjais o f one's property. 
For a fuller discussion o f cô(î)éA,eia, see the comment on §34 below. For Frick (p. 19), utilitas drives 
Socrates' behavior in court, that is, since life is the highest good for a man o f Xen.'s type, he projects
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point is frankly stated in Comm. 1.2.53 ff., where relatives are described as ridding 
themselves of, i.e. burying, a loved one as quickly as the animated component (ii/DXÉ) 
has left his body, and in the following section, where humans are described as quite 
happily ridding themselves, even while alive, of such bodily growths as callouses 
which are of no use to them whatsoever.^® Xen.'s emphasis is here, as elsewhere, on 
the practical.
Note finally the conspicuously defensive tone created by the repetition of the 
word Oanpaaxov in Socrates' reply to Hermogenes, a word repeated in §§11, 21, and 
25 to express both incredulity and a sense of obviousness.®^
"HiSeiv ooicos jiot Kat ôiKaicos anavxu. xov ptov peptconévov: The verb jiôeiv 
seems to fly in the face of Socratic ignorance, though it does in fact correspond to the 
Xenophontic Socrates' professed ability to instill virtue in his followers (see §20), 
while the adverbs ooicDS and ôiKatos conespond respectively to the impiety and 
corruption-of-the-youth charges of the indictment (see §10).® 2 For a discussion of the 
Xenophontic Socrates' notion of to Sikoiov, see the comment on §3 above. Its 
countei-pai’t to ooiov represents the same sense of order as it exists outside the human 
realm,®3 and although it is tempting to connect this statement in some way with the 
oracle-inspired divine mission elaborated in PI. Ap. 20D-24C, there is unfortunately 
very little in Xen.'s Socratic works to justify such a comparison (see the comment on 
§14). At most, Xen.'s Socrates figure sees the oracle's pronouncement as an 
affirmation of, not as an impetus for, his philosophical activities.
What, then, does this Socrates believe to be a pios ôaicos PePico|xévos? For 
now, I will limit the answer to this question to those views on religion which appear
this outlook onto his Socrates figure and concocts the latter's willingness to die before the onset o f old 
age.
®®Chroust ([1957] 127-28) believes that the idea that practically useless persons or things should be 
discarded is o f Cynic origin, and that Socrates’ statement tliat a corpse, or soulless body, should be 
buried without ceremony can be connected with Antisthenes' disregard for the material (see too Cyr. 
VIII.7.25 for Cyrus' similar views on the dead). Chroust ([1957] 23 & 106-108) also sees in Socrates' 
willingness to die the influence of an original Antisthenian consolatio mortis (see Ax. 367B ff., which 
shows a similar influence, and D.L. 6.5 & 6 ,68 , which describe Antisthenian attitudes towards death); 
according to Chroust, this consolatio was designed to dispel the fear o f  death by depicting the horrors 
of old age. Joël (2:538) feels that, in spite o f their differenct backgrounds, the influence o f Antisthenes 
on Xen. is a well-founded assumption: Es ist also keine Frage, dafi in dem Junker, Offizier und 
Landwirt Xenophon der Pietdts- und Anciennitdtssinn stark ausgeprdgt war, aber es ist auch keine 
Frage, dafi er sich mit diesen Gefuhlen in den Idealen des Antisthenes wiederfand, der die 
Feudalstaaten des Lykurg und des Kyros gepriesen.
®^Cp. the similar use o f GauiiaaTOv in Comm. 1.1.1.
®2See the comment on §10 and also Comm. 1.2.37, where the two spheres are closely linked (see too 
Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 92 & 99).
®3After a careful analysis of the Euthphr., McPherran (p. 71) sums up Socrates' beliefs 
regarding piety as follows: Pious acts are a species of just acts, whose performance is a 
service to tlie gods which assists them with their work productive of a good result, and all 
these elements exist in the context o f a limited agnosticism that precludes their specification 
n full detail.
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elsewhere in Xen.'s Socratica and which are often structured in such a way that the 
notion of worship develops naturally from some proof of the gods' existence. Each 
set of views appears in its own respective context as follows:
- Comm. 1.3.1-4: Socrates is said to have advised his associates to follow the 
Pythian priestess' injunction to all worshippers to obey their local laws regarding 
worship. He prayed for what was good in general and felt that a more specific 
prayer was pointless since the gods themselves know what is best for each 
worshipper, who in turn is expected to offer sacrifices in proportion to his 
resources and with a full sense of devotion. Socrates himself invariably obeyed 
all signs sent to him by the gods, the daimonic voice in particular, and disregaided 
human opinion if it seemed to conflict in any way with the gods' wishes.®"^  In this 
sense, diviners, seers, oracle-givers and poets are all media, not sources, and 
require some sort of rationalizing, since knowledge derives from application of 
one's reason: This must also surely apply to Socrates' dreams and sign (see 
Vlastos 167-71).
- Comm. 1.4: Socrates here offers Aristodemus a teleological proof of the gods' 
existence®® and points out that the pre-eminent position of man in the hieraichy of 
living things demonstrates their particular interest in human affairs: for this 
reason, they deserve to be honored in some way. The significance of divination 
and prodigies applies to everyone, not just to individuals like Aristodemus, and 
the ubiquity of the gods should inspire good behavior generally.
®"^ hi the context o f both a%oA.oytai, for example, the gods seem to be indicating that Socrates has 
reached a timely point at which to die. Chroust ([1957] 123) believes that Sociates seems to reflect 
Antisthenian views when he cautions his listeners against the use of, or reliance on, omens, particularly 
for trivial matters.
®®Socrates' "proof of a benevolent deity appears in Comm. 1.4,2-19 (see too IV.3.1-18). McPherran 
(p. 274) summarizes Xen.'s main argument (1.4.2-7) as follows: 1) "Everything that is clearly 
purposeful...is the product o f intelligent design.... 2) Human beings...exhibit 'signs of forethought' [e.g. 
eyebrows].... 3) Things that exhibit 'signs o f forethought' are clearly purposeful. 4) Thus, human 
beings are the product of intelligent design. 5) The existence o f products o f intelligent design implies 
the existence of an intelligent designer-cieator." 6) Thus, an intelligent designer-creator o f the cosmos 
exists. McPherran notes that this "is no mere prototype but close to being a full-fledged version o f the 
classic Argmnent from Design" (idem). He concludes that Socrates' deity "appears to be an 
extrapolation from [Socrates'] own understanding of the human soul" and notes that it is characterized 
by its omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence, as well as by its desires and affective states (pp. 
277-78). The distinction between this single deity and the remaining gods is unclear: Both seem to 
fulfill similar functions, and to reconcile this with Socrates' apparent polytheism (see, for example, PI. 
Ap. 29D & 35D) it is possible to imagine that the single deity oversees a community o f lesser gods or 
that the latter are a manifestation o f the former (p. 278). [McPherran (pp. 286-89) presents other 
evidence (including references from Plato) o f Socrates' teleological view o f religion and remarks (p. 
280) that, if  Socrates really possessed a teleological view of the cosmos, then he might have exerted "a 
primary influence on Plato's introduction o f the Demiurge into his own philosophy". Regarding the 
question of mono- vs. polytheism, Joël (1:136) maintains that in the Comm. Geos signifies a cosmic 
godhead, while the plural emphasizes the more manifest, all-caring aspect o f  divinity.] Socrates' 
teleology, if  it existed, seems to have been influenced by Xenophanes and especially Anaxagoras (p. 
289). For a discussion o f Diogenes o f Apollonia's possible influence on Socrates' teleology, see 
McPherran 290 and Gomperz (1924) 148-49.
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- Comm, rv.3: The benevolence of the gods in providing for mankind is 
discussed,®® and Socrates tells Euthydemus that the invisibility of the Divine does 
not disprove its existence, citing as an example the invisible effect of the mind on 
the body. Socrates repeats the Delphic injunction to honor the gods according to 
local usage (see above).
- Comm. IV.6.2-4: The following conclusion regarding eùaépeia is deduced in a 
chapter which provides several examples of Socratic dialectic: ô dpa td  Ttepl tons 
08OÙS vopipa elôôs Ôp9c5s dv T)pîv eÛGe(3f)S (optopevos eiT]. Note that, just as 
the Right is equivalent to the Lawful where humans are concerned (see above), so 
is the Religious equivalent to the Lawful where the gods are concerned.
- Oec. 5.18-20: Farmers must also pray to the gods to protect their property and to 
help avert unforeseeable catastrophes.
- Oec. 7.22-32: The gods have apportioned each sex its own particular talents and 
duties, and not fulfilling these functions is a form of impiety.
- Oec. 17.2-4: The gods signal the beginning of each sowing season by sending 
rain.
- Smp. 3.14 & 4.46-49: The gods are described as omniscient and omnipotent 
friends who look after Hermogenes and indicate their intentions to him through 
various signs which, if unheeded, lead inevitably to negative consequences. He 
mentions four ways of serving them (of which Socrates readily approves): praise, 
offerings, inoffensive speech, and truthfulness whenever their names are invoked 
on any occasion.
According to Xen.'s Socrates, then, a properly religious life involves 1) 
obeying the gods’ behests over human opinion and in accordance with local custom,
2) relying on the gods to know what is best for the individual, 3) becoming familiar 
with the many ways in which the gods communicate with humans, 4) acting with the 
certain knowledge that all human activities are under constant scrutiny by the gods, 5) 
realizing that the invisibility of the gods by no means disproves their existence, 6) 
conforming to one's assigned lot in life, and 7) knowing how to worship the gods 
properly. This at least partly constitutes a pios ooitos pepicopevos.®  ^ This question 
and the implications of the Schiitzschrift will be treated more fully in the comments 
on §11 ff., sections which represent Socrates' more specific response to the impiety 
charge.
®®Gomperz ([1924] 148) cites E. Supp. 201 ff. as a related proof o f the divine through its manifestation 
in nature.
®^Xen. certainly does not ignore the fickleness of divine favor (see, for example, Oec. 8.16: éàv Ôè [ô 
0 eôs] pôvov p f |  àTtoA,è(m t q ù s  p n  dpapxctvovxas, Tiâvü àyamiTÔv èàv ôè k q I  itàvü KaXcos 
ÙToipetobvcas ocp^ T), ttoA.Xti xâpis...xois Geots).
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coerce lo^upcos ayajievos enauxov xauxà T\x>ptcncov Kai xous e |io i 
«TUYyiyvonévous ycyvcÉKTKovxos jcept è|ioù; Cp. Comm. 1.6.9: o ie i oùv otTcô 
Tcdvxcov xoÙTCûv xooaùxTjv TiÔovqv Eivai ôoT|v àîcô xoù éaoxôv xe i^Y£Îo0ai PeXxlco 
YiYveo0ai Kal ôiÀoos àpelvous Kxâo0ai; Busse (p. 225) calls this passage ein 
Beispiel der in der Apologie üblichen mafilosen Übertreibung. Socrates' self- 
avowedly high reputation among his followers, which is at least partially the result of 
a continent lifestyle {Comm. n. 1.19 & 33), can be compaied with the ignorance of the 
dicasts, who are unaware of his virtues (see ibid. IV.8.9). Ribbing (p. 45) acutely 
observes that implicit in the idea that Socrates had reached the acme of his career was 
the concern that his reputation would soon begin to diminish. (See the comment on 
§17 for more information on Socrates' relationship with his followers.)
6. VÙV ôè e i ëxi jcpoPficTexai fi Socrates was seventy at the time of the trial
(PI. Ap. 17D), and if we can rely on the accounts provided by our witnesses 
concerning Socrates' healthy and hardy constitution,®  ^we can assume that he was still 
quite healthy at this point in his life, though perhaps a bit frail (FI. Ap. 38C and 
Comm. IV.8.1).
àvdYKT] ë<Txai...Kal ôpâv xe %elpov Kai aKoùeiv flxxov kxX.: Note the stress on 
those senses and faculties - seeing, hearing, learning, and memory - which are 
conducive to leading a philosophical life and which stand in jarring contrast to the 
seemingly un-Socratic emphasis on pleasure in this passage (tcôs av...èycb ext dv 
fiôécûs Pioxeùoipi;) and throughout this section. It is tempting to attribute this 
uncharacteristically hedonistic tone to the influence of a source other than 
Hermogenes and, in particular, to some Socratic writer such as Aristippus.®® Whether 
or not a direct connection can be made between Aristippus and the dialogue with 
Aristippus on éyKpdxeia in Comm. II. 1,^ ® at least some Aristippan influence on Xen. 
is clear, and Aristippus' words in Comm. II. 1.9 (èpauxov ye pévxoi xdxxto els xoùs
®^See PI. Smp. 219B-D, Com n. 1.2.1,1.3.5 ff., 1.6.2, and Nu. 412-19 (see too Dover Clouds xii-xlii). 
®®For a list o f Aristippus' works, see Mannebach (pp. 29-30); for his philosophy in general, see Guthrie 
([1978] 490-99). The hedonistic caveat o f the Cyrenaics - that one should be master of, not mastered 
by, pleasures - is not out o f keeping witli the beliefs of the Xenophontico-Platonic Socrates, whose 
utterances could in fact lend themselves to "a utilitarian, and even to a hedonistic, interpretation" {ibid., 
p. 498). Vlastos (p. 301) takes Socrates' view "to be that if one has not yet com e in sight o f the 
Sovereignty o f Virtue, hedonism faute de mieux would still be better than living in a muddle: it would 
provide one with a low-grade morality of utility which, bad as it is, could at least save one from the 
self-destructive ways o f the likes of Critias and Alcibiades". For Ribbing (p. 28), the Xenophontic 
Socrates' philosophy can be described as a type o f Eudaemonism, ...insofern dam it eine solche Ansicht 
verstanden wird, die den Wert tnenschlicher Wirksamkeit nach ihrem Verhdltnis zu etwas Anderem  
miJ3t...und dabei das sinnlich Angenehme zumMafistab macht.
^®Contrary to Gigon ([1953] 26-27), Fritz ([1965] 269 ff.) believes that Xen. was referring in some 
way to a lecture or dialogue of Aristippus when he wrote this passage, though there is admittedly a 
great deal in the dialogue which is undeniably Xenophontic.
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Po'üA.opévo'üs -% pdaxct xe K a l ijôiGxa pioxeueiv”^ )^ are directly parallel to the passage 
under discussion and similar thematically in their emphasis on good health as a 
prerequisite to a good life (with, in Xen.'s view, no Aristippan eleu0epta as a middle 
g r o u n d ) . ^ 2  The inteipretation of the passage in the Ap. turns on the word fiôécos, 
which, in light of the restricted emphasis above on certain senses and faculties, seems 
far more likely to represent the Platonic type of "tme" p l e a s u r e . ^ 3  This more 
moderate interpretation is supported by the more anti-hedonistic. Antisthenic tone of 
Xen. Ap. in general and by the value placed in this section on a life led n o b l y A s  
Oilier (p. 97) notes, this section of Xen. Ap. puts Socrates' readiness to die in a not 
ignoble light.
7. Kat 6 Geos ôt eûnéveiav Ttpo^svet pot: The verb Tcpo^eveiv denotes all of the 
duties expected of a state-sponsored Tipo^evos (= a public ^évos), including those of 
patronage and protection, which, if the occasion arose, sometimes included greasing 
the wheels of the diplomatic process to promote specific interests. The providential 
nature of Xen.'s gods is summed up nicely by Socrates in Comm. 1.1.19 and by 
Hermogenes in Smp. 4.47 ff. (see the comment on §5 above).
Ev Kat pm xi\s fvX,iKLas K axalûaai xov piov: Solon's tales of Tellus, Cleobis, and 
Biton in Hdt. 1.30-31 form a locus classicus for the Greek attitude towaids dying and, 
in particular, towards dying opportunely. ^ 5 This attitude accords nicely with what 
Socrates states in §5 above: He has excelled in leading a virtuous life, an
2^Cp. the uses o f pÇaxa and pQt0 xri to describe Socrates’ type of execution in the following section, 
^^indeed, in §9 Socrates calls a prolonged life under such worsening circumstances a life led 
àveXen0épû)s. See Com n. III. 12.6-8, where health is discussed in connection with ene^ia and aging. 
23Treated in R. 583 ff., Phlb. 39A  ff., 51A ff. & passim, and Phd. 60B-C, 64D ff., 68E-69A & 114D- 
E; for examples o f Platonic "hedonism" in Xen., see Comm. 1.2.23,1.5.5,1.6.8-9, II.6.5, IV.5.6, IV.8.11 
and Oec. 1.22-23 (note here the use o f pqov pioxeneiv). This notion is summed up well in Comm. 
IV.8.6  (apioxa pèv yap oijxai Çfjv xoùs âpiaxa éTcipEXop-évons xoù é s  peXxioxons ytyveaGai, f|§toxa 
5è xoùs fxàA-iaxa aioGavopévons ôxi peXxlons yiyvovxai), and the word lîSiaxov in Ap. 5 can best be 
taken in this sense. It should be recalled, however, that Socrates, like Aristippus and even Antisthenes 
(see Xen. Smp. 4.38), by no means abstained from the pleasures o f the body {Comm. 1.3.15).
24See the comment on éyK pdxeia  in §18 below; for extended comments on possible Antisthenic 
influence on Xen., see Joël 2:528-32. Taylor ([1932] 75 & note: see too Chroust [1957] 8), noting 
Xen.’s negative treatment o f Aristippus in Comm. II. 1 (cp. D.L. 2.65) suggests the possible influence of 
Antisthenes. Comm. 1.3.2 also represents an Antisthenic perspective comparable with Socrates' view in 
Xen. Ap. that he is the beneficiary o f an unprompted divine Kpo^evia. Be that as it may, I see no 
evidence for Benjamin's unsupported assertion (p. xiü) that Hennogenes was a follower o f Antisthenes 
and was consequently biased in his report to Xen., though we can perhaps assume that they were at 
least acquainted with each other. [The ancient accounts of Xen.'s antipathy towards Aristippus as set 
out in Mannebach (p. 26) are vague and untenable.] In general, Socrates’ attitude towards death and 
decrepitude is similar to that o f the Cynics and Cyrenaics and may in fact reflect a more accurate 
tradition (Navia [1984] 60-61).
2®See How and W ells (1:68) for additional passages on this theme. The Greeks generally considered 
death as an escape from troubles, not as the soul's release from the prison o f the body, as the Orphists 
and Pythagoreans held.
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accomplishment which has won not only his own admiration, but also that of his 
followers. In his view, his life can only deteriorate from this point on, hence his 
readiness to die.
xfi xeXenxfi xpfiaGai r\ p^cn;'n...KÉKptxai; Cp. §32 (xc5v Ôè Gavdxcov xoù pdaxon 
exn%Gv). Since, therefore, the notion of an easy (i.e, expedient) death is inconsistent 
with Xen.'s general portrayal of Socrates,^® it can be concluded that Xen.'s Socrates 
sees the verdict of the trial as having been preordained by some daimonic power and 
seeks an explanation not in philosophy but in the Greek tradition of dying 
opportunely - in this case, at the height of his intellectual and philosophical powers.
In short, just as the absence of any daimonic intervention in PL Ap. indicates a tacit 
sanction of Socrates' actions, so the apotieptic influence of xo ôaipôviov in Xen. Ap. 
effects an outcome which Xen., elaborating on an actual remark made by Socrates 
about his old age, chooses to intei-pret in his own way.^  ^ To Xen., Socrates has 
become a participant, not an active agent, in a divinely controlled process.
In this particular context, the word pdaxr) can consequently be construed as 
referring not to a shirking of responsibilities, but to the form of execution he will soon 
have to face. Three types of capital punishment existed in the period under 
consideration: precipitation into a pit, a type of execution called d7coxnji7iavia|iôs (see 
below), and the ingestion of h e m l o c k . ^8 There is no known Athenian source for an 
example of precipitation actually having been carried out, though references to it 
appear in Hdt. 7.133 (concerning the execution of Persian envoys) and PL Grg. 516D- 
E (on the trial of Miltiades). The practice of àTroxnpTcaviajLiôs is well documented 
and may have involved an extended clubbing or a bloodless crucifixion involving 
strangulation and exposure.^® The imbibing of hemlock was apparently introduced 
under the Thirty and became accepted practice under subsequent governments.^® 
Burnet’s description of the effects of hemlock poisoning ([1911] 149-50) seems to be 
largely influenced by the Phd. itself, where the symptoms include a gradual 
refrigeration and numbness of the body beginning at the extremities until the heart is 
finally affected; death is accompanied by a spasm. Burnet adds finally that the effects 
of the poison vaiy according to the dosage taken and the individual involved. On the
^®Note too that the notion o f an easy death does not appear in Comm. IV.8.4, the counterpart to Ap. 1. 
For the use o f military language to describe Socrates' attitude towards death, see the comment on §33 
(see too PL Ap. 28D-E for the image of a soldier standing his ground).
According to E. Meyer (5:227), Xen. gathered from his sources that Socrates' behavior made the 
verdict inevitable, and since he did not understand the subtleties of PL Ap. and C r i,  he reached his own 
conclusion about Socrates' readiness to die.
28My sources for capital punishment in Athens are Bonner & Smitli 2:278 ff. and Lipsius 1:77 ff. 
Phillipson (p. 223) lists poison, crucifixion, the wheel, decapitation, and stoning; other fonns, 
including hanging, were reserved for a baser class o f criminals.
^®Gemet (p. 254), following Keramopoullos' study, opts for the latter interpretation of the evidence. 
^®See the notorious example o f Theramenes' death in HG n.3.56 (see too Plu. Pkoc. 36).
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other hand, Gill (passim) describes not only the symptoms which appear in the Phd., 
but far more violent symptoms as described in Nicander and in modem accounts of 
hemlock poisoning. These include vomiting, choking, impaired vision and hearing, 
thickness of speech, dilation of the pupils, spasms, convulsions, etc., all a far cry from 
the tranquil scene depicted in the Phd., especially if Socrates was required to take a 
larger dose than usual.81 If Gill’s account is indeed the coiTect one, the interpretation 
of the word pdaxTj in Socrates’ case seems to be merely one of degree, though it 
seems likely that Socrates' crime would not have fallen under any of the capital 
crimes punishable by precipitation or aTcoxupTraviaiitos (see Bonner and Smith 285-87 
and Lipsius 1:77 ff.). When one considers the remaiks in Cri. 53A ff., it should be 
added that Socrates also might have considered an execution by hemlock "easiest" 
when compared, for example, to a death in exile, an alternative in all capital cases 
(Harrison 185-86).
The words m o xmv xonxou éîtifieA.'qGévxcûv in this section appaiently refer to 
the Eleven, who were in charge of cairying out death penalties (see Lipsius 1:77 ff. 
and Haiiison 17), or to one of their minions such as the turnkey who appears in Phd. 
116B-D.
aTCpaypovetTTdx'n ôè xois (jitXois: The word d%payp.ovGoxdini probably refers at 
least indirectly to the potential consequences to Socrates' friends if he had chosen to 
flee Athens and die e l s e w h e r e , ^2 and recall Socrates' general point in Cri. 49A ff. that 
it is worse to haim others than to harm oneself. More obviously, this must refer to the 
burden of a prolonged illness on one's loved ones, and Socrates' concern in this regai'd 
is well exemplified by his desire to wash himself prior to his death to spare his female 
relatives the trouble of washing his coi-pse.^ ® The words 7cX8ioxov...7c60ov 
èpTCOioùaa xmv xeXevxévKùv are clearly explained below by a<7%T||j.ov...jLiT|ôèv pT|Ôè 
ôoa%epès mX. below.
81 See Phd. 63E. Gill dismisses as possible explanations differences in dosage, the type o f hemlock, 
and the inability o f an any eye-witness to overlook any of the violent symptoms described. If Plato has 
therefore falsified his account, what were his motives in doing so? GiU suggests that he intended to 
demonstrate Socrates' notorious control o f mind over body (see PI. Smp. 219E ff.), and that there may 
have been aesthetic considerations as well. More importantly, however, he probably wanted to 
illustrate a major theme o f the Phd.: the liberation o f the soul from the body. Since the ximxh was held 
to be the animating force in the body, there would be considerable symbolism in Socrates’ death as 
described by Plato, especially in the slow spreading o f numbness from the lower extremities towards 
the heart.
^2xhe inevitable consequences o f exile are set out humorously in §23 (see too Cri. 53 A-B).
83jPM. 115 A. The words èv ta  is yvmpais tcov Trapôvtoov in the text below also seem to recall the 
gathering of Socrates' followers on his last day. There might well be an element o f  Xenophontic 
utilitarianism in Socrates' concern about troubling his friends, that is, he may feel that he will soon no 
longer be of any use to his friends because of his approaching infirmity (see Comm. H.3.17 and the 
comments on §§5 & 34). This burden would fall more naturally to one’s loved ones (see Comm.
II.2.8).
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KataXeiTfHTat <xis>: This is Stephanus' supplement of KaxaHTrnxai in the 
manuscripts. Lundstrom suggests KaxaliTrp xis.
8. ôpGôs ôè oi 0Eoi xoxe poo fivavxioôvTO ktX.: Note that it is no longer the 
daimonic sign but the gods themselves through whom Socrates is dissuaded from 
seeking an acquittal by any means p o ss ib le .T h e  shift in emphasis can be explained 
by Xen.'s desire to personalize the divine motivation behind Socrates' behavior in 
court (and in general). It is interesting to note that this sentence implies that there was 
actually a moment at which Socrates and his friends discussed all and eveiy means 
(ex TcavTOs xpoTcoo) to get him acquitted (Tejera 154).
xfi xoo loyoo  èmcrKéx|fEt: To whose Xoyos is Socrates refemng? Diogenes Laertius 
(2.40-41) refers to a defense speech written by Lysias for Socrates which the latter 
rejected and which Chroust interprets as a fiction based on the appearance ca. 390 of a 
Lysianic speech directed against Polycrates.®® No matter what truth there is in 
Diogenes' statement, the use of the plural in §1 (yeypd^aai jièv oùv irepl xoùxoù xdi 
dA.A.oi) makes it likely that Xen. turned to other Socratic sources in addition to, if not 
instead of, Lysias' àîtoXoyia (see Gigon [1946] 214).
9. èycb xaùxa oùôè a:po8upf;(Topai kxX.: Note that xawa must refer to Ttdvxa xà 
XaXena k%X. in the preceding sentence, and that what Socrates tells Hermogenes in 
this section detemiines the stmcture of his speech before the dicasts (Edelstein 143).
Ainim (pp. 19-20) points out that this section is inconsistent with other parts 
of Hermogenes' report in that Socrates here admits the possibility of being acquitted 
(xauxpv [xqv ôô^av] dva^aivcov el papuvô xoùs ôixaaxàs®®). This certainly echoes 
the intentions expressed by xà à7ro(j)eDKUKà in the preceding section and is in 
keeping with Xen.'s claim in §22 that Socrates made every effort to win an acquittal 
(cp. PI. Ap. 37A-B).®2 Yet the self-fulfilling tone of the verb papùveiv in this section, 
the account of the aftermath in §32 (ZmKpàxqs Ôè ôià xô peyaX-ùveiv èamôv èv xm 
ôiKaaxriplcp (j>06vov èTiayôjievos), and the repeated indications in Pl. Ap. that
®"^ Cp. his prophetic dream in Cri. 44A-B. For die use of the imperfect tense, see the comment on §4. 
®®See Chroust ([1957] 20), who also alludes to scholars who want to distinguish between an àTcoÀoyla 
written by Lysias for the trial and a separate one written as a response to Polycrates (see Essay C). 
®®Marchant's proposed emendation here, while quite ingenious, is unnecessary (see apparatus ad loc.). 
Vander Waerdt (p. 17 n. 52) finds a possible reference to Xen.'s jieyaXTiyopla thesis in Epict. II.2.18: 
e i gTi XL Kaipos èoxiv éîiixnôes épeGtoai xoùs SiKaaxàs é s  EtOKpctxei.
®^See Maier 475. Oilier (p. 104 n. 1) believes that the words xoù qôii xoù piou in Xen. Ap. 8 
seem to indicate that Socrates is predisposed towards a guilty-verdict.
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Socrates does not expect to be acquitted make it clear that his attitude, not necessarily 
his intentions, towards the trial could only have resulted in a guilty-verdict.®®
It has also been noted®® that the language here closely resembles that in PI. Ap. 
38E {àXX oùte xoxe ôqOriv ôelv ëvexa xoù Kivôùvot) Tcpâ^ai oùôèv âveAÆÙSepov, 
...àXkà TioXù pôXXov alpoùpai éôe àrcoloyTiodpevos xeGvdvai -q èKeivms t^\v). A 
subtle difference hinges on the words àveleuGépms (Xen.) and àveXeùGepov (Plato): 
Whereas in PI. Ap. Socrates specifically refuses to resort to a self-debasing emotional 
plea for his life in front of his peers, Xen.'s Socrates will refuse more generally to beg 
for his life in a manner unsuitable to a free-bom man. The latter Socrates' statement 
can be seen as an indirect reference to the notion of KaX,0 KayaGia,®® and the word 
dveleùGepos itself is a rather pregnant term which connotes the following:
1) Ethnic Inferiority: The vast majority of slaves were not ethnic Greeks but 
pdppapoi ti'eated accordingly.
2) Lack of Means and Economic Dependence: Both of these conditions were 
treated with contempt in contemporary Athenian literature (Dover [1974] 40 & 
114: see Oec. 4.1-3 and Comm. 1.2.6, II.7-8, HI. 10.5, IV.2.22).
3) Parsimony: Slaves were obviously far more concerned with selfishly securing 
and maintaining the basic and more individual conditions for survival than were 
their free-born masters, who could direct their attention towards contributing in 
some way to the community, hence the mean and illiberal man is often called 
dveXeùGepos (Dover op. cit. 115: see Cyr. VHI.4.32).
4) Incontinent and Expedient Behavior: 2ciK|)poaùvT\ was considered a 
characteristic of free men, whereas slaves are described as being primarily driven 
by then- appetites (Dover op. cit. 114-16: see Comm. 1.2.2,1.2.29,1.5.2-3,111.13, 
IV.2.31, IV.2.39, IV.5.4 and Oec. 13.9) and were represented in comedy as 
frequently taking the path of least resistance (Dover op. cit. 114).®^
5) Fear and Resentment: Dover (ibid., p. 284) quotes D. 8.51, where it is stated 
that the slave differs from the free-born man in that he is deterred from 
wrongdoing only by the threat of physical pain (see Comm. IV.5.3 and Lac. 8.2),
®®In support of this, Amim (p. 12) cites the following passages from PI. Ap:. 19A, 24A, 28A, 36A  & 
37A-B (see too Shero 111 and Chxoust [1957] 41). Yet the supposition that Socrates' defense made a 
positive impression on, the court seems to be well demonstrated by the number of those in PL Ap. who 
voted for his acquittal, placed by Riddell (pp. xii-xiv) at 220, with 281 voting for a conviction.
®®See Busse 226, Hackforth 17, Vrijlandt 77, and Amim 21. Amim takes this as yet another example 
of Xen.’s corrective approach to the events o f the trial as related by Plato. Vrijlandt compares Xen.’s 
alpnaotiai with Plato's aipoûgai (spoken after the verdict, as in the case of Xen.'s Socrates).
®®See, for example. Comm. 1.1.16: tons pèv elSotas hyeito [EcoKpaxqs] KaX-ons KàyaOoùs e iva i, tons 
5' ayvoonvtas ctv6pa7ioSco6eis dv SikqIcos KGKAnoGat (see too Joël 2:1048 ff. and my comment on 
§34 below).
®Ht is amusing to note, however, that Aristippus’ hedonism (see Comm. ILl.15-16) actually makes him 
unsuitable for slavery.
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and it can be assumed that fear was in general a constant in any slave's life. This 
is particularly relevant to Socrates' crisis as he describes it in §9, with resentment 
as a natural consequence (see PI. Ap. 39C ff.: note too how this section of Xen. 
Ap. strikes a note of defiance similar to Socrates' words in PI. Ap. 29C ff.). An 
implicit reference to a slave begging for his life under court-sanctioned torture 
might also be intended here.
See too the comments on §§14 and 16 in reference to the Delphic oracle.
Other parallels include the following: The word KepÔâvai is reminiscent of 
Socrates' words in Phd. 116E-117A (oùôèv yap olpai KepÔaveîv àXiyov ùaxepov 
TCKOv àXXo ye ^ yéXma ô(|)A,f|a8iv Tiap' èpaw®, yA.t%6pevos xoù Kal ôeiôôpevos 
oùôevôs ëxi èvôvxos), and Socrates' concern for his potential loss of reputation 
resembles the attitude of the Platonic Socrates towards escape and exile in Cri. 53A 
ff. There is, however, no basis for seeking a Platonic influence in this passage since, 
as elsewhere, close parallels between the two authors might well derive ultimately 
from Socrates' own words in court.
10. (OS OÙS |ièv è  tcoAuIS vopi^et Oeoùs où vopi^oi kxX.: None of the versions of 
the indictment differs significantly from the others,®^  and this represents one of the
®2The other versions of, or direct references to, the indictment appeal' as follows:
- Comm. 1.1.1: àôiKeî ZcoKpdxris oùs pèv fi tiôA-is vopiÇsi Geoùs où vojitÇcov, ëxEpa Ôè Kaivà 
Ôaipôvta eÎ0 (|)épo)v ôô ik ei Ôè Kal xoùs véous ôia(t»0eipo)v.
- Pl. Ap. 24B-C: ZçoKpdxn <l)Ticylv [MÉliixos] ôôikeiv xoùs xe vécus ôia(|)0£ipovxa koi 0eoùs oùs 
Ù TcoXis vopl^Ei où voplÇovxa, ëxEpa Ôè ôatpôvia Koivd.
- Euthphr. 3B: <}>Ti0 l  ydp [MéA-tixos] pE tioitixtiv Eivai 0E(Sv, koI é s  Kaivoùs îtoioùvxa Geoùs xoùs 
ô’ dp%alous où vopiÇovxa Èypd\|/axo xoùxcov aùxév ëvEKa, é s  <])T|aiv.
- Favorinus ap. D.L. 2.40: xdÔE éypd\|/axo Kal dvxcopôaaxo Méirixos MeA,ùxou ITixGeùs 
ZtoKpdxEi Zé(|)povloKou ’MctwiEKfîGev dÔiKEî ZmKpdxqs, oùs pèv f) 7iôA,is Geoùs où vopiÇœv, 
èxepa ôè Kaivà ôaipôvia eioTiYOÙpevos- dÔiKEi ôè Kal xoùs vécus ôia<t)Geipa)v. xlpx^pa 
Gdvaxos.
Favorinus' version supposedly represents tlie final fonn of the indictment as he discovered it among the 
Metroon archives in die temple of Cybele; it is all but identical with the indictment as reported by 
Xen., who offers a shorter version and uses the verb Glo<|)épeiv instead o f eloriyeioGai (see Gomperz 
[1924] 130 ff. and A. Ferguson 157-59). The reference to the indictment in Euthphr. 3B brings the 
vaguer reference in PI. Ap. into line with Xen.'s belief that the charge of introducing Kaivà ôaipôvia  
was directly related to Socrates' innovative belief in a daimonic influence on his actions (Gundert 514: 
see below). It should also be noted that Plato differs significantly from Xen, in directly linking the 
impiety with the corruption charge (see PL Ap. 26B and Euthphr. 3 A-B), though a possible allusion to 
this appears in §19 (...xiva oioGa ùit’ èpoù yEyevTipévov...é^ eùoepoûs àvôaïov;).
Hackforth (pp. 60-63; see Phillipson 311) finds no grounds for Burnet's interpretation of 
vopiÇeiv in an ambiguous sense in PL Ap. 26C (see the latter's comment ad loc.): Hackforth points out 
that 29 A and 3 5 0  (see too Nu. 819) confirm the word in the sense o f a disbelief in the existence o f the 
gods, and concludes that the àaép eia  law o f 399 must have covered such cases as these. Taylor 
([1911] 7), referring to Lys. 12.9, maintains that the words où vopl^eiv Geoùs does not necessarily 
refer to atheism, while Reeve (p. 78: see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 31) comes out strongly in 
saying that Burnet's interpretation is untenable since the verb is used elsewhere (26B, 29A  & 35D) to 
mean vopiÇeiv Geoùs e iva i. Unfortunately, most o f the texts concerning impiety laws liave
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few areas in Socratic studies which we can approach with anything resembling 
complete confidence regarding its historicity. Note that the same sequence of charges 
is retained in this section as in Comm. 1.1.1, and that the charges are also addressed in 
this order in Xen. Ap. 11-21 (as opposed to PI. Ap. 24C-28A, where they are treated in 
reverse order).®® In what follows, the charges of impiety and coniiption of the youth 
will be discussed separately.®"^
The impiety char ge actually encompasses the first two related charges as they 
appear in the indictment, i.e. not recognizing the state gods and introducing new 
deities.®® In general, citizens were left alone if they fulfilled their public religious 
obligations, did not declare dissenting beliefs publicly, or made an attempt to convert 
another citizen to another religion, and the existence of the democracy and the 
presence of resident aliens acted as a mitigating influence against religious bigotry.®® 
In Socrates' case, it was not so much the notion of not worshipping the state gods in 
the traditional way but the notion of a private oracle which was potentially 
subversive,®'  ^and this explains the reaction of the dicasts in Xen. Ap. 14 (q.v.). It 
should also be borne in mind that, in responding to the charge of iri'eligion, Socrates 
was by no means required to declare himself as a selfless adherent to a state- 
controlled orthodoxy: Since the state religion had no official theological dogma, 
Socrates’ indictment had nothing to do with any notion of 'heresy' as such, nor was it
disappeared, but it seems that the àaepeias on which the impiety charge was based had wide 
applicability; in fact, few prosecutions o f this nature actually took place. The types o f punishment for 
àaépEia included death, exile, expropriation, fine, imprisonment (applied infrequently), and loss of 
civic rights (Phillipson 215-16 & 222).
®3Vrijlandt (pp. 86-88) observes that botli Xen. and Plato preface their refutations o f the charges with a 
recapitulation of the indictment, and feels that the altered order of charges in PI. Ap. 19B further 
detracts from Plato's overall credibility. Taylor ([1911] 6: see Wilamowitz [1919] 2:47) believes that 
Favorinus is not a reliable wimess for the indictment and that it is likely that Xen., because o f his 
absence, consulted tlie official records while Plato reported the charges in the order in which Sociates 
brought them up during the trial. Note too that Xen. and Favorinus speak of introducing novel 
divinities while Plato speaks only of recognizing them.
®^See too Appendix C for additional remarks on Kaivà Saijiovia. Phillipson (p. 212) holds that the 
death penalty applied to the impiety charge only, and in Ep. 325B Plato gives impiety alone as the 
reason for the accusation (as opposed to Polycrates, who seems to have focused only on the corruption 
charge).
®®For discussions of the connection between the main charges themselves, see Reeve 75, Brickliouse & 
Smith (1989) 36-37, Derenne 155, Maier 478, McPherran 119, Taylor (1919) 1 ff., and Bumet (1924) 
102-104; Bonner (p. 170) and Vrijlandt (pp. 98-99) feel that the connection is unjustified. Reeve (p.
97: see too Morgan 17) speculates that either or both charges might have been comiected in some way 
to the publication o f Critias' Sisyphus, and it should perhaps be added that the subject o f àaépEia 
comes up in Aeschines' Alcibiades (see Dittmar 121).
®®Phillipson 216-18 (see also Kraus 73, Wilamowitz [1919] 1:157-58, Maier 490-91, Parker 210, and 
Guardini 27-28). In general, the distinction between the state and its religion was very fine indeed 
(consider, for example, the quasi-divine personification of the Laws in the Cri.), and not worshipping 
die gods in the traditional way put the entire city at risk (Chroust [1957] 49).
®^See Vlastos 293-97, Gomperz [1924] 158-59, and Waterfield 35. Parker (p. 216) cites Plato's 
disapproval o f the establishment of private shrines in Lg. 909D-910D.
70
an offense to disbelieve the traditional myths.^  ^ It is important to recall that there was 
no "letter of the law", that is, what constituted impiety, for example, was what existed 
in the minds of the dicasts on any given day.^ In effect, any citizen could bring a 
ypa(()Ti against another, hence the bringer played the roles of both prosecutor and chief 
witness, a fact which made Meletus in a sense the final authority on what his charges 
meant and made Socrates' goal duiing the cross-examination an attempt to discredit 
him as a witness. In short, Socrates' primary concern was to answer the charges as 
they were interpreted by Meletus and not the written charges as explicitly identified 
by the law (Reeve 86).
Although it is cleai* from both Xen. and Plato that Socrates held a non- 
traditional view of the gods,^ ®^  it is never explicitly stated in either account of the trial 
that he did not believe in the traditional myths, a matter which he approaches quite 
aggressively by referring in Xen. Ap. 11 to his conspicuous practice of paiticipating in 
public rituals and in §24 to his exclusive worship of the Olympians, and less 
persuasively in Plato through the weak reductio ad absurdum in Ap. 24C ff. and by 
the reference to the sun and the moon (versus the major gods) in ibid. 26D. It seems 
clear that Socrates did indeed acknowledge the traditional gods, particularly Apollo,
9^See Phillipson 281, Taylor (1919) 15, and Chroust (1957) 26-27. It is interesting to consider Plato's 
consummate artistry in comparing Socrates' transcendent piety with the ritualistic fanaticism o f the seer 
Euthyphro: Though personally sympathetic witli Socrates' plight, the type represented by Euthyphro in 
fact represents the driving force behind the charge (Chroust [1957] 27), and it is quite likely that 
Socrates disbelieved tlie traditional stories about tlie gods precisely because of the way in which they 
were being treated by men like him (see Euthphr. 6A for Socrates' attitude towards myths). Taylor 
([1919] 17 ff.) maintains that the real basis for the impiety charge was Socrates' association with 
foreign Pythagoreans, a view disputed by A. Ferguson (p. 157 ff.).
^^McPherran 119 (see too MacDowell [1978] 199-200, Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 119, and Reeve 
85). Reeve (p. 86 ) notes tliat the prosecutor combined the roles o f prosecutor and witness, and the 
Ypa(j)Ti the qualities of both affidavit and charge: This makes Socrates' arguments dhected towards 
Meletus 100% relevant (as well as his efforts to discredit him).
lOOj^^cPherran (p. 272) describes the "Socratic reformation" as "that moral cleansing of the Homeric 
deities which frees them of those various unsavory characteristics that make them less than perfect 
exemplars for us imperfect mortals", and Guardini (p. 218) as follows: "In all this [sc. Socrates' 
revolutionary emphasis on insight as the proper basis for any action] there appeals a new standard of 
validity and a new etlios determined by it. Instinct, the authenticity o f the established order of things, 
the authority o f tradition, the power o f irrational religious experiences and the wisdom of symbols lose 
their reassuring and binding force. They are opposed by the capacity for personal responsibility, 
resting on insight into the nature of things and the duty of objectivity - an attitude, therefore, which is 
based on a mind become aware o f itself and master of itself." Gomperz ([1924] 153-54) cites the 
following passages as evidence for Socrates’ scepticism regarding tlie Olympians: Nii. 423, Euthphr. 
6B-C, Phdr. 246C-D, Ti. 40E ff., and Epin. 984D, and he also points out that the so-called proofs for 
Socrates' belief in the traditional gods in PI. Ap. 27C ff. and Comm. 1.1.5 are rather weak and ultimately 
based on the reference.to Saipovia in the indictment, not on the Olympians themselves (see too Gontar 
100). McPherran (p. 77) cites the following as additional evidence for Socrates' attention to ritual:
Phd. 61B, 118A, Smp. 176A, 220D, and Euthd. 275C-D; other references to Socrates’ orthodox 
religious behavior appear in Euthd. 302A-303A, Mx.. 243E-244B, Phdr. 229E, and Comm. 1.1.2,
1.1.19,1.2.64, IV.3.16-17, IV.6.4-6. He further notes (p. 140) that Socrates had a household shrine 
dedicated to Apollo Patroos (see Euthd. 302C-D) and would have taken any number of civic oaths in 
the course o f his life. As Amim (pp. 17-18: see too Riddell xxviii) observes, all o f the Platonic 
Socrates' actions are motivated by religious concerns, and the same could certainly be said of Xen.'s 
Socrates (see, for example, his rebuttals to the charges o f non-conformity in religious practice in Ap. 
11-13 and Comm. 1.1.2-20).
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in some way: He refers Xen. to the Delphic oracle before Cyrus' expedition (An. 
in. 15), and there are numerous references to Apollo in both defense speeches (Xen. 
Ap, 12,14-15 and PI. Ap. 20D ff., 28E-29A). That the Platonic Socrates is willing to 
lay down his life to pursue his god-inspired mission is convincing evidence of his 
piety (Phillipson 304), and the Xenophontic Socrates' unpreparedness directly results 
from dutifully obeying the daimonic voice.
Examples of famous impiety cases are listed by Dover ([1976] 24-25).^®  ^ The 
controversial Decree of Diopithes (the only reference to which appears in Plu. Per. 
32.2) was aimed at toùs xà 08Îa pfi vopt^ovnas i] Xoyovs Ttepl tc5v peTapoicov 
Ôiôàcncovras, though Dover (p. 47 ff.), because of the questionable validity of most 
of the primary sources, has taken issue with the long-held opinion that an intellectual 
witchhunt took place in Athens of this p e r i o d .  Socrates would have nevertheless 
been inevitably associated with the atheistic Anaxagoras through his brief interest in 
physical science and through his association with Archelaus, and a bigoted Athenian 
would have presumably considered Protagoras et al. a9eoi by taking the part for the 
whole, that is, having new beliefs would be considered equivalent to having no beliefs 
at all.i®  ^ As a result of this public attitude, Plato’s Socrates seems only to foster 
confusion in Ap. 26C ff. about Socrates' philosophical antecedents since these new 
beliefs were associated with atheism, and although the atheism charge should have
too Parker 207 ff. Later àoép eia  cases against philosophers involved Stilpo, Tlieodorus, 
Aristotle, and Theophrastus (Maier 491 n. 2).
lO^Dover (1976) 47 ff. Dover (pp. 39-40) questions the historicity o f Diopitlies' decree because o f its 
language and its notable absence in other authors and suspects that, if  mdeed fictional, it shows the 
influence o f Demetrius of Phalerum and tlie Peripatetics. Reeve (p. 80) lists the following reasons for 
being sceptical about the existence o f Diopithes' psephism: 1) Socrates was charged by ypacfui, not by 
eioayyeXla, and 2) the Amnesty o f 403 had gone into effect. He also holds that it could not have 
formed the basis for the prosecution against Socrates in particular because 1) Plutarch is the only 
source, 2) it would have been virtually nullified by the legislation o f 403, and 3) it provided for an 
eioayyeXta, whereas Socrates’ prosecutors proceeded against him by an ordinary ypacjn) (see Euthphr. 
2A). Reeve (pp. 81-82), however, believes that Diopithes* e iaayyeU a was doubtless replaced by the 
less cumbersome form of a ypa^fi during the law reforms since, with the exception o f treason, most 
were. In any case the decree would have served as a precedent: Since it outlawed as atheistic any 
naturalistic explanations of meteorological and astronomical phenomena, it is likely that more general 
charges of atheism could still be made after tlie amnesty (Brickhouse and Smith [1989] 32). 
l^^See Phillipson 298 and Brickliouse & Smith (1989) 34-35. In considering PI. Ap. as a whole, 
Derenne (p. 147 ff.: see too Phillipson 313) concludes that the prosecutors did in fact bring up the 
Aristophanic charges of "scientism" and sophism, associating the former with the impiety charge while 
Ihiking the latter to the corruption of the youth. Vlastos (ch. 6 passim) comments at length on Socratic 
reason vs. religion, observing no real contradiction between the two: "Thus in Ionian physiologia  the 
existence of a being bearing [the name o f 'god'] becomes optional. What is mandatory is only that to 
have a place in the real world a deity must be naturalized and thereby rationalized, associated with the 
orderliness o f nature, not with breaches of its order, as it continued to be for the vast majority o f  
Greeks" (p. 159). Vlastos gives little credence to the teleological arguments in Comm. 1.4.1 ff., IV.3.3 
ff., and to other references to Socrates' interest in speculative philosophy (pp. 161-62: see too D. 
Morrison [1987] 16) and notes the following: "[Socrates'] gods can be both supernatural and rational so 
long as they are rationally moral." He therefore produced a "moral theology" instead o f the lonians’ 
"natural theology" (p. 162), and this moral philosophy would have seemed just as revolutionary as the 
physicists' views (p. 166). In general, diviners, seers, oracle-givers and poets are all media, not 
sources, and require some sort o f rationalizing, since knowledge derives from application o f one's 
reason; this must also surely apply to Socrates' dreams and sign (pp. 167-71).
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been treated only cursorily because of its groundlessness, he feels compelled to 
devote an inordinate amount of time to refuting itA®"^
References to the chaige concerning the introduction of Kaivà ôaipôvia 
appear in Xen. Ap. 12-13, Comm. 1.1.3,1.6.2-3, and PL Ap. 26B ff. Xen.'s Socrates 
figure counters the charge by comparing his daimonic voice with accepted fonns of 
divination (§12 ff.: cp. Comm. 1.1.3) and by stating in §24 that the prosecution has in 
no way proved that he recognizes any non-traditional gods. In light of the additional 
remark on this matter provided by Plato in Euthphr. 3B, namely, that Socrates is 
considered a "maker of new gods", it seems best to accept Xen.'s words at face value 
and identify the Kaivà Saipovia of the indictment with Socrates' daimonic voice.
That Socrates protested against the lack of evidence concerning the coiinption-of-the- 
youth charge (see PL Ap. 33C ff.) but did not do so in speaking of the impiety charge 
would support the thesis that the daimonic sign, the existence of which Socrates 
freely admits, was the cause of the latter (Phillipson 277); another clue perhaps lies in 
the Aristophanic Socrates' pre-Socratic conception of the word 0eôs (see Nu. 247 
ff ) 106 The genius (and weakness) of the accusation lies in the prosecution's use of an 
ambiguous phrase (such as "religious innovations" in English) which could range in 
meaning from an abstraction to something more concrete ,and  it is interesting to 
note that Xen.'s Socrates interprets it as meaning the former, while Plato's Socrates
l04Reeve (p. 82) believes that Socrates' concern about the atheism charge (in §18C, for example) must 
indicate that there was such a law on the books. That the impiety charge is connected to atlieism is 
expressed clearly by Meletus himself in PI. Ap. 26C, and since practice and belief are two sides of the 
same coin, Xen. must have also understood the charge in the same way (see Brickhouse and Smiüi 
[1989] 31 and McPherran 119-20: see too Comm. 1.1.5, where the indictment seems to be interpreted as 
referring specifically to atlieism). According to Feddersen (p. 10), the sole surviving words of 
Theodectes' aTOA,oyta (els itoiov lepov liaépiiKev; rivas Gemv on xeripTiKev;) seem to show that 
atheism was not the issue as it is in PI. Ap.
lO^See Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 35, Phillipson 275, 285 ff., Hackforüi 6 8 , Wilamowitz (1919) 156 
ff., and Amim 58 (see too Chroust [1957] 236 n. 119 and McPherran 159 for their more general 
remarks).
lOôTiie fact that Socrates does not directly address the impiety charge has troubled a number of 
scholars who interpret it as being either the result o f the vague impiety law (see Brickhouse & Smith 
([1989] 33-34) or an implicit admission o f guilt (Taylor [1919] 9, Derenne 168, and Reeve 83); 
Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 33-34) remark that Socrates was nevertheless quite willing to dispute 
points o f law regarding the Arginusae affair in PI. Ap. 32B-C. Allen (p. 15) attributes his inability to 
defend himself adequately to his professed ignorance concerning the nature o f piety and virtue as 
exhibited in the Euthphr. and Men., respectively.
^®^See Appendix C. Burnet ([1924] 114) equates the Saigovia in the indictment with the Saipovia  
Tcpdypara in PI. Ap. 27C. Popper (p. 165) maintains that the vagueness of the charges can best be 
explained by the prosecution’s real intention o f silencing Socrates for having educated Alcibiades & 
Co., while Taylor ([1932] 107-109) states that, since the irreligiosity charge had nothing to do with 
heresy, with disbelief in conventional mythology (or in that o f Homer and the poets), or with Socrates' 
daimonic sign, Meletus' charge was more or less meaningless. The very nature of the case was 
perforce vague: Dover ([1976] 25 & 41) notes that àaépeia  was a widely applied term and generally 
signified some "variation o f religious procedure", and that, to be the victim of a ypac(ni at Athens, "it 
was not necessary to have committed an act which was forbidden by law in so many words". The next 
recorded example o f a ypa<|)Ti aaepelas involves the courtesan Phryne (see Ath. 590D-591F), who was 
indicted ca. 350 on a charge o f introducing new divinities. Demades and Aristotle were also accused 
o f kainotheism, which according to two late sources (J. Ap. 2.267 and Serv. A. 8.187) was proscribed 
by law (see Parker 214-15).
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uses up a considerable amount of his time allotment in linking it with gods, demi­
gods, etc., combining, in effect, both impiety charges into one. °^  ^ To the authorities, 
communion with an unauthorized Saijioviov would have allowed Socrates to 
dispense with the usually recognized means of ascertaining the divine will, hence the 
charge that the daimonic voice, in motivating Socrates' anti-democratic behavior (as 
countered in the Schutzschrift), posed a threat to the democracy,
Finally, it should be recalled in considering the background of the impiety 
chai'ges that Athens was in a period of religious flux, with new cults such as those of 
Sabazius, Cotytto, Bendis, and Adonis having been recently introduced from the East, 
and that religious quackery (in the foim of the ’Op(})8 0 TeX8 <yi:ai and ventriloquial 
prophets) was rife (Phillipson 10: see too Parker ch. 9 and Morgan 15-21 for more 
general assessments). McPherran (p. 26) mentions the following elements as 
contributing to the contemporain religious atmosphere: 1) the ritual-focused 
household and civic religion of the polis, 2) the story-focused religion of traditional 
poets, 3) popular mystery cults such as that of Eleusis, 4) the sectarian practices and 
beliefs of groups such as the Orphies, 5) the Pythagorean blend of philosophy and 
religion, 6) the religious reflections of playwrights like Sophocles, 7) the more 
criticial probings of literature instanced by some of Euripides' characters, and 8) the 
new and influential mteUectualism of the natural scientists and sophists. It is 
important to note Parker's comment (p. 215) that "individuals or groups could 
establish new cults...only with the authorization of the people [i.e. the assembly]", but 
that, on the other hand, there is no evidence for official approval of Asclepius and
l^^Gomperz (1924) 144. This is a difficult problem: Opposing viewpoints are represented by Chroust 
([1957] 48), who points out that, since no allusion to the daimonic sign in this respect is made in PI. 
Ap., it was probably not an issue at the trial, and by Hackforth (p. 84), who states that "the silence of 
PI. Ap. [concerning Kaivà 5aipôvia] loses its difficulty if we assume that the truth about the 
ôaipôviov was known when he wrote it". Neither o f these two arguments is very cogent, however, and 
I feel that the problem of discrepancy loses its difficulty if we take Plato’s approach as part o f his larger 
effort intentionally to obfuscate Socrates' religious beliefs in the Meletus dialogue to avoid addressing 
the impiety charge directly, which he must have considered irrefutable. This would also imply that he 
had a different and perhaps deeper understanding o f Socrates' sign than did Xen., and would explain 
the absence in Plato of Xen.'s emphasis on Socrates' participation in public sacrifices. Why one author 
differed from the other can perhaps be explained by his individual relationship with Socrates and more 
generally by the striking diversity among the Socratics in their interpretation o f their master's ideas. 
^®^See Phillipson 288-89, who notes elsewhere (p. 218) that the Atiienians were nevertheless allowed 
to have private altars at home and to perform sacrifices there. Note too that the notion o f the gods' 
omniscience represented in Comm. 1.4.19 prevents the possibility of any transgression going unnoticed. 
 ^^ ^According to McPherran, Socrates' moral theory was influenced by the last five factors mentioned. 
Parker (p. 200 ff.) believes that the mutilation of the Herms in 430, the profanation o f the Mysteries in 
415, and widespread scepticism towards divination in general might have contributed towards creating 
public unease during the period in question; he adds (p. 206) that five o f the persons convicted for 
impiety in 415 were associates o f Socrates, a fact which might have played some role in the trial. 
Morgan (pp. 21-31) describes the possible influence of new religious developments on Socrates and 
concludes tlie following (p. 30): "Adapting these [imported cathartic] traditions, together with his 
unique metliod o f sophistic examination and rational inquiry, Socrates develops a rational revision o f  
ecstatic ritual based on the conviction that human beings can attain divine status."
74
other deities (p. 2 1 6 ).^  On the one hand, the charge of not recognizing the state 
gods had no real basis since there were far more conspicuous examples of heterodoxy 
at the time, and there is no record of any prosecution initiated on the grounds of 
repudiating the traditional myths (Phillipson 203 & 217: see too Parker 203). On the 
other hand, Gomperz ([1924] 152 & 157-58) points out quite rightly that the impiety 
charge is understandable when we consider das weltbildende Daimonion described by 
Xen. (see the comment on §5) and quotes Hegel in saying that the impiety charge 
marked a transition from the belief in oracles to an awareness of individual 
conscience. In this sense Socrates was indeed guilty.
In Men, 92E ff. Anytus intimates that any decent Athenian gentleman is 
capable of teaching the young, to which Socrates replies that such a person is not 
necessarily successful at it (cp. PI. Ap. 24E ff. and Prt. 324D). This attitude forms the 
basis of the Xenophontico-Platonic Socrates' opinion on education, namely, that it 
should be entrusted to experts, not to laymen (see the comment on §21 below), and it 
also forms the basis of the corruption-of-the-youth charge, since Socrates was by all 
accounts known to have a following of young men, often the sons of wealthy citizens 
(most notably Critias and Alcibiades), who frequently associated with him,^^  ^and it 
would seem that the term veoi would apply to anyone under the age of thirty (see
steps involved in the official acceptance of a new deity involved an initial epiphany o f some 
kind, popular support, a petition to the government for implementation o f the required changes, and 
approval by the relevant god or gods via an oracle (McPherran 132-33).
ll^ ln  Grg. 485D, for example, Socrates is described as habitually whispering with tliree or four young 
men in a comer, and Derenne (p. 156 & note) feels that the prosecution surely brought up Critias and 
Alcibiades as concrete examples of the corruption charge (see tlie comment on §11 for the possible 
effects o f the amnesty o f 403 on the judicial proceedings). For references to the coiTuption charge in 
Plato, see Ap. 23C-D, 24C-26A, 33 A, 33D-34A and Euthphr. 2C-3B. While Gontar (p. 99) might be 
going a bit too far in claiming that the Euthphr. can be seen as a work written to express Socrates' 
support o f filio-piety and as a rebuttal to the Clouds, there were, o f courae, powerful religious sanctions 
supporting respect for one’s elders, an attitude which is quite evident in Socrates' shock at Euthyphro’s 
actions (see Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 37). It should be noted in addition that the purely exploitative 
motives o f Alcibiades as represented in Xen. do not agree with his portrayal in Plato.
Toole (pp. 4-5) has conveniently set out the relevant references in Xen. and Libanius as
follows:
Ô IcoKpaxTis Ka0icn:â robs véous...
- ovoatous Kai aaepeXs (Ap. 19, Comm. 1.2.2, Lib. Ap. 43)
- olvoïtôras (Ap. 19, Comm. 1.2.22)
- bppioràs KQi Tiapavopous (Ap. 19, Comm. 1.2.2,1.2.25, Lib. Ap. 4 3 ,1 0 3 ,1 1 2 )
- paX,0aKobs k oi (jivyoTcbvous (Ap. 19, Comm. 1.2.2,1.2.25, Lib. Ap. 13, 127)
- oTtardXovs x a i laipdpyovs (Ap. 19, Comn. 1.2.2,1.2.25)
- aKoA-Ctcrous (Ap. 19, Comm. 1.2.2,1.2.25)
- diteiGdpxous els robs yovets (Ap. 20, Comn. 1.2.49)
- lepoobXovs KOI x lènras (Ap. 25, Cotnm. 1.2.62, Lib. Ap. 1 3 ,103 ,112 )
- àvSpaTcoôiaràs (Ap. 25, Comn. 1.2.62)
- 7rEpi<l)povTiràs rcov vôptùv, piooSiipous kcCi jrpoSbras rrjs jco^ems (Ap. 25, Comm. 1.2.29,1.2.63, 
IV .4.11,L ib.A p. 13,48, 54).
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Comm. 1.2.35 and 1.2.31 ff. in general for Critias and Chaiicles' edict forbidding 
Socrates to converse with young Athenians).
A comparison of both defense speeches leads one to conclude that, as in the 
case of the impiety charge(s), Socrates must have actually dealt with the corruption- 
of-the-youth charge in the course of his interrogation of Meletus (Hackfoith 109-10). 
The defense offered by each Socrates figure is rather disappointing: Unless the 
accusation concerning disobedience to one's parents can be considered an exception, 
the lengthy responses as they appear in the Schutzschrift are entirely lacking (see 
Essay C), and this Socrates (as opposed to Plato’s, who takes the initiative throughout 
the dialogue) only brings up the cormption matter passively in response to a well- 
founded point made by Meletus. The Platonic Socrates is certainly the more 
impressive debater of the two, but the argument for his innocence, i.e., that he who 
harms others also haims himself, is unconvincing and could in fact be used to justify 
any criminal behavior whatsoever.
In short, Xen. does not deny the coiTuption chaige but attempts to explain it; 
Plato maintains that the prosecution had no clear basis for the accusation, which in 
effect removes Plato from all consideration in attempting to anive at any conclusions 
on this point. In refeiTing his alleged role in comipting the youth back to the vague 
charges of the indictment (see Ap. 24B-C and Euthphr. 3A-B), Plato's Socrates seems 
to be avoiding addressing the question directly, and whereas he would have no doubt 
won the sympathy of some of the dicasts through the prosecutors' inability to clarify 
their vague charges, there is still no explanation for why (and how) they pressed these 
chai'ges in the first place. This makes PL Ap. all but useless in trying to determine 
what the actual grounds for this charge were (see Gomperz [1924] 140-41). Plato's 
argument is essentially a non-argument.
Did Socrates in fact encourage his followers to turn to more knowledgeable 
and authoritative sources than their elder relatives in certain cases? Gomperz ([1924] 
139 n. 1) notes that they seem at any rate to have used his elenctic techniques on their 
elders (see Comm. 1.2.40 ff. and PL Ap. 23C, 39C-D), and we must conclude in this 
case that Meletus' Polycratean charge in §20 must hold at least some truth, since Xen.
P.J. Rhodes (ap. Stokes [1997] 11) states that in classical Athens there was no other official accusation 
of comipting die youth.
^l^Gomperz (1924) 140 n. 1. Gomperz further observes on the same page \hs&...diese Verteidigung 
[gegen M eletos] hdlt sich...durchaus im Allgemeinen and Formalen. His conclusions about the 
comiption-of-the-youth charge appear on pp. 138-39. Phillipson (p. 326) believes that this charge 
involves Socrates' doctrine that no one errs intentionally.
^^^Grg. 521E-522B seems to indicate that the corruption-of-the-youth offense was ethical rather than 
political (Hackforth 75: see also Anytus’ statement in PI. Ap. 29C). The words o f the Laws in Cri. 53C 
are also relevant in this respect: ooxis yap voptov ôia<l)0opEV)s éariv 0 (}»ôôpa itou Sô^eiev âv vécov ye 
KOI àvofixcûv àv0p«wtcûv ôt^O opsiis elvai.
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would have had no other conceivable reason for yielding on this point to the 
prosecution A
11. © àvôpes: Plato's Socrates also addresses the dicasts as âvôpes ’A0r}vaîoi while 
reserving the appellation m âvôpes ôiKaorai for those who vote to acquit him (see PL 
Ap. 40A and the comment on §24).
Tomo nèv 7cp©Tov Oa'o^d^© MeXtixou Kxl.: MacDowell ([1962] 208-10) lists and 
discusses eight more or less contemporary Meleti, a number of whom he is willing to 
consider as being identical p e r s o n s . F o r  our purposes, it is only important to 
consider if the Meletus in Xen. Ap. can be identified with the prosecutor who 
paiticipated in the impiety trial against Andocides {de Myst. 94) which occuned 
around the same time as the proceedings against Socrates (see Blumenthal 175 ff.), or 
with the tragedian of the same name mentioned by Aristophanes {Ra. 1302 and frr. 
117, 156, 453 Kassell & Austin) ^  and identified with Socrates’ accuser in a scholion 
onPLAp. 18B.
Whatever is to be learned about the prosecutor of Socrates {PA 9830) can be 
gleaned from the following sources: Xen. Ap. 11-21, PL Ap. 23E-28A, Euthphr. 2A- 
B, D.L. 2.38-40, 2.43, Lib. Ap. 2, 29, 33, and D.S. XIV.37.7. On the basis of these 
passages, we arrive at the following composite picture: The name of Meletus' father 
{PA 9829) was also Meletus (D.L. 2.40), and he himself hailed from the derae Pitthus 
{loc. cit. and Euthphr. 2B). According to Socrates' description in the Euthphr., he had 
long hair, a patchy bear'd, and a hooked nose, and although Meletus was young and 
unknown at the time of the trial, it was he who officially brought the indictment 
against Socrates {loc. cit., PL Ap. 24C, and D.L. 2.38-40), though in collaboration 
with Anytus and Lyco (for whose actual participation in the trial, see Lib. Ap. 2). All 
three prosecutors represented individual groups which had grievances towards 
Socrates, with Meletus in particular' representing the poets (PL Ap. 23E and 
Antisthenes ap. D.L. 2.39). In spite of Meletus’ prominent role in the sources, it 
seems to have been Anytus who provided the impetus for the indictment.
ii^N ote in particular that an expanded version of tlie disobedience charge appears in Comm. 1.2.49-55, 
and that, as Gomperz ([1924] 132) observes, Xen. surely would not have used the same material twice 
unless it were substantially true.
 ^^ ^Sixteen Meleti o f the fifth and fourth centuries BC are listed in Osborne and Byrne's A Lexicon o f  
Greek Personal Names (vol. 2 p. 302).
^l^Aelian {VH 2.13) reports that Aristophanes was bribed by Socrates' enemies, including Meletus and 
Anytus, a chronological impossibility. Tlie Meletus identification in Frogs is problematical (see Dover 
[1993] 350).
ll^ se e  Xen. Ap. 29-31, PI. Ap. 18B, 29C, 3GB, 31 A, D.L. 2.38, and Lib. Ap. 29, 33. Zeller ([1954] 
191) observes that Anytus and Meletus cannot easily be seen as paragons o f the type o f traditional 
public morality formerly exemplified by such men as Miltiades and Aristides.
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According to Diogenes Laertius (2.43) and Diodoms Siculus (XIV.37.7), Meletus 
was put to death by the Athenians after Socrates’ execution as the result of 
widespread public remorse.
In spite of the great number of articles which treat the problem of the multiple 
Meleti in great detail,^the identity of Socrates’ prosecutor rests, as Blumenthal (p. 
170) himself points out, on one unsatisfactory piece of textual evidence, i.e., Euthphr. 
2B, a passage in which Meletus is described as being “young” and “unknown” 
(véos...Kal ayvc6s).^2  ^ MacDowell’s arguments ([1962] 208-209: cp. Kahrstedt 503) 
against identifying this Meletus with the tragedian and Andocides’ prosecutor of the 
same name are as compelling as they are succinct: 1) If our Meletus was young and 
unknown in 399, he could not have been the same person as the tragedian mentioned 
in Aristophanes’ Farmers (produced ca. 424 B.C.),i2i and 2) although it is tempting 
to connect the tragedian with the fanatically religious accuser of Andocides (see 
Taylor [1949] 158 and Blumenthal 174-75), the latter can be ruled out for similai* 
reasons, that is, if Andocides’ prosecutor had been directly involved in the Leon of 
Salamis affak, he would not be described in the Euthphr. passage as unknown, and 
Socrates would not fail to mention him in PI. Ap. 32C, where he refers to his own 
participation in this e v e n t . I t  should be added that the fact that Socrates’ accuser 
acted on behalf of poets (PI. Ap. 23E) does not prove that he (or his father of the same 
name) was a poet. Dover (Lysias 80 n. 80) objects to MacDowell’s assertion ([1962] 
209) that “Sokiates’s colleague in 404 could not have been unknown to him in 399” 
on the following grounds: 1) MacDowell’s statement presupposes that Andocides’ 
allegation of Meletus’ complicity in the Leon affair is literally time, 2) Socrates’ 
failure to mention Meletus in PI. Ap. 32C is not a convincing ai'gument since it is at 
least possible that Socrates did not meet the other four men involved in the affair, and
3) Socrates’ words in Euthphr. 2B do not necessarily imply that he did not know 
Meletus at all. These are reasonable objections, yet they bring us no closer to making
^^^See, for example, Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 27-29 and Blumenthal 169 for overviews of the 
pertinent scholarship.
^2®Derenne (pp. 124-26) believes that Socrates' statement is ironic, and prefers to identify Meletus 
with the playwright.
According to Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:47-48), if Meletus’ fatlier was also named Meletus, then both 
were probably ttagedians, and it was in fact the father who was named in Aristophanes' Farmers (and 
also probably in Frogs); Wilamowitz also believes that Meletus the accuser probably wrote the 
Oedipodia  mentioned in Aristophanes’ Storks (see the scholion on PI. Ap. 18B). The scholiast also 
states that in Farmers Aristophanes called Meletus a lover o f Callias (see MacDowell [1962] 208), and 
it would be interesting to make some connection in this respect between this Meletus and Callias' half- 
brother Hermogenes, the given source of Xen. Ap.
l^^Blumenthal (p. 174 ff.) proposes that Meletus might have prosecuted Andocides as a means of 
restoring a reputation already tarnished somewhat by his own complicity in the misdeeds o f the Thirty, 
i.e. the arrest o f Leon (And. de Myst. 94) and the embassy to Sparta (HG  n.4,36), and tliat, if  
Andocides' trial came before Socrates', Meletus' religious fervor might have attracted Anytus’ 
attention. Blumenthal elsewhere (p. 172) strongly supports the identification o f the two prosecutors, 
pointing to the paucity of Meleti and the infrequency o f impiety trials during this period.
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a positive identification. In sum, due to the scanty evidence and the relatively large 
number of contemporary or near-contemporary Meleti, a n y  identifications are 
problematical, and for reasons of provenance, lineage, and probable familiarity to 
Socrates through public notoriety, MacDowell ([1962] 209: see Brickhouse & Smith 
[1989] 27-29) concludes that Socrates’ prosecutor should be treated as distinct from 
the other seven Meleti on his list.
Whether he spoke alone at the trial or together with Anytus and Lyco,
Meletus, as the one who had submitted the indictment, had to conduct the case 
himself and to submit to questioning by the d e f e n d a n t .  ^^3 jf conducted the case in 
concert with the other two prosecutors,he nevertheless would have spoken first as 
the nominal prosecutor (Phillipson 267) and would have concerned himself with' the 
indictment proper, while the other two prosecutors could have dwelled on the political 
charges and on more general insinuations (Riddell xv).i25 Meletus' speech does not 
seem to have been particularly cogent, since he would have surely paid a fine for not 
garnering enough votes if he had not been assisted by the o t h e r s ,  though Phillipson 
(p. 310) recalls that Meletus was a poet and therefore a person who was likely to have 
better-than-average verbal skills. In general, although neither Meletus figure is fully 
characterized, what little we see of him does not seem entirely congruent, and it 
would be best, perhaps, to consider him as a convenient type representing the current 
prejudice towards Socrates (A. Ferguson 170). It should also be noted that each 
Socrates figure does his best to make Meletus seem foolish, an effect diminished 
somewhat in Xen.'s version by Meletus' trenchant rejoinder.
Much has been said about Meletus’ being tongue-tied by the amnesty of 
403,^27 5 m nature of the Athenian courts was such that there was in fact nothing
Riddell ix. For the legal basis for the Meletus dialogue, see PI. Ap. 25D and D. contra Steph.
11.10; see too Riddell xviii-xix. Meletus is mentioned in Comm. IV.4.4 & IV.8.4 as the author o f the 
indictment; in Comm. I .l the accusers are simply called o i ypa\{fdgevoi (Breitenbach 1891). Toole (p. 
7) believes that each Socrates figure's address to Meletus probably has a literary forerunner in 
Palamedes' address to Odysseus in Gorg. Pal. 22. Bonner (p. 175) notes that it is unique to PI. Ap. that 
the prosecutor is forced to reply under compulsion by the jury.
As seems clear in PI. Ap. 36A-B. See Lofberg's article, in which he contests the thesis that PI. Ap. 
does not supply a complete account of tlie trial and that it is a reply to only one o f his accusers and to 
only half o f their argument.
125J would here add a remark made by Gomperz ([1924] 140 n. 3: see too Vrijlandt 88-91), who finds 
it rather puzzling that Plato has Meletus behave like such a hapless oaf in PI. Ap. 24D ff. while Xen. 
has him raise such an incisive objection in Ap. 20 (see the relevant comments in Appendix B).
^^^See Derenne 151-52, who bases this opinion on PI. Ap. 35A-B and generally questions the 
verisimilitude o f the Platonic account (p. 167). Derenne (p. 151) adds that, unlike the Platonic 
Socrates, the real-life prosecutors apparently spoke oratorically (17B-C), persuasively (17A), and 
patriotically (24B: MéXtitov tov oyaOov xe kqI (|)iX.6ji:oXiv). Note too that, although the elenctic 
method is mentioned in Comm. 1.4.1, it is not used on Meletus by Xen.'s Socrates.
^2^See, for example, Taylor [1949] 162. MacDowell ([1978] 47) sums up the major provisions o f the 
amnesty, which was not completed till 401/400, as follows: "No law passed before 403/2 was valid 
henceforth unless it was included in the new inscriptions made in the years from 410 to 403; no 
uninscribed law was to be enforced; no decree could ovem de a law; and no prosecution could be 
brought henceforth for offenses committed before 403/2." For more information and a bibliography, 
see Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 32 n. 113.
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to have prevented Meletus et al. from mentioning, at least obliquely, any or all of the 
unofficial charges which appeared later in Polycrates’ Kaxrvyopla (see the comment 
on §20) as long as they did not appear specifically in the wording of the indictment, 
which alone would have had to conform to the restrictions of the amnesty.^^  ^ This 
seems to be reflected in some of Socrates’ statements in court: for example, in his 
denial of having instilled quite specific types of dissipation in his followers (Xen. Ap. 
19) and in his response to the accusations of his earliest accusers (PI. Ap. 18B-20C).
ox(p noxh yvovs: A seemingly clumsy constmction which prompts Marchant to 
propose oxcp Tcoxe xpOTCCO. Thalheim supports it by refening to Cyr. 1.3.5.
GTtet 0'üovxâ yé ]is èv xaîs Koivois èopxàis Kai èm  x©v ôîijiooimv pmjimv:
Dover (Clouds xlv) nicely sums up Socrates' religious attitude as follows: "The 
Socrates of Plato and Xenophon is not only a pious man, who paiticipates in the 
obseiwances of the society in which he lives...but displays an unwavering faith in the 
reality of the gods...and the providential government of the u n i v e r s e . "^^9  
Xenophontic Socrates elaborates on the theme of sacrificing in Comm. 1.3.3 (cp. ibid.
1.4.2 and Oec. 2.5), where he places his sympathies squarely with the common man 
who, like him, cannot afford lavish offerings to the gods: 0uaias ôè 0'6o)v piKpàs qtco
piKprnv o ù ô è v  f iy e îx o  p e io û a O a i xmv ànb ttoAAcûv k q I  {leyctAcov noXkà K a i peyaA ,a
01)6 vx© v.
The stress in Xen. Ap. 11 seems to be on public sacrifices, which is quite 
understandable since Socrates would want to emphasize the more public aspects of 
his behavior. Why, then, does Plato's Socrates seem to downplay his attention to 
public ritual? Shero (p. 110) suggests that each author probably focused on those 
aspects of Socrates' life with which he was best acquainted, and I would suggest that 
Plato's more intimate knowledge of Socrates' heterodox religious beliefs did not allow 
him to present his master in such an orthodox way. Again, at least some of the 
discrepancies existing between Xen. and Plato can be explained away quite 
reasonably as resulting from their respective relationships with Socrates and from 
their familiarity with different aspects of his thinking and everyday behavior.
Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 37, Derenne 156, and Parker 207.
129For more on Xen.'s treatment o f Socrates' religious beliefs in general, see Comm. 1.4.2-18 & IV.3.3- 
17. As Derenne (p. 153) remarks,...// leur [les accusateurs] était impossible de soutenir que l'accusé 
ne pratiquait pas les usages du culte public et privé  (but see Vlastos 290-91).
^^^But see, for exemple, Phd. 118A:^D Kpl-rov, ë^ti, xâ 'AoxXiiTîiip 6 (j)eiXo|iev aXeKipnova (see too 
the comment on §10).
^3lBecause of the inadequacy of the Platonic Socrates' treatment o f the impiety issue (which, in its 
weakness and incompleteness o f argumentation, undoubtedly would have caused tlie judges to 
conclude that Socrates did indeed believe in gods, but not in the state's gods), Amim (pp. 83-86) finds 
it necessary to turn to the supplementary account in Xen. Ap. 11-13 and concludes that Xen.’s account 
must be more accurate in this case. On the other hand, Wetzel (p. 70) believes that the Meletus
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Kttl avxos MeX-Tixos: Richards' suggestion ([1907] 109) Kdv amos Méliycos is 
attractive.
12. Kaivd ye jiTtv ôaijiovta ktX.: See the comment on § 10.
Xeymv oxi 08ol) |iot <j>©vfi (jiatvexai oTiliatvotxra o xt xptl ?toietv: Note the 
strong emphasis in Xen. on the strictly aural aspect of xo Saipoviov^^s and, as in 
Plato, on the association of Socrates with the Delphic oracle (see the reference to 
Delphi at the end of this section). Other similarities with PI. Ap. include a brief 
acknowledgment of the mantic aspect of the daimonic voice in §40A (i)...8ico0md |xoi 
pavTiKT] f] X0 Û Saip-ovlou) and Socrates' condescending approach to Meletus in 
demonsti'ating that the latter has been completely mistaken about the nature of 
Socrates' religious beliefs.
Hackforth (p. 95) is no doubt coiTect in saying that Xen. would not have been 
such a strong admirer of Socrates if the latter had been completely sceptical about the 
traditional forais of d i v in a t io n .  Examples of Socrates' belief in divination appear 
in PI. Ap. 30A, 33C and Comm. 1.1.5-9,1.4.15, and he describes himself as a pdvxis in 
Phd. 85B and Phdr. 242B. Although he recommends divination to his followers 
(Comm. IV.7.10), he believes that it should only be employed to determine things 
outside the human sphere {ibid. 1.1.6-9) and that such things cannot be manipulated 
by human agency (ibid. 1.1.15).
13, èy<b Ô8 xonxo ôaijiôvtov KaX©: See Appendix C.
dialogue in Xen. Ap. lacks credibility 1) because there is no movement to the dialogue and Socrates' 
words could just as easily appear in a continuous monologue, and 2) because both Meletus and 
Socrates speak as if the accusations are being aired for the first time. In spite o f these problems, Xen.'s 
account is probably largely accurate, an example o f peyaT-TiYopia derived, perhaps, from Information 
provided by the authors mentioned in §1.
l^^The noun (jxavfi does not play such a large role in PI. Ap. (see 3 ID, for example). As Vrijlandt (pp. 
78-79) comments; apud Xenophontem Socrates in causa defendenda - iusto ergo loco! - de daemonio 
quod vox erat loquitur.
l^^See, for example, Eq.Mag. 9.9 (my thanks to B. Dunsch for bringing this to my attention). Joël 
(1:75-80) believes that, in contrast to Xenophon, Socrates himself put little faith in the efficacy of 
divination, and states accordingly (1:89) that ...sokratisch ist allés, was im xenophontischm Bericht 
neben die Mantik gestellt ist, in Wahrheit ihrfeindlich gegeniibersteht: das  ôaipôviov, das 
Berufswissen, die Selbsterkentniss. McPherran (p. 175 n. 1) lists the forms o f divination as follows: 1) 
divination by lots, 2) interpretation of signs, and 3) the production and interpretation of oral oracles by 
a seer (irdvxis), while Beyschlag (p. 508 n. 2) cites as contemporary evidence for the decline of 
divination S. O T  (?11. 707-709: no specific reference is given), Th. 11.54, V.103, VIII. 1, m d  Euthphr. 
3C.
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©s ye jiiqv ou i|ret»ôo|JLai Kaxà xofi 0eofi Kat xoi>t’ ex© xeKjifipiov kxX.: That 
Socrates' daimonic sign is always truthful and, by implication, more accurate than the 
other forms of divination mentioned would seem to be well substantiated by his 
friends' apparent willingness here to testify on his behalf, yet neither Xen. nor Plato 
gives a specific example of any distinctly clairvoyant quality of xo Saijioviov which 
benefited them, that is, the emphasis seems to be not so much on the nature of the 
information conveyed but rather on how it is conveyed to him (see Appendix C). 
Contextually, this section is framed by the mention of the Pythian priestess at the end 
of the preceding section and by the reference to Apollo in the following. The Delphic 
god, then, who knows everything (cp. Comm. 1.3.2), passes this infoimation along in 
advance (jcpocripatveiv) to whomever he wishes. The issue of clairvoyance comes 
up again in §30 (q.v.), though in a different context.
In general, this section is not concerned with rebutting the atheism charge but 
with emphasizing Socrates' special status among men, a position which only increases 
the megalegorical tone of the speech as a whole (see Gigon [1946] 224 and Amim 60 
ff.).
14. oi ôiKa<Txat èOopnponv, oi pev àmcrxoûvxes xois Aeyopévois, o i ôe Kai 
<j»0ovonvxes, e i Kai jcapa 0e©v pei^ov©v f[ auxoi xnyxavoi: As Gomperz 
([1924] 158-59) points out, it was not so much the fact that Socrates did not worship 
the state gods in the traditional way but the notion of a private oracle which was 
controversial, and this explains the reaction of the dicasts in this section. ^ 4^ Tfig 
passages in PL Ap. relating to 86pn(3os concern
1) Socrates' unforensic style of speaking (17C-D: èàv ôià x©v aùx©v loymv 
àKonrixé pou artoAoyoupevou Ôi’ ©vTiep ei©0a ^ y eiv  xai èv àyopq éîii x©v 
xpa7ceÇ©v, ...pfjxe 0aupdÇ8iv pf)X8 0opu(38Îv xoûxou ëv8Ka),
2) the possible effects of his report concerning Chaerephon on the dicasts (20E- 
21 A: Kai pot, é  âvôpes ’A0Tivdioi, pf] 0opt)pf|cn(X8, p-qÔ’ èàv ôô^© xi ûpîv péya 
Aéyeiv* ....koI, ôrcep Aéy©, pf| 0opt)petx8, © âvÔp8s),^^  ^ and
According to Vrijlandt (p. 140), any intention to upset the dicasts seems more appropriate to Xen.'s 
characterization o f Socrates: Plato Socratem identidemfacit orantem et rogantem urbane adnwdum et 
demisse indices ne irascantur causidicorum in tnodum. Fritz ([1931] 65 n. 1) notes that...0op-upeiv 
wird in keiner anderen Schrift des Xenophon fUr eine Bezeugung des Unwillens gebraucht, and that 
0opt)|56tv is used more appropriately in PI. A p . to forestall any strong reaction from the dicasts, while 
in Xen. Ap. it points backwards towards an illogical conclusion about divine favor (p. 65). Note too 
Euthyphro's statement {Euthphr. 3C-D) that he is ridiculed in the assembly whenever he refers to his 
mantic powers.
^^^See too D.L. 2.38, where the dicasts' envy is also described.
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3) his civil disobedience (30C: Mt] Sopupeixe, © âvôpes 'AHqvaîoi, àXX 
èppeiva'üé poi oîs èÔeri0rjv ûp©v, pf\ ©opujJeiv è(|)’ oîs âv Xéy© àXV àKoûeiv'
KQi yâp, ©s èycb oipai, ôvf|<je<j9e âKoûovxes).
Bers, who concludes that "dikastic Oôpupos" was quite common in Athenian 
courts ,def ines  it as "any vocal expression that one or more jurymen (ôiKaaxai) 
direct to a litigant or other members of the jury panel", a phenomenon which was 
sometimes elicited, of course, by rhetorical manipulation of the jury. Bers (p. 8 ) also 
notes that, in Socrates' case as well, bystanders standing at the fringes of the 
proceedings would have undoubtedly contributed to the uproar. It should also be 
noted, however, that the fact that Socrates made a positive impression on the dicasts 
seems to be well demonstrated by the number of them who supposedly voted for his 
acquittal.
Cobet (ap. Thalheim) writes ei xis Kai ktA., and Schenkl (ibid.) napà 0e©v 
Kai KXl.
Xaipecj»©vTos yap Tcoxe èKep©x©vxos èv AeX<{»oîs fcepi époû: Little is known 
about Chaerephon (PA 15203). Xen. describes him as belonging to the Socratic circle 
(Comm. 1.2.48) and as having difficulties with his younger brother Chaerecrates (ibid.
II.3.1 ff.). That he was well acquainted with Socrates is borne out by the other 
Socratic s ou rces .Tay l or  ([1911] 12), who believes that, as in the case of 
Antiphon, the chief suspicion against Socrates was that he was the leader of an anti­
democratic exaipia, also believes (see too Winspear 83) that any reference to the 
democrat Chaerephon in PI. Ap. 20E ff. would have been untimely since Socrates had 
stayed in the city during the rule of the Thirty, though, as Brickhouse and Smith 
([1989] 23) remai'k, Socrates’ friendships both with the democrat Chaerephon and 
with notable oligaichs might have kept him from being tried any earlier.
Tcollmv 7rap6vx©v aveiXev 6 'AxcoHmv jniôéva e lv a i av0p©7C©v èpon pfjxe 
èXei)0ept©xepov pfixe ôiKatoxepov pfixe cr©<j)pové(rxepov; For references to 
Socrates as an èXeu0épios, see Comm. IV.5.2 ff., Oec. 1.17-23, 4.2-3, 10.10, 13.6-12, 
14.9, and Smp. 1.10; to his ôiKaiocruvq, see Comm. IV.4.1 ff., IV.6.5-6, IV.4.12,
^^^Bers 1 (see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 211 and Riddell xvii n. 8). Justus o f Tiberias (ap. D.L. 
2.41) relates that Plato was also shouted down by the dicasts when he attempted to speak during the 
trial.
Ap. 20E, Chrrn. 153B-C, Grg. 447A-448C, 458C, Ar. Nu. 104 ,144 ,146 , 156, 503, 831, 1465, 
Av. 1296,1564, V. 1408,1412, frr. 295, 552, 584, and Eupolis frr. 180, 253 (see too tlie scholia on PI. 
Ap. 20E and Nu. 144). The question of Chaerephon's deme (see Nu. 156) is treated by Dover (Clouds 
114-15).
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IV.8.11, and Oec. 9.13, 14.2-10; and to his aaxj)po<T6vT|, see Comm. 1.2.17-18,1.2.21- 
23, IV.3.1, rV.5.7, and Oec. 2 1 . 1 2 .^ 8
It seems likely that, due to the penury imputed to him in the primary sources, 
Chaerephon would have been forced to use the two-bean method of sortition at 
Delphi, a method which resulted in yes-or-no responses only.^^  ^ The words îioXAcov 
Tiapovxmv in this section support this (see Parke 250 and Reeve 29), though, as 
Guthrie ([1978] 3:406 n. 2) believes, the threefold response does not^^o ii 5^5 been 
suggested by Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:52) and Gomperz ([1924] 165 n. 1) that, since 
people queried the oracle out of necessity, not out of curiosity, Chaerephon's question 
was prompted by his interest in finding a good teacher, not in seeking confirmation of 
his own estimation of the man.^ 1^ The crux of the Delphic problem rests in the 
motivation for the response: If it was delivered by the Pythia or a priest chosen to
more observations on these three Socratic qualities, see my comments on §§3,9 , and 16. Note 
that these qualities are those which are also stressed in traditional encomia (see Essay C n. 6). 
l^^See Vlastos 288-89. Stokes ([1992] 59-60) disputes the practice of cleromancy at Delphi.
Schmid (3:1:240 n. 9) believes that Chaerephon in fact posed the Xenophontic version of the 
question because o f the importance o f these three concepts for the Socratics. General references to 
various scholars' conjectures concerning Chaerephon’s visit to Delphi appear in Deman (p. 44 ff.) and 
Reeve (p. 30). Note tliat Chaerephon’s question is ultimately a negative one (as the Platonic Socrates 
himself interprets it: see McPherran 212), and it is tlierefore quite understandable that tlie oracle could 
so easily answer it in the negative: Since the question required a yes-or-no answer, the oracle simply 
might have given Chaerephon the answer he wanted (see Wilamowitz [1919] 2:52-53 and Derenne 
165). Gomperz ([1924] 165, n. 2) and Parke (p. 250) attempt to re-construct Chaerephon's actual 
question (see Ap. 21A for Plato's version: ijpexo yap 5fi e’i tis  èpoô eiti oo^icôxEpos), and the latter 
(idem) believes that it could indeed have been posed as an alternative question. The oracle's response 
as it appears in tlie scholion on Nu. 144 (see too Suidas s.v. oocjjôs) is as follows:
a o ( l» ô s  X 0 ( j )0 K 9 in s ,  o o ^ é x E p o s  5 ’ E ù p i m Ô x i s '
âvSpcôv 6è îiàvxœv ZtOKpâxqs ao<j)®xaxos.
ApoUonius Molo (ap. Schol. ad Nu. 144) states that this version is spurious: xoùs yàp noGiKoùs 
XpxiGirobs É^apÉxpous E lv a i  (see Vrijlandt 81, Montuori 68, and Parke & Wormell 2:170), and the 
reference to Euripides would be anachronistic unless the oracle occurred at a very late date (see below  
for the issue o f dating). In the scholion on PI. Ap. 21A it appears in a slightly different form, as does 
the version o f Diogenes Laertius (2.37), who reproduces the second line only. Vrijlandt (p. 81), 
following Zeller, thinks that all quotations o f the oracle are spurious. Reeve (p. 31) observes that the 
oracle’s choice of Socrates as the wisest, if true, was in keeping with its tradition o f honoring humility 
(see Strycker 42-43 and especially Parke & Wormell 1:384-85, who relate the story about the humble 
Myson o f Oeta, who is judged by the oracle to be wiser than the haughty Chilon), and it should also be 
recalled that the spirit o f the oracle, according to Plato, was that human wisdom is insignificant when 
compared with that o f the gods, a fact which further widens the discrepancy in nature between Plato's 
and Xen.'s accounts o f the oracle (see Stokes [1992] 57).
^^^See Reeve (p. 32), who believes that Chaerephon might have been impressed by Socrates' elenctic 
“wisdom”, and J. Ferguson (p. 71), who holds that the question resulted from tlie furore created by the 
comic treatment of Socrates. Many attempts have been made to date Chaerephon's consultation o f the 
oracle, including Reeve's (p. 21), which places it in the 430's with reference to PI. La. 187D ff. See too 
Chrm. 153B, where Socrates is described as resuming his mission after his return from Potidaea in 
432/1. For references to other scholars' attempts, see Reeve 21 n. 21, Taylor (1932) 78 & (1911) 140,
J. Ferguson 70 ff., Phillipson 35, Parke & Wormell 1:401-402, Strycker 40-41, Stokes (1992) 52-54, 
and Gomperz (1924) 166 n. 2, who discusses attempts made to date the oracle on the basis o f its not 
being mentioned in contemporary comedy. It is clear in any case that Chaerephon would have known 
Socrates by 423, the year in which Clouds was produced. (For Chaerephon’s problematic role in the 
comedy, see Dover Clouds xcv-vii).
84
interpret her answer, either she or he was directly responsible for its content; if by lot, 
then we need not attribute the verdict to human judgment (Parke 249).
A number of connections between Socrates and Apollo appear in the piimaiy 
sources: Socrates is said to have composed a poem to Apollo in Phd. 60D, he 
describes himself as a devotee of Apollo in ibid. 85B, he is compared to the Pythia in 
his advice to abide by each city's vopos in Comm. 1.3.1, and he is portrayed as 
discussing the Apollonian injunction yvco0i aaDxov with a follower in Comm. 
IV.2 .24.^^2 Joël (2:772-75: see too Parke & Woimell 1:387-89 for more general 
infonnation) also links the Delphi stoiy with the legends associated with the Seven 
Sages, whose wisdom was confirmed by the oracle. In any case, since he sent 
Xenophon to consult the oracle, Socrates apparently must have believed in it, and 
since he is prepaied to call in Chaerephon's brother to bear witness for him in the 
matter (see PI. Ap. 21 A), it is unlikely that it was an invention of Plato intended to 
sway the Athenians. In general, the oracular response would have had a stronger 
effect on the dicasts than his own allusions to a daimonic voice since the former was a 
recognized authority,and political sympathies might also have played a role in the 
matter since both the oracle and Socrates were known to be pro-Spartan. This 
latter view seems to be supported by the reference to Lycurgus in §15 (q.v.).
^42see too Comm. III.9.6. He is later said to have read these words himself on the temple wall at 
Delphi (see Arist. ap. Plu. adversus Colot. 1118C and ap. D.L. 2.23). That this famous gnome exerted 
a considerable influence on Socrates’ philosophy is also well-attested by the other literary evidence 
(see Nu. 842 and Ale. 1 124A-B, 129 A, Prt. 343A-B, and Phdr. 229E-230A: see too Joël 2:774-75), 
and according to Diogenes Laertius (2.32), Socrates was also acquainted with the proverb jLHiôèv ayav. 
W. K. C. Guthrie (The Greeks and Their Gods, Methuen, London, 1950, p. 184, n. 1) also lists 
additional Delphic injunctions which seem appropriate to Socrates' Weltanschauung: Oup.O'O Kpdxei, 
Ttépas ÉTUXÉlei, uppip p eia e i, eb<j>'nM.os yivon, xo Kpaxoujx # P o û , TtpooKuvei xo Oeiov, èTtt pcàp  ^p-b 
Kau%m, and yuvaiKos dp%E. Morgan (p. 15) comments that, "if historical, tlie tale [of Chaerephon] 
and Socrates' affinity with Delphi would establish Socrates' allegiance to the traditional gap between 
human achievement and divine status", a tradition which Morgan elsewhere (p. 18) defines as "Delphic 
theology", that is, as a theology "which viewed tlie gods as distant and powerful, and men as frail and 
endangered". See the comment on §10.
143 Wilamowitz [1919] 2:53 (see too Taylor [1911] 140 and Derenne 166). Vrijlandt (p. 86) suggests 
that if, as Xen. tells us in reporting his version o f the oracle, there were witnesses present when 
Chaerephon consulted the oracle, these might have included his brother Chaerecrates. Stokes ([1997] 
115) believes that both accounts of the oracle are fictions because of 1) the fact that it only appears in 
these two contemporary sources, 2) the discrepancy between the two versions, and 3) the similarity 
between Plato's oracle-story and other oracle-stories.
the connection between the daimonic sign and Delphi in Xen. Ap., Oilier (p. 86) points out that 
it would be not at aU surprising that the gods would bestow their favor on a man for whom they 
professed such a high regard (see too Derenne 165: Peut-être aussi les prêtres de Delphes avaient-ils 
pour le philosophe une estime particulière à cause de son respect pour Toracle). Cicero (Div. 1.54) 
speaks o f the Atiienians’ reliance on the Delphic oracle, though tlieir relations with tlie oracle were less 
than cordial during the Peloponnesian War (see Th. 1.118.3), while the Spartans' ties to Delphi 
remained particularly close through the deaüi o f Lysander in 395 (see Parke & Wormell 1:192-93 & 
203-208).
^^^Gomperz (1924) 167 n. 2 & 165 n. 3 (see too Strycker 43). I tliink that Bury and M eiggs (p. 580) 
go too far in suggesting that Delphi was trying to enlist Socrates' help against such figures as 
Anaxagoras.
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A principal difference between Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the Delphi 
incident lies in each Socrates figure's motives in bringing it up during the trial: 
Whereas Xen.'s Socrates uses it as a provocative means of rebutting the charge of 
impiety, the Platonic figure mentions it for the additional reason of explaining the real 
cause behind the prejudices of the "old accusers": his god-inspired mission to expose 
the ignorance of his fellow citizens. ^ 46 Hackforth (pp. 89-93) has tried to discount the 
Platonic version as a fiction by pointing out two difficulties in the role of the oracle in 
the divine mission: 1) Socrates desired to prove it mistaken and 2) continued his 
mission after his wisdom had been substantiated,which opinion is supported by the 
inconsistency in motives appearing in PI. Ap. 33C and by the problem of the 
unexpectedly great importance attached by Socrates to the oracle. Gomperz ([1924] 
163-64) finds it puzzling that Socrates would rely on an oracle when he already had 
direct access to the daimonic sign and that he would interpret the oracle's words to 
mean that he was destined to test the wisdom of others as a lifelong m i s s i o n . T h e  
significance of the fact that Xen., who in his Socratica presents many situations in 
which Socrates does in fact expose the ignorance of his interlocutors, does not make 
any reference to a Socratic mission cannot be overestimated in any consideration of 
this problem, and the absence of any mention of the oracle in general in any of the 
contemporary literature, including the other works of Plato, is nothing less than 
astounding. In general, the accidental and incomplete quality of the incident raises
Xen. the dicasts are to test Socrates as to the truth of tlie oracle, while in Plato Socrates distrusts 
it and sets out to test the oracle himself (Breitenbach 1889). The question o f which came first,
Socrates' reputation as a 0 O<t)ôs or tlie Delphic pronouncement on his oo(|)la, has led to an ongoing 
cliicken-or-the-egg debate among various scholars prompted by the following question: Is the oracle to 
be understood as an impehis for, or as an affirmation of, Socrates' philosophical activity? Most fall on 
tlie side o f the chicken, e.g. Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:52 & 64); for other views on the subject, see Taylor 
(1911) 141, Riddell xxiv, Elmore xxxiii, Daniel 84, Stokes (1992) 68-69, and Parke & Wormell 1:403. 
Hackforth (pp. 102-103) tries to resolve tliis issue by saying tliat Socrates' conversations, already well 
known, took a decidedly elenctic turn after he learned of the oracle's pronouncement, though 1 would 
add that Socrates had perhaps already earned a reputation for his eXeyxos if  tlie word aoijjos in the 
oracle can be interpreted as meaning ôeivôs (see Comm. IV.3.33). If Plato's account is in fact the true 
one, the oracle seemed to bring on a spiritual crisis in Socrates and to lead to his subsequent mission, 
i.e., to convince others of their ignorance and to persuade them to tend to their own souls (Taylor 
[1932] 78 ff.). Taylor expands on this elsewhere ([1932] pp. 139-40) by describing the goals of the 
Platonic Socrates' mission as being the attainment o f a knowledge o f existence as it really is and the 
ability to distinguish between good and evil: In short, 56^a must be replaced with true knowledge. 
i^^^See too Gomperz (1924) 164, Vander Waerdt 38, and Vrijlandt 82. Guthrie ([1978] 3:407) counters 
the former argument with the opinion that Socrates' mission does not entail disobedience to the oracle, 
i.e., he was merely trying to fathom its meaning. Vrijlandt (83) holds that Socrates' dissembling 
regarding wisdom seems contradicted by his knowledge o f wisdom as expressed in PI. Ap. 29D-E & 
30A-B. Riddell (pp. xxiii-xxiv) believes that the reference to Delphi is a subterfuge used to conceal 
Socrates' real mission, which was to effect nothing less than an intellectual revolution, while Elmore 
(pp. xxxiii-xxxiv) maintains that the oracle was probably a Platonic literary invention used for 
compositional purposes, i.e., to mitigate the jurors’ bias against Socrates and to anticipate the issue of 
impiety.
^^®More (pp. 38-39), also a sceptic vis-à-vis the Platonic version, explains the Socratic mission as 
having resulted from a profound disillusionment. See Oec. 2.16-18, where the Platonic Socrates' 
mission seems to be turned on its head.
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many questions, and it seems just as doubtful that Socrates himself would have 
invented it as a rhetorical device (Elmore xxxiii-xxxiv).
The other principal difference beween the two authors concerns the oracular 
response itself. The Platonic version (see Ap. 21 A) is as follows:
BpETO yap ôfi [Xaip£(j)®v] el xis epoh eir) aocjxoxepos. àveîAev ovv nvOia 
priôéva ao())(ôxepov eivai.
The Xenophontic version is reproduced here for the sake of comparison:
jcoAAmv Tiapovxtev àveîAev 6 'AnàXKoav pijôéva eîvai àv0pcojc©v èpoû pf|xe 
èX8U0epi(oxEpov pfjxe ÔiKaiôxepov p.f|xe a©<j>povécyxepov.
The wording is problematical in the Xen. passage: The adjectives eXeuOepicoxepov 
and ôiKOiôxepov are repeated and supported by examples in §16, whereas 
a©(|)povéax8pov seems at first glance to have been replaced by oo(|)6v. There have 
been various reactions to this: Amim (p. 87) believes that there is a lacuna in §14, and 
Gomperz ([1924] 165 n. 2), Richards ([1907] 109-110), and Arnim (p. 87) want to 
add pf|xe ao^coxepov after pfjxe om^povéoxEpov so as to paiallel the use of <ro(|)ôv in 
§16. Shero (p. 109 n. 9) takes oo(|)6v in §16 as a specification of <j©(j)pov£oxEpov and 
believes that it is also possible that Plato’s oo^mxEpov, like Xen.’s <JO(j)ôv, represents 
a later interpretation of the oracle’s meaning. In any case, the omission of the 
Platonic word oo<|)ôs in the Xenophontic version seems accounted for when the word 
later appeal’s in §16.^ o^ The words tzoXX&v Tcapovxmv in Xen. Ap. would favor the 
bean method of divination mentioned above, though Montuori (p. 70) raises several 
strong objections to the possibility that there were onlookers present.
Stokes [1992] 55. Its historicity was questioned in antiquity (see Colot. ap. Plu. adversus 
Colot. 1116E ff. and Ath. 218E-219A, regarding tlie latter o f which Vrijlandt [p. 81] notes: Hie 
Athenaeus...recte observât Socratem nullius sapientiae, ut aiebat, sibi conscium fuisse). Vander 
Waerdt (pp. 28-29) adds that, if  the oracle was in fact consulted in the 30's, we would have to suppose 
that Plato’s Socrates and Chaerephon kept it from public knowledge for over three decades, and 
because of tliis and the other reasons cited in my text above concludes that Xen.'s version represents his 
effort to correct the Platonic one.
l^^See Gomperz (1924) 165 n. 2 and Strycker 42; for more general comparisons, see Vrijlandt 79-80 
and Schmitz 228 n. 20. Professor Halliwell resolves the problem by interpreting the first sentence of 
§16 (xiva |0£v yap èîilaxaoOe fixxov époO ÔonÀenovxa xais toO owpaxos ÊirtOnplats;) as an expansion 
of (jœ<ljpové0 xepov in the oracle, rendering the structure o f the two sections as follows: §14 (ABC) <-> 
§16 (CAB). Tliis can be supported, I feel, by the fact that Xen. switches from the three comparative 
adjectives to the positive-degree form oo<{*6v in the fourth question posed in the latter section. (See 
Comm. IV.8.1 & IV.8.11 for Xen.’s use o f superlatives to describe Socrates.)
l^^That is, since the question and answer had to be submitted and received in writing when it involved 
anyone other than tlie questioner, since the written reply was sealed and handed to the questioner, and 
since anyone other than the person directly concerned risked losing his eyes, hand, or tongue if he 
learned of its contents, it becomes unlikely that the oracle could have been made and received noXkm  
TiapovTcov.
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What, then, are the reasons behind the longer version of the Delphic 
pronouncement as related by Xen.?i52 Frick (p. 68) believes that Plato's account of 
the oracle must be the correct one since the notion of oo(f»la was an important one at 
the time due to the sophistic movement, while Chaerephon would have had no reason 
to inquire specifically about éAeuOepta etc.^ ^^  The discrepancy might also be due to 
the fact that Plato wanted to emphasize the one, more intellectual aspect of the 
pronouncement, i.e. the aspect most geimane to his treatment of Socrates' mission A 
Amim (p. 88) suggests that all of Xen.'s adjectives appeared in the original oracle, but 
that Socrates focused solely on wisdom as being the most unbelievable while 
conceding the rest for the reasons cited by Xen. In this respect, most of the Comm. 
could be considered an elaboration on these three Socratic qualities. Conversely, 
Hackforth considers it likely that it is Xen. who exaggerated the o r a c l e a n d  that, as 
a follower of Socrates, he was surely aware of its occurrence before he left Greece in 
401. In any case, it is Hkely that Xen. is here bonowing from the Antisthenes source 
which he also used for Smp. 4.42-43, where the same qualities, especially éAenOepia, 
appear, his purpose being simply to reproduce the viitues as he found them in other 
Socratica.
Whatever the reason for the longer version of the oracle, the effect seems to be 
quite calculated, as evidenced by the provocation that precedes it: ’'Aye Ôf] aKonaaxe 
Kai aXXa, iva exi paXXov oi pouAopevoi ùprôv aTtiaxteoi xm èpé xexipfjaOai ûxcô 
ôaipôvwv. The addition of the words noXX&N xcapovxmv, the direct reference to 
Apollo, and the series of three adjectives can have only contributed to the pervasive
152For a more general treatment o f this question, see my remarks in Appendix B.
And yet Xen. might have avoided using the word ao^os for that very reason (see Comm. 1.6.13, 
where the sophists aie compared with whores). Vander Waerdt (pp. 41-42) believes that Xen. has 
removed the word ao<|»'ia from the oracle's response because o f its Platonic associations with ignorance 
while reaffirming his own interpretation of the term in §16, since "Xenophon construes the doctrine of 
the unity of virtues so as to admit a plurality of individual virtues each with its own distinctive sphere". 
For Xen., tlie term therefore encompasses all o f the remaining virtues, including tliose mentioned in his 
tripartite version of the oracle (see Comm. n i.9 .5 and my comment on §16). Parke and Wormell 
(1:403) prefer Plato's version on the grounds that all later versions stress Socrates' wisdom, not his 
moral character (unless, o f course, all later versions derive from PI. Ap., for which see ibid. 2:59 &
170).
^^^See Shero 109, Stokes (1992) 56, and Strycker 41-42. Note again, however, that for Xen. tlie term 
ao(|)la encompasses all o f the other virtues. Amim (pp. 87-88) maintains tliat Plato's version must be 
more accurate since his entire work rests on this as the basis for Socrates' mission, while in Xen. the 
oracle seems merely to complement the notion o f divine favor seen in the daimonic voice. Fritz 
([1931] 64-65) believes that (Ps.-)Xen.'s version derives from Plato since the forger's version is too 
verbose for a normal oracular response, whUe the Socratic-mission aspect o f the oracle was too abstract 
for him to reproduce, hence its omission.
l^^Recall that Xen. himself was not averse to manipulating the oracle for his own purposes (An.
III. 1.4-7 and D.L. 2.49-50), and a yes-or-no oracular response would have made any authorial 
modification o f it easier (Vander Waerdt 39-40).
^^^See Hackforth (pp. 18-21), who also rules out Xen.'s well-attested practice o f  self-borrowing in this 
particular case (p. 20 n. 1).
tone of jieyaATjyopia in Socrates’ speech before the dicastsj^^ and Xen.'s intentions 
can be taken to be at least partly literary, since the threefold version better motivates 
what follows and what he intends to say generally.
15. o l ôiKa<TTat ëxi p â llo v  eiKoxms èOopèpoDV: See the comment on §14.
'A X X a  pév, © âvôpes, elitev 6 6e6s èv xpTlo’poîs Jtep'i AvKoijpyoD xov 
AaKEÔat^oviois vopo0exTi<Tavxos Ttepi èpov kxX.: This story was well known 
in antiquity, and it remains to be considered why it is invoked here.^ ^^  The 
conspicuous inclusion of the word vopoGexpoavxos seems intended to place Socrates 
squarely within the rank of Greek sages, reformers, and vopoOéxai, an allusion which 
would seem to counter any notion that Socrates was an anti-democratic dissident by 
suggesting his desire to have order restored to the state after the recent internecine 
turbulence of 403. For all that, the comparison with the Spartan law-giver seems 
rather untimely. Wilamowitz ([1897] 103 n. 3) sees this as a clumsy attempt to 
play on Xen.'s own pro-Spaitanism, though he feels that Xen. himself would have 
rejected this compaiison,i*50 and I would add that Socrates' counter-productive and 
apparently disingenuous effort to calm down the dicasts by drawing their attention to 
the fact that he is not in fact divine can only be construed as yet another example of 
peyaA-qyopia.
àXXà Ka0’ ev eKacrcov ènttTKonstxs ©v sin ev  o 0eos: Vrijlandt (pp. 91-92) 
compares this passage with PI. Ap. 24C (xouxou ôè xoû eyxAfipaxos êv exaoxov 
è^Exdompev) and notes that ...ubi autem [Socrates Platonicus] 26B pergit, non 
singillatim crimina aggreditur, sed ea miscentur et contaminantur, nor does Plato's
great contrast to the Platonic Socrates' more self-effacing, if  not ironic, interpretation of tlie 
oracle. Amim (p. 88) points out quite correctly that even Socrates' reference to himself as oocjiwxaTOS 
in §23B is not out o f keeping with the relatively softer tone of PL Ap. See Appendix D.
^^^See, for example, Hdt. 1.65 and Plu. Lyc. 42B; Parke and Wormell (2:14) provide other references. 
Amim (pp. 86-89) compares this passage with the reference to avBprojdvri oo^io. in PI. Ap. 20D and 
concludes that Socrates' reference to Lycurgus in this passage is probably historical.
^^^Keith Coe (ap. Vander Waerdt 31 n. 86) relates Lycurgus' martyrdom in Plu. Lyc. 39.3-5 to 
Socrates' own; note too that Socrates is compared in Comn. 1.2.61 with Lichas the Lacedaemonian 
benefactor. Lincke (p. 712) sees Xen.'s reference to Lycurgus in Ap. 15 as a backhanded compliment 
to Athens: Gar zu weit duifie dock Athen hinter Sparta nicht zurUckstehen. 
léOpor other references to Lycurgus in Xen., see Comm. IV.4.15 and also Lac. passim, where the 
famous law-giver all but personifies the contemporary Spartan state. Nickel (pp. 26-27) notes, 
however, that Xen.’s philo-Laconism was certainly measured (see, for example, HG  V .4 .1 and Lac.
14.5 ff.: see too Breitenbach 1699), and that his praise of the Spartan system was obviously affected by 
his predominantly Spartan sources. (For other references to Socrates’ admiration for the Cretan and 
Spartan forms of government, see Comm. in.5.14-28, IV.4.15, Cri. 52E, Prt. 342A ff., Hp.Ma. 283B 
ff., and Ar. Av. 1281.) Vrijlandt (p. 80) observes that Sphaeras of Bosporus (ap. D.L. 7.178) wrote 
three volumes entitled irepi AuKoupyou kqi StoKpaxous which probably had some connection with 
Xen. Ap. 15.
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Socrates really answer the impiety charge. He observes in addition that ev eKaaxov 
refers to the oracle in Xen., to the charges in Plato.
16. xiva |iev yap sjiioxacTOe qxxov èpov SouXeuovxa xais xot) crcopaxos 
èmeu^iiais; Socrates now elaborates on the ways in which he has fulfilled the 
oracle by dealing with each of the three adjectives in turn, beginning with èAeueépios 
in the sense of eyKpaxqs.^ i^
xiva ôe avGpmjcmv eXet>0epi©xepov, os Trap’ oôôevos oiSxe 5©pa ow e jiitT06v
ôe^Ofiai; Socrates is not only internally free from the desires of his own body but 
also from any sort of external economic dependence on other c i t i z e n s .  1^ 2 The remark 
about not receiving any gifts or fees seems contradicted by his statement in §17 (opms 
noXXovs èm dvpéiv èpoi xi Ô©peîa6ai), though one could draw a distinction here 
between the desire to compensate and the actual act of c o m p e n s a t i o n .  163 Comm. 
1.6.3 Antiphon faults Socrates for not accepting a fee (koI pijv %pqpaxd ye ou 
Aappdveis), stating that the impoverished condition that results from it offers little 
hope of material success to his followers. This is reiterated in ibid. 1.6.5 (èpoi ôè pq 
[fxioeôv] XappdvovTi), where Socrates points out that not accepting a fee allows him 
to speak with whomever he wishes (cp. ibid. L2.5-6 & 1.5.6), and also in ibid. 1.6.11 
(oûôeva yoûv xqs ouvouaias dpyupiov Tipdxxp), where Antiphon argues that 
Socrates appaiently does not place any value on the time which he devotes to his 
philosophical activities, i^ i^ Besides the many references to Socrates' poverty in PI.
l6 lT he importance of examining one's life is stressed in Comm. 1.1.16 & HI.7.9 (see too PI. Ap. 38A). 
For references to the importance o f ÈYKpàxeta for Soaates' philosophy, see the comment on §18; for 
Professor Halliwell s remarks on the relationship between the three aspects o f the oracle and theii' 
elaboration in §16, see n. 150.
162por a fuller treatment o f éXeuBépios, see the comment on §9 above. Hackforth (pp. 38-40) holds 
tliat Xen.'s tendency to follow the Xôyos loïKpaTiKÔs genre caused him to add elements of drama and 
to embellish Socrates’ justification of the oracle in this and the following sections, all o f which is meant 
to suggest Socrates’ Todessehnsucht in general.
l63The question o f compensation is certainly unclear (see D.L. 2.74, for example, where Socrates is 
described as accepting food and drink), and a similar vagueness applies to Socrates' activities as a 
teacher. See the comments on §§17 and 20 below.
I64see too Comm. 1.2.60, where Xen. portrays a Socrates who gives unstintingly o f his time to citizens 
and foreigners alike, and whose association is exploited by others who in turn exact fees for what they 
have learned from the master for free. In Comm. II.2.6, on the other hand, hiring a suitable teacher is 
described as being one o f the customary responsibilities of good Athenian parents, and in ibid. IE. 1.11 
Socrates takes it for granted that one should accept fees for qualified instruction. Xen.’s criticism 
seems rather to be directed against tlie specific type o f knowledge purveyed by the sophists, and the 
negative opinion o f his Socrates tow^ds them is quite clear (see, for example. Comm. 1.6.13 and Cyn. 
13.1 ff.). Guthne ([1950] 66-71) arrives at the following commonalities among the sophists: 1) the 
teaching of àpexfi, 2) a scepticism regarding the acquisition o f absolute knowledge, and 3) its 
corollaries, namely, moral relativity and human action based solely on expediency. Gutlirie (ibid., p. 
72. see Stone 40 ff.) concludes that Socrates combatted these points by combining them into a 
philosophical consideration, i.e. apexri = knowledge, an awareness to be arrived at through inductive
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Ap., the issue of his not accepting a fee is brought up on three separate occasions (in 
19D-E, 3IB & 33A-B: see too Euthphr. 3D), references intended, as in Xen., to 
distinguish Socrates' practices from those of the sophists. As in Xen., however, the 
distinction between fees and gifts remains very fine indeed.
ôvKaiôxEpov Ôè xiva âv elKÔxras vojiiaaixE kxX.; Socrates is here described as 
being ôiKaios in a sense best translated by “balanced” or “able to adapt oneself to the 
status quo”, a meaning brought out clearly by the inclusion of the participle 
cruvqppoapévou, and a quality of independent thought which can be understood as a 
Socratic pre-condition for all just behavior, including that pertaining to a good 
citizen. 6^5 this particular sense it anticipates the description in §18 of Socrates’ 
indifference to the conditions imposed by the siege of Athens and explains his 
indifference to prosperity or haidships in general. ^ 66 AiKaios is similarly used to 
refer to Agesilaus’ indifference to money {Ages. 4.1), while ôiKaiocrovr] is presented 
as being one of the true riches. ^ 67 closely related meanings ôIkqios is equated by 
Xen. with vopipos {Comm. 1.2.24, IV.4.13, IV.6.5 and Cyr. 1.6.27, n.2.14) and 
aco({)p©v {Oec. 9.13 & 14.3: see too Cyn. 12.17 and An. VI. 1.3), and the common use 
of SiKttios in the sense of “just” is also quite prevalent in Xen. (see his reference to 
Socrates in Comm. IV.8.11, for example).
<ro<j»6v ôè Tccos ouk âv xis eiKOxms âvôpa (jnqoreiev e lv a i kxX.: For the use of
ao(|)ôs instead of oco(j)p©v, see the comments on §14 above. The remainder of this 
sentence (kqI Çqxœv xal pav6dv©v o xi éôuvdpqv dyaGov) conforms to the meaning 
of the former, while the issue of Socrates' ato^poomvq re-emerges in §18, where it is 
elaborated by examples (q.v.), in §19, where the adjective ofixj>povos appears, and less 
directly in §29, where the dissipated behavior of Anytus' son is described. In general, 
the notion of a©(j)pO(juvr| is closely related to that of èyKpdxeia.
Xcodpmv has various nuances in Xen., but its fundamental meaning appears in 
Comm. 1.2.23:
argument and general definition. Taylor ([1911] 161-62) maintains to the contrary that Socrates' 
thought can be seen neither as a result o f nor as a reaction to sophism p er se.
^^^Comm. IV.2.11. The aspect o f balance is weU illustrated by the use o f the word to refer to fair 
portions allotted to bees (Oec. 7.33) and to soldiers (Cyr. VIII.4.30). For Socrates' notion o f  a pios 
ôiKaicos pepiMjxévos, see the comment on §3.
^66see Smp. 4.42, where SiKaios and eikeXns are described as being closely related. Earlier in the 
dialogue (4.1 ff.) Callias playfully perverts this meaning of ôiKaios by suggesting that he improves his 
friends’ moral behavior by giving diem money, a practice which, he claims, prevents them from 
stealing. Tlie effects o f the presence or lack of money on public morality are also mentioned in Vect. 
1.1.
6^7^ n. Vn.7.41. See too Cyr. VI.1.55, where it is opposed to TtXeove^ia, andAgej;. 11.3, where Xen. 
puns on its ambiguity. Its potential ambiguity is also revealed in Socrates' conversation with 
Euthydemus {Comm. IV.2.12 ff.), which eventually leads to the latter's aitopla.
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jxdvxa pèv o^v ëpoiye ôoKèl xà KaÀà Kai xàyaGà âcncqxà eivat, où% qKiaxa ôè 
G©(j)pOGUVT|. èv yàp x^ aûx© oépaxi aupTie '^Oxe'upévai xq V^xfi al qôovai TrelGouoiv aùxqv pq a©(j)poveîv, àXXà xqv xa%laxqv èauxaîs xe Kai x© a©paxi 
XaplÇeaGai.
The lack of accxjipoauvq is associated with youth {Comm. 1.2.26) and sexuality {Ages. 
5.4 and Lac. 3.4 ff.), and a©(()pov8iv is frequently opposed to ûpplÇeiv {Comm.
1.2.19, ni.10.5, Cyr. HI. 1.21, VIII. 1.30, Vni.6.16, mdAges. 10.2) and once to the 
adjective à(j)p©v {Cyr. III. 1.17). It occasionally appears connected with eùaepqs or 
other similai* expressions {Comm. IV.3.17 ff., Oec. 5.20, and Cyr. IV. 1.6). It can 
indicate a sort of common sense or self-control which presupposes some measure of 
forethought {Comm. 1.2.21,1.6.13, H.2.14, IV.3.1 ff., Smp. 4.26, HG H.3.34, IV.3.6, 
and An. V.8.24), and in a more negative sense refers to the obedient behavior 
appropriate to wives {Oec. 7.15) and slaves {Oec. 7.41 & 9.19), a meaning brought 
out far less ambiguously in the verb a©<j)povi^8iv.
Xen. frequently uses the adjective ao(()6s negatively because of its association 
with the noun ao^iaxqs, a meaning which would support the view that he 
intentionally omitted the adjective in his report of Chaerephon's q u e s t i o n .  ^68 Xo(j)6s in 
this sense appeal's in one of the Polycratean charges against Socrates in the 
Schutzschrift {Comm. 1.2.52), in Antiphon's criticism of Socrates as being ÔiKaios but 
not GO(()ôs for refusing to accept fees {Comm. 1.6.1 ff.), and in Xen.'s comparison of 
sophists and p h i l o s o p h e r s . ^ 6 9  More positive is the use of the adjective as meaning 
"skilled", as applied,, for example, to the divine ôqinoûpyosi'^^ and to Prodicus, 
Lycurgus, and Daedalus {Comm. 11.1,21, Hier. 1.1, and Comm. IV.2.33, respectively). 
Eo(t)ta is described by Xen. as an èmoxqiiq {Comm. TV.6.1) and as the opposite of 
apaGia {Comm. TV.2.22), though it does not consist in mere book-learning {Comm. 
IV.2.9), and in its most positive sense is defined as a virtue which encompasses all 
others, including ôiKaiocrovq {Comm. III.9.5: for Xen.'s concept of the unity of 
virtues, see the comment on §14). The adjectives ao(|)ôs and a©(|)p©v are often 
closely linked {Comm, in.9.4).
oxouTtep ^uviévai xà Aeyopcva qp^dtpqv oÛTcmrroxE ôiéXeiTTOV Kai ^qxmv 
Kai pavOavmv ô xi èôuvâpqv âyaGov; According to my theory (see Appendix C 
and PI. Ap. 3 ID), Socrates would have first begun to become aware of the daimonic 
voice during childhood.
^68gee too PL Ap. 38C and Euthphr. IIC , where Socrates denies being intentionally oo(})ôs. The 
reader should occasionally be reminded to allow for possible omissions or distortions due to Xen.'s 
reliance on Hermogenes’ account.
^69cyn. 13.6 ff. For an example o f <jo<i)ôs meaning "clever", see Hier. 5.1, where the tyrant discusses 
the various tlneats posed to his rule by the dlKtpoi, ao<j)ot, and ôÎKaïoi.
1.4.7. For its religious connotations, &e&Ages. 11.5, where it is opposed to ctvoaios, and 
Cyn. 12.16, where it is connected witli SeooePqs.
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17. ©s ôè où pâxqv èjcovouv: Socrates praises l^AoTCOvia in Comm. 1.2.1 & 56-57 
(see too PL Ap. 22A). Chroust ([1957] 33-34), who detects a strong Antisthenian 
coloring in the preceding and following sections, defines Antisthenes' conception of 
TCOvos (versus epyov, which denotes a more physical kind of toil) as involving the 
many strenuous tasks inherent in leading a virtuous life.^ ^^  See the comment on 
Socrates' èyKpdxeia in §18 below.
x©v dpexqs è((nepév©vi'72: The problem of imparting virtue is treated at great 
length by Plato's Socrates, who believes that, while virtue is knowledge, it cannot be 
instilled in any traditional manner (see Men. 91B-D).^^3 The acquisition of 
knowledge/virtue is therefore to be understood simply as a recollection (dvdpvqais) 
of knowledge acquired in previous lifetimes, and the teacher's role consists in 
stimulating, not inculcating, a pre-existing virtue through the process of dialectic. 
’Avdpvqois also plays some part in Xen. (see Oec. 15.1 ff.), but it is quite cleai* in the 
Socratic writings that his Socrates figure does in fact believe in the teachability of 
virtue and uses every opportunity to instill his values in his followers in a traditional 
manner. Very few of the short dialogues in the Comm., with the possible exception of 
the dialogue in IV.2, could be described as aporetic.
In Comm, ni.5.7 ff. Socrates' values are described as being rooted in the 
dpexq of his forefathers, a virtue which serves as the foundation for all well-run 
households and city-states {ibid. 1.2.64); elsewhere {ibid. II.6.39) Socrates describes 
pdOrjcns and peXexq as the bases for all dpexai. Xen.'s notion of dpexq is difficult to 
distinguish from that of KaXoKàyaÔta (see Comm, ni.8.5), which, as induced from 
the relevant passages in the Comm., has the following qualities: 1) self-reliance as the 
result of self-discipline, 2) specialized knowledge and a certain degree of education,
3) the ability to make good friends and to cooperate with people in general, 4) the 
ability to help friends and to harm enemies, 5) the ability to manage one's estate, 6) 
the ability to benefit and, if need be, manage one's country, and 7) traditional virtues 
such as wisdom, justice, self-control, and p i e t y .  general, Xen. tends to praise
Chroust (1957) 112. Chroust remarks elsewhere {ibid., p. 153) that the Hesioclic line cited in 
Comm. 1.2.56 later became a favorite o f tlie Cynics because of their emphasis on itovos, and that Xen. 
often uses this word in reference to Socrates.
^^^For similar formulations, cp. §34, Comm. IV.2.7, IV.8.11, and Smp. 8.41.
^^^The Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge has four immediate corollaries: 1) the unity o f all 
virtue, 2) its capability o f being imparted to others, 3) the belief that no one errs willingly, and 4) the 
paradoxical assertion that it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily (Adam [1894] xviii),
^^^See Taylor (1932) 146-50. Chroust ([1957] 119) notes that, according to Aristotle (ap. Stob.
V.29^ .25 Hense), Socrates believed that virtuous parents bore virtuous children.
^^^Waterfield 60. The collocation KaA,oi KayaGoi is found as early as Herodotus (2.143) and 
Thucydides (IV.40.2 & VIIl.48.6), and KaXoKayaOta appears in Xen.'s Socratica tdl but synonymously
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simple virtues such as trustworthiness (see HG 7.2.1 ff.), and there are certain 
passages which, though certainly consonant with Plato's chaiacterization of Socrates, 
seem to reveal far more about Xen.'s own p e r s o n a l i t y .  ^^ 6
jtoAAo'bs jiev TtoAixas,.., ttoA-Aoùs Ôè §év©v, ék Tiàvxmv npoaipeiaGat èpot 
Çuvèivat; Evidence for a Socratic circle appears in Comm. 1.2.48,1.6.14, III. 11.17, 
in. 14.1 and Phd. 59B ff.^ "^^  In the latter work these èxaîpoi do not seem joined by 
any single philosophical doctrine, much less by a Theory of Ideas, and Simmias 
and Cebes' ready assent to Socrates’ line of aigument probably has fai* more to do with 
recognizing affinities with Pythagoreanism than with sharing a common set of beliefs 
(Hackforth 162 ff.). T a y l o r l i s t s  Socrates' friends and acquaintances as follows:
The Socratic "Circle Those present at the deathbed included two Thebans, i.e. 
Simmias and Cebes, once students of the Pythagorean Philolaus {Phd. 59B-C: see 
too Comm. 1.2.48), and two Megarian Eleatics, i.e. EucHdes and Terpsion; 
Aristippus of Gyrene and Cleombrotus of Ambracia are mentioned as being 
absent. The Athenian followers present included Apollodoi*us, Critobulus, his 
father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Ctesippus, 
Menexenus, and "some others" {àXkoi xivés); Plato was absent because of
with the word apexn (see Comm. 1.2.2,1.2.17, III.8.5, IV.8.11 and Smp. 8.27), Dover ([1974] 41 ff.) 
translates the expression as "both good to look at and manifesting goodness in action", whereby the 
purely aesthetic element is submerged in the usual moral application of the word (see Comm. II.6.30 
and HG  VI. 1.2, for example). He adds that the widely used koXoi KoyctGol may have been used on 
occasion as a "class label" (see Comm. II.6.27, PI. R. 569A, and Th. VIII.48.6), a common enough 
phenomenon among the upper classes in all ages and therefore of little social consequence. Glover (p. 
174) expresses the concept nicely in the form of an analogy: The ideal o f KaXoKayaBia is to tlie 
individual what the ideal of oaxtjpoobv-n is to the nation.
^^^See, for example. Comm. 1.7, where àXaÇôveia is treated. Xen. reveals at times a surprising 
naïveté regarding human nature, particularly in tlie An. (see Higgins 92). In general, Xen.'s personality 
is characterized by his joy in a life led actively and especially by his will to resist unhappiness: As 
such, he can be considered a precursor of the Stoics (see, for example, his reaction to his son Gryllus' 
death as recorded in D.L. 2.54).
^^^Bumet ([1911] xviii) suggests that Xen.'s naming of the Socratic circle in Comm. 1.2.48 seems to be 
borrowed from Phd. 59C, though Xen. spells Plato's "Phaedondes" in the Boeotian way. (Was he 
perhaps his personal acquaintance?) Note too that the followers listed are o f  all ages.
^^^Waterfield (p. 223) describes Socrates' relationship with his followers as a relationship between 
realized and potential goodness. To be sure, some were attracted to Socrates because they were 
entertained by the sometimes devastating results of his eXeyxos (PI. Ap. 33C: cp. R. 539B), and 
according to Xen., Critias and Alcibiades associated with Socrates for all the wrong reasons (see 
Comm. 1.2.15-17). For these and other reasons Lincke (p. 712) states that this section about Socrates' 
beneficial influence on his followers constitutes the main point o f the entire work. On the question of 
Socrates’ teaching, see the comment on §20; on Xen.'s conception o f friendship, see tlie remarks on 
dxjiéXeia in the §34 comment.
^^^Taylor (1932) 75 ff. Gomperz ([1924] 166 n. 2) lists all o f Socrates' Gesprdchspartner as they 
appear in Xen. and Plato (see Delebecque 26 for the Xenophontic references only).
^^^Note that this acquaintance with men from enemy states presupposes his having met them before 
the outbreak of the war. On Socrates’ acquaintance with Athenians and non-Athenians alike, Xen. 
states the following in Comm. 1.2.60: èKeivos yàp itoXXoès èmOnpiycàs Kai àoxoùs Kai Rêvons Xa^èv 
obSéva néKOxe pioOôv xf|s cruvonalas éirpà^axo, àXXà îtâaiv à(|>0ov(ûs èrcTipKei xc&v éa w o ê .
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illnessA®  ^ In addition to the ^evoi Simmias, Cebes, and Phaedondas, Xen. {loc. 
cit.) lists the Athenians Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, and Hemiogenes as 
being Socrates' ôpiXqxai.
Other Friends and Acquaintances: Alcibiades; Plato's cousin Critias, his uncle 
Charmides, and his brothers Adimantus and Glaucon; the family of Cephalus of 
Syracuse, the father of Lysias; Aspasia (see Mx. and Aeschin.Socrat. Asp.); 
Callias (see Xen. Smp. passim); the circle of Cimon (see Aeschin.Socrat. Milt.); 
Nicias and the families of Thucydides and Aristides (see La. passim); and Damon 
of Oea, Pericles' t e a c h e r . ^^2
If one bases one's opinion, as many have, on his complexity of thought, Xen. 
himself leaves the general impression of having stood at the periphery of, if not 
completely outside of, the group of Socrates' more intimate followers, and Xen.'s 
acquaintance with the philosopher would have been limited in any case by his youth 
as well as by his duties as a soldier. Xen. was acquainted with Socrates from ca. 
412 on and was possibly his follower from 404 to 401, the year of his departure to 
join the Cyreans.^ '^^  Taylor ([1911] 194 n. 1) believes that Socrates did not take Xen. 
into his confidence because of the latter's youth and “the general superficiality of his 
character”, a not uncommon assessment. Guthrie ([1978] 3:335) accounts for Xen.'s 
attraction to Socrates as follows: "Xen. honoured and respected intellectual ability, 
but all the more, we may suspect, when he saw it combined, as it was in Socrates, 
with high physical courage, a good war record and general contempt of d a n g e r .  
Burnet ([1911] xvii-xviii) agrees that Socrates’ military experience would have 
attracted Xen. and others in similar circumstances, and further remarks that his anti­
democratic actions (e.g. in the trial of the admirals at Arginusae) would have also
Plato's family had long been acquainted with Socrates, and besides the reference in Phd. 59B, his 
name appears twice in PI. Ap. (34A & 38B), where the priority of Plato's name and the contiguity of 
both his and Socrates' names seem to suggest a special intimacy (Hackfoith 6-7: for a description o f  
Socrates' relationship with Plato and his family, see Burnet [1911] xxvi ff). There is only a single 
mention o f Plato in Xen. (Comm, in.6.1) and none of Xen. in Plato unless Lg. 694C ff. constitutes a 
criticism of the Cyr. (Anderson 29: see D.L. 3.34 for the supposed rivalry between tlie two Socratics). 
^^^See A/<7. /  118C and La. 180D. Agathon, Aristophanes, Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Alcibiades 
(already mentioned) appear as interlocutors in PI. Smp., and Diogenes Laertius (2.18 & 2.33) also 
makes Socrates and Euripides acquaintances. We can of course assume many other unattested 
acquaintances.
I83see Derenne 73. Nickel (pp. 69-70) describes Socrates' influence on Xen. as being primarily 
orientational at tliis stage in his life.
^^'^Pomeroy 21. Delebecque (p. 27) describes a seven-year "window" for Xen.'s relationship with 
Socrates (408-411), though these turbulent years were not favorable for participation in philosophical 
discussions. Compare the itinerant Xen. with Socrates, who steadfastly remained in his native poUs. 
For the possible exclusion o f Xen. from the Socratic circle, see Higgins 21 ff.
this respect Socrates shared much in common with Agesilaus, Xen.'s other hero (Higgins 82: cp. 
Xen.'s description of Cyrus in An. 1.9 and Oec. 4.16 ff.). Xen. and Socrates could never have served 
together because o f their age difference, however, and the accounts in Str. 403 and D.L. 2.22 o f  
Socrates' rescuing Xen. at Delium are of course apocryphal.
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appealed to them. Based on his general attitudes, it can be concluded that Xen. 
probably never considered Socrates to be a pure philosopher but rather an Athenian 
actively engaged in civic affairs (see Delebecque 207).
jrdvTccs e iôéva i oxi èyd) f\Ktcrt’ dv exotpi xpTjjiata âvxiôtôôvat: Pomeroy (p. 
28) comments that the fact that Socrates qualified for hoplite service at Delium and 
Potidaea (PI. Smp. 220E-221 A) indicates that he was not impoverished all of his life, 
and she adds (appaiently taking Aristophanes' chai'acteiization at face value) that by 
the composition of the second version of Clouds in 420-17 he was undoubtedly 
poor.^^  ^ Libanius says that he inherited eighty minae and his father’s trade as a mason 
or sculptor {Ap. 17: see D.L. 2.18-19), and it is possible that he gave up this trade to 
become a philosopher (see PI. Ap. 31B).^^  ^ In Oec. 2.3. he values his own property at 
five minae. He seems to have had later opportunities to enrich himself financially at 
the courts of various tyrants (see Arist. Rh. 1398A24 and D.L. 2.25), and we can 
assume that his dialectical/elenctic skills would have made his services quite 
marketable among the Athenian elite {Comm. 1.2.60). The cause of Socrates' self- 
imposed poverty is given variously by Xen. and Plato: Where Plato's Socrates 
describes it as being an inevitable result of his complete devotion to his divine 
miss ion,Xen. ' s  Socrates ascribes it to his refusal to accept fees for the many hours 
spent each day with his followers {Comm. 1.6.1 ff. and Smp. 4 . 4 4 ) . Both accounts 
assume an unwillingness to curtail his philosophical activity. In defense of his 
condition Xen.'s Socrates focuses above aU on the disadvantages of being wealthy 
{Smp. 4.29-33, Oec. 2.1 ff., and Hier. 4.8-9) and on the point that poverty is in fact 
only a superficial perception {Comm. IV.2.37 and Smp. 4.34-36). His opinion on the 
advantages of poverty can be best summed up as follows: romo yap §f| î]KiaTa pèv 
èm(})0ovov, TiKiaxa ôè jiepijnaxTiTOv, koi à(|)t)?iaKi:ov ôv acpÇexai Kal àpeloupevov 
loxnpoTepov yiyvexai (Xen. Smp. 3.9).
Nu. 103, 175 & 362 (see too Oec. 11.3, which refers to the Aristophanic portrayal). Socrates is 
ranked squarely among the Sniroxai and rcevnxai in Comm. 1.2.58-60.
^^^Pomeroy (p. 28) also notes that contemporary sculptors could do quite well financially and refers, 
for example, to Davies on Praxiteles ([1971] pp. 286-90 no. 8334 Kephisodotos). Demetrius of 
Byzantium (ap. D.L. 2.20) says tliat Crito, who seems in some way to have filled the role o f  Socrates' 
benefactor (see, for example, Cri. 45B), took Socrates away from his workshop: Kpixcova 5’ 
avaaxncrai aùiov ôtco roh èpyaonipiou koi naiôeûoai xr\s kutô voxpv xctpitos èpaoOévxa. In any 
case, Xen.'s Socrates felt that he could at the very least rely on his friends to provide for his material 
needs (see Oec. 2.8).
^^ ®P1. Ap. 31C (see too P M . 68C). Edelstein (p. 152) provides tlie following list o f  Plato's references 
to Socrates' poverty: Ap. 23B, 30B, 31C, 33A-B, 36C, 37C, 38B, Cra. 384B, Cri. 45B, La. I86C, and 
R. 337D, 338B.
l^^In this respect, poverty can be considered to be true freedom, a quality which Antisthenes and the 
Cynics extolled beyond all others (Chroust [1957] 110: see too §16, where Socrates is described as a 
"free man").
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ôficos îioX-Lous èm0t)H8tv èpot xt ôcapetcrOat: For Socrates’ teaching without 
accepting fees, see §16.
èpol ôè TcokXoès opoloyelv xàpixos otj^eikeiv; For the Xenophontic notion of 
à){|)éXeia, see the comment on §34.
18. èv xf\ itoXtopida: An apparent reference to the recent siege of Athens by the 
Spartans in 405-404 and perhaps implicitly to the travails suffered at the time by all 
Athenians alike, regardless of their individual differences.
èp,è ôè èK xiis dvex> ôàjcàviis [eèitaÔetcts] t^ôIods èxeiveov fiT|x«vâ<T0at:
References to Socrates' frugal diet also appear in §19, Comm. I.3.5-7,1.6.4-8, IV.7.9, 
and D.L. 2.27 & 34 (see too Anderson 30-32). This passage is closely related in 
thought to the notions of è^uGepimtepov and ÔiKaioxepov in §16 as well as of 
aco(])povéax8pov in §14, and represents a further expatiation on the oracle's meaning 
(see Comm. 1.6.10, where xo pTjôevôs ôeîaOai is described as Oetov).^^  ^ Socrates' 
simple habits are described at great length in Comm. 1.3.5-15 (see too ibid. 1.6.2, 
where they are ridiculed by Antiphon), and self-restraint in general is seen as being a 
necessaiy pre-condition for any serious spiritual pursuit (Comm. 1.2.19-23 & IV.5.6: 
cp. Phd. 64D ff.), for any significant friendship (Comm, n.6.1 ff.), and for any 
important office or position of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The notion of èyKpàxeia, or self- 
restraint, is defined elsewhere (ibid. 1.5.4 and Smp. 4.42) as the foundation of virtue 
and, implicitly, of KaXoKayaBia.^^^
Xen.'s Antisthenes figure praises this concept at considerable length in Smp. 
4.34-44, where §41 in particular is practically identical with the wording in the 
present passage, a fact which has caused many to suppose that Xen. used Antisthenes
Vander Waerdt 31 and Oilier 106 n. 3. For other references to the hardships suffered under the 
conditions o f war, see Comm. 11.7 (especially §2), 11.8.1, and II, 10.4. Maier (p. 81 n. 1) remarks that 
the term |iGYaXo\m%ta as applied to Lysander and Socrates in Arist. Ath. 97B21 is defined as xô 
à S iâ ^ p o i e lv a i eùtüxow xes koi àxoxoûvxes.
^Wetzel (pp. 391-92) believes that Comm. 1.2.1-8 is in fact based on Ap. 16 ff. and remarks further 
that these types o f profligacy receive little or no attention from Plato.
l^^See Comm. 1.5,11.1.2-7 and Oec. 9 .11,12.11-14 (see too Waterfield 277-78). The implication of 
the words in Comm. 1.5.2, as in this section of Xen. Ap., is that someone like Socrates himself is best 
qualified to educate the young (jcaiSas appevas itaiSenaai).
Other references include Comm. 1.2.4-5,1.2.14,1.2.30,111.11.13-14,111.13.2, IV.5.11 and Stnp. 2.3- 
4, and D.L. 2.25 deserves to be quoted for its relevance to Ap. 16: TtoXXdtKis 5' à^opâv els xà nXi\Qn 
xmv TriTrpaoKopévMv ëXeye %pôs èaw ôv, "ïtôacov éy à  xpeiav oûk ê%m." Jaeger ([1944] 2:53-54) 
believes that, since eyKpaxEia first appeared in the writings o f Xen,, Isocrates, and Plato (see R. 430E, 
Lg. 840C, and Def. 412A-B), it is likely that it originated in the ethical thinking o f Socrates at a time 
when the external authority of law had begun to break down. Note tliat for the Platonic Socrates the 
motives for temperate behavior are every bit as important as that behavior itself (see Phd. 68E-60C).
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as a source. In general, Xen.'s Antisthenes states that asceticism is the surest road 
to virtue and happiness and that self-sufficiency involves the suppression of all 
sensual desires. Although the works of Antisthenes the Socratic are too 
fragmentary to allow for an extensive reconstruction of his ideas, it does in fact seem 
possible, as Chroust in particular suggests, to see a strong Antisthenian element in 
Xen.'s writing. Chroust's points are as follows:
1) The Xenophontic Socrates' èyKpàxBia, or moral autarchy, was also one of 
Antisthenes' principal doctrines and a quality which Xen. emphasizes above all 
others ([1957] 108);
2) this doctrine receives little or no treatment in the writings of the other Socratics 
(p. 132);
3) the Cynic principle of living according to nature was understood to be the 
irreducible minimum necessary to sustain the simplest existence, a conspicuous 
quality of Xenophon's Socrates;
4) according to Antisthenes, moral autarchy distinguishes the free man from the 
slave (see the comment on §9), and it also entails man's emancipation from all 
established laws, mores, and conventions (p. 109); and
5) with his Ttovos/èyxpdxeta doctrine, Antisthenes seems to have reduced 
Socrates to a practical and moralizing reformer, a description which certainly 
rings true of Xen.'s characterization.
Schanz 88-89, Joël 2:38-47,2:561 f f .  Busse 225, Marchant (1949) 963, Anderson 29-30, 
Breitenbach 1890, Oilier 59 n. 1, and Chroust (1957) 33-34 for their remarks on this passage. In 
general, Chroust ([1957] 106) believes that Xen. probably referred to the earliest Socratica, including 
Antisthenes' writings, and thinks that the references to Socrates’ simple diet and physical hardiness, for 
example, derive ultimately from Antisthenian sources {ibid., pp. 114-15 & 123, respectively). Guthrie 
([1978] 3:347: see too Jaeger [1954] 27 and Gomperz [1924] 132 n. 1) tliinks little o f those who would 
ascribe to Antistlienes most o f Xen.’s information concerning Socmtes, and Vrijlandt's sobering 
comments on this issue certainly bear repeating:
- ...m n  licet sinefirm is argumentis perhibere Antisthenem a Xenophonte cornpilatum esse. 
Utrumque, et Antisthenem et Xenophontem, e Socrate hausisse magis credendum esse arbitrer, (p. 
167)
- Pauciora de Antisthene, tnea senteritia, ad  nos pervenerunt, quam ut ab hoc viro, tanquam ex 
fonte, Xenophon et Plato repeti possent. (idem)
- Desinant viri docti pugnare ignotis dialogis. Desinant quoque omnia ex ignotis Antisthenis 
scriptis illustrare. Nimis lubrica ilia via et incerta. Equidem expectandum esse arbitrer d im  plura 
innotuerint ex caecis illis scriptis. (p. 134)
^^^See Comm. IV.5.9 and Smp. 4.37-38, where simple needs are said to lead to simple pleasures (see 
too Cliroust [1957] 117 and the comment on §6). This is undoubtedly the best way to construe the 
paradoxical reference in this section to the pleasure to be gained by restraining the appetites.
^^^Ibid., p. 144. See Comm. 1.6.2: Çf\s yoOv onxms é s  où5’ âv eis SoDXos m o  ôeoTcoTri Siaixcôpevos 
ireiveie. Cliroust, who does not draw a sharp distinction between Antisthenes and the later Cynics, 
also notes {ibid. 109) that the latter considered Socrates to be a model of moral autarchy.
^^^Ibid., p. 140. Joël (1:514 ff.) observes that Comm. 1.2 & 1.7 correspond to the Antisthenian 
pedagogical ideal that one should set an example for one's followers rather than discuss virtue in theory 
(cp. D.L. 6.1-19 passim).
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It seems somewhat odd that Xen. the aristocrat should be so attracted to Antisthenes 
in constructing his description of Socrates, but Chroust {ibid. 131-32) plausibly holds 
that he was drawn mainly by the aspects of èyKpàxeia, pro-Spartanism, anti­
hedonism, (()iX07C0vla, and by the focus on the practical.
Kai i>n6 0ec&v x a i x>n av0pc6jtcov; A reference to both aspects of the indictment. 
Cp. Comm. 1.2.61-64, where Socrates is described as deseiwing to be honored as a 
public benefactor. Wetzel (pp. 394-95: see too Vrijlandt 101-102) finds the influence 
of the Platonic Socrates' counter-proposal here (see PI. Ap. 36D-37A).
19. aXH OficDs cm fie m MéXîfxe, xoiavxa èmxTfôeàovxa xohs véoDS 
ôtcM|)08ipeiv; See the comment on §10 for a full treatment of the corruption-of-the- 
youth charge.
Kttixoi èmcrcàfieOa fièv ÔTfîtoi) xlves eicri vétov ôta<|>0opai kxA..; This passage 
corresponds to the Platonic Socrates' challenge to Meletus to produce 'ruined youths' 
in PI. Ap. 33C-34B.^^  ^ Arnim (p. 91), who believes that nothing in PI. Ap. contradicts 
Xen. Ap. 19-21, maintains conversely that the challenge to Meletus in Xen. Ap. 19 
cannot be historical since we can conclude from PI. Ap. 33A-B (in particular, from the 
words Kai xouxrov èytb eixe xis xPfioxos ytyvexai eixe pf|) that the prosecution 
actually named examples of Socrates' ill-advised followers (e.g. Ciitias and 
Alcibiades), as did Polycrates in his later work: For this reason, the Platonic Socrates' 
challenge seems more accurate.
Note that the phrase euoepons àvôcaov suggests that Socrates had also 
been accused, if only unofficially, of teaching his young followers to be impious (cp. 
PI. Ap. 26B). While this refers back to the impiety charge in the indictment, the pairs 
of antonyms appearing in the remainder of the sentence refer directly both to the 
corruption charge and to the notions of aaxjrpocruvri, è y K p à x e ia , and similar virtues 
introduced earlier as elaborations of the oracle. In Comm, n.6.17 ff. Socrates
According to Beyschlag (pp. 510-11), it is clear from this line that Xen. Ap. appeared after the Euthphr. (cp. §2C: xlva xpoTtov o l véoi 5ia<{i6etpovxai Kal xlves o i ôia<{>0elpovxes aùxoùs). Cp. too Comm. 1.2.8: rcâs dv côv ô xoio'Oxos dvqp 5ia(j>6eipot xohs véons; e l pfi dpa n rr\s dpexfis èTcipeXeia 
Sia(j)0opd éoxiv.
199%Qimisch (pp. 413-14) points out the particularly Xenophontic flavor o f the rarely used adjectives 
eùôiaixos and oivô<{»Xu^ , the latter o f which foreshadows the description o f  Anytus' son in §31. For 
similar types of profligacy, cp. <9ec. 1.22.
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describes immoderate, self-serving behavior in general as being ultimately self- 
destructive,200 and his views on a%oXfj are expressed in ibid. in.9.9.
20. crot TCEiOeffOat p& llov r\ tots yetvapévois^^^ kxL.: It seems at least plausible 
that Socrates is here responding to something which appeared in the original 
accusation (see Wetzel 71). The argument regarding the priority of expert opinion 
over that of one’s parents shares much in common with Socrates' argument against the 
use of sortition to choose leaders in govemment^^  ^and with the general issue of 
filiopiety.^^  ^ This subject is ti'eated in Comm. 1.2.49 ff., where Socrates compares a 
son's right to commit his deranged father to the right of the wiser to imprison the 
more ignorant^o  ^and again expresses the view {ibid. §53) that expert opinion should 
take precedence over the opinions of fathers and other relatives (cp. Nu. 1321 ff., 
where Phidippides challenges the right of his father to impose traditional values on 
him which have been rendered hopelessly old-fashioned by Socrates' teaching at the 
(t)povTi<jTppiov). The Socrates figures in both Xen. and Plato disavow any 
responsibility for the actions of their followers.^^^
^OOHowever, he notes elsewhere {Comm. III.9.7) that what tire public considers extreme behavior is 
only a question o f degree.
^O^reivapévois is a typically Xenophontic word which also appears in Comm. 1.4.7 (Immisch 411). 
202see Comm. 1.2.9, Pit. 297E ff., and Arist. Rh. 1393B3 ff. (see too Gomperz [1924] 133). Note that 
Socrates refers in tliis section o f Xen. Ap. to generals and speakers as well as to physicians (for tire 
potential reference here to Anytus as a former general, see the comment on §29). Tejera (pp. 154-55) 
has described the authority-of-expertise argument as being sophistic, and Chroust ([1957] 58) observes 
that Socrates’ anti-sortition stance is also in line with the sophistic position as set out in A laooi Aoyoi 
7. The topic o f leadership is a common one in Xen.’s Socratic works, with the emphasis being placed 
above all on the importance of qualified leaders {Comm. III.5.5, III.5.15 ff., III.9.10-11, IV .2.2 ff. and 
Oec. 21), on tire fact that there are few good leaders {Comm. III.5.21), and on the qualities o f  a good 
leader {ibid. III. 1.6, III.2 & HI.3.11). It should be noted in particular tlrat Xen.'s Socrates figure {ibid. 
III.4.7-12) holds that the organizational skills o f a good leader are transferrable to different types o f  
leadership, and that no real distinction exists between leaders in the public and private spheres since 
those who are led consist o f the same human material everywhere. From this perspective, Socrates 
could certainly be considered a leader in his own right.
203cp. §§30-31 below. In spite o f Derenne's observations to the contrary (p. 156), I do not see any 
remarks in PI. Ap. which are directed expressly against an accusation that he taught the youth to 
disobey the law. The filiopiety theme certainly seems to be echoed, however, in the reference in Cri. 
54B to the priority o f the laws over one's own children, and in Men. 93A-95A Pericles and others are 
criticized, among other things, for tlieir paternal failings (see too Grg. 515B-517C). For Platonic 
examples o f the argument from expertise, see Cri. 46D-47D and La. 184D-E.
204(2iii-oust ([1957] 63 & 149) again sees a Cynic/Antisthenic influence in this analogy (see D.L. 6.12). 
See too Amim (p. 92), who believes that the entire argument is completely in line with Socrates' 
teachings.
^®^See Comm. 1.2.24-28 and PI. Ap. 33B. Socrates' influence seems evident in Alcibiades' verbal joust 
with Pericles in Comm. 1.2.40 ff., and the philosopher's later reputation for having influenced Critias is 
demonstrated by Aeschin. contra Timarch. 173: etieiO' hpeis, tS ovSpes ’AOpvaioi, 2coKpâTnv...TÔv 
ao<t)ioxriv aicEKxeivaTE, oxi Kpixlav èttidvTi TrETtaiSE’üKtàs, Eva xôv xpiâKovxa xcôv t 6 v  ôfjfxov KataXwàvtcDv.
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’OnoLoy<»...7iepi 7 e  Ttatôeicts* to w o  yàp tcaoxv è |io i jicfieX-TiKos: Socrates' 
claim that he is an expert in education seems odd when one considers, for example. 
Comm. 1.2.3 and PL Ap. 19D-20C, 23C-D, 33A-B, where he expressly denies it.^ ^^  
This problem can be resolved by interpreting Socrates' use of the word Tcaiôela to 
mean a type of longstanding cruvoucna which eventually has a positive protreptic 
effect on his followers (see Comm. 1.4); the word cannot be taken in a more formal 
pedagogical sense in light of Socrates' repeated protestations to the c o n t r a r y . p o r  
the Xenophontic Socrates' views on education in general, see Comm. I.l, IV.7 and 
below.^®  ^ Xen. himself, though supportive of education, did not support 
institutionalized higher education, an element which is missing, for example, in the 
utopian picture of Cyr. 1.2.6 (Charlton 89).
In what ways did Xen.'s Socrates hope that his followers would benefit from 
their association with him? or, less cautiously expressed. What did he hope to instill 
in thera?209 Empa^la {Comm. III.9.14), the ability to maintain good health {ibid. 
IV.7.9), and the potential for becoming a good leader {ibid. ni.7 and Oec. 13.3-5) are 
mentioned as important goals, and in general Xen. characteristically stresses the more
^^^References to Socrates' teaching appear in Comm. 1.2.17,1.2.31,1.6.13, IV .7.1-2 & passim. The 
non-didactic characterization in the passages from PI. Ap. cited above (cp. Men. 84C-85B and Tht,
150C-151D: but see Euthphr. 3C-D) may have been motivated by Plato’s antipathy towards the 
sophists (see Shero 109-10). D. Morrison ([1994] 205-207) remarks that the phenomenon of 
àvàpvTiais in Oec. (e.g. 18.9-10) brings into question the whole issue o f teaching: Can teaching 
actually occur if the pupil already possesses the information?
As Reeve (pp. 163-66) notes, Socrates in essence denies that éX,éy%eiv is SiÔâaKeiv. Joël (1:533) 
observes that Xen. intentionally avoids using language tliat would link Socrates with teaching (see, for 
example, his careful phrasing in Comm. IV.2.40), though this seemed to differ from later public 
opinion since, as Vrijlandt (p. 108) remarks, Socrates' followers are called pa6nxaL not èxalpoi, in 
Isoc. Bus. 5 (see too Aeschin. contra Timarch. 173). Wetzel (p. 393 n. 1), referring to Comm. IV.3.1, 
describes Socrates' teaching as involving sowohl die Erziehung (ao6(()povas Ttoieiv) als auch den 
Unterricht (^eKxiKoùs x a i xpaKxiKons Kai |xri%aviKohs Tcoielv) (see too Vrijlandt 107, Beyschlag 501 
and Gigon [1947] 170). In general, the Xenophontic Socrates' notion o f Tcaiôela consists o f  
investigating the practical aspects of life, while the Platonic Socrates' îcaiôeta has only one object: 
knowledge of the good.
208lt is interesting to note that his ideas partly resemble those outlined in Plato's Republic, i.e.,
1) an enlightened self-interest which ultimately benefits the entire state (Comm. II.6.24-25 and R.
412D-E),
2) ongoing moral improvement as a pre-condition for holding positions o f leadership {Comm.
II.6.20 ff. and R. 519D-521B, 531D-534D, 540A-541B),
3) an emphasis on physical training {Comm. 111.12 and R. 376E) and on training in the arts {Cyr.
1.2.6 ff. and R. loc. cit.),
4) an emphasis on practical {Comm. 1.1.11 ff., IV.7 and R. 519B-D) and military matters {Comm.
III.5 and R. 521D-522E), and
5) no innovations in education once tlie system is in place {Lac. passim and R. 423D-425B).
2®^Caution is required, however. Although Xen. makes it clear that Socrates' followers profited from ^
their association with him, it is by no means clear where Xen.'s Socrates stood on the teachability-of- !
virtue issue (see Comm. IV.4.5: e l  p é v  x i s  p o t iX o ix o  o K u x é a  Ô i 5 â ^ a a 0 a i  x i v a  r\ x É K x o v a  p % a l K é a  p 
l î tT x é a , lift à x o p e i v  ô j t o i  ôv 7tép.\j/as x o t ix o u  x t i% o i, é à v  Sé xts p o t ik x ix a i  fj aùxôs p a 0 e i v  x ô  ô l K a ï o v  f\ 
o l ô v  o lK é x T \v  ô i 5 à ^ a < j 0 a i ,  } if \ e l ô é v a i  ôtcoi â v  è l 0 m v  x é % o t  x o û x o u ) .
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practical side of learning. i^® Above all, the aim of Socrates' association with his 
followers was for them to become good citizens (as defined in Comm. IV.6.14) and 
KaXoi KdyaOol {ibid. 1.2.48 & IV.7.1: see the comment on §9 and Jaeger [1944] 
2:61). Fraudulence was absolutely unacceptable {ibid. 1.7 and IILl), especially in the 
political sphere {ibid. III.6), and self-knowledge was the key to true political success 
{ibid. rv.2.26). In general, a distinct moralizing tone is typical of Xen.'s 
characterization of Socrates, while this remains largely implicit in the Platonica,^^  ^
and we may conclude with Usher (p. 68) that, since Socrates was accused by two 
aristocrats and condemned by commoners, our Xenophontic Socratica contain only 
the more exoteric parts of his teaching.
Because of the controversial nature of the teaching issue, Socrates' methods 
deseiwe to be treated at some length. I believe that Jaeger ([1944] 2:62) is laigely 
right in maintaining that Plato mostly shows the elenctic side of Socrates' teaching 
and Xen. the protreptic, though eley%os is certainly not lacking in the latter's writing: 
The encounter in Comm. IV.2.1 ff. between Socrates and Euthydemus represents by 
far the most detailed example in Xen. of Socrates' elenctic pedagogy, an approach 
which has been well summaiized by D. Morrison^^  ^as follows:
1) an initial attempt to attract the addressee, followed by
2) a gentle teasing;
3) the repetition of the first stage with the addressee's growing interest;
4) finally, a one-on-one encounter and the beginning of the elenctic phase of the
relationship;
See Oec. 15.6-9. Pomeroy (pp. 29-30) remarks that the portrayal o f Socrates in the Oec. as a 
practical man has disturbed scholars, botli modem and ancient (see Pomeroy 68 ff. for the assessment 
of the Oec. in antiquity). The sources for this portrayal lie in botii the literary traditions o f tlie 
Socratics and historical reality, but in any case everyday life in Athens and Socrates' own philosophical 
interests would have naturally caused him to investigate the nature o f the o ik o s . Cliroust ([1957] pp. 
130-31) supposes tliat the Xenophontic Socrates’ disdain for frivolous subjects (see too Comm. 1.1.11- 
16 & IV.7.1-10) must be Antisthenian in origin, and adds that tliis anti-intellectualism has no 
counterpart in Plato. In this respect, Socrates' sceptical attitude towards itinerant purveyors o f special 
skills (see Comm, m .l)  should also be noted.
21  ^See D. Morrison ([1994] 191-94), who describes Socrates elsewhere (pp. 196-97) as a sort o f moral 
"trainer" (in the Athenian sense). Aristotle {Metaph. 987B1-4) places the focus o f Socrates' 
philosophical activity on ethics as well as on the importance o f establishing definitions as the basis for 
dialogue.
2 l2 se e  Morrison (1994) 186 ff. for his treatment of this passage (see too ibid., pp. 182-83 and Jaeger 
[1944] 2:63). Compare Comm. III.6, which differs from the Euthydemus passage only in that Socrates 
is mostly concerned with making Glaucon aware o f his ignorance regarding politics, not so much o f  
any false assumptions that he might bear. See too Dittmar's reconsfruction o f Aeschin.Socr. Ale. (pp. 
125-28) for anotlier perspective on Socrates' pedagogical techniques.
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5) the addressee's recognition through curopta of his ignorance, which makes him 
dependent on Socrates for a solution, yet Socrates intentionally continues to press 
the éXeyxos with the same results;2i3
6) further association with Socrates as the only means of becoming à i^6A.oYos;2i4 
and
7) final acceptance by Socrates into his "cii'cle".
The basis of this approach was Socrates' belief that self-examination was the sine qua 
non of a philosophical life (see Comm. IV.2.24 ff.), even if it leads, as it does in the 
Euthydemus dialogue, to a disturbing awareness of the ambiguity inherent in such 
fundamental teims as àyaBôs and kokos (see Comm. IV.2.31 ff.).2i5 The exact 
method used to aiiive at philosophical truths was of course d i a l e c t i c .
The passage in Comm. III. 13.5, which presents Socrates as pointing out 
blatant inconsistencies in his interlocutor's reasoning in a nearly unbroken 
monologue, seems more typical of Socrates' didactic style in dealing with mere 
acquaintances (cp. the other scenes presented at the end of bk. HI), while Socrates' 
encounter with Euthydemus seems more typical for those destined to become his 
followers. D. Morrison ([1994] 197-98) points out that there am only four "potential 
intimates" in Plato (Cleinias, Lysis, Menexenus, and Charmides), none of whom 
provides much to compaie with Xen.'s Euthydemus character. On the basis of Comm. 
IV. 1.1 ff., Morrison (pp. 183-84) lists the traits of "loveable" souls as follows: 1) the 
ability to learn quickly, 2) the ability to remember what has been learned, and 3) a 
desire for every kind of practical knowledge, and he notes further (see Comm. IV. 1.3-
5) that Socrates' "targets" fall into three classes: 1) those who think that nature has 
made them good, 2) those who believe that wealth will make them good, and 3) those
^t^Morrison ([1994] 188) comments that the function o f eXsyxos in Xen. is twofold: 1) to awaken a 
desire for wisdom and 2) to test the strengtli and durability of this desire by subjecting it to further 
eXzjxos. Note that Socrates himself avoids an elenctic trap set by Antiphon in Comm. III. 8.1-3. 
^I'lSee Comm. IV.4.6, where the importance o f repetition as part o f Socrates' didactic method is 
stressed, and ibid. III. 1.6, where he states, tliat a subject should be treated from every perspective. 
2l5McPherran (p. 94) aptly comments that, "altliough it appears that Socrates wishes to preserve most 
o f the content o f popular morality, ...his methods threaten diat very aim". We can safely imagine that 
such quasi-sophistic doctrines as the one expressed above and in Comm. IV .2.19-20 would not have 
been popular with the more conservative elements in Athenian politics.
2l®For the importance o f dialectic in Socrates' intercourse with his followers, see Comm. III.2.4 and 
Oec. 19.14-15. Ribbing (p. 53) summarizes the process as follows: Wie bekannt und einstimmig 
bezeugt 1st, war Sokrates' Lehrweise ihrer Form nach induktorisch; er ging, wie Xenophon selbst sagt, 
von dem Allen Bekannten aiis, und seine erste Aufgabe war immer, die einzelnen Fdlle unter 
allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zu fassen, und dabei waren diese einzelnen Falle gewôhnlich oder fast 
imtner aus dem praiaischen Leben geholt. Morrison ([1994] 207) makes an additional distinction: "By 
calling dialectic teaching, Xenophon's Socrates acknowledges his superior position.... By denying that 
dialectic is teaching, Plato's Socrates emphasizes that tlie origin of the views arrived at is within the 
interlocutor himself, and he deflects responsibility for the outcome from himself onto the pupil."
Jaeger ([1944] 2:31-32) believes that ancient medicine's liberation from cosmology parallels Socrates' 
own, and that his method of induction is akin to that of the matter-of-fact empiricist in medicine.
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who believe that they have the finest education (e.g. Euthydemus).^!^ The rigorous 
process described above is meant to show that Socrates did not by any means hand 
out his intellectual tools in d is c r im in a t e ly ,^ ! ^  and it should be recalled that obviously 
no edification of any kind could occur without the follower's cooperation with his 
mentor {Comm. 1.2.39): Socrates cannot promise to make anyone virtuous {Comm.
I.2.3), and becoming virtuous is of necessity a cooperative process in which the 
follower learns by his mentor's example {Comm. 1.2.3, ni.3.9, IV.4.10 and Oec. 
12.18). Whenever he was unable to provide help himself, Socrates encouraged 
friends to seek out professionals {Comm. II.7.1, IV.7.1-5 and Oec. 2.15-16; see too 
La. 180C-D), and he describes himself in this capacity as a paaxporcos (see Xen. Smp. 
3.10 & 4.56-64: cp. Tht. 15 IB).
Socrates' civic beliefs largely coincided with those of the state, though he 
arrived at his own through a careful scrutiny of the established customs, not through 
the force of tradition, an approach that put him at odds with the hoi polloi; this 
antagonism is also true of his fundamental belief that a citizen must be sure of his 
own moral well-being before meddling in that of others. 21® A notable paradox 
presents itself, however, in Socrates' passionate inter*est in the welfare of the polis as 
an organism (see PI. Ap. 30E) as opposed to his reluctance (or refusal) to participate 
in politics because of the risks involved for an honest m a n .220 a  specific reason for 
Socrates' ApoUtie is given in Comm. 1.6.15 (see too Reeve 159), that is, that he would 
better serve the community by training others for public service, while quite practical 
(and convincing) reasons for staying out of politics are offered by Aristippus in ibid.
II. 1.8-9. Two popular views probably resulted from Socrates' political inactivity: 1) 
that he actively, not passively, abstained from politics, and 2) that he therefore 
represented a graiie Eminenz in the polis, as Polycrates later i n s i n u a t e d .221 it should
2!7M om son ([1994] 184-85) further states that, although Euthydemus represents only one type, we 
can assume that Socrates' approach was similar for all three types, a perhaps questionable assumption. 
For more on Socrates' attraction to his followers, see Guthrie (1978) 3:398-402.
2!8Morrison (1994) 189. In short, Socrates only took on those students who he tliought would benefit 
from his association, and it is interesting to note how he treats them individually in the Platonic 
dialogues, e.g. Theaetetus kindly, Meno with some sarcasm, and Alcibiades rather harshly (Vrijlandt 
108 n. 1, who cites an abundance o f related passages on pp. 109-110).
2l®Zeller (1954) 95-96. See Comm. II. 1 and also Grg. 521D ff., where Socrates claims to be the one 
tme statesman. In this light, Socrates' refusal to flee Athens is not surprising since he had upheld the 
laws his entire life, an obedience to authority no doubt explained by his having grown up in the 
Periclean age (see Adam [1891] xx and Taylor [1932] 50 ff.).
22®it is interesting to note that Socrates finds that he has no time for leisure because o f his involvement 
in Ôniidaia (Comm. III. 11.16: for other references to his political aloofness, see Comm. 1.6.15, PI. Ap. 
31C-32E, R. 496A-E, Ep. 324B-326B, 330C-331D, and Ael. VH 2.11). The exceptions include his 
opposition to the Thirty and to the eKKlpola during the trial o f the admirals at Arginusae, both o f  
which incidents are brought up in PI. Ap. 32B-C. One wonders if a dicast would have asked himself if 
Socrates was capable o f cooperating with any government.
221 Chroust (1957) 165-66. Hackforth (p. 125) points out that a contradiction apparently existed 
between Socrates' Apolitie and his fearlessness towards death, hence Plato's interpolation o f his own 
attitude towards politics. For a general discussion of Socrates’ abstention from politics, see Guthrie 
(1978) 4:91-93. The question o f Socrates' attitude towards the Athenian democracy is difficult: His
104
be noted finally that the controversy over Socrates' teaching is foreshadowed by the 
restrictions imposed on his philosophizing under the Thirty (see Comm. 1.2.31-38 and 
the comment on §10).
Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 113 n. 9) remark that forms of the verb pAletv 
(cp. pepeXriKOS in the present passage) appeai* frequently in the Meletus dialogue in 
PL Ap. and might be considered a wordplay on Meletus' name.
21, icepl xov ji8 7 i<rroD a 7 aOoi) avOpcoTrois, JtEpt îraiÔEtas: See the comment on 
§20.
péX^xioTos El vat 'OTTO Tivov irpGKpivopai: That Socrates was singled out by some 
as being an excellent teacher would seem, in contrast to the denial of accepting fees in 
§16, to align him squarely with the sophists and to represent yet another example of 
p.87aA,Ti7opta.
Socrates' reputation as a public figure seems to have been firmly established 
by the time of the first production of Clouds in 423.222 His characterization by 
Aristophanes presents many interesting problems, whose Socrates figure is 
distinguished by the following traits: 1) a complete unwillingness to participate in the 
life of the larger community, 2) an ineptitude in judging and dealing with other 
human beings, and 3) an anerotic personality, all elements of an asceticism which 
runs counter to the Socratic characterizations in Plato and Xen. and to the spirit of 
Attic comedy in general (Strauss [1966] 311-14 and Phillipson 191). MacDowell 
([1995] 131) sets out the major differences from the other Socratica as follows: In 
Aristophanes Socrates is presented as an expert in rhetoric and as a scientist who
appraisal o f the assembly-men in Comm. III.7.5-6 is certainly not very flattering (cp. P it. 319A ff.), yet 
it is stated quite clearly elsewhere (Comm. IV.4.11) tliat Socrates was never responsible for inciting 
civil strife o f any kind. Indeed, Xen. portrays a Socrates who praises opovoia (ibid. IV.4.16: see too
IV.4.19 ff. and Oec. 9.14), who through his very impoverishment can be identified with the Sûpos 
(Comm. IV.2.37), and whose actions belie an elitist attitude (ibid. 1.2.58-61).
222gee in particular Nu. 94 ff. With all due respect to Professor Halliwell, I still find it difficult to 
disagree with Taylor's observation that Aristophanes' caricature could not have succeeded unless it was 
founded on some (albeit slender) basis of fact, and that a conglomerate caricature o f a type can never 
be as successful as that of an individual. (See Taylor [1932] 18 and [1911] 131-33 & 138-40; see too 
Hackforth 155. References to Aristophanes' attack on Socrates appear in Oec. 11.3 and Smp. 6.6.) 
McPherran's comments (p. 91) also support this position: "It is...hard to believe that [Aristophanes'] 
portrait is pure malicious invention, since he coiüd not have reasonably hoped that his parody would 
succeed with his audience unless the stage-flgure he presented bore a recognizable and substantial 
affinity to the Socrates they knew from the marketplace." McPherran remarks further that tliis view is 
supported by the many physical similarities, the shared idiosyncrasies and the amount o f attention Xen. 
and Plato devote to dispelling Aiistophanes' caricature (see, for example, PI. Ap. 18B ff.). The problem 
consists, of course, in distinguishing fact from fiction, but in any case, Aristophanes' lampoon surely 
could not help but create or reinforce the public's prejudice against Socrates, a fact which makes his 
caricature all the more pointed (Phillipson 194).
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disbelieves in the traditional gods and sets up a new religion; he also keeps a school, 
works as a teacher, charges fees, and claims to have expert knowledge.
Dover {Clouds xlvi-1) offers three possible explanations for the discrepancies 
among the Socratica:
1) Aristophanes is portraying the tmth, while Xen. and Plato are writing fiction. 
Consideration of the sources, however, seems to tell somewhat against the 
hypothesis that, as Aiistophanes would seem to indicate, Socrates professed to 
teach science and oratory and that he exacted fees for doing so.
2) Aristophanes caricatures Socrates as he was in 424/3, while Plato and Xen. 
portray him as he became in the last twenty years of his life.
3) Plato and Xen. are telling the truth, while Aiistophanes attached to Socrates 
characteristics which rather belonged to the sophists, a view adopted by Plato in 
Ap. 23D [see below].
Since Aiistophanes' ignorance of Socrates can almost certainly be eliminated, the last 
position seems the most tenable, and Aristophanes probably did not draw as fine a 
distinction as we do between Socrates and the sophists and, if anything, drew a 
distinction between the working man and the parasitic philosopher {ibid. 1-liv).
Burnet ([1911] xxxviii-xxxix) and Taylor ([1911] 156 ff.) point out that none 
of the accounts in Xen., Plato, or Aristophanes mns counter to the notion that 
Socrates dabbled in natural science before turning to e t h i c s . 223 Other points in 
common between Clouds and the other Socratica are as follows: Socrates could be 
considered an educator and undoubtedly received gifts, meals, and other gratuities 
from his friends and followers, and he did in fact make the worse argument the better 
by refuting statements which were apparently true (whereas Aiistophanes' Socrates 
refutes those which are actually tme).224 To these Guthrie ([1978] 3:373) adds 
Socrates' general appeaiance (I 362 ff.), poverty, Spartan habits, teaching by analogy, 
convincing others of their ignorance (1. 842), an inner circle of devotees and outer 
circle of young gentlemen, the undermining of respect for parents, and a 
"(})povxioTf|piov" (see Grg. 485D-E and Comm. 1.6.14, HI. 1 4 .1).225
There is little difference between accepting hospitality and accepting fees, and 
Socrates' description of himself in this section of Xen. Ap. as being a pedagogical
223In particular, it is difficult to see in what way the caricature in Clouds contradicts the picture o f  
Socrates in Comm.: In both cases Socrates' chief interest is in tlie practical sciences o f ethics and 
politics, and it is made clear in both that he was acquainted with physics and mathematics and had at 
one time studied them. See Petrie (p. 518), whose article is meant to rebut Taylor’s thesis in Varia 
Socratica  that Aristophanes' and Xen.'s accounts are ultimately incompatible.
224MacDowell (1995) 132-33. References to to tôv X6yo\ fjrTto K p e m o )  itoieiv appear in Oec. 11.25 
and P I . # .  18B, 19B, 23D.
225por similarities between the Aristophanic and the "historical" Socrates, see Murray 92-94.
106
expert and sought out as such by a certain segment of the population would have 
evoked among the dicasts immediate associations with the s o p h is t s .2 2 6  Yet these 
sophistic associations do not square with the more common image of Socrates as he 
appears in Plato and Xen. As Dover {Clouds xlv) notes:
Nothing could be more alien from the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon than to 
teach young men how to achieve worldly success by exploitation of the arts to 
which the world yields. He professes total unfamiliarity with the lawcourts...and the machinery of public life..., and his hostility to rhetoric is outspoken.... So far 
from taking money for teaching..., he likens such a procedure to prostitution... .22?
The Aristophanic Socrates' un-Socratic approach to teaching should also be 
considered: Aristophanes presents him as teaching for money, with forensic rhetoric 
as his specialty, the reason for Strepsiades' interest; metrics and grammar are 
propaedeutic, and the two methods of teaching expository and tu to r ia l.2 2 8  in sum, 
Dover sees nothing in the non-Aristophanic sources which could have caused him to 
be singled out for attack by Aiistophanes as a sophist, and he concludes that the 
playwright "foisted onto Socrates practices and beliefs which he could fairly have 
attributed to other intellectuals" and probably decided to treat Socrates as a type of the 
entire sophist g e n u s .2 2 9  Similarities between the sophists and the composite Socrates 
aie more general: a mastery of dialectic, an interest in natural science, an aversion to 
the old religion, attacks on traditional views, and the principle of man’s own 
knowledge and judgment (see Phillipson 182-84 and Ehrenberg 276-77).
Aristophanes did not distinguish between sophists and philosophers: This begins with 
Plato, who uses the word more narrowly (Dover op. cit. xxxv n. 1: see too 
MacDowell [1995] 131). It should be noted finally that the distinction between a 
band of friends and a philosophical school was a fine one, and the burning of the
226 As Glover (p. 164) observes, the new relative moralism might be convenient for conducting 
international relations, but it was far less easily tolerated at home in Athens.
22?with respect to the Platonic Socrates, Dover (idem) notes the following: "Plato's Socrates 
absolutely denies that he has any interest in, or knowledge of, astronomy and geo logy .... Indeed, he 
professes ignorance of all technical and specialized subjects; the manner in which he expresses himself 
on the subject o f metre..., referring uncertainly to words which he has heard from Damon, is 
noteworthy."
228p)over op, cit. xxxiv. Socrates' tutorial method could be taken as a caricature o f his dialectical 
method (ibid., pp. xliii-xliv and MacDowell [1995] 133).
229£)over (1972) 117-18 (see too Taylor [1911] 129-77, who represents the opposite camp in this 
debate). Guthrie ([1978] 3:371), on the other hand, feels that Socrates' rhetorical methods and atheism 
in Clouds make him a "replica" of Protagoras, and the description o f Socrates in Ar. Ra. 1491-15(X) 
certainly seems to portray him as the arch-sophist. Dover (op. cit. 118-19) adds that it was probably 
Socrates' association with Alcibiades which caused Aristophanes to choose him as a representative o f  
the sophist genus, while Phillipson (pp. 190-91) believes that Aristophanes saw the greatest threat in 
the power of dialectic, sometliing in which Socrates particularly excelled.
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(|)povTioTqpiov in Clouds must be taken as significant, not just as good-natured fun, 
since people were actually executed for alleged injury to the c o m r a u n i t y .2 3 0
èjis ôè^.Bavâtoi) 'otto coü ôicÔKEO'Oai: See the comment on §25 for the issue of 
capital punishment. I prefer the reading eivai el in C to Stephanus' oxi.
22. ’EppfiOii pev ÔiîLov oxt xovxov irXeto gjto xe aircov Kai xcov (rovayopex)- 
ovxtov <|>iLcov a\)xm:23i This passage comes as quite a surprise on the first reading, 
and one would expect such asseverations as appear in Comm. IV.4.2-3, for example, 
to be included in Xen.'s account of Socrates' trial. The most obvious reason for the 
truncation seems to be one of two alternatives: 1) that Xen. feels that he has 
sufficiently demonstrated Socrates' innocence and his readiness for death (as 
evidenced by his use of peyaX.'nyopla) and therefore chooses to relate only certain 
paits of Heimogenes' report to his readers, or 2) that his source or sources were too 
inadequate for him to piece together a more complete account of the trial. Vander 
Waerdt (p. 27) remarks that, in composing the Ap., Xen. probably intended "to 
highlight Socrates' justice rather than the considerations which would exonerate him 
from the charges stated in the formal indictment", while Arnim (p. 71) believes that 
Xen.'s cursory treatment of the remainder of the trial is due to the fact that he did not 
have a reliable record of what had actually tianspired. Delebecque's suggestions (p. 
221: see too Frick 81-82), i.e., that the Ap. might have had as its audience Xen.'s 
friends and family at Scillus or that, since the work is obviously addressed to 
converts, it was possibly used as the basis of a lecture or of a Socratic conference in 
the Peloponnese, hold some appeal.232
The word ouvayopeuovxes seems to indicate that Xen. believed that actual 
speeches had been made on Socrates' behalf by <Tuvf|yopoi, a belief which conflicts 
with Plato's testimony mAp. 21 A, 32D-E, and 33D ff., where references are made to 
potential, not actual, witnesses (Shero 111 and Riddell xiv). Wetzel (p. 401: see too 
Menzel 6) tides to resolve the problem by equating Xen.'s cruvayopeuovxes <|)lA,oi with 
the Entlastungszeugen which appear in PI. Ap. 33D ff., and Brickhouse and Smith 
([1989] pp. 75-76) make some further observations regarding this issue:
23®Dover (1972) 119. The ôpovTiaxnpiov might have been intended to represent a eta tp la  with its 
appropriate initiation rites (Cüiroust [1957] 193-94) or to recall the burning of tlie Pythagorean 
a w éô p ia  in Magna Graecia (Taylor [1911] 173-74).
231 Russell (p. 194 n. 10) believes that Libanius might well have taken this sentence in Xen. Ap. as the 
starting-point for his own ditoXoyia.
232Delebecque suggests elsewhere (p. 216) that Xen.’s blast at the sophists in the Cyn. 13.1 ff. 
bespeaks his interest in staying involved in the current philosophical debate. For the possible reasons 
for Xen.'s brevity as opposed to Plato’s longer treatment o f the events o f the trial, see Appendix B.
Note that the general commonalities between the two authors' accounts up to this point have been 
Socrates' treatment o f both indictment charges and a reference to tlie Delphic oracle.
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1) Xen.'s report of auvTiyopoi seems slightly supported by Justus of Tiberias' 
claim (ap. D.L. 2.41) that Plato tried to speak on Socrates' behalf (p. 75 n. 45: see 
too Chroust [1957] 36).
2) PI. Ap. is so short that the additional time might have been taken up by 
cruvfiyopoi (p. 76 n. 4 8 ).233
3) Conspicuous omissions (e.g. those concerning political matters) might be due 
to the fact that Socrates relied on his cruvf\yopoi to fill in the gaps (p. 76).
In short, an Athenian litigant was in principle expected to plead his own case, but the 
use of ouvpyopoi - character witnesses who were normally friends or relatives of the 
main litigants - was often seen as a way of circumventing this rule, a practice which 
was in fact quite widespread (Rubinstein 1-3) and which should certainly not be ruled 
out in this case simply because it is not specifically mentioned by Plato. As Maier (p. 
481 n. 2) notes, the Platonic references could just as easily be taken to indicate the 
appearance of character witnesses during the actual court proceedings, and it seems 
equally probable from Ap. 24 that regular witnesses were also produced in accordance 
with standard legal p r o c e d u r e .2 3 4
Feddersen (pp. 29-31) brings up an interesting problem by interpreting the 
pronouns am ov  and aùxm at the beginning of this section as referring to Heimogenes, 
not to Socrates, the immediate implication of which is that the second part of the Ap. 
relies on other, unknown witnesses, i.e. on oi (juvayopeuovxes (t>lA,oi aùxœ (= 
'EppoyévT])- His argument can be outlined as follows:
1) It seems fitting that Hermogenes' narrative be introduced and concluded by 
Xen. in this section so that the correspondence to the Comm, can be maintained 
(see IV.8.10: xoiaûxa pèv Tupôs 'Eppoyévriv xe Kal %pos xoùs àAÀous).
2) That Heimogenes is not mentioned by name is not surprising (cp. the use of 
8(j)T| in §10).
3) The inclusion of the word ZcoKpàxTjs in this section seems superfluous if aùxoû 
and aux# already refer to him.
233Socrates twice mentions (19A & 37A) how short of time he is. According to Brickhouse and Smith 
(idem), the work as written takes approximately fifty-three minutes to deliver, whereas Socrates would 
have had about two hours and twelve minutes to present his defense.
234%)erenne (p. 170 n. 2) is o f course correct in stating that anvayopeneiv never means papxnpeoGat. 
He is on softer ground, however, when he maintains that Cri. 45E (aioxtivopai jip So^ Tj aitav x6 
irpdypa t ô  luepi o e  âvavSpiçi xivi xQ ppexépçi 7 r e î t p â x 6 a i . . .K a l  antôs ô crymv x p s  Ô Ik iis  é s  èyévexo) 
indicates that no one spoke on Socrates' behalf. The passages from PI. Ap. already cited and the 
readiness on the part o f Socrates’ friends to offer an adequate amount o f money as a counter-penalty 
surely offer a sufficient basis for the opposite argument.
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4) Xen. would have written something like the following if he had had Socrates in 
mind: prjOfivai ecju] [sc. 'Eppoyéviis] oréppfiOri pàv...7i:Ept xe aùxoû [sc. 
XcoKpdxous].
Feddersen uses these observations to anive at the following conclusion (p. 30):
Euvayopeuovxes <j)iX,oi ergo neque aut deprecatores aut testes vel similes quidam 
aut ceteri scriptores Socratis Apologiarum, velut Lysias, Theodectes, alii sunt 
habendi, sed Xenophontis auctores nihil aliud quam Hermogenes referentes ob 
eamque causam cum eo consentientes, fartasse eidem, qui Menu IV 8, 10 
significantur verbis %pos xoùs dÀÀous, quibus non ceteros quosdam velut 
Aristodemum vel Euthydemum significarL..ponimus, sed sermonis arbitras nescio quos.
Feddersen consequently takes ouvayopeùeiv to mean consentire, citing as supporting 
passages Cyr. n.2.20, Isoc. 4.139, and Th. VII.49.3, and comments that this verb is 
nowhere found in a forensic context, where ouvriyopelv (from ouvfiyopos) is 
commonly used (see Ar. Ach. 685,705, PI. Lg. 937A, and S. Tr. 814). Feddersen 
feels that Socrates' post-conviction speech should also be referred to these sources, 
and he notes that Hermogenes’ ecjiri is replaced by Xéyexai in §§28-29. His last 
remark on the matter (pp. 30-31) is intuitive: Ceterum nobis consentaneum videtur 
esse Socratem, ut cetera defensionis adiumenta, ita hoc quoque testium, prorsus 
répudiasse.
Feddersen makes a good argument, but it falls short for the following reasons: 
1) The word eiîieîv in §24 contradicts the supposed finality of èppfi0r|...7C/l8ico, that 
is, eiTtetv must continue the indirect discourse originally introduced by Hermogenes 
in §2. 2) The verb eppfiOrj is also used of Socrates in §1. 3) Socrates is also refened 
to as aùxôv in §4. 4) Socrates appears as the subject of the indirect discourse as 
recently as §21 (the preceding section), and the emphasis has long since rested on 
what Socrates has said, not on Hermogenes' report. This is reinforced by the 
hyperbatonic position of èppfiBq in §22. 5) Feddersen's point about cruvayopeueiv is 
not entirely true: Although the verb seems to appear more frequently in a deliberative 
setting (see, for example, Th. VI.6.3, D. inAristocr. 172, and D. contra Polycl. 6), it 
is in fact used forensically in D. contra Timoth. 10 and Aeschin. in Timarch. 87 in 
regard to character witnesses of the type described above. 235 Por all of these reasons 
it is much more natural to inteipret the two pronouns as refemng to Socrates.
235Lys. 12.25 could also be cited as an example if it were not for the extra-judicial nature of the 
proceedings, that is, Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were sentenced to death in absentia  by the 
Thirty, an action against which Eratostlienes supposedly spoke out at the time.
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a l l  îipKECTÉ pot ÔTilâcat ôxt 2<OKpàxTvs...èiroiètxo236; Socrates again refers to 
both aspects of the indictment (ppte jcepi Oeoùs àaeppoai ppxe itepi avOpowtoos 
dôiKOs <t)avfivai),232 and the two intentions expressed in this section, i.e. to prove 
Socrates' piety and his readiness to die, correspond to two fundamental beliefs of 
Xen., namely, a strong belief in the di patrii and the notion of u t i l i t y . 238 His efforts to 
prove his innocence in no way mle out his use of peyalriyopta to secure his 
conviction, and Vander Waerdt (p. 23 n. 69) quite justifiably takes the pév-clause and 
the following 6é-clause in §23 as referring together to this aspect of Socrates' defense.
Scholars have proposed many different reasons to explain Xen.'s motivation in 
writing the Ap. : Nickel (p. 81) thinks that the the work is primarily meant to explain 
Socrates’ peyalpyopia and to supply a psychological complement to other accounts 
of the trial. Chroust ([1957] 15) believes that Xen. wrote all of his Socratica out of a 
sense of rivalry with other great writers of his age, and states elsewhere ([1957] 19 & 
69) that both the Ap, and the Schutzschrift were written in reply to Polycrates and the 
anti-Socratic literature in general, with the Schutzschrift being more overtly 
antagonistic in this respect. Delebecque (p. 207) sees Xen.'s motives as being at least 
partly political: As Sparta’s position weakened after the King’s Peace, Xen. felt the 
need to reconcile himself with Athens through the writing of his Socratica, and this 
placed him in a difficult situation: Xen. was still an Athenian at heart, yet he was pro- 
Spartan and distrustful of a government which had executed Socrates, his former 
association with whom also entailed a number of risks. He nevertheless wanted to 
remain on good terms with all parties in Athens in case his situation at Scillus became 
too precarious, hence his Socratic writings, which Delebecque believes (p. 211) were 
also written for his own enjoyment and his sons' edification. Other scholars are rather 
negative in their appraisal of Xen.'s motives: Frick (p. 66) feels that we should see the 
main flaw of the Ap. as being Xen.'s inability to appreciate the noble motives behind 
Socrates' behavior in court, while Tejera (p. 156) believes that the Ap. is an 
ideological work, i.e., that Xen. intends "to confer upon Socrates the same 
chauvinistic and pedestrian educational ideas and functions that he imposes upon him 
in the Memorabilia, Symposium, and Oeconomicus"'.
Vander Waerdt comes closer to the mark, I believe, by focusing his attention 
on Xen.'s statement in §22 (èy© où xà Tiàvxa emeiv xà èx xfjs Ô1kt|S éonoùôaoa,
236oilier's emendation xôxe xô seems to me to be well-founded (see apparatus ad  loc.).
232 As Vander Waerdt (p. 22) remarks: "Socrates' paramount aim was not simply refutation of the 
indictment, but rather preservation of piety and of his reputation for justice." Compare the emphatic 
negatives here witli those appearing in similar contexts in §24 and Comm. 1.1.11,1.1.20, and note 
Socrates' additional statement in ibid. IV.4.11 that he has never borne false witness or been guilty of 
sycophancy.
'^^^Nam quiciimque cum vel mediocriter cognitum habet, hoc utique scit duas maxime res eius proprias 
esse: primum singulari quadam religione - ne dicam superstitione - deos patrios coluisse; iterurn ad 
solam iitilitatem...eum omnia revocavisse (Frick 18). See the comments on §§10 and 34.
I l l
àXX TÎpKEoé \ioi 6TiX,(Baai ôxi SwKpàxris xô pèv pxixe Tcepl Geoùs âoepfiaai pf)xe 
Tcepl àvGpcôîcous àôiKOS ôavfjvai nepl mvxôs èTcoietxo). From this he concludes 
that "Socrates' paramount aim was not simply refutation of the indictment, but rather 
preservation of piety and of his reputation for justice" (p. 22), and that "we may 
expect [Xenophon's] selection of details in composing the Ap. to highlight Socrates' 
justice rather than the considerations which would exonerate him from the char ges 
stated in the formal indictment" (p. 27). In short, since Socrates as a critic of the 
democracy could not identify the just with the lawful, Xen. must show that Socrates is 
"exonerated by a higher understanding o f  j u s t ic e " .239 Xen.'s Socrates understands 
justice to consist in benefaction, and this benefaction consists in turn in offering his 
polis an example of self-restraint, which is the basis of virtue (see Comm. 1.5.4) (pp. 
43-48). This, according to Vander Waerdt, is the ultimate meaning of the oracle in 
§14, an interpretation which explains Socrates' behavior in court (and elsewhere) as 
depicted by Xen.
Although Vander Waerdt's well-considered views have much to recommend 
them, I feel that the purpose of this short comment would be better served by limiting 
the treatment of Xen.'s puipose to what appeal’s in the text itself, where his intentions 
are expressed quite clearly: In §1 Xen. states that he would like to recall Socrates' 
feelings towai’ds his defense and the end of his life, and that he intends to explain 
Socrates' aiTogance in court, a topic treated by other writers who were unaware of his 
actual motives. In §22 Xen. states that his puipose is not to report everything said at 
the ti-ial, but rather to show that Socrates did everything within his power to 
demonstrate his innocence. In §§33-34 Xen. expresses his admiration for Socrates, 
implying that, just as the philosopher has served as a useful role model for him 
throughout his life, so can he be of equal seiwice to any other seeker of virtue, 
including the reader. All of these intentions are duly fulfilled in the course of the 
writing, and like Vander Waerdt, the reader is also left with the feeling that, although 
Xen.'s Socrates addresses the indictment charges in a direct effort to refute them, his 
personal (and transcendent) sense of piety and justice did not necessarily correspond 
to that of his peers, a set of personal values which he shares in common with his 
Platonic counterpart.
23. x6 Ôè jUTi àTtoOaveîv oùk ^ t o  Xirtapiixéov e lv a t Kxl.: Cp. PI. Ap. 34C-35CD 
& 38D-39A.240 Xen. states in Comm. IV.4.4 that such emotional appeals24i were
239Socrates' seemingly contradictory statement in Comm. IV.4.13, i.e., that the just is identical with the 
lawful, is tlierefore necessarily qualified by trans-legal considerations o f justice (Vander Waerdt 45- 
46).
24®Note that this statement in Plato comes after the conviction. Toole (p. 6) also compares Gorg. Pal. 
33 (on <j)iX,cùv pOT|0elais oûôè Xixais où6è  oik tois Set iteiOeiv hpas, à ix à  x ç  aa^eaxaxto SiKaiq),
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illégal, but Bumet ([1924] 144-45) cites evidence to the contrary. Socrates' refusal to 
prostrate himself before the dicasts goes hand-in-hand with his attitude towards 
servile behavior in general (see PI. Ap. 38E and the comments on §§9 and 14), yet 
Xen. provides different reasons than Plato for Socrates' behavior regarding an 
emotional plea, i.e., that Socrates had done everything within his power to establish 
his innocence, and that he had also reached a convenient point at which to die (Xen.'s 
original thesis). Nevertheless, the fact that Socrates refused to propose a counter­
penalty at this stage could in fact be considered an act of suicide since the dicasts 
could only choose one of two alternatives, unless, of course, he was counting on the 
prosecutors to propose a milder penalty.
omE anxos nrcExinfitraxo^^s onxE xoùs f i lo n s  EiaaEV kxX.; For a general 
compaiison of this with Plato's account of a threefold counter-penalty proposal, see 
Appendix B. In accordance with judicial procedure, both sides presented brief cases 
for their proposed penalties after the guilty vote was rendered (MacDowell [1978] 
254).
In Plato's version, Socrates makes a proposal to be maintained at the 
TcpwavEiov (Ap. 36B-37A), then offers to pay one mina as being all that he can 
afford (38B), and finally proposes to pay a thirty-mina fine, with Plato, Crito, 
Critobulus, and Apollodoras volunteering to sei*ve as guaiantors (loc. cfr.).243 Several 
things speak in favor of its historicity: Frick (p. 69: see too Phillipson 374-75) 
believes that Socrates must have proposed a counter-penalty of some kind since its 
inclusion in PI. Ap. is, as it were, the lectio dijficilio?', and since Xen. would hardly 
have passed over such a brilliant example of peyaX,T)yopia, the npuxaveiov proposal 
must be fictive and the other two real, which Plato treats in an offhand way in order to 
diminish their effect on the r e a d e r .244 Moreover, by tendeiing a serious proposal
Ôiôd^avxa xôX,Ti0és), while Vrijlandt (p. 76) compares this passage with Phd. 117A (y i^%ôp.8vos xoû 
Kol <{)ei6o|j.evos oùSevôs ëxi èvôvxos) and Cri. 53E (exolpnc^as oùxco ylto%po)S Ë7ci0t)ja.eîv Çfiv). 
24lThese often involved the parading o f family members and references to one's own patriotism 
(Chroust [1957] 22).
242According to Immisch (p. 414), moxiiraoOai is definitely not an Attic usage and demonstrates how 
Xen., who left home at an early age, had allowed himself to be influenced ...von dem immer mehr 
anschwellenden Strome des ôstlichen Hellenismus. Immisch (p. 411) also notes the Xenophontic 
flavor o f die relatively rare verb Im apelv  in die text above (cp. Oec. 2.16, HG  III.5.12, and Cyr. 1.4.6). 
243In Cri. 52C the personified Laws also suggest that Socrates could have proposed banishment as a 
counter-penalty.
244see Reeve 171 and Maier (p. 483 n. 2), the latter of whom also finds a possible reference to die 
Platonic "aixriais-fiction" in Comm. 1.2.62 (cp. the unorthodox position o f Vrijlandt [pp. 102-103], 
who believes that Plato in fact based his account on Comm. 1.2.61-64). Amim (pp. 75-76) plausibly 
dismisses the first two proposals as being ludicrous and considers the third to be historical, though he is 
incorrect in considering it to be as ridiculous as the first two, especially in light o f Socrates' reduced 
financial circumstances (see Appendix B). Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 233) are quite correct when 
they observe that Socrates’ knowing that die counter-penalty would not be accepted does not 
necessarily make it flippant, though Socrates certainly seems to expect such an interpretation from the 
dicasts (PI. Ap. 37A: see too D.L. 2.42, where it is reported that Socrates proposed a fine, then public
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Socrates would have been complying with the laws, his reverence for which is 
evident throughout the CrL (ibid., pp. 69-70). Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 216-19) 
agree with the latter point and add that a proposal was justified for three additional 
reasons, that is, Socrates' unwillingness 1) to disobey the Delphic god's directive to 
pursue his philosophical mission, 2) to consider death a necessarily evil thing, and 3) 
to allow the dicasts to harm their moral well-being by convicting him.245 Busse (p. 
227) prefers Plato's version because he was an eye-witness, while Xen.'s motives 
must lie in presenting his Socrates as thoroughly consistent, even in the face of 
pressure from his friends. 246 Shero (p. 110) believes that Xen. simply misunderstood 
Hermogenes, who said something similar to what appears in PI. Ap. 37B ff. while 
saying that Socrates' friends had in fact made a proposal, or perhaps the avxixipqors 
could be accounted for if Xen. relied on hearsay or on reports which suppressed or 
remained silent on Socrates' counter-penalty p r o p o s a l .2 4 ?  Amim (p. 75) accounts for 
the difference in the two versions as being due to the difference between a sketchy 
and a fuller report, a view which implies a enormous degree of carelessness on Xen.'s 
pai't.
According to Xen., Socrates did not propose a counter-penalty, nor did he 
allow his friends to do so. Frick (p. 69) is quite dismissive in his explanation for this 
(Xenophon autem pro sid ingenii facidtate illam aesttinadonem omnino negat, disciso 
simpliciter nodo Gordio), and the cause is surely elsewhere to be found. Oldfather (p. 
209: see too Chroust [1957] 40) believes that Socrates did indeed make his state- 
pension proposal, which was followed by another uproai*, during which, though 
monetary proposals were shouted out by Plato et al., the court clerk only recorded the 
first, which Xen. could not take seriously, a view supported by the allusions to a 
possibly early vote which appear in Lib. DecL 2.5 and Cri. 45E. This explanation 
relies on too much speculation, and I would only conclude by pointing out a cmcial 
point of agreement on this issue in both ctEokoyiai: Both Xen. and Plato state that 
Socrates considered a counter-penalty proposal to be an admission of guilt, and Xen.'s
maintenance at the Ttpmavelov, a sequence of events which, if true, would make Socrates' attitude 
seem more openly defiant).
245 An act which would have harmed Socrates as well (see Cri. 49B ff.).
246See too Wetzel (pp. 71-72), who maintains that Xen. must have relied on his own instincts rather 
than believe the testimony o f those in the know. Wilamowitz ([1897] 105) also disagrees witlt the 
tradition that Socrates totally rejected proposing a counter-penalty.
247Hackforth 15-17. Hackforth elsewhere (pp. 135-36) favors the historicity o f the nputaveiov 
proposal for the following reasons: 1) The increase in the number o f votes against Socrates after the 
second vote (see PI. Ap. 35E-36A and D.L. 2,41), and 2) the fact tliat Diogenes Laertius obviously used 
an independent source since his account varies from Plato's. Hackforth's argument is not persuasive 
since 1) there are in fact many things that Socrates might have said that would have biased the dicasts 
against him and 2) Diogenes' account may simply represent a garbled version o f the events as 
described in PI. Ap.
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version is certainly consistent with this a tt itu d e .2 4 8  Another consideration is the 
following: Is it possible that Plato has his Socrates propose a counter-penalty, with 
Plato and other Socratics offering to stand surety, so that they will not lose face for 
not having interceded at a critical point in the judicial p r o c e s s ? 2 4 9  This issue causes 
Crito, for example, considerable concern in Cri. 44B-C. To be sure, this suggestion 
runs directly counter to the Bumet/Taylor thesis (see too Fritz [1931] 42) that Plato's 
account must be essentially correct in its details because of the potential censure of 
contemporaries who weæ also present at the trial, but their contention is based on the 
assumption that Plato intended to render a largely historical account of the trial.
Maximus of Tyre (3.7: see too Lib. Ap. 23) believes that Socrates remained 
mute during the court proceedings, a controversial position taken up by Gomperz and 
to a large degree by Oldfather (see above). Gomperz ([1936] 32-33) also maintains 
that Socrates said nothing or very little in court, which accounts for the abundance 
and diversity of the subsequent aTToJtoyiai, and he offers unfamiliarity with forensic 
practices, outrage, or even disgust as reasons for Socrates' silence. Gomperz (pp. 33- 
34) supports his thesis with two passages from the Grg. (486A-B & 523C ff.) which 
apparently refer to Socrates' trial, and concludes that the publication of PI. Ap. 
therefore must have followed that of the Grg.'^ ^^  Gomperz (p. 36) sums up his 
assessment of PL Ap. as follows: Platons Wiedergabe der Verteidigungsrede hdtte 
von der echten Rede ebenso weit entfernen konnen, wie die Reden eines Perikles oder 
Kleon bei Thukydides. He turns next to Maximus’ “silence” tradition (p. 39) with the 
following justification: ...je aujfalliger diese Überlieferung dem allgemeinen Glauben 
des spateren Altertums widersprach, als desto verlafilicher mufi sie dem Schriftsteller 
gegolten haben, der aus ihr das Thema einer Kunstrede schdpfte. Gomperz (p. 41 n.
248see E. Meyer 5:227, Feddersen 38, and Amim 76; note too that Socrates' tone remains consistently 
defiant in both authors (see too §27). Fritz’ comments ([1931] 41-42) are elucidating: Was in der  
xenophontischen Apologie steht, entspricht dem Klischee des Weisen, der keinerlei noch so geringes 
Kompromiji mit der realen Welt eingehen darf, while Plato’s version shows Socrates struggling with 
his own personal values versus die dujiere Form o f the law in an effort not to compromise tlie former. 
Hackforth (pp. 136-37) believes that Xen. failed to mention the public-maintenance proposal because it 
seemed so incredible or because he was shocked by the misplaced levity o f Socrates’ words.
249see Joël 1:439. Schanz (p. 98) believes tliat, by including tlie surety offer, Plato intends to convey 
the following to posterity: Ich und die Ubrigen gennanten Jiinger des Sokrates M tten gern matérielle 
Opfer gebracht, um uns den M eister zu erhalten. Allein es wdre vergeblich gewesen. Vrijlandt (p. 105) 
finds it odd that Plato is mentioned before Socrates' wealthy friend Crito in PI. Ap. 38B when Crito’s 
name appears before Plato's in ibid. 33D and Phd. 59B, and he comments accordingly: Utique Plato 
anxius fuisse videtur, ne Athenienses existimarent Platonem inter fideles Socratis amicos non esse 
numerandum. Vrijlandt (p. 105) further remarks that Xen.’s words o w e  xoùs <j>lA.ons [ÙTCoxipâoBai] 
e’iaoEv have often been taken to be directed specifically at Plato, who changed the facts so that he and 
his friends would appear in a better light, while Vrijlandt believes that the passage in PI. Ap. 38B 
(èxiiXTiad[XTiv âv xphtidxœv ôoa  è p e llo v  ÉKxeioeiv, où5èv yàp âv èpX,âpTiv) is in fact directed at Xen. 
2^®Gomperz (p. 36 ff.) also quotes Tht. 172C-175D to support his argument, which passage would be 
quite ineffectual if  Socrates had in fact defended himself well in court (p. 38). The Gorgias passage 
refers clearly to Socrates, while the Tht. passage is more generalized (idem). Gomperz (pp. 35-36) also 
does not rule out the element o f peyaXiiYopia: Sokrates hatte jedoch irgendwelche Sdtze 
hervorgestossen, denen man 'GroJSsprecherei' (d.h. Megalegorie) nachsagen konnte.
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13) suggests Aeschines of Sphettus or even Polycrates as Maximus' sources and 
disputes the claim that Maximus based his assertion on Xen. Ap. 4 or Comm. 
IV.8.5.251
ETteixa xcov èxaipcov èKKXé\|rai pouX,opév(ov kxX,.: Cp. Cri. 44B ff., where Crito 
expresses his and his friends' willingness to help Socrates flee Athens.252 Socrates’ 
response, that death cannot be avoided anywhere (cp. PI. Ap. 35A), also largely 
corresponds to the futility of languishing in exile as described by the Platonic 
Socrates in the Cri. and more directly to the awareness of his own mortality in Xen. 
Ap. passim. The sudden temporal leap forward in this particular passage seems rather 
jarring from a compositional point of view, but the mention of Socrates' subsequent 
refusal to escape fits in well with his general attitude towards the prospect of death 
(Oilier 88 and Vrijlandt 104).
Xen.'s Socratic apothegm is worthy of a Diogenes Laertius, and the reader 
should be reminded that Xen. himself was in no better position to judge the truth of 
the bons mots in §§23, 27, and 28 than we are. Beyschlag (pp. 515-16) believes that 
the appearance of this and other Socratic loci in Xen. Ap. can be attributed to the 
Greek literary practice of mimesis. Le. die Weiterbildung eines einmal gepragten 
literarischen Typus, which would at least partially account for the discrepancies in 
setting between Xen. Ap. and the other Socratic writings. If this zeal for apothegms 
seems pueiile, one should remember their popularity in antiquity (Wetzel 76).
24. Gs Ô8 xélos eljcev f\ ôiicn: In spite of Wilamowitz' opinion that a third speech 
was never held and that Plato included one simply to establish the moral superiority
25lSee Gigon ([1946] 218) and Allen (p. 4), tlie latter of whom believes that Maximus' and Libanius' 
accounts derive from the Grg. passage cited above. In his "Socrates in Court", Oldfather writes to 
supplement Gomperz' and Maximus' contention that Socrates offered no defense (his expanded list o f  
sources includes Grg. 486A-B, 521B-522C, 526E-527A, Tht. 172C-175D, and Lib. Ap. 23), and he 
creatively reconstructs the speech as follows (pp. 207-10): Socrates began with an "inappropriate 
locution" which amused the jurors and was followed by a general row. He referred to his integrity, 
Delphi, and the daimonic voice, then denied the truth of tlie accusations and pointed out the absurdity 
o f being tried by men who, like Meletus, had never concerned themselves with ethical questions. This 
attitude was taken for jneyaXTiYopia. The disturbance grew, and Socrates now felt dazed and 
speechless. His friends, including Plato, tried to intervene witliout effect (see D.L. 2.41). Socrates 
made his state-pension proposal and was led away during the subsequent uproar.
25230e too Cri. 45E (cp. PI. Ap. 29C), where Crito suggests that it was unnecessary for Socrates to 
appear in court; 52B, where Socrates expresses his reluctance to flee; and 52C & 53D-E, where he 
states that he in fact prefers death to fleeing. Idomeneus (ap. D.L, 2.60 & 3.36) says that it was 
Aeschines, not Crito, who tried to persuade Socrates to flee. Vrijlandt (p. 114) indicates a possible 
inconsistency between Cri. 44B, where Crito urges Socrates to flee, and Phd. 115D, where it is 
indicated that he posted bail for him, tliough I think that this potential risk is implicit in Crito's 
willingness to undergo any risk for his friend (see Cri. 45 A). Derenne (pp. 178-79) poses a related 
question: Did the dicasts over-vote, thinking that Socrates would take advantage o f the subsequent 
opportunity to escape? This would explain Crito's concern at the public outcry tliat would arise at the 
negligence o f his followers to secure his escape.
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of his Socrates figure for all time,253 there is surely nothing to have prevented 
Socrates from delivering a short speech to his supporters while the administiative 
business of the trial was being concluded by the authorities. Although there is no 
separate witness for this practice elsewhere, the testimonies of both Socratic writers 
seem to substantiate the fact that Socrates actually delivered another speech after the 
verdict was r e n d e r e d ,2 5 4  and although the post-trial speeches seem dissimilar, they 
have the same underlying motives in common (see Appendix B). The point of Xen.'s 
speech is to compare Socrates' situation with that of the prosecutors and jury members 
who found him guilty: These have paradoxically condemned themselves, not 
Socrates, on the charges of godlessness and in ju s t ic e .2 ^ 5  thought occurs in PL 
Ap. in Socrates' first and third speeches, and the argument returns to the Platonico- 
Socratic tenet that it is better to suffer than to do evil (see Cri. 49C), a thought which 
is also emphasized by Xen. in his reference to the Palamedes myth in §26.
(S àvÔpes: For other examples of this appellation, see §§11 and 15. A distinction is 
made in PL Ap. between àvÔpes 'ABrivatoi (§17A et alibi) and àvôpes ôtKaaxat 
(§40A) (see Burnet [1924] 68 and Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 211-12).
Toùs (ièv Ôiôâmcovxas xoùs iiàpxupots cbs zpt] èîaopKoûvxots Kaxaij/EUÔopap- 
xupelv èjioù...èauxots omveiôévai àcrépeiav K a l  àôtidav: In PL Ap. 35C
Socrates enjoins the dicasts to abide by their oaths by not allowing themselves to be 
swayed by base emotional appeals made by defendants in order to win leniency from 
the court (see the comment on §23), and a similar tone of admonishment is apparent 
in PL Ap. 38C ff. (see Vrijlandt 117). Here the Xenophontic Socrates chastises the
253\vilainowitz (1897) 104. He concludes from tliis that, since Socrates did not hold a third speech 
(including tlie reference to Palamedes), the writer of the Xenophontic Ap. must have borrowed this 
from Plato. One could attribute this error to Xen. himself, but he nowhere else shows such a slavish 
dependence on Plato (pp. 104-105). Fritz ([1931] 68 ) feels that this final speech is completely 
gratuitous, lacks Plato’s subtle train o f thought, and is to be considered a patchwork o f various Socratic 
sources (see his remarks in Essay A).
254i)erenne (pp. 169-70), who adduces no evidence to support his argument, is certain that a third 
speech was not held since it would have been shouted down by the very dicasts he had just condemned, 
nor would the court officials have allowed him any time for an additional speech. Toole (p. 7) refers to 
the passage in AiisL Ath. 67.3 about equal time allotments for both litigants in order to support the 
same claim, yet this is far from being solid evidence since the third speech can be considered extra­
judicial. See Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 235), who cogently maintain tliat there is nothing to have 
prevented Socrates from making a third, post-trial speech.
255zeller ([1954] 192) maintains that Socrates' mistake consisted in the fact that he attempted to 
reform his changing society on its own terms instead of harking back to the rose-colored morality that 
existed earlier in that century, so that, in punishing Socrates, the Athenians were actually condemning 
themselves. It is also worth recalling here that the Platonic Socrates considers himself to be the victim 
of men, not o f the Laws (Cri. 54B-C). In general, Xen.'s return to the piety-and-justice theme seems to 
be at least partly due to the scantiness o f his sources (Amim 77-80).
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dicasts who persuaded others, or allowed themselves to be persuaded by others, to
vote for his conviction.256
A litigant could raise a charge of perjury (é7cicTKTi7rxea0at xivi xcov 
\l/£uôopapTUpi©v) in a public or private trial against a witness presenting evidence 
that was either illegal or untrue. A SIkti yenSop-apTUptmv had to be raised before the 
results of the the main issue of prosecution were determined or put to a vote, and in 
normal cases the penalty for the larger issue was not assessed until the the tmth of the 
ô1kt| xj/enô. was determined. (Obviously, the execution of the penalty was suspended 
in the case of capital cases.) The penalty for proven perjury was a fine, and anyone 
who was shown to have perjured himself three times was automatically subjected to 
aTiqla. Unfortunately, it is uncleai' from the extant forensic speeches what the 
precise requirements were for using a ô1kt| ij/enô. to reopen the original case. The 
process of chaiging witnesses with peijury came into existence as a means of 
challenging the practice of ôiapapTUpia and was in place by the end of the fifth 
century.257
In Socrates' case, since the votes had already been cast in favor of the death 
penalty, his reference to perjury here would therefore appear to be a purely symbolic 
one motivated, it would seem, by the same considerations which caused him not to 
offer a counter-penalty (see §23 above). It is tempting to consider if the words xoùs 
pèv ôiôàoKOvxas xoùs iiàpxnpas might contain a thinly veiled reference to the claim 
that Anytus was the first to bribe an Athenian jury (Arist. Ath. 27 et alibi: see the 
comment on Anytus in §29). The sheer number of jurors made bribery difficult, 
though not impossible (see Bonner and Smith 2:295 and Todd 84-85).
An eùaepfjs is defined in Comm. VI.6.4 simply as ô xà Ttepl xoùs Beoùs 
vôqiqa elôcôs; for the concept of àôiKia, see the comment on §5.
oùôè yàp ëycoye âvxi Aios Kat "Hpos...oùxE ôpvùs oùxe vopt^ov a llo n s  Beoùs 
àvarcéô'nva: Wetzel (p. 393: see too Breitenbach 1890) comments that the subject of 
atheism, so prominent in PI. Ap. (see §26C ff.), comes up here and in Comm. 1.2.64,
256Tiiis tone is continued in §26: où yàp éjxol àXkà xoTs Katayvoùai xoùxo aloxpôv èoTi (see 
Vrijlandt 117). Vrijlandt (p. 116: see too Breitenbach 1890) notes that tlie Xenophontic Socrates' 
reproach includes accusers, witnesses, and dicasts, and that he does not address the dicasts separately, 
whereas in Plato's version not only are the dicasts addressed separately, but the demonstrative oùxoi in 
39B seems to indicate tliat they are actually standing (or are fictively made to stand) separately. For 
the dicasts' susceptibility to superficial displays, see PI. Grg. 523C-D; for an example of dicastic 
"persuasion", see Ar. V. 550 ff.
2^^300 Lys. 23.13-14 and Isoc. 18.11; for the preceding information, see Lipsius 2:2:778-83, 
M acDowell (1978) 213, Harrison 2:192-97, and Bonner & Smith 2:261-70. Brickhouse and Smith 
([1989] 42-43) observe tliat the peijury law pertained only to witnesses, not to the litigants, hence the 
latter were free to mislead the jury as they wished. Socrates declares himself innocent o f ever having 
committed peijury in Comm. IV.4.11.
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while Plato's "old charges" (see PI. Ap. 19B ff.) come up in Comm. 1.1.11-15 but not 
directly in Xen. Ap. (see the comment on §29 below).
25. è(j»' ois ye jiTiv ëpyoïs Kelxai Oavaxos ÇTijxta...oùô' aôxoi oi àvxtôtKOt 
xoùxmv îTpâ^ai xi Kax’ èpoù ôaoxv: For the various forms of capital punishment, 
see the relevant comment on §7. The death penalty was imposed for murder, high 
treason, temple robbery, various KaKoupyripaxa cases (i.e., those involving KXeTcxai, 
Xamo^mai, àvôpaTtoSioxai, xoi%©pu%oi, and paXavxioxopoi), and certain offenses 
in connection with the grain supply; in the majority of cases the fixing of the 
punishment was left to the discretion of the court (see Lipsius 2:363 ff., Bonner & 
Smith 2:276, and Phillipson 223-25). The capital crimes specifically mentioned by 
Xen. in this section and Comm. 1.2.62 include temple robbery, house-breaking, 
stealing in general and stealing clothes in particular, robbeiy (involving cutpurses), 
betrayal of the city, and e n s la v e m e n t ;2 5 8  in Comm. II.2.3 Socrates describes capital 
punishment as the worst form of punishment since it deprives the criminal of oaa 
[KaXà] oi 0eoi 3rapé%ouai xots àvBpcimois. Schmid (p. 224 n. 1) explains the 
congruency between this section and the coiTesponding Comm, section as deriving 
from Socrates' actual speech in court, a point better supported by the curious omission 
in both cases of any mention of murder as a capital crime.259 I f  Socrates' words to the 
hapless Aristarchus (Comm. II.7.13-14: cp. ibid. 1.2.32 & II.3.9) concerning the value 
of sheepdogs can be applied to himself in the present situation, he actually deseiwes 
privileged treatment at the hands of his Athenian "masters" for the interest he has 
shown in their welfare (cp. the Tcpuxaveiov proposal in PI. Ap. 36B ff.).
Diogenes Laertius (2.20) states that Socrates was the first philosopher to be 
tried and put to death.
©crxe Oanpaaxov ejiotye ôokeI e iv a i kxX.: Stobaeus' paraphrase (ÏÏI.7.58 Hense) 
begins here and ends with ...ùtcô xijs (j)i)0 8 ®s 6 Bdvaxos in §27.
26. où yàp èpol àXLà xols Kaxayvoôox xoôxo aloxpov èoxt: For a similar tone 
of admonishment, cp. PI. Ap. 38C-D.
258300 too the list o f unofficial charges in Lib. Ap. 13. Hackforth (pp. 29-32) feels that the mention of 
capital crimes in the Cotnm. is inappropriate since its purpose is simply to rebut the charges, and that it 
seems incongruous and clumsy in general. 1 would add once again that it seems ratlier pointless that 
the argument against the death penalty occurs in the Xenophontic Socrates' defense speech after the 
sentence has already been passed.
259xen. does in fact treat murder and sedition in his defense against the KarpYOpos charge in Comm.
1.2.9-11. Finley (p. 65) observes that, if  the death of Socrates was indeed due to a political backlash, it 
is curious that Üiis is not mentioned by either Xen. or Plato.
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TcapapD0èlxai ô ëxt pe Kai HaLapùôïis 6 7capaicXTi<yi®s èpol xsXeoxTiaas:
Palamedes260 was a Euboean or Argive chieftain who participated in the Greek 
expedition to Troy. Although he is not mentioned in Homer, a fact which leads 
Strabo (8.368), among others, to doubt his Homeric origins, he nevertheless appears 
in the Cypria and, in particular, in conjunction with the enlistment of Odysseus.261 
Palamedes' name became a byword for ingenuity and cleverness (Ar. Ra. 1452 and 
Phdr. 26ID), and he ranks with Prometheus, Orpheus, and Daedalus as one of the 
great Greek inventors. Along with Cadmus, he is credited with the invention of 
letters (E. Pal. fr. 578 Nauck) and is also associated with dice, numbers and counting, 
weights and measures, innovations in warfare, etc. The three major tragedians 
apparently adapted the Palamedes myth for their own pui’poses,262 and the story line 
takes its final form in their hands as follows: Palamedes was dispatched to help 
muster the Greek army, a mission which also took him to Ithaca to enlist the services 
of Odysseus, who attempted to avoid serving by feigning madness,^^  ^ By 
intentionally endangeiing the life of Telemachus, Palamedes revealed the deception 
through Odysseus' reaction and thereby earned his undying enmity. At Troy 
Palamedes' services were indispensable, and his growing popularity among the 
troops, combined with Odysseus' hostility, finally caused the latter to take revenge.264 
This occuiTed in collaboration with Diomedes in some versions, for example, in the 
Cypria (fr. 21 Allen), where Odysseus and Diomedes attack and strangle Palamedes 
while he is fishing. In other versions, Odysseus enlisted the aid of a Phiygian captive 
to help him forge a letter from Priam to Palamedes in which a large amount of gold 
was promised if he would betray the Greeks. When the letter was brought to the 
attention of the ai*my and gold was discovered in Palamedes' tent, he was turned over 
to the troops and executed by stoning. 265
The unjustified deaths of Palamedes and Ajax appear throughout Greek 
literature as examples par excellence of judicial murder, the example most 
immediately relevant to Socrates' trial being the reference in PL Ap, 41B to both 
figures, with whom Socrates hopes to share his own unfortunate experience: ÔTtôxe
26®The name is derived by some scholars from naXdiiTi + meaning "the handy or clever one", or, 
on tlie basis o f the Etruscan form "Talmithe", from TaXaM,fiôris (see Wiist 2500 and Woodford 145). 
261See T. Allen Horn. Op. 5:103. The allusion in this section to a popular myth from the epic cycle 
may be related to tlie Polycratean abuse-of-poets charge brought up in Comm. 1.2.56-61.
262see Cic. Off. 3.97 and Str. loc. cit. It will also be noted in what follows that Palamedes' death in the 
later, tragic sources results from being judged guilty of treason, not from an act o f private vengeance, 
as in the earlier versions (Gantz 606).
263Odysseus' resourcefulness is also mentioned in Comm. 1.3.7.
264since Odysseus envied Palamedes for his wisdom, Socrates’ identification with him could therefore 
be interpreted as another example of peyaXiiYopia (see Strauss [1972] 135).
265por more information on Palamedes, see Gantz 603-608, Woodford, Rose & March, Wiist, and 
Lewy.
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èvT'6%oiiii naXaiaTjôei Kai Aiavu t® Tela|i®vos Kai e ï xis d^Xos xcôv 7caA,aic5v ôid 
Kpiaiv dôiKOv xéOvTiKev, dvu7iapa(3dXA,ovxi xà èpamoi) TcdOrj Tcpôs xd èK£lv®v.266 
Besides the author of the Cypria and the tragedians, Gorgias treats the myth in his 
defense speech lïaA^apTiôous ’AjroXoyla.^^  ^Pseudo-Alcidamas in his speech against 
Palamedes ’Oôuaaeùs Kaxd rialapT)6 ous Trpoôoaias, and the younger Astydamas in 
a tragedy entitled riaX-apf|ÔTis.
A fragment from E. Pal (fr. 588 Nauck) - éKdvex’, èKdvexe xàv/7üdvao(j)Ov, œ 
Aavaoi,/xdv oùôév’ dX-yuvouaav drjôôva Mouadv - has been intei*preted by Welcker 
(pp. 469-70) as a criticism directed at the Athenian democracy for persecuting its 
noblest citizens, and although Philochorus' statement that Euripides in this play is 
refemng specifically to Socrates' execution cannot be true for chronological 
r e a s o n s ,268 the similarities between the deaths of Socrates and Palamedes bear 
immediate comparison. Besides the obvious, more general similarity that each figure 
was tried on a tiumped-up charge (in the present passage: oiÔ’ ou  koi 
papx'upfiaexai...Ôxi fiÔlKrjaa pév oùÔéva TccoTcoxe oûôè 7COVT]pôxepov èîi:otT\o’a) and 
consequently executed by a group of his peers, there aie many other points in 
common as well: wisdom in general (see Comm. IV.2.33 and Cyn. 1.11) and 
cleverness in particular; the role as a public benefactor (as here: euxipyexouv Ôè xoùs
266wilamowitz ([1897] 104) believes that tlie origin o f the Palamedes parallel in Xen. Ap. is to be 
found in the Platonic passage, a conclusion which Oilier (p. 93) disputes: The Palamedes myth was a 
current literary theme, and since they treat tlie same subject, it is only natural that the two dîtoX-oylai 
should share some similarities. Vrijlandt (p. 118) finds Socrates' light-hearted mention o f Palamedes 
unsuitable for a man who has just been sentenced to deatli, and finds the reference to Ajax far less 
comparable to Socmtes’ immediate situation. He also interprets the use o f the word Ttàôri in PL Ap. 
41B (cp. its use in reference to Palamedes in Comm. IV.2.33) as being mock-tragic (p. 119) and 
concludes (p. 120) that it is another example o f Socratic irony.
^^^Guthrie ([1978] 4:77) believes that it is possible that Socrates himself might have been aware o f  
Gorg. P a l  when he made his speech in court, but Guthrie rejects the thesis that the reminiscences of 
the P a l  in PI. Ap. imply latent approval of Gorgias’ rhetorical practices. Others (e.g. Chroust [1957] 
216-18) have suggested a specific influence of the P a l  on Xen. Ap., a position which Wilamowitz 
([1897] 104 n. 1) strongly rejects as follows: 1) Xen. Ap. cannot really be described as aojivos, 2) tlie 
P a l  could not have exerted such an influence since it was written decades earlier, 3) Gorgias goes out 
of his way to avoid parallels with Odysseus, and 4) that Gorgias in ch. 1 uses an expression similar to 
that in Xen. Ap. 27 proves nothing other than it was a phrase in common usage (see D.L. 2.13 & 2.35 
for similar expressions). Radermacher (pp. 149-50) takes issue witli Wilamowitz' remark concerning 
the word hpvos, which seems to be based on the latter's belief that it can only refer to songs.
According to Radermacher, who cites numerous examples, the noun is rare in early prose, appearing 
mostly in Plato, while tlie verb upveiv is much more common and can be commonly translated as "to 
speak of someone in a complimentary way" (loben, preisen) or even simply as "to speak" (reden). In 
general, Wilamowitz' four remarks can certainly be disputed. Morr (p. 469), for example, compares 
the mention of Palamedes in Comm. IV.2.33 with Gorg. P a l  25 and also notes (p. 468) that Xen. 
praises Gorgias in An. n.6.16 and Smp. 1.5 while poking fun at Gorgianic figures in ibid. 2.26. To rule 
out Gorgianic influence in Xen. Ap. is therefore unjustified.
268philochorus ap. D.L. 2.44 (see too the hypothesis to Isoc. Bus. for the audience's supposed remorse 
on hearing the quotation). For the possible influence of E. P a l  on this particular passage, see 
Wilamowitz ibid. 103-104, Wetzel 398-99, and Morr 468. Some have wanted to resolve the 
chronological problem by positing a later performance o f the play, but as Wilamowitz ([1897] 104 n.
1) points out, there is no reason to read into Euripides' words anything other than a direct reference to 
Palamedes. Beyschlag (p. 516: see too Toole 7) agrees, remarkhig that ...die literarische Erôrîenmg  
der Leiden des Palamedes ist seit Gorgias typisch geworden. Phillipson (p. 220) believes tliat 
Euripides is alluding to Protagoras in the fragment in question.
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èjioi ôiaAÆYopévoDS iipoïKa 6 i 6 d<jK®v ô xi èô'uvdixTiv àyaSôv) and as a detector of 
falsehoods; the reputation for being popular among a certain segment of the 
community, a circumstance which earns each figure the ill will of his leaders; the use 
of an accomplice in order to accomplish the plot at hand (i.e. Meletus and the 
Phrygian slave, respectively); the negative aftermath of the executions, evidenced by 
Athens' remorse (D.L. 2.43-44) and by the wrecking of the Greek fleet off Euboea by 
Nauplius, Palamedes' father; and the popular posthumous cult of each figure (here: 
ëxi yàp KOI VÛV TcoXh xaXltODs hpvons 7tapé%exon ’OÔnaaéms xob àôiKWS 
àixoKxeivavxos amôv: see also Comm. IV.8.10 and Cyn. loc. cit.). In general, any 
allusion to the Palamedes myth would have been rich in overtones to a fourth-century 
reader of either ÔTtokoyta.^ ^^
oiô' ÔTi Kai èpot papxajpfiaexai x)Jtô xe xov èjciôvxos Kai t)n:o xoi) 
TrapsX/TiXDOoxos xpovon: Cp. PI. Ap. 38C ff., where Socrates warns the dicasts of 
the likely repercussions of their decision to have him executed. Consider too the 
allegory of Arete in Comm. II. 1.33, where the death of one who has lived under her 
guidance is described as follows: oxav 6’ xo TceTcpmpévov xéXos, où pexà Xf|0qs 
dxtpoi KeXvxai, àXXà pexà pvr)pT)s xôv àei %p6vov ùpvoùpevoi Ga^&ouoi.
JcpoïKa ÔiÔàcTKcov o XI èSuvapiiv àyaOôv: See the comments on §§16 and 20. As 
Tejera (p. 155) remarks, this Socrates is decidedly unaware of his own Socratic 
ignorance.
27. âîrfiei Kai oppaoi Kai axfipaxt Kai paôiapaxi <{)aiôp6 s: By all accounts 
Socrates remained not merely resigned to the prospect of dying but in fact quite 
cheerful, as here.220 This attitude is foreshadowed by his many statements in §§3-9 
and best summarized, perhaps, by his question to Antiphon in Comm. 1.6.9: oiei oùv 
àno Tcàvxmv xoùxmv xooaùxqv Tiôovqv eivai ôot|v àno xoù èamôv xe 'qyeiaGai 
(3eXxt® yiyveaOai Kai (|)iXous àpeivous Kxâo0ai;27i
269'j’jjjs is well demonstrated by the question put to Socrates' interlocutor in Comm. IV.2.33: xà 5è 
naXapiîGous oùk àioiKoas îictéri; Rutherford (p. 54) remarks that Xen.'s Socrates rarely uses 
mythological allusions, a major exception being the lengthy parable o f Heracles in Comm. II. 1.21 ff. 
(drawn from Prodicus). For an example of Homeric influence on Xen., see Smp. 4.6-7.
220see, for example, Comm. IV.8 .1-3, PI. Ap. 40C-41C, Cri. 43B, and Phd. 58E, 84E-85B, 114D, 
117B.
271 See too Comm. IV.8,3 (kqi tcôs dv xis Kd^7,iov ij onxcos d7to0dvoi; f\ ttoios dv eiTi Bdvaxos 
KaXUcov f\ ÔV KdXXioxd xis djioGdvoi; luoios 5’ dv yevotxo Odvatos eùSaqiovéoxepos xoû 
KaXXlaxon; r\ tcoios 0eo(t»iXéaxEpos xoû eù5aip.oveaxàxou;) and Comm. III. 10.4 ([o'l xe ^povxiÇovxes 
KOI 01 |xf\] ém  |xèv yàp xois [xc5v <j)iXo)v] dyaGoIs (])aiôpoi, éiii ôè xois kokois oKuGpomol ytyvovxat). 
The point o f the latter quotation is that one’s character is revealed in one's expressions (ev xois 
oppaoi), and in ibid. III. 10.8 Socrates adds that certain expressions of character are suitable to certain 
types (e.g. a victor). We can therefore imagine Socrates' deportment here as being appropriately
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For his refusal to ingratiate himself with the dicasts, cp. §23, Comm. IV.4.4 
and PI. Ap. 34B-35B, 38D-39D. Guthrie ([1978] 4:72) observes that Socrates' refusal 
to stoop to base appeals seems to have been a forensic commonplace (see Gorg. Pal.  ^
30).
Note that the narrative both leaves and returns to oratio obliqua in this section 
(cp. §20). It is tempting to suggest that Xen. switches to direct discourse (as in §§22- 
23, for example) when he is using a source other than Heimogenes and becomes, in 
essence, the other source's mouthpiece temporarily, but the fact that indirect discourse 
is not used unifoimly throughout Hermogenes' report (see §20) makes this 
supposition untenable. In fact, the entire account up to the appearance of Xéyexai in 
§28 might very well be based on Hermogenes' testimony.
ot> yàp nùXox ta re  ôxt oxonrcep èyevopiiv Kaxm}ni<j»tcrpévos fjv pon iynb xi)s 
(^ ncrecos Oàvaxos; This view, i.e., that aU mortals are condemned by nature to die, is 
strangely reminiscent of Xen.'s words on learning of his son Gryllus' death in battle 
(see D.L. 2.54-55: evioi ôè oùÔè ÔaKpûoal (|)aaiv amôv* àXXàyàp emetv, "^ôetv 
0VT1XÔV yeyevvTiKés") and may in fact have influenced the later t r a d it io n .2 7 2  Socrates' 
admonishment of his followers to stop weeping is similar to the words of Plato's 
Socrates in Phd. 117C-E where, although he provides a different, explicit reason for 
his iiiitation at their tears (kqi yàp dxfiKoa oxi èv eu^Tjpiq %pfi xeXenxâv), there also 
seems to be an implicit reproval of their appaient unwillingness to be persuaded by 
his arguments for the immortality of the soul (and, conversely, for the mortality of the 
body, a line of thought which relates it more closely to the Xenophontic passage 
under consideration). Note additionally that none of the three post-trial anecdotes in 
§§27-31 contributes towards establishing Socrates' piety (Strauss [1972] 140).
A number of scholars have pointed out the similarity between the words où 
yàp nàXai taxe ktX. in this section and a passage in Gorg. Pal. 1: Gàvaxov pèv yàp fi 
ôùcas ôavepâ x^  îràvxœv Kaxexi/Tiôioaxo xmv Gvpxmv, fjTtep fjpépçt è y é v e x o .2 7 3
subdued, as would behoove a philosopher who, though triumphant in the knowledge that his entire life 
has served as ample proof o f his innocence, would nevertheless remain controlled and undemonstrative 
in his behavior, especially in light of his views on self-restraint (see Sittl 8-9 for ancient attitudes 
towards overly demonstrative oratory). Socrates' radiant self-satisfaction on leaving court finds a 
parallel, perhaps, in the Platonic Socrates' concluding sense of conviction that the daimonic's silence 
can be interpreted as its tacit approval o f his actions (PI. Ap. 40A-C: cp. Ages. 1.13, where Agesilaus 
notifies the Persian envoys (^atSpç Tipooccnrci) that the gods are on clearly his side in his dealings 
with the perfidious Tissaphemes). Gray (p. 139) believes that Socrates' lighthearted demeanor here is 
intended by Xen. to serve as a counterweight to the predominantly megalegorical tone of the preceding 
(see Appendix D).
272'pejera (p. 155) in fact calls this statement Pythagorizing, Sophistic, and Stoic. See too D.L. 2.35:
[Ô EœKpâxTjs] npôs xôv elîiovxa, "Gôvaxôv oou Kaxéyvooav ’AOrivoloi," "KàKelvtov," einev, "ù 
ijibots." Diogenes immediately adds that this remark has been attributed by som e to Anaxagoras, and 
in fact the dicta in D.L. 2.35 & 2.54-55 appear combined in ibid. 2.13 (on Anaxagoras).
273ceffcken (1934) 2:42 n. 80, Wilamowitz (1897) 104 n. 1, Busse 226, Fritz (1931) 68 , Toole 7, 
Marchant (1949) 963, and Morr 467. Cp. D.L. 2.35.
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Mon* (pp. 467-68) believes that, since the Gorgias passage is general and the Xen. 
more specific, it is likely that the latter is bonowed from the former. That a specific 
passage from Gorg. Pal. actually occurred to Xen. (or even Socrates) seems just as 
plausible as an actual allusion made by Socrates to Palamedes himself in the course of 
the trial (see §26).
e i SÈ xaX^n&v jrpoorôoKcopévcov KaxaXxxa tov piov ktX.: A recapitulation of 
Socrates' argument in §§6 -8 .
28. Ttapcbv Ôé xis 'AîcoXXôômpos Kxl.: Apollodorus the Athenian (PA 1453) was the 
brother of Aeantodorus (PI. Ap. 34A) and is characterized in the sources as being 
simple-minded (loc. cit.) and passionately devoted to his friends (PI. Smp. 173D), 
especially Socrates {loc. cit.: see too Comm. HI. 11.17, PI. Smp. 172C, PI. Ap. 34A-B 
&Phd. 59A-B, 1 1 7 D ) .2 7 4
Apollodorus' outburst in this section resembles that in Phd. 117D: 'AnoX- 
loômpos ôè Kai èv xm ëpTcpooeev %pôvcp oûôèv èjcaùexo ôaKpùmv, Kai ôf\ Kai xôxe 
àvaPpD%T|Gdp8 vos Kldmv Kai àyavaKxôv oùôéva ôvxiva où KaxèKlaoe xmv 
Tcapôvxcûv 7tX,tiv j e  aùxoù XmKpdxous, and this, combined with the similai* references 
to the stroking of Apollodorus' hair in this section and of Phaedo's in Phd. 89B, has 
caused Wilamowitz 1) to speak out strongly in favor of Platonic influence, 2) to use 
this supposed influence, since such clumsy borrowing could not be attributed to Xen., 
in support of his larger argument for the inauthenticity of Xen. Ap., and 3) to use this 
conclusion to establish thePhd's priority of p u b lic a t io n .2 7 5  This opinion has since 
been considered to be unjustified, and I reproduce Wetzel's short assessment of the 
matter (p. 401) because of his well-founded incredulity: Aber ich sehe wirklich nicht 
ein, warum nicht Sokrates aufier dem Phadon auch noch einem anderen Schiller iiber 
das Haar gestrichen haben kann.'^ '^  ^ Both Oilier (p. 93) and Amim (p. 24) also 
observe that the collocation Kaxa\]/âv xivos x^v Ke^alijv is not such a rare usage (see
274Additional references include Comm. 111.11.17, D.L. 2.35, Ael. VH 1.16, and Atli. 507A-B; for 
general information, see Kirchner (1894) passim.
275 Wilamowitz (1897) 101-102: see too Fritz (1931) 67 and Beyschlag 515. Rutherford’s argument (p. 
48 n. 24), i.e., that Xen. must be borrowing from the Phd. passage since Socrates is sitting in that 
scene, not walking as in the Ap., and that the hair-stroking in the former is therefore a more natural 
gesture, does not convince me. Scholars have been generally quick to accuse Xen. o f plagiarism 
because o f similarities between both authors' Symposia (Hackforth 21-22).
276see too Hackforth 21-22, Oilier 93, and Amim 24-25. Amim, who believes that Socrates perhaps 
habitually stroked the heads o f his followers in a gesture o f consolation, strikes a more strident tone (p. 
24): D er von Xenophon m d  der von Platon erztthlte Vorgang haben nichts mit einander gemeinsam als 
dafi Sokrates einem seiner SchUler den K opf streichelt, nicht Ort, nicht Zeit, nicht Person, nicht Sinn 
und Bedeutung des Kopfstreichelns. As Oilier (p. 93) notes, it is only natural that the two coroXo'ylai 
should share some similarities since they treat the same subject, and there is therefore no justification 
in saying that Xen. necessarily plagiarized Plato here or elsewhere (see Essay C and Appendix B).
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Hdt. 6.61), and Sittl (pp. 33-34) cites other examples of this gentle gesture, which 
applies not only to teacher and pupil, but also to parent and child, master and slave, 
master and animal, etc. Breitenbach (coll. 1890-91: see too Busse 226 and Beyschlag 
515-16) argues from a different perspective, stating that Oilier and Amim's remarks 
ignore the literary aspect of the À.ôyoi ZœKpaxiKol in general, a position which would 
make the consolation of Apollodorus more of a literary motif.
Note that the naiTative in this section is first introduced by the finite verb 
elTcev and then by the impersonal verb léyexar. One wonders, in fact, if all of the 
infinitive constructions in §24 ff. can be understood to depend on an implicit A^yexai, 
especially since Hermogenes has not been mentioned since the vei*y beginning of the 
work and since there is no paiallel to this post-trial account in the Comm. Certainly, 
the impersonal verb now moves the narrative into the realm of mere hearsay (see 
Chroust [1957] 3).
paX,Xov è p o ù lo u  pe ôp âv  ôtKaicos àôÎKcos àitoOvficncovxa; Cp. Socrates' 
remark to Xanthippe in D.L. 2.35: xf)S yuvaiKos eiTcouoris, "àôiKÔs a7co0vficnc8is," 
"où ôé," ë(|)T), "ôiKalœs éj3oùA,ou;" See too Socrates' comment on death in the 
previous section, the setting for which Diogenes seems also to have confused.
29. Xéyexat ôè K a i  "Avuxov Tcaptovxa iôe>v elTceîv Kxl.: Anytus {PA 1324),277 a 
leading democratic politician at the end of the fifth century (Isoc. 18.23, Xen. HG 
II.3.42 ff., and And. 1.150) and one of Socrates’ prosecutors, was born ca. 450 as the 
son of Anthemion of the deme E u o n y m o n .2 7 8  Anytus made his fortune as a tannei*y 
owner (Xen. Ap. 29, D.Chr. 55.22, and Schol. ad PI. Ap. 18B) and as a shoemaker 
{idem), both of which occupations made it financially possible for him to gain access 
to the highest Athenian social c ir c le s 2 7 9  and to cultivate the friendship of such foreign 
aristocrats as Meno the Thessalian {Men. 90B) as well as relationships with such 
notable Athenians as Alcibiades, his supposed lover (Flu. Ale. 4.4-5, Mor. 762C,
277The following summary of Anytus’ life has been drawn from Davies (1971) 40-41 and Judeich. 
278it is possible that the father was identical to the Anthemion mentioned by Aristotle in Ath. 7.4 and 
by Pollux (8.131), though a positive identification cannot be made because the name is known from 
other demes. There is at least some possibility that there is a relationship to an Anytus of tlie same 
deme {PA 1325) who served as a syntrierarch in 323, and that the Anytus {PA 1321) who proposed an 
honorarium for Herodotus (Diyllus ap. Flu. de Herod, mal. 26) was an older relative of Socrates’ 
accuser, perhaps even his grandfather. In particular, this passage refers to a gift o f ten talents made to 
Herodotus by a certain Anytus (lacking a patronymic), an act which causes Derenne (pp. 127-28) to 
suggest that, since Herodotus held traditional religious beliefs, Anytus' part in moving that he be so  
rewarded seems a reflection of his own.
279 Anthemion had himself amassed a considerable fortune {Men. 90A), and his son Anytus is 
described as tcov lieyioxav m o  xijs n0A,E(os.,.a^io'Opevov in Xen. Ap. 29 (cp. Men. 90B: a lp o w x a i 
yonv aùxôv [ol ’A0rivaioi] éîti xàs peyioxas dp%ds). See Derenne (p. 130): Tel devait être Anytos, un 
"homo novus", que la richesse avait fa it entrer dans une société intellectuellement supérieure à celle 
qtii'il avait connue dans son enfance.
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Satyrus ap. Ath. 534E-F, and Schol. ad PI. Ap. 18B: see too Zeller [1885] 207 n. 2). 
As a general, he was ordered ca. 409 to rescue Pylos and, after storms had thwarted 
the mission, was accused of being a traitor, a charge which he supposedly escaped 
through bribery (D.S. Xin.64.6, Plu. Cor. 14.4, and Arist. Ath. 27.5: see too Rhodes 
344 for problems in dating).280 After the defeat by Sparta, Anytus sided with 
Theramenes as a moderate democrat (Arist. Ath. 34.3: see Derenne 130), then 
participated m the rebellion against the Thirty (Lys. 13.78, 13.82 and Xen. HG 
II.3.42, II.3.44), losing a considerable amount of money as a result (Isoc. 18.23), an 
event which probably occurred during his exile and shortly before his associate 
Theramenes’ downfall (Arist. Ath. 34.3); in spite of this, he refused to seek 
compensation for his losses and was instrumental in restoring the democracy (idem 
and Isoc. 18.23). Although he seems to have had some prior associations with 
Socrates’ followers (e.g. Alcibiades) and possibly even with Socrates himself (see the 
short dialogue in Men. 89E ff.), he eventually fell out with him and later played a 
prominent role as a member of the prosecution during his trial.281
It is interesting to find Anytus in the same year as Socrates’ trial involved in a 
defense of Andocides against a chai'ge of impiety (And. L 1 5 0 ),2 8 2  a curious volte- 
face due perhaps to the fact that the letter’s revelations “had been of service to the 
democratic paity” (Burnet [1968] 153). One tradition holds that Anytus was 
eventually banished from Athens because of his role in the trial of Socrates and that 
he traveled to Pontic Heracleia, where he was stoned by the residents (Them. 239C 
and D.L. 2.43).283 An Anytus is mentioned in Lysias (22.8-9) as working in the 
Piraeus as a and the family line becomes obscure after Anytus’ second
exile and d e a t h .  284
280Derenne (p. 128) believes that the bribery story was created as part o f the hostile tradition (see note 
below). See too §20 above, where Feddersen (p. 37) construes the reference to generals as a potential 
barb directed against Anytus for his failed career as a general during the Peloponnesian War.
Feddersen consequently interprets Meletus' following remark (obxto yap kxA,.) as an inteiTuption meant 
to silence Socrates on this point.
281 Plato's Socrates indicates that he is not so much the victim of Anytus' or Meletus' animosity p er se 
(Ap. 28A, 22E & 23C) but rather of tlie general ill will created by Socrates' critical nature (see Zqü&t 
[1885] 206-207). This makes the vindictiveness o f Xen.'s Socrates seem even more uncharacteristic 
and more indicative, perhaps, o f Xen.'s own acceptance of the eye-for-an-eye ethics appropriate to a 
KaXos KÔyaGôs (see Comm. 11.3.14 & 11.6.35). Breitenbach (col. 1890) points out that it is only here 
that Xen. deals with the personality of one of the accusers, and that Anytus is not mentioned elsewhere 
in his Socratica.
282see Rhodes 432, MacDowell (1962) 166, Derenne 129, and Burnet (1968) 153; Brickhouse & 
Smith ([1989] 28-29) dispute the identification. For the dating of the Andocides trial, see M acDowell 
([1962] 204-205), who favors 400 over 399.
283i)iogenes says elsewhere (6.10) that Antisthenes was responsible for his exile.
284p)avies [1971] 41. The magistracy is dated variously to before 409 by Judeich, to 388/7 by 
Wilamowitz ([1893] 375) and also Davies ([1971] 41), who suggests that this refers to his son, to 386 
by Amim (p. 22), and to 385/4 by Chroust ([1957] 17). The Lysias passage has frequently been used 
to establish a terminus post quem for Xen. Ap. (see Essay B), though Oilier (pp. 89-90) points out quite 
rightly that Kirchner ([1901] 1:91-92) lists no fewer than six men named Anytus living between 445 
and 323, a fact which makes any identifications problematical (see too Vrijlandt 150-51: Vander 
Waerdt's arguments for identifying Anytus with the grain official [p. 13 n. 39] are not persuasive).
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In order to avoid turning the trial into a political affair, Anytus apparently had 
Meletus render the indictment and file the affidavit against Socrates (see PI. Ap. 18B, 
19AB and D.L. 2.38 & 2.40), using him, in effect, as his mouthpiece; the crucial 
words X0 ÙS apôi ’'Avmov in PI. Ap. 18B, however, seem to show that Socrates was 
well aware of who was behind the a c c u s a t i o n .285 Regardless of Anytus’ direct role in 
events, there is some literary evidence for his possible presence during the trial:
1) There seems to be some reference in Xen. Ap. 20-21 to Anytus’ failed 
relationship with his son, a statement which could be interpreted as a direct swipe 
at Anytus himself;286
2) Diogenes Laertius (2.38) states that Anytus possibly wrote the prosecution’s 
speech and, if we accept the emendation suggested for this passage (q.v.), actually 
delivered it; and
3) the passage in PI. Ap. 29C seems to be a quotation from this s p e e c h .2 8 7
According to Diogenes Laertius (2.38) and Quintilian (Inst. II. 17.4 & III. 1.11), it was 
actually Polycrates’ KaxriYopia that was delivered at the trial, and it has been 
suggested by Phillipson (pp. 270-71) that the KaTqyopos in the Schutzschrift may 
actually refer to the prosecutor, not to Polycrates. It is in fact possible that all three 
prosecutors spoke in turn against Socrates (see PI. Ap. 23E-24A and D.L. 2.38) and 
that, because of time constraints, the latter was forced to limit his response to 
Meletus’ arguments only. Because of Anytus’ public stature, the prosecution would 
undoubtedly have been more effective if he had spoken last (Phillipson 268).
Fritz ([1931] 43-44) considers Xen. Ap. 29-31 to be an interpolation and disputes the identification 
witli the oixo^nXa^ on the grounds that it would have been odd for Lysias to bring in Socrates' 
prosecutor as a supporting witness if he had already attacked him in his own bucoXoyla, and Fritz 
explains the omission of tlie patronymic as resulting from the fact that the Anytus in question appeared 
in court in person. Bluck (p. 119 n. 7) accepts the identification, implying that one o f the péyiaxai 
àp xai mentioned in Men. 90B might be tlie oixo(|)bXa% office. Derenne (pp. 129-30 & 178), who also 
accepts the identification, admits that finding Anytus holding an important magistracy after tlie trial of 
Socrates obviously conflicts with the supposed unpopularity o f the prosecutors after the trial, but that 
the negative tradition is very late, and that any change o f heart in Athens would have occurred after 
several generations, after the Socratic literature had had time to exert an influence.
285 Anytus' influence on the prosecution’s brief can be seen by comparing Meletus’ remark in PL Ap.
25 A (i.e., that any Athenian would be a better teacher than Socrates) with Anytus’ similar opinion on 
the sophists in Men. 92E. For further mentions of Anytus, see PL Ap. 23E, 25B, 28A, 29B-C, 30B-D, 
31 A, 34A-B & 36A (see too D.L. 2.38, where some anonymous sources report that Anytus himself 
wrote the prosecution's speech). One wonders to what extent he can be cast in the role o f Odysseus as 
a foil to Socrates' Palamedes role (see §26). Certainly, the behind-the-scenes manipulation of events 
bears some comparison to tlie mythical figure.
286Gigon ([1946] 226 ff.) also takes this view. See the comment on §20 and my further remaiks below  
(see too Essay C for an interpretation of this passage as a possible reply to Poly crates).
287[*'Av'Uxos] e<j)Ti h x^ v apxhv on ôeiy épe ôenpo eioeXGeXv r\, èTteiôf] eiaqXeov, onx oiov x’ elvai xo 
Ph outOKxelvai pe, Aiytov Ttpôs npâs és s i  5ia<t>en^ oipTiv nôii nptôv ol nets èiüixnôenovxes à 
ScoKpâxTis ôiSotoKEi TtdvxES îiovxàTiaai SiactiOapiiaovxai. See Wilamowitz [1919] 2:51, Derenne 152, 
and Chroust [1957] 171.
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It would seem, then, that Anytus' political influence at the time was such that 
his personal animosity towards Socrates and his direct involvement in the trial might 
have tipped the scales in favor of a guilty-verdict. The motives for Anytus’ enmity 
towai'ds Socrates have been explained in various ways:
1) In the portrayal of him in Men. 89E-95A and 99E-100C, Plato indicates that 
Anytus, who is introduced as cuiTently holding office as a democratic politician 
(90B), harbored considerable resentment towards Socrates for the latter’s 
allegedly anti-democratic s e n t i m e n t s 288 and identified him at least indirectly with 
the sophists. (The many references in Men. 93A-94E to failed father/son 
relationships will be considered below.) Irony is evident in Socrates’ references 
to Themistocles and Pericles, who are also disparaged in the Grg.,289 and also in 
the fact that Anytus was to become one of Socrates’ accusers: Indeed, if apexn 
existed in any of these men, it had to be the result, as the argument of this 
dialogue maintains, of divine dispensation (Crombie 198-99). Note too Anytus’ 
hypocrisy: He admires past aristocratic leaders yet is a self-avowed democrat, and 
he condemns sophists yet knows nothing about them (Sharpies 19 and Connor 
165-66); on the other hand, Socrates’ association with philosophers from formerly 
hostile cities would only have served to strengthen Anytus' position on both 
counts (Burnet [1924] 184 and Taylor [1911] 17). It is possible that Anytus was 
still alive when Plato wrote the Men., and this seems to have affected the tone he 
uses in referiing to him: The injunction which Anytus is to receive from Meno 
(see lOOB-C) seems to be a veiled criticism of his fervor in stirring the Athenians 
against Socrates (seen here in his attitude to the sophists and in his oversensitivity 
to Socrates’ remarks concerning former statesmen), while the treatment of him in 
PI. Ap., if not conciliatory, is certainly r e s t r a in e d .290 While writing the Men., 
Plato perhaps would have been acquainted with Polycrates’ characterization of 
Anytus in his Kaxriyopia, and the Men. (see especially §93A5-6) might also have 
been written at least partly as a response to i t .2 9 i  As regar ds Xen. Ap.,
288see especially §95A (see too Grg. 521A ff., where Callicles also seems to hint at a potential threat 
from Anytus). Fritz ([1931] 47) believes that the Anytus presented in the Men. becomes annoyed 
...weil erglaubt, selbst ein vortrefflicher Politiker zu sein (S. 95A) und aufierdeinfühig, andere das 
Gleiche zu lehren. This, o f course, does not correspond to the relationship with his son presented in 
Xen. Ap. 29.
289see too Comm. IV.2.2, where the nature-vs.-nurture question is applied to Tliemistocles’ behavior 
as a public figure.
299wilamowitz [1919] 2:147. Chroust ([1957] 202) suggests tliat Plato was perhaps compensating for 
the over-abuse of him in the writings of other Socratics,
291 Wilamowitz [1919] 147 and Sha^les 3 & 174. Sharpies (p. 169) and J. Morrison (pp. 58 & 76-78) 
want to identify the Polycrates mentioned in Men. 90A with the rhetorician, though the phrase “the 
wealth o f Polycrates” (i.e. the Samian tyrant) might well have been proverbial. For Delebecque’s 
dating of Xen. Ap. based on the Men., see Essay B: In general, Delebecque (pp. 217-18) believes that 
Xen. intended in his Ap. to correct Plato’s characterization o f Anytus in the Men., where the
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Wilamowitz ([1919] 2:147) holds that the relevant passage in the Men. would 
alone suffice as an adequate source for the Anytus section, while Vrijlandt (pp. 
130-33) takes the opposite position, asserting that the Men. passage in question 
refers directly to Xen. Ap. 29-31.
2) Riddell (p. xii) suggests that Anytus bore a lover’s gnidge against Socrates 
because the latter, not he, was the true focus of Alcibiades’ affection.
3) According to Libanius (Ap. 26 & 30-31), Anytus was annoyed by Socrates’ 
constant references to tanners and cobblers and was in fact willing to drop char ges 
if he would desist. Xen. may be referring to this when he mentions the son of 
Anytus the tanner in his aTroXoyia, and it is more than likely that Libanius’ 
explanation has its origin in Socrates’ association with craftsmen (Wilamowitz 
[1919] 2:146) as well as in his analogies based on the various c r a f t s .292 it is 
possible too that, as a nouveau riche, Anytus would have been offended by 
Socrates' remarks concerning the menial sources of his wealth.
4) In the passage under consideration {Ap. 29-31), Xen. describes Anytus’ 
hostility as having resulted specifically from Socrates’ concer*n for, and implicitly 
his potential influence over, the future of Anytus’ son, a tanner's son with an 
interest in philosophy who by Xen.’s account (§31) turned into a drunkard and 
ne’er-do-well after Socrates’ death.293. As this passage shows, the cause of 
Socrates' conviction seems to have originated primarily in his teaching of the 
artes philosophiae, not in his politics.294
5) On the other hand, it has been proposed by Dittmar (pp. 94-97) that all 
references to the quarrel between Socrates and Anytus, including those appearing 
in comic writers (see Breitenbach 1891), go back to a seminal X à y o s  SwK paxiK O s. 
This would essentially remove any genuinely personal element from the Anytus 
episode and render it a stock theme to be included perfunctorily as part of the 
growing number of Socratic w r it in g s .2 9 5
description is not sufficiently disparaging, and points to a precedent in Xen.’s correction in An. II.6.21- 
29 o f Plato’s flattering portrayal o f Meno. in tlie Men. (who, one should recall, was also Anytus’ 
friend). In short, it was important that Xen. attack Anytus in his own person in the Ap. since he meant 
to correct Plato’s account of him and wanted to address the question o f Anytus’ son’s education 
directly (see his treatments o f education in the Cyn. and Lac. passim).
292por particular references in Xen., see Comm. 1.2.37 and especially IV.4.5, which might also contain 
a veiled allusion to Anytus' son (èàv Ôé xts poéXtixat ij aùxôs paOeiv xô ôiKaïov fj m ôv f| otxéxqv 
ôiÔâ^aoSai, pfi eiôévai ôîtoi âv èlG èv tô^oi xonxon). For a creative treatment of the tanner issue, 
see Dittmar 91 ff.
293E. Schwartz {FttnfVortrage iiber den griechischen Roman, Berlin, 1896, p. 57) seems to have been 
the first to draw a comparison between the fate of Socrates and that o f Tigranes’ tutor in Cyr. III. 1.38, 
who was executed by his father for supposedly exerting an adverse influence on his charge. 
294Feddersen 37. Derenne (pp. 136-37) also comments that the reconstruction period after the 
Peloponnesian War would have placed special demands on tiie young, who under the circumstances 
should not have had time for philosophy, yet another possible reason for Anytus' irritation.
295Vrijlandt (pp. 133-34) lists various scholars' conjectures (see too Fritz [1931] 48-49, Derenne 133, 
and Maier 468).
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What, then, were Xen.’s motives in appending a relatively lengthy attack on 
Anytus to Socrates’ defense speech? I believe that his motivation was twofold: He 
wanted 1) to show how Anytus had fallen out of public favor after the execution of 
Socrates and 2) to point out his failings as a father. The extent to which the first 
prediction held true can only be gathered from the confusing testimony cited above.
It remains, then, to speak briefly of his failings as a father. There are, perhaps, 
several general clues to be found in the Men.: The fact that Socrates goes into great 
length about Anthemion and says little about Anytus himself (89E-90A) hints at a 
disparity between father and son and foreshadows the later failure of Themistocles et 
al. to impart excellence to their sons (Klein 224-25), and the rather prolonged 
treatment of these relationships would seem to be sufficient to establish at least an 
indirect reference to Anytus’ own paternal shortcomings.296 it is possible that Xen. 
also intends here to counter the Aristophanic portrayal of Socrates in which 
Phidippides, though he acquiesces to Strepsiades' desire that he be indoctrinated at the 
Ôpovxiatfipiov, is mined by Socrates and ultimately does not live up to his father's 
expectations of him.29? It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the attack on 
Anytus iwAp. 29-31, Xen. in Smp. 9.1 has Lyco298 commend Socrates for his 
beneficial influence on Callias and, indirectly, on Lyco’s son Autolycus, while the 
Comm, naturally include many similar instances. In focusing on Anytus in this
296See Schanz 83 & 90-91 and Toole 8 . A number of more specific references to tliis have been 
detected by various scholais in Plato, namely, by Amim (p. 22) and Hackforth (p. 76 n. 1) in Men. 95 A  
C'Avuxos irev poi ôokei xaX,ejraivEiv, kqI oùSèv 0an|j.âÇe)' oiexai ydp pe itpoôxov |ièv KaKxiyopeiv 
xobxons XOÙS dvSpas, eitEixa fiyEixm kqi anxos e iva i els xobxcov), by Wilamowitz ([1897] 100-101) 
in the Theognis quotation in Men. 95D (èo0A,ü5v pèv yàp àn' èo0Xà ôiôâ^eai' pv ôè 
KaKOiaiv/aupixlayi^s, âïioA.eis Kai xôv èôvxa vôov), by Vrijlandt (p. 130) in Men. 92B (oùô" dv oXXov 
Êdoaigi x(Sv ÉjLirôv oûôéva Kxl.), and by Sharpies (p. 171) in Ap. 24B (the indictment). To this I would 
add Anytus' abrupt and inexplicably strong reaction to Socrates' statement in Men. 94E concerning the 
inability o f  Thucydides to impart virtue to his son.
297Note that Lamprocles’ filial ingratitude is roundly censured by Xen.'s Socrates as an ei>.iKpivfis 
àÔiKia in Comm. II.2.3, and in IV.4.17 he states that sons can best be entrusted to a vô|ri|ros. For a 
reference to tlie inability o f fathers, even excellent ones, to instill virtue in their sons, see PI. La. 179C- 
D. The other father/son relationships in the Socratica which directly involve Socrates show 
considerable diversity: As mentioned, Lamprocles is eventually won over to his father's point o f view  
in the passage cited. Lyco shows an almost idealized form of paternal devotion towards his son 
Autolycus in Xen. Smp., as does Demodocus towards Theages in (Ps.-)Plato's dialogue of the same 
name. In both cases their affection towards their sons is reciprocated (see especially Smp. 3.12-13), 
and both fathers warmly acknowledge Socrates’ good intentions. However, in spite of Diogenes 
Laertius' report to the contrary (2.29), the results o f tlie philosopher's influence on Euthyphro's 
subsequent behavior towards his fatiier remain unclear, and Aristophanes' Phidippides character is 
completely corrupted by Socrates' influence. In this respect, provided tliat Anytus saw the performance 
o f Clouds and given the troubled relationship with his own son, the deleterious influence of 
Aristophanes’ Socrates on Phidippides surely must have had some effect, however slight, on his 
attitude towards the philosopher. With all due respect to Professor Hailiwell, and in due consideration 
o f the nature of Attic comedy, I nevertheless maintain, like Plato's Socrates (see Ap. 18B ff.), that such 
images, no matter how preposterous, remain involuntarily embedded in our memories (see n. 222  
above).
298'pijis Lyco may or may not be identical with the prosecutor o f the same name (see Waterfield 221 n. 
1).
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section of the Ap., then, Xen. seems above all to be intent on providing an example by
contrast. 299
e i à«éKtové pe: See Comm. n i.9 .12-13 for the inevitable consequences for leaders 
who ignore or execute ol ev ôpovoûvxes.
OÙK ë(j)iiv xpùvai XOV mov îcept pùpcros TtatÔeùeiv: Cp. the phrase èm xfj 
ÔouXo7cp87ceî ôiaxpiPîj in §30 below. The reasons for Socrates' anti-banausic attitude 
are detailed in Oec. 4.2-3.^^ Xen.'s Socrates here expresses the nobleman's 
conventional disdain for any occupation which would distract him from the serious 
pursuit of politics and the military (see Pomeroy 235-37), an attitude more 
appropriate to Xen. h i m s e l f . Note that this section supports Anytus' accusation in 
§20.
Fritz ([1931] 46) ti*anslates the preceding aùxôv as a sort of anticipatory 
pronoun refening to Anytus' son, not to Anytus himself. I see no justification for this 
(see, for example, H. W. Smyth's Greek Grammar §§990 & 1121).
übs jioxOîlpos omos: For other examples of similarly acerbic language from Socrates, 
see Appendix D.3®2 jf the appearance of the word po%0qp6s in PI. Ap. can be used as 
a basis of comparison, Socrates appears to be ranking Anytus among those who voted 
against him (cp. PI. Ap. 39B: (ix()A,T|KÔxes po%0T|piav xal àSiKiav), and it is also 
possible that Xen. through the use of this word is referring to various Platonic 
passages concerning the negative effects of associating with the sophists,^^  ^ or 
perhaps to Grg. 521C, where Callicles discusses the prospect of Socrates' being haled 
before court m o rcdvu laœs ^o%0qpoû àvôpccwrou xal ôaùX.ou. Note that the word 
poxBrjpla appeals in Socrates' prophecy concerning Anytus' son in §30 below.
299oiiier, who questions the authenticity of tlie Anytus section in general (p. 95 n. 1), notes elsewhere 
(p. 88) that it nevertheless does not constitute a serious digression but continues the previous themes of 
the Ap,'. Socrates remains superior to those who have condemned him, and his beneficial effect on the 
youth is supported by the implication that Anytus’ son would in fact have improved under his tutelage. 
Wilamowitz ([1897] 100), who questions tlie authenticity o f tlie work as a whole, points out that the 
introductory verb Xeyetai brings the historicity of the Anytus section into even further doubt than the 
previous Hermogenes device.
300see too Oec. 6.5, Comm. III.7.5-8, IV.2.22, PI. Smp. 203A, R. 495D-E, 522B, 590C, A/c. /  131 A-B, 
Tht. 175E, 176C, and Lg. 848A, 919B-C. His arrogance towards artisans and menial labour in general 
is also evident in Ael. VH 2.1, which seems to have been influenced by Comm. 1.2.9 or a similar 
passage from Xen. (see above). Fritz ([1931] 47) comments that pupooôei|/tKf| does not appear among 
the xéxvai mentioned by Socrates in Men. 90C ff.
agree with Fritz ([1931] 46-47) that it seems uncharacteristic that Socrates, ...der hnmer mit den 
xéxvai als einem Beispiel festen Wissens exemplifiziert, das Gerberhandwerk als solches zur 
SonXoTTpeitTis Siaxplpri gestempelt Mtte.
302p)eig5ecque (p. 36) remarks that Xen. treats Anytus neutrally in HG  II.3.42 since the event occurs 
earlier historically.
303see PI. Ap. 25E and Men. 9 IE & 92D. This would be a sharp riposte indeed when one considers 
Anytus* strong opinions against them as expressed in the latter work.
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emphasizing the direct connection between cause and effect. It is certainly plausible 
that Socrates addressed some some such remark to Anytus at some point during or 
after the proceedings, a remark which Vrijlandt (p. 7) reconstructs in a gentler tone as 
follows: "Adinoneo te ut cautus sis. Magis ingenuus magisque liberalis filius tiius 
quam ut ex eo cotiarius fiat. "
offioxepos fip,®v Ktti cpupàopcoxepa Kai K allim  e is  xov à e t  xpovov ôtajré- 
TtpaKxai: Cp. the related prediction in §26.
30. avéOriKE pèv Kai "Opiipos ëaxtv oîs xmv èv KaxaXùaei xoù pion Tipoyi- 
yvmoKGiv xà p èllovxa: Schanz (pp. 88-89: see too Chroust [1957] 127) remarks 
that the Cynics' particularly strong predilection for Homer, combined with the 
reference in D.L. 6.9-10 to Antisthenes' hostility towards Anytus, makes it at least 
possible that the prophecy concerning Anytus originates in an Antisthenic source of 
some kind.
Socrates' clairvoyance picks up themes already introduced earlier in the Ap., 
i.e. his explanation of the daimonic voice (§12-13), °^"  ^his references to the Delphic 
oracle (§§12 & 14-15), and his prediction concerning the future appraisals of him and 
Anytus (§26), all of which lend a decidedly mystical aspect to the p r o c e e d i n g s ^ ® ^  
further underscore his seemingly super-human status among men (see Appendix D). 
Wetzel (pp. 399-400) believes that Socrates' prophecy concerning Anytus' son is to be 
taken far more figuratively than literally: Ahnlicher 'Prophezeiungen' hat sich 
vielleicht mancher von uns auch schon schuldig gemacht, while Fritz ([1931] 46) is 
far* more sceptical: Wenn man hier nicht die plumpe Vergrdberung von Motiven aus 
der Socratikerliteratur erkennen kann, so ist dies in den plumpsten der pseudoplato- 
nischen Dialoge auch nicht moglich.
The description of Socrates' Homeric gift of prophecy as reported in this 
section seems to be based on two passages in the Iliad (16.851-55 & 22.355-63: see
8®4xhe opening words of §13 are particularly important in this respect: âXXà pevtot k q i  to  
Tipoeiôévai ye tov 0 e 6 v  to pÉXlov k oi to  itpocrripatvEiv cp pouX^tai, k o i tovto , cocntEp Éym <|»T)pt, 
ontco TtdvtES KOI XÉyonai koi vopi^ouoiv.
^®^This is indeed an issue o f great controversy, but if the Phd. is at all reliable as a historical source, 
Socrates seems to have been influenced at least to some extent by Orphism and Pythagoreanism (see 
Burnet [1911] passim). The phrase èv xataX w E i ton ^iovin  particular has a distinctly Orphic 
resonance (see Burnet [1911] 75) and recalls many of the ideas brought up in the Phd. (see §79C ff., 
for example: see too Burnet [1924] 164 on the belief that temporary clairvoyance becomes possible as 
the life force is about to rid itself o f the body). It is interesting to note that Xen. makes no mention of 
Socrates' ecstatic spells (see PI. Smp. 220C-D), a mental state which Phillipson (p. 87) explains as 
involving prolonged periods of contemplation during which Socrates applied his dialectical metliod to 
himself, with the daimonic voice acting as a probable stimulus: In short, Phillipson describes the 
phenomenon as an intellectual process accompanied by ecstatic fervor, and Socrates' ante mortem  
clairvoyance here can best be considered another facet of his. visionary nature.
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Oilier 119) and resembles Socrates' words in Ap. 39C (xal yap elpi i\br\ èvxaûOa èv 
(S |idX.iaxa av0pamoi xpTioM-cpSonaiv, oxav péXXœoiv à7co0av8Îa0ai); both passages 
in turn are similar in thought to the notion of a "swan-song" as described in Phd. 84E- 
8 5 B .806 Two questions remain; Is the prophecy spoken in court or to his followers? 
And is it directed at Anytus or at the court in general? It seems more likely that 
Socrates, as Plato reports, directed these words in court against those who had 
condemned him. Note too that Xen. introduces this story (as well as the one about 
Apollodorus) with Xéyexai, which would seem to indicate that Xen. is less willing to 
vouch for its reliability, and that it is more likely that Xen.'s version would have been 
distorted by word of mouth, whereas Plato was an eye-witness. In short, these words 
about future shame would have had far more pathos if actually spoken before the 
court and would therefore be more appropriate in that setting (Amim 81-83).
ô ià  ôè x6  |iT|ôèva èxeiv  crjrouôoiov emfieXrixT^v itpooritecreîcrOat xivi alcrxPV 
èTitOujiiqt KxX.: A close parallel is offered by the example of Alcibiades, whose 
profligate behavior after his association with Socrates had ended is well documented 
in contemporaiy and later sources (see Comm. 1.2.24, PI. Smp. 216A-C and Plu. Ale. 
194B-D). Comm. 1.2.20,1.2.27, and 1.2.49-55 defend Socrates directly or indirectly 
against his allegedly detrimental effect on father/son r e l a t i o n s h i p s , ^ ® ^  and this issue 
obviously shares much in common with the coiTuption-of-the-youth charge (see the 
comment on §10).
We move with this passage out of the realm of the prophetic and are 
introduced to a more persuasive aigument, namely, that Socrates was a good judge of 
character. In Comm. 111.1.9 Socrates says that a well-educated man should be 
expected to know how to distinguish good character from bad, and Vrijlandt (p. 138) 
finds an excellent parallel to Xen. Ap. 30-31 in Tht. 142C-D (on Socrates' quasi­
prophecy concerning Theaetetus' future, a prediction based on his actual association 
with him: kqi ouyyevopevos xe xa'i bmXexQeis nâvv àyaaOfivai aùxoû xf^ v (j)ùaiv).
^®®See Bumet's notes ad loc. cit. For more references to mutual influence between Plato and Xen. 
concerning Socrates' ability to prophesy, see Breitenbach 1891, Schmid 224-25, Amim 81 ff., and 
Busse 226 (see too Vrijlandt [pp. 135-36], who draws attention to problems in Plato's version o f  
events). Wilamowitz ([1897] 105) interprets the similarity as evidence that Xen. borrowed freely from 
the Platonic passage in question and points out elsewhere (p. 103 n. 2) that the description of Socrates 
as being clairvoyant seems to contradict his inability to advise Xen, on his best course o f action 
regarding the Cyrean expedition (An. IE. 1.5). Wilamowitz' assertion seems contradicted in §13, where 
Socrates all but states that he has prophetic powers (see Vrijlandt 137, who stresses the usage o f  
e^ ayyeilas), and Hackforth (p. 17) also counters this with the argument that Xen.'s language is not 
similar to Plato’s and that the contents o f the two passages are entirely different: Word of Socrates' 
prophecy in court was probably a fact or common report, and Xen. and Plato might have recorded it 
independently of each other.
^®7See too Cri. 50E-51A, where the father is said to hold a superior and unassailable position in 
respect to his offspring.
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31. a l l  6 veavioKos Ti<r0eis oivq> oùxe vvktos oiSxe fifiépas STcaùexo rrlvmv
K x l.:  This contrasts markedly with Socrates' own self-controlled behavior as 
described in §18 and with his protestations in §19 that he has never been responsible 
for instilling incontinence and, more particularly, a propensity for dipsomania in his 
fo l lo w e r s A ® 8  Xen.'s Socrates considers èyKpàteia to be a distinguishing 
characteristic of human beings (see Comm. II. 1.4, where human vices are compared to 
the behavior of wild animals), and the failure of Anytus' son to function within the 
different spheres of human activity mentioned in this section of the Ap. (oùxe xrj 
èamoû Tcolet ow e xots pilots ome abx® a^ios oùôevôs èyéveto) coiTesponds to 
valions passages in the Comm., in particular, to those dealing with the individual’s 
relationship
1) to his polis {Comm. 1.5.1): ap’ ovxtva aia6avoipe9a pxxm yacxpos ij otvou ij 
àôpoôtcRWv ij Tcovou ij uitvou, XOÙXOV dv [axpaxqyôv] aipoipeOa;
2 ) to h i s  f r i e n d s  {ibid. n.6.1): e i  ôeolpeOa ^ t l o u  d y a S o û ,  tco>s d v  è T t i x e i p o i î i p e v  
o K O T t e î v ;  d p a  T C p r o x o v  p è v  T^jxrixÉov, ô a x i s  d p % e t  y a a x p ô s  xe K a i  ( | ) i l o 7 c o a i a s  
K a i  l a y v e i a s  K a i  utwou koI d p y t a s ;  and
3) to himself {ibid. 1.5.3): Kai yàp...6  àKpaxps...KaKoûpyos pèv xmv dllmv, 
éauxoû ôè Tcolù KaKoupyôxepos et ye KaKoupyôxaxôv èaxi pij pôvov xôv oîkov 
xôv èauxoû ôGetpetv, à llà  Kai xô ampa Kai xpv \|/uxf)v. (Cp. ibid, n.6.1: ô yàp 
ÙTtô xoùxmv Kpdxoùpevos oùx’ aùxôs éaux^ ôùvaix’ dv oùxe ôtlo) xà Ôéovxa 
Ttpdxxeiv.)
It is interesting that, although all three aspects of the secular realm are set out in this 
sentence, Xen. surprisingly fails to mention the effect of alcohol on Anytus' son's 
ability to perform his proper duties to the gods, a point which would have further 
supported Socrates' defense against the impiety charge. Socrates' feelings towards 
dpyta and àpéX,eia come out clearly in Comm. 1.2.57 and n.7.7, in the latter of which 
passages these shortcomings of Aristarchus' family are ironically contrasted with the 
industry demonstrated by another Athenian's slaves, and the uselessness of Anytus' 
son to those around him would have been considered behavior ill-becoming an 
èXeùGepos dvijp. This section should also be closely compai'ed with §34, where the 
example of Socrates as môèltpos offers a direct contiast to that of Anytus' son.
^®^The results o f incontinence are treated generally in Cotnm. 1.5, o f dipsomania in ibid. 1.2,22 and 
Smp. 2.24-26 (see too Comm. IV. 1.3-5, which deals with the problems in educating the young and 
spirited). Wilamowitz ([1897] 100-101) feels that the fate o f Anytus' son is adumbrated in Men. 95D, 
which would make the version in §31 all the more understandable as the result o f its influence and 
allow the work as a whole to be dated to the first half o f the 4th century.
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Kat ô ià  xTiv aùxoù àyvmiiooùvTiv ëxi Kot xexeleoxEKœs xxyyxàvei KaKo- 
ôo^ias: For traces of a negative post-trial literary tradition concerning Anytus, see 
the accounts in Arist. Ath. 17.5, D.S. 13.64,14.37, Schol. ad PL Ap. 18B, Lib. Ap. 10, 
24-31, Socratic. Ep. 14.2, Plu. Mor. 538A, 762D, Max.Tyr. 18.6, Them. 239C, and 
D.L. 2.43, 6.10. Menzel (pp. 41-47 & 60: see too Stone passim) may well be correct 
in saying that posterity has been too hai'sh on the prosecutors and theii* motives and 
that it has fallen prey to the hostile tradition directed against them.3®9 Note that 
Isocrates (18.23) expressly states that Anytus, like Thrasybulus, did not abuse his 
power to satisfy personal grudges, and it is not unlikely that Anytus truly believed 
that he was protecting the democracy (Derenne 133-39 and Maier 473).
Wetzel (p. 400: see too Vrijlandt 150) would prefer to omit the second 
sentence of this section because of its incongruity: The pév...ôé construction which 
straddles §§31 and 32 offers no apparent contrast, and Wetzel believes that Xen., der 
Feind der athenischen Demokraten, perhaps later inserted the sentence for personal 
reasons. The omission of this reference to Anytus' death would allow an earlier 
dating of the Ap. (see Essay B). Beyschlag (p. 507) believes that, contraiy to 
Immisch's opinion, the last sentence in §31 can be retained since a contrast does in 
fact exist when one looks at the laiger context (i.e. Kai xexeXemriKCos xuy%av8 i 
KaKoôo^las versus 0eo(j)iA-oùs polpas xExnxT\Kévai). This is unconvincing, however, 
since 0 eo(|)iloùs polpas xexuxTiKévai is itself part of a new pév,..ôé construction, and 
this leaves the previous Ôé-clause dangling. Fritz ([1931] 45) holds that Wetzel's 
omission in this section does not provide a smoother reading, and that the Ap. is in 
fact full of similar inconcinnities. Feddersen (p. 32) also takes issue with Wetzel, 
commenting that, just as the first part of §31 confions Socrates' prophetic ability, so 
the second part confirms what was said in §29 (cos p6x0r)pos kxX.).
I feel that the text stands as it is but for reasons other than the aforementioned, 
namely, that the adversative effect of the pév...ôé construction consists in the fact 
that, while Anytus has been condemned by posterity, Socrates in effect condemned 
himself {èamôv and èanxoù) by his megalegorical behavior in court, a reading also 
supported by the inclusion of paXlov. I see no inconcinnity or incongruity here.
32. DcoKpdxns Ôë Ôià x6  peyaX-ùveiv kxX,.: Xen. recapitulates the main theme (see 
Appendix D) and signals the close of his writing. Note the persuasive effect created 
by the return to Xen.'s personal nanative voice in this and the preceding sections 
(xanxa S’ elTicDv oùk è\|/eùaaxo): The verb peyaXùveiv is used by the narrator himself 
and definitively sets forth his final judgment on the proceedings (Tejera 156). Shero
^®®As Maier (p. 468) observes, die SokratesjUnger flatten an Anytos...grausame Rache genommen, a 
predictable development suggested as early as PI. Ap. 39C-D.
135
(p. 109) believes that Socrates' statement in this section does not necessarily suggest a 
deliberate provocation of the juiy, and that the notion of a suicide inflicted through 
judicial process is unjustified
èpol pèv oùv ÔOKèl 0EO<|>tXoùs poipas xexDXTlKévav: Busse (p. 226: see too 
Toole 7 and Beyschlag 515) notes a similarity of this passage with Phd 58E;
eù ô a tp ro v  y à p  p o t  à v ijp  è ^ a iv e x o , ...cos à ô em s k q i  y e v v a im s  è x e l e ù x a ,  &axe p o t  
£K 8 tv o v  T tap taxaoO at pT|ô’ 8 t s  "Atôox) io v x a  avev  0 8 t a s  p o tp a s  t é v a t ,  àXXà K a i
8 K 8 l o 8  à(l)tK Ô p8V 0V  8 U  Ttpd^EtV 8t7C8p XtS KGMOXe K a i  àXXoS.
The consolatory tone of this section seems to be directed at least partly towards Xen. 
himself (Amim 28), and Hackforth (pp. 40-41) concludes from this that Xen.'s 
motives for including the peyalriyopta and wiUingness-to-die issues in general were 
obviously personal; additional motives lie in his desire 1) to praise Socrates' bravery 
in the face of death (§33) as well as his overall ao^ia and yevvaioxrjs (§34), and 2) to 
demonstiate that he was innocent of both indictment charges (§22). This passage in 
§32, especially the word 08O(j)tXot)s, seems to encapsulate Xen.'s own sense of divine 
justice.^
33. ènet yàp ëyvm xoù ëxi Çf\v x6  xe0vàvai aùxm Kpëixxov e tv a i kxX.; The
ambiguity concerning Socrates' motives behind his behavior in court continues here, 
though these motives can be elucidated, perhaps, by reviewing the pertinent points in 
his various speeches, namely,
1) that he considered a life well led to be his best defense (§3),
2 ) that he interpreted the dissuasive influence of the daimonic voice before the 
trial to mean that he had reached a suitable point in his life at which to die (§4),
3) that he justified this interpretation by considering the fact that he was at the 
height of his philosophical powers and that he would soon have to face the onset 
of decrepitude (§§5-8),
4) that he did not rule out the possibility that he would be acquitted but was 
nevertheless determined to speak frankly (§9),
2l®Cp. too the defensive tone o f Comm. IV.4.4, where Socrates’ efforts to conform to judicial 
procedure are emphasized. See the comment on §33 for a final treatment o f the suicide question. 
^^^See Frick 19: Sirnulque hoc ex loco totum libellum etiam, si hoc verbo uti licet, theodiceam  
quondam esse cognoscis Xenophonti si cui alii profecto convenientem. What is dear to the gods is 
discussed at great length in Cri. 6E ff. and is defined as em pa^ia in Comm. IH.9.15. For the notion of  
a timely death, see tlie comment on §7; for a possible reference to Xen.'s belief in an after-life, see Cyr. 
VIII.7.19 ff.
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5) that he did in fact do his best to prove his innocence regarding the indictment 
charges but was unwilling to beg for his life since he felt that his death would be 
opportune, an attitude borne out by his refusal to propose a counter-penalty (§§2 2 - 
23),
6 ) that he continued to protest against the injustice of the sentence even after the 
ruling had been made and seemed to find some solace in the fact that he would be 
remembered favorably by posterity (§§24-26),
7) that he consoled his followers by pointing out that every mortal is destined to 
die and that he would die opportunely (§27),
8 ) that he consoled Apollodorus in particular by indicating that he was at least not 
guilty of any criminal behavior, i.e., that he had led a virtuous life (§28), and
9) that Anytus and his son would ultimately suffer the consequences of the court's 
ruling (§§29-31).
The evidence seems to indicate, then, that Socrates was all but certain that his 
sentencing and execution were inevitable because of his refusal to compromise his 
principles in front of the dicasts, and that he was nevertheless determined to convince 
them of his innocence, an attitude which seemed to spring from his desire to conform 
to the laws of his city (see Comm. IV.4.4). The contradiction apparent in Socrates' 
adherence to human laws in the Cri. and to a higher law in PI. Ap. is explained in the 
foimer work, where the personified laws of Athens describe their relationship to the 
laws in the next world as being one of actual kinship (54C: ol ijjiéxepoi àÔ8 (^j)ol ol 
èv "AiSon vopoi) and where any corruption of the laws is attributed to human failings 
(54C-D: VÛV pèv f)8 tKT)pèvos à7C8 i,..oùx Êpô)v xmv vopmv àXkà im' 
àv0 pmjtmv).3i2 The divine and human spheres also merge in the two àiroloylat, with 
each Socrates figure interpreting the presence (or absence) of the daimonic voice to 
mean that the gods sanction his decision to go through with the legal process in spite 
of its futility.^i^
oùôè itpos xov 0avaxov épaXaKioraxo kxX,.: Cp. Socrates' composure in Phd. 116E 
ff.; for his refusal to kowtow to the authorities, see §§23 and 27. Several of the words 
in this section (ptopri, paX,aKl 8^ iv and, to a lesser extent, 7cpoa5 éxBo0 ai) have a 
decidedly military flavor to them, i^'  ^indicating that Xen., a soldier himself, wants to
^l^Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 138-40) find Socrates’ strongest statement against civil disobedience 
in Cri. 51B-C and cite the relevant passages in PI. Ap. as follows: 28D, 29B, 19A, 25D, 3 IE, 32B-C & 
35B-C.
^^^The Xenophontic Socrates' refusal to propose a counter-penalty seems exceptional in this regard 
(see the comment on §23).
^l^There are many examples in Xen. of military contexts for pmpp (e.g. HG  n i.4 ,19, VI.1.15, VII.5.23, 
Comm. IV.2.32, Oec. 11.11-13, 11.19, An. III.3.14, Cyr. 1.6.12, IV.2.21,Aggj. 1.28, 6 .8 , m ûEq.M ag.
2.5), while paXaKiÇeiv often appears in similar contexts in compound forms of the verb {Oec. 11.12,
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call attention to the fact that Socrates faced death like the good soldier that he once 
was. For Socrates' fearless attitude towards death, see Phd. 58E & 116E ff.
34. om e jif\ jiepvijcrOai ôùvapai am où oùxe jiejiviEievos jiTi oùk èiratvelv: 
Note the use of ixeiavfioôai and the related participle, both of which may indicate an 
intention eventually to write Socratic àTcopvTmoveùpaxa.^^^
e l ôé XIS xmv apexfjs ècjiiepévmv axjieXtpmxépm xivi SmKpaxovs rruveyévexo, 
èKetvov èym xov âvôpa â^iopiaKaptcrxoxaxov^i^ vojA^m: Cp. this last sentence 
of Xen. Ap. with Plato's literary epitaph in Phd. 118A:
tjôe f] TeAeuxf), © ’ExeKpaxes, xoù exaipou fiptv éyévexo, àvôpôs, cbs ijpets 
Ôoûpev âv, xmv xôxe mv èjteipâBripev àplaxou koi â llm s ôpovtpmxâxou koi ôxKaiOxdxou.
The two nouns and single adjective describing Socrates in this final section of Xen. 
Ap. (oo(|)ia, yevvaiôxris, and môeÀ.tpmxepos, the adjective being in essence a 
superlative) can be compared with Plato's threefold description of his master above as 
being aptaxos, ôpovipmxaxos, and ôiKaiôxaxos.^^  ^ There aie indeed some other 
verbal similarities between §§33-34 and Phd. 118A (èTcexeXéaaxo —> xeXeuxfi, 
apexps —> apiaxos, and croveyévexo —> èTceipdOripev), though none seems to 
justify a claim for direct influence in either direction.^^  ^ Feddersen's rhetorical 
analysis of the last sentence (p. 33) reveals duae periodi quateinorum colorum, a 
result which he uses to support his thesis that Xen. Ap. was an oration meant to be 
recited (see Essay C for possible rhetorical influences on the work).
Xen.'s choice of the adjective m^eXipos is revealing of his relationship with 
Socrates and deserves some consideration.^^® A problem for me as a modern
An. II. 1.14, V.8.14, and Cyr. II.3.3, ni.3.41); the verb itpoaÔéxeaGai appears in collocations with 
oxpaxtd (Cyr. III.2.29) and irolép-toi (ibid. IV.2.26 & IV.5.22). Note that Xen. defines ctvôpeîoi in 
Comm. IV .6.11 as oi...én:iaxd|X8voi xois Ôeivoîs xe kqi éjüiKivôwois KaXrôs xppoSai, a concept with 
special significance for Xen.'s Socrates, who is well aware of the risks involved in his behavior (see 
§9) and yet manages to use tlie situation to his ultimate advantage (§32).
^^^See Appendix A  and also comparePM. 58D: k q i  yàp xô fxepviiaGai ScoKpdxous k q i  aùxôv 
A.éyovxa k q i  dXlou dKonovxa epoiye del ixdvxmv üôiaxov.
3l6pgddersen (p. 19) notes Xen.'s fondness for forming compounds (cp. pexpiOTtoxris and eùSiaixos in 
§19 and 3xpooe0 iÇeiv in §25).
^^7one would expect Xen. to make a more direct reference to the indictment charges (§10) or to the 
oracle's judgment o f Socrates (§14). For Xen., however, ao(j)ia transcends all virtues (see Comm.
III.9.5), while the qualities o f yevvaidxps and ox|)éXeia would seem to apply to Socrates' noble bearing 
at the time o f death and to his posthumous appraisal o f him by his followers, respectively. As 
Breitenbach (col. 1892: see too Oilier 111 n. 2) notes, the tone of this final section is encomiastic and 
the concluding remark an dôuvaxôv.
^^^This holds in general, a fact which even Vrijlandt (pp. 141-42) is willing to admit.
^^®Cp. Xen.'s use o f cîxiyeXéîv and related forms in Comm. 1.3.1 and IV.1.1 to describe his motives in 
writing his memoirs.
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American reader lies in my (admittedly idealized) conception of friendship and 
marriage as individual relationships originating in such abstractions as affection and 
love, not as community-based ones founded on such practical considerations as 
mutual interest and advantageA^o As a result, Xen.'s views on friendship often seem 
quite utilitarian. This comes out in the objectives of Socrates' teaching (§§20 & 25) 
and particularly in his concern in §7 for causing his friends a troublesome death (see 
Frick 20-21), an attitude which seems all of a piece with the do-ut-des, tit-for-tat 
mentality associated with Ka^oKdyaOla.^ i^ Tfiig utilitarian aspect of human 
relationships comes up quite frequently in the and it is somewhat tempting
to use the brief reference to axjiéXeia in Ap. 34 in support of the latter work's priority 
over the former, where the subject is treated in greater depth. For Xen., every object 
is good only inasmuch as it fulfills its purpose; this also holds for traits and 
abilities.323 The equating of the good with the useful (see Comm. III. 8 & IV.6 ) is 
understandable when one considers the nature of Xen.'s life, which was literally 
apolitical and concerned with personal relationships: This makes the good more 
realizable by bringing it into the personal realm, thereby making it the individual's 
own responsibility to realize the good for his own benefit.324
As opposed to Maier (p. 306 ff.), who strongly criticizes Xen.’s emphasis on 
môéketa and compares it with Aristippus' hedonism and the libertinism of Critias and 
A l c ib ia d e s ,3 2 5  to Montuori (p. 10), who believes that Xen. pictured Socrates as "a
320j^y feelings are-no doubt due to being oversaturated by Hollywood pabulum, and I certainly 
admit that a self-serving element exists in any friendship, at the very least to the extent that we enjoy i
another's company. According to Xen., love of praise and honor (see Comm. III.3.13-14) was the I
driving social force among the Atlienians, as it is in ours.
32lSee the comment on §9. Retaliation against one's enemies follows naturally from this concept.
(For examples o f its endorsement by Xen.'s Socrates, see Comm. II. 1.19, II.3.14 & II.6.35; for tlie 
Platonic Socrates' rejection o f retaliation, see D. Morrison [1987] 16-18 and Vlastos ch. 7 & pp. 297- 
300).)
II.3 & II.6 are particularly illustrative on this point (see too 1.1.16,1.2.15, IÏ.2.5 ff., 11,9-10,
III.IO, ni.11.2 ff., IV.2.11, IV.2.25, IV.4.24 and Oec. 12.5-8,20.29). For the usefulness of particular 
talents, see Smp. 3-4; for that o f knowledge, see Comm. IV.7. The usefulness o f tlie gods is discussed 
in Comm. TV.3.11, and the teleological argument for the existence of a deity is based on the notion of 
(D<|)éXeta as applied to the things provided for mankind's benefit (ibid. TV.3.1).
323See Nickel 34: Je besser ein Gegenstand im richtigen Gebrauch seinen Zweck eiftillt, desto 
wertvoller, niitzlicher und schOner ist er. See Oec. 1.1-15, where olKovojiia is defined as knowledge |
o f the opOfi xpfjais of one's property; for a discussion of eù%pT|oxla, see Comm. III.10.9-15. Even the !
courageous are described as ot...èmoxâpevot xbls 6eivdis xe k o i  èiiiK ivôw ois KaXôs xpfjoGat {ibid. i
IV.6.11), while the incompetent man is called ouxe %pf|oi|ros oi>ôèv...oùxe Geo i^XrjS {ibid. III.9.15: cp. i
Phdr. 268A-269B). I
324por a general treatment o f the concept, see Guthrie (1978) 3:462-67 (see too Nickel 34: ...fUr Xen. |
gibt es keinen Nutzen ohne Vernunfi und Wissen, d.h. Wissen vom rechten Gebrauch der Dinge). In |
Comm. IV.2.25 f| àvGpcûjtlvn xp eia  is described as the object o f philosophical self-examination, and i
Nietzsche (pp. 103-104) observes that the Platonic Socrates' no-one-does-wrong-intentionally tenet is I
ultimately utilitarian (see too Hp.Ma. 296B-E for the Platonic equivalence of xô ücx|)éA,i|j.ov with xô I
KoXov). I
325In comparing the hedonistic attitudes o f Critias and Alcibiades with that o f Xen.'s Socrates, Maier i
(p. 308) sees in the latter ...nur eine Verschiedenheit der Lebensklugheit, nicht der sittlichen |
Lebensanschauung. Chroust ([1957] 120 & 150-52) is of the opinion that Xen.'s notions of ({uA-ia and |
dx|)éA.eia could ultimately be Antisthenic in nature. Joël (vol. 2 p. 1014) takes exception to this and on !
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primitive matter-of-fact utilitarian, measuring the good life in terms of expediency 
and usefulness", and to Joël (vol. 1 p. 437), who speaks of an Anarchie der Werte, 
Nickel (p. 34) feels that Xen.'s philosophy does not represent such a stark 
utilitarianism. In fact, Xen.'s conception of friendship, though clearly based to a large 
extent on the notion of "usefulness" (see especially Comm. 1.2.52-53), is not entirely 
so: Friendship and intercourse with like-minded souls contribute to the realization of 
èyKpàx8ia,326 while Hiero, for example, who as a tyrant does not know genuine 
friendship, values (jiiUa more than anything else {Hier. 3). Certainly, the pmrient 
aspects of a friendship are not to be overemphasized {Comm. IV. 1.2 and Smp. 8.7-43), 
and Xen. strikes a rather Hesiodic note in maintaining that sound relationships are 
based on a sense of mutually beneficial competition {Oec. 7.42-43). In general, the 
criterion for approaching friendships and family relationships should be to a^pov 
dtipov èati {Comm. 1.2.55), and Xen. concludes his vindication of Socrates on this 
particulai* point {ibid. 1.2.59-61) by emphasizing the latter's more general belief that 
every citizen, rich or poor, should be helpful to his polis in every capacity.
Xen.'s concept of human relationships was therefore not quite as rigid as some 
have supposed, and this growing emphasis on the less utilitaiian elements of 
friendship in particular was a natural development of the times, with a new focus on 
human values over the more exploitative value of f r ie n d s h ip s .3 2 7  Nevertheless, some 
aspects of Xenophontic friendship remain rather jairing, for example, the notion that 
friends can be considered possessions {Comm. H.4 and Oec. 1.14) and that prices can 
be set on the value of vaiious friendships {Convn. n.5). In Xen.'s view {ibid. 1.6.14)
the basis o f Comm. H.4 ff. remarks tiiat Antistlienes' concept o f friendship is based on (j)iA,av0po)Jtla, 
while ...Xenophon...versteht und schdtzt am Kynismus den derb praktischen Zug. So findet sich hier in 
den Lobreden aufdie Freundscha.fi kein lyrischer, geschweige sentimentaler Hauch, nichts von dem  
GlUck der Sympathie, Teilnahme, der Aussprache, des Vertrauens. He remarks further that ...nichts als 
der rohe Nutzen ist hier Argument, und der  (t)Uos, von dem hier geredet wird, ist im Grunde gar nicht 
der Freund, sondern vielleicht der Genosse, richtiger aber der Heifer, dessen NUtzlichkeit abgeschûtzt 
wird. In particular. Comm. 1.2.53-55 has been considered to be Antisthenic in origin, but Busse (p.
219) sees rather an influence from the Academy (see PM . 115E-116A and Arist. EE 1235A35 ff.: for 
considerations o f utilitarianism in Plato, see too Men. 87E ff., Ly. 207D-210D, Prt. 356D ff., Grg. 
474D, R. 336C-D, 339B, and Hp.Ma. 296B-E).
326Comm. II.6.5 (see too IV.5.10). Nickel (p. 28) comments that it is surely intentional that the 
Aristippus section in Comm. II is followed by dialogues concerning tlie value of friendship, and he 
traces a direct line of development leading from Socrates' Apolitie to his éyKpâteia to his notion o f  
<j)iA,ta. Note too that Xen.'s Socrates {Comm. II.6.14) considers one’s own goodness to be a pre­
condition for winning the friendship of others.
327see Jaeger ([1944] 2:108), who notes elsewhere (vol. 2 p. 57) that a whole literature concerning 
friendship arose in the post-Socratic schools of philosophy. For a lengthy discussion of utilitarian 
<j)iA,ia in Xen., see Joël (vol. 2 pp. 1030-53), who defines it generally (vol. 2 p. 1030) as die Kunst des 
àp éaK eiv . Ribbing (p. 107) strikes a nice balance on the issue: Wenigstens bei mehreren unterden  
Sophisten war dieser ndmlich ein sozusagen offenbarer und direkter, aufdie grôberen sinnlichen 
Geniisse des einzelnen Subjektes gerichteter [Eudaernonismus], wohingegen der xenophontische 
Sokrates uns einen, durch die Richtung aufdas Wohl Anderer und der Gesellschafi als M ittel fUr 
feinere Geniisse, gleichsam verborgenen urui so durch einen Umweg zu seinem Ziel gelangenden 
Eudaernonismus zeigt, welcher eben damit was die dufieren Wirkungen des Handelns betrijfi, wirkliche 
Tugend nachahmt.
140
making friends was never to be driven by purely mercenary m o t iv e s ,3 2 8  however, and 
more sympathetic aspects of friendship are in fact occasionally revealed in his 
writings, as for example in Socrates' words of concern for a friend in Comm, n.7.1:
’Apiatapxov ydp %ote ôpcôv cncnOpco/roos e%ovta, ’'Eoikos, m ’Apioxapxe, 
Papecos (j)ép8iv ti. %pÈ Ôè toû pdpons p8taôtôdvat tots p ilots' toms ydp dv tt 
08 Kat Tipets Kot)(|)toatpev.
Note that, since Socrates is in no position to compensate his friends materially 
for their favors (see §17), it is clear that the basis for his relationships with his 
followers cannot be a purely utilitarian one. Konstan, drawing largely from 
Aiistotle's Nichomachean Ethics, offers a number of general observations that 
confirm this. In general, he notés (p. 13) that the fact that there are practical 
advantages to friendship "does not necessarily reduce it to a set of transactions based 
on interest and obligation rather than selfless affection", and more specifically that 
"ancient treatments of friendship also regularly subordinate its instrumental value to 
more disinterested motives" (idem: see Arist. EN 1155B31 ff.). In short, even though 
the ancients did not act according to the modern concept of the individual, they 
nevertheless recognized "a domain of human sympathy uncontaminated by the desire 
for personal advantage or gain" (pp. 1 3 -1 4 ).329
328Recall that Xen. nevertlieless accepted Proxenus' offer paitly in order to become Cyrus' friend and 
that he chose Agesilaus' friendship over allegiance to his own fatlierland (Nickel 28-29).
329por a fuller discussion o f ancient vs. modem friendship, see Konstan 14-18. Konstan (p. 72), citing 
Arist. EN  1156A10-22, notes tliat the origin o f (jiiXia can in fact be utility, but that "tlie affection is not 
reducible to the mutual appreciation o f one's serviceability". Aristotle elsewhere (EN 1162B5-21) 
distinguishes the types o f based on virtue and pleasure from that based solely on utility and 
observes that tlie latter type of relationship is inherently problematical (see Konstan 78).
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Appendix A: A Comparison with Xenophon's 'ATcopvqpovGnpata
Parts of the Ap. are practically identical to a number of passages in the Comm., 
a fact which has been used in various attempts 1) to establish a sequence of 
publication for the two works and/or 2) to prove that the former is simply a patchwork 
forgery based on the latter. General similarities between the Ap. and Comm, are as 
follows: 1) The material presented is based on Xen.'s own recollections, and each 
work is written in opposition to other opinions on the same topic, 2) an air of 
objectivity and preciseness is created by alluding to a source or sources, 3) Xen, sums 
up his opinion of Socrates in each conclusion, and 4) both conclusions have a 
defensive, challenging tone. ^  In comparing the two works, it is important to bear in 
mind the purpose of each: The Ap. will be more oveitly defensive than the Comm. 
since it supposedly refers to events at the trial and is placed in the mouth of Socrates 
himself, while the issue of |i8ya?iT|yopia, so crucial to the Ap., is not even considered 
in the Comm, (see Appendix D). In any case, the Comm, represent a more expansive 
version of the topics brought up in the Ap., and I would here anticipate the issue of 
authenticity treated below and in Essay A by asserting that, on the basis of common 
thematic elements alone, the works are so closely related that the Ap. can only be 
attiibuted to Xen.
The corresponding portions of the Comm, are 1.1-2 (the so-called 
Schutzschrijïp' and IV.8.3 In what follows I have juxtaposed the relevant passages 
from both works as the basis for each set of comments:
^For the notion that the Ap. was at one time literally connected to tlie Comm, in some published form, 
see the comment on Title. (Richards seems to be alluding to this when he states that the Ap. is "not 
strictly a chapter or integral part [of the Comm.], but rather a closely connected pendant".) For an 
exhaustive treatment of tlie correspondences between tlie two works, see Frick 21-33 & 39-51. P.
Meyer (col. 720) accounts for the general differences as follows: Aus [dem Benefit des Hermogenes] 
nafvn Xenopfion zweimal seinen Stojf, einmal als er zeigen wollte, dafi es dem Sofcrates bei seiner 
Verteidigung nur daraufangefcommen sei zu zeigen, dafi ifin fceine subjefctive Schuld treffe und dafi 
Sofcrates zum Tode entscfilossen gewesen, das andere Mai, al er zeigen wollte, dafi Sofcrates selbst 
seinen Tod als GlUcfcfUr sich betrachtet fiabe.
2So called because o f the belief that it was originally published separately (see, for example, Maier 22 
and also 25 n. 1, where he notes tliat the aEopviiiioveupaxa proper seem actually to begin at Comm. |
1.3.1). Busse (pp. 215-21) divides the Schutzschrift into three parts arranged sequentially as follows: |
Part One (1.1.1-I.2.8), a defense against the indictment which shows no indication of Polycrates' I
influence. Part Two (1.2.9-16 & 1.2.49-64), a defense against Polycrates' charges [see Essay C], and 
Part Three (1.2.17-48), a defense against Socrates' negative influence on Alcibiades and Critias wliich 
shows the influence o f Antisthenes and Aeschines. [The sequence o f Socratic or other quotations in the 
Comm, does not, of course, contribute to any conclusions about the publication sequence of any of its 
parts or o f the enthe work vs. the Ap.] Busse adds (pp. 228-29) that the characterization o f Socrates in |
the Ap. is totally inconsistent with diat in the Schutzschrift and can be explained by Xen.'s outrage over i
tlie verdict.
3 Amim (p. 48) holds that Comm. IV.8 in general is surely genuine since a forger could have finished i
the speech without plundering the Ap. for material, while Xen. would have been more likely to plunder |
the Ap. himself once he had recognized, and felt compelled to vie with, the superior quality of PI. Ap., j
which probably exerted some influence on him in his revision of the original material. Edelstein (p. I
134) distinguishes between the two pertinent sections of the Comtn. as follows: Wdhrend aber dort |
[d.h. in Comm. 1.1-2] nach den Argumenten gefragt wurde, die die Richter Uberzeugt haben fcônnten, 1
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Ap. §§2-6: [2] 'EpiLto'yévns pévtoi ô 'iTCTcoviKOV ètd lpôs ne fiv am ®  kqi è^TjYyeiXe 
Tiepl aÙTOÙ toiaÙTa dSoxe 7ipé7roa)aav ^aiveoGai xr\v peya^Tcyopiav aùtoù tê  
Ôiavoiçt. èxeivos yàp ôpmv aùxôv Tcepl Ttàvxoov pâXkov ôiaXeyôpevov ij Trepi 
xrjs ôIktis eiTceiv [3] Oùk è%pijv pévxoi okotieîv, m ÉcÔKpaxes, Kai ô xi àîtoXoyTjcrp; 
xôv Ôè xô pèv Tcpœxov àîtOKplvaoOav Où yàp Ôokcû ao i àTcoloyeîaOai pelexmv 
ÔiaPePicùKÉvai; ènel Ô’ aùxôv èpéoGai* Hms; "Oxi oùôèv àôiKOv Ôiayeyévripai 
Ttoxéàv* ijv^sp voplÇû) pelèxT{v è lv a i KaXllGxr;v àîcoA-oyias. èTcel ôè aùxôv TcàXiv 
lè y e x v  [4] Où% ôpçs xà ’ABqvalcûv ôiKaoxripia côs TrolXaKis pèv oùôèv àôiKoùvxas 
A,ôycp TcapaxBévxes àixéKxeivav, TtolXàKis ôè àôiKOÙvxas ij ÈK xoù Xôyoo 
olKxtaavxes îj èTcixapixoos eÎTcôvxas à7céX.X)aav; ’AXXà v a l pà Ata, ôàvai aùxôv, Kai 
ôls TjÔTi émxeipùcyavxôs poo cjKOTceîv Tcepl xf|S àTcoXoyias èvavxioùxai poi xô 
Ôaipôviov. ms ôè aùxôv elTieîv* [5] O aopaoxà Xéyeis, xôv ô’ aù àiroKpivaaSai* 
Baopaaxov vopiÇeis e l Kai xcp 08® ôok8Î èpè péXxiov e iv a i fjÔii xeXeoxâv; oùk 
o ic é a  o u  péxpi pèv xoùô8 oùô8vl àv0püù7cœv ù^eipriv <âv> péXxiov èpoù 
P8pi®K8vai; Ô7C8p yàp îjôiaxôv èaxiv, fjÔeiv ôol®s poi Kai ôiKai®s àîcavxa xôv 
piov pEPiœpévov ®ax8 lox'upùs àyàpevos èpavxôv xaùxà TjopioKov Kai xoùs èpol 
(Toyyiyvopévoos yiyvcocncovxas %8pl èpoù. [6] vùv ôè 8 l e u  Trpopnoexai f) fjXiKia, 
o îô ’ ôxi àvàyKTi ëaxai xà xoù yijpœs 8mx8X8Îa0ai Kai ôpâv xe xelpov Kai àKoùeiv 
fjxxov Kai Ôoopa0èax8pov e iv a i Kai c5v ëpa0ov èiuXTiapovéoxepov. âv ôè 
aio0àv® pai xeipmv yiyvôpevos Kai Kaxapépôœpai èpaoxôv, Tcœs âv, elîrsîv, èycb 
ë u  âv ùôèms pioxeùoipi;
Comm. IV.8.4-8: [4] Xè^m ôè Kai a 'Eppoyévqs xoù 'I jc tc o v I k o o  IjKooaa Jiepl aùxoù. 
ë^ Ti yàp, Tjôri MeXijxoo yeypappévoo aùxôv xf|v ypatjiijv, aùxôs ÔKOÙmv aùxoù Tcàvxa 
pâXXov îj Tcepl xijs ô I k t is  ÔxaXeyopévoo Xéyeiv aùx^ ®s XPÈ oKOTieiv ô u  
àTioXoyTjoexat. xôv ôè xô pèv Tcpcoxov el^elv Où yàp ô o k c d  aoi xoùxo peXexwv 
ÔiaPePiroKevai; è%el Ôè aùxôv ùpExo Ô7i®s, emelv aùxôv ôxi oùôèv âXXo tc o k ù v  
ôiayeyévTixai ij ôiaoKOTcrôv pèv xà xe ôiKaia Kai xà âôiKa, Tcpàxxmv ôè xà Ôiicaia 
Kai xmv àÔlKrov àîcexôpevos, îivTrep vojilÇoi KaXXlaxrjv peXéxijv àjroXoyias eivai, 
[5] aùxôs ôè TcàXiv elîtelv Oùx ôpâs, m XcoKpaxes, ôxi ol ’A0tivt|01 ôiKaaxal 
TtoXXoùs pèv ïjÔTi pTjôèv àôiKoùvxas Xôycp 7capax0évxes àTcéKxeivav, noXXovs Ôè 
àÔiKoùvxas àjréXDoav; ’AXXà vp xôv Aia, ôàvai aùxôv, m'Eppôyeves, r\dx\ poo 
èmxEipoùvxos ôpovxiaai xijs Tipôs xoùs ôiKaaxàs àîcoXoyias ùvavximOri xô ôaipôviov. [6] Kai aùxôs elTceîv ©aopaoxà Xéyeis. xôv ôé, ©aopdÇeis, ôàvai, el 
xm 08^ Ô0K8Î péXxiov èivai èpè xeXeoxâv xôv piov ijÔT); o ù k  oio0’ ôxi pe%pi pèv 
X0ÙÔ8 xoù xpôvoo èym oùôevl àv0pm7cmv ù^eipiiv âv oùxe péXuov où0’ ijôiov 
èpaDxoù pépimKevai; âpiaxa pèv yàp oipai Çfjv xoùs âpiaxa èTcipeXopévoos xoù 
ms peXxiaxoos yiyvea0ai, ijôiaxa ôè xoùs pàXioxa aia0avapévoi)s ôxi peXxioos 
yiyvovxai. [7] â èym péxpi xoùôe xoù xpôvoo Tia0avôpT]v èpaoxtp ooppaivovxa, Kai 
xoîs âXXois àv0pm7cois èvxoyxàvmv Kai Tcpôs xoùs âXXoos àv0pmixo\)s %apa0empmv 
èpaDxôv oùxm ôiaxexéXeKa Tcepl èpamoù yiyvmmcmv Kai où pôvov èym, àXXà Kai 
ol èpol <j)l5ioi oùxms ëxovxes Tcepl èpoù ôiaxeXoùoiv, où ôià xô ôl^æîv èpè, Kai yàp 
ol xoùs âXXoDS ôL^oùvxes oùxms âv eixov %pôs xoùs èaDxmv ôiXoos, àXXà ôiÔTcep 
Kai aùxol âv oiovxai èpol crovôvxes péXxioxoi yiyv8o0ai. [8] ei ôè pimoopai 
TcXeim xpôvov, loms àvayKoiov ëaxai xà xoù yijpms èTcixeXeîa0ai Kai ôpâv xe Kai àKoùeiv fjxxov Kai Ôiavo8Îo0ai xeîpov Kai ôoapa0éaxepov ÔTcopaiveiv Kai èTuXTjapovéaxepov, Kai mv TCpôxepov peXximv fjv, xoùxmv xeipm yiyveo0ai' àXXà 
pijv xaùxà ye pij aio0avopévcp pèv àpicoxos âv e’irj ô pios, aio0avôpevov ôè Tums 
OÙK àvàyKTi xeîpôv xe Kai àriôéaxepov Çfiv;
und deren Nichtigkeit dargetan wurde, wird je tz t [d.h. in Comm. rv.8] nach den inneren Gründen 
gefragt, die den Tod des Sokrates bestimmten. Feddersen (p. 34: see toc Fritz [1931] 54) considers it 
worthwhile to mention Richter's thesis, i.e., that the Comm, were recitations which were originally 
collected posthumously, a thesis that would account for the inconsistencies within the Comm, itself and 
for the similarities between the Comm, and the Ap.
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In terms of language alone, these two passages coiTespond to each other to a 
remarkable degree, with any immediate differences being due to their respective 
settings, an obvious example of which is the omission of the words èx xoù Xoyou 
oiKxiaavxes ij è7Ci%aplxcos eÎTcôvxas in the Comm, version, words more appropriate to 
a forensic milieu A A more puzzling difference lies in the omission in the Comm, of 
the word 61s in reference to Socrates' divinely thwarted efforts to prepare a formal 
defense before the trial, and in the use in this context of the the aorist tense instead of 
the present (pou èm%eipoùvxos...f)vavxi(o0T) xo ôaipôviov versus ôis ijSr) 
èmxeip'Éaavxôs pon,..èvavxioùxai poi xo ôaipôviov in the This difference
might be explained by Xen.'s desire to stress the continuing presence of the daimonic 
throughout the period leading up to the trial and consequently to offer this as a 
stronger refutation of the impiety charge; the words ÔiaaKOTcmv pèv xd xe ôixaia xai 
xd ctôiKa, Trpdxxmv ôè xd ôixaia xai xmv dôixmv àirexôpevos in Comm. IV.4.4 seem 
to have been written with the same intention. The foraiulation ol ’A0r|VT|cn, ôixaaxai 
in the following section is also more damning that the neutral xd ’A&qvaimv 
ÔiKaaTrjpia in Ap. 4. In Comm. IV.8.6 ijôiov appears in addition to péXxiov in 
anticipation of the subsequent (and somewhat mitigating) explanation of the 
astonishingly immodest view set forth by Socrates in the Ap. (oùk oiaGa oxi péxpi 
pèv xoùôe oùôevl dv6pm%mv ù^eipriv <dv> J3éXxiov èpoù pejJimKÉvai;).® In Ap. 6
^It should be added that tlie prooemium of the Ap. is more elaborate since it functions as an 
introduction, whereas the corresponding Comm, passage has more o f a connecting function 
(Delebecque 219).
6por the use o f Sis, see Busse 225. In comparing Ap. 3-4 with Comm. IV.8.5, Amim (pp. 33-34) notes 
tliat the nature o f Socrates' defense is not germane to the Comm., hence any mention o f oikxos and 
Xdpis is dropped, and that the durative quality of the passage has perhaps been changed because Xen. 
saw as a shortcoming Socrates' hesitation to obey xo ôaipôviov. Note Uiat the tense changes to the 
imperfect in §8 (ôp0âs ôè o i 0eol xôxe pou ùvavxioûvxo kxA,.), a change which simply indicates a 
different perspective regarding the commencement o f the trial (see Fritz [1931] 51-52).
^Busse (p. 224) sees this as one of several expansions o f what originally appeared in the Ap. and 
accordingly decides for the latter's priority. Amim (p. 34 ff.) has the following remarks to make on 
tliese corresponding passages:
1) K ai is omitted before x^ 0ecB in the Comm, to lay emphasis on the divine role in events and to 
remove tlie notion of deliberation, a revision which causes Socrates to equate tlie best life with tlie 
most pleasant and which can only be seen as a morally questionable and limiting conclusion.
2) Xen. was influenced by PI. Ap. 29D-30B & 36C (cp. the similar wording), where Plato 
emphasizes the difference between the virtuous life and the pleasant.
3) The Ap. lacks a succinct statement o f Socrates' activity as a teacher, hence its inclusion in the 
revision. |
4) Xen. applies Socrates' protreptic injunction to Socrates' own claim that he has lived the best life j
possible. '
5) Neither the ability for nor the awareness of self-improvement will survive the degeneration of j
the body, hence the fuller and more consistent version in the Comm. \
6) O l auvôvxes also refers to friends and acquaintances. ;
7) The Comm, passage has to do not only with Socrates' ethos but also with his primacy in striving |
for self-improvement. ;
8) His followers' affection as a motivation does not appear in Comm. 1.2.3. I
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the emphasis is on Socrates' advancing age (vùv ôè el ext Tcpo(3f)G8xat i\ f|ÀtKta), not 
only on living (cp. el ôè pt(oao|iai jcXelco %p6vov in Comm. IV.8.8), while in the 
same section of the Comm, the adverb tarns places equal emphasis on all of the 
various aspects of senescence, a condition accentuated by the further inclusion of 
ôiavoeîaSai xeîpov and àîrojBalveiv.  ^ The opening clause in Ap. 6, with its 
(3eA.xicov/xelp«> antithesis and the quasi-Platonic dpicoxos dv etr; 6 j31os,^  appears in a 
considerably longer fonn in Comm. IV.8.8. The corresponding question concluding 
both passages appears in an altered form in the Comm, inasmuch as xeîpov is added 
and the adverb f\ôéo)s of the Ap. passage appeal’s as the negative àiiÔéaxepov.
Ap. §10: ...87T8i0f\ KaxTiyopriaav aùxoù ol àvxtÔtKot cbs oùs pèv fj ixôXis vopl^8i 
08OÙS où vopK^ot, ëxepa ôè Kaivà ôaipôvia ela^épot Kai xoùs véoDs ôta(|)0etpot,
7tap8X0OVXa 8t7t8ÎV kxA,.
Comm. 1.1.1: ...'AOqvatous 87C8iaav ol ypa\j/dp8vot ZcoKpdxqv cbs d^ios sîti 0avdxou 
xfj tiôA.81. f) pèv yàp ypa^ù kax' aùxoù xoidÔ8 xts fjv dôtK8t ZcoKpdxris oùs pèv f] 
TcoXts vopl^8i 08OÙS où voplÇcûv, 8X8pa ôè Kaivd ôaipôvia 8la({)épcûv’ dôtKèt ôè 
Kai xoùs véous ôta(j)08lp(ov.
See my remarks on the indictment ad loc. My pui-pose here is simply to compaie the 
way in which each version is presented. In the Ap., Socrates has just elaborated on his 
reasons for not preparing a formal defense and, after an abmpt transition,® appears in 
court disposed as previously described (oùxœs Ôè yvôvxa). The versions of the 
indictment itself are practically identical, with the principal difference being the fact 
that the impiety and corruption-of-the-youth charges are closely joined in the Ap.,
9) The inclusion of the self-improvement element supports tlie argument for tlie priority o f the Ap. 
over the Comm, and seems influenced by PI. Ap., where Socrates compares him self with others and 
always comes out as tlie wisest (in tliat he is aware of his own ignorance).
7The addition o f (5v epaGov in Ap. 6  points forward to the words pavGdvcov ô xi èôwdtpriv àyaGôv in 
§16.
^Hackforth (pp. 24-26) accounts for the antitliesis by maintaining that Xen. has apparently 
misunderstood his own model (i.e. Ap. 6), though this does not necessarily mean that the result is 
nonsense: Xen. has imported into tlie Comm, the possibility of moral deterioration, hence Hackfortli’s 
contention that this development in Xen.'s thinking presupposes the priority o f the Ap. Amim (pp. 45- 
46) believes that the influence of Plato's unexamined life is evident in the Comm, passage, tliough Xen. 
limits this to the physical plane only.
®Fritz ([1931] 52-54), who denies tlie Xenophontic authorship of the Ap. and believes that the work is a 
patchwork made up o f different elements drawn from the Comm., uses the abmpt transition from §9 to 
§10 to support this thesis, arguing as follows: The sudden transition shows that the initial speech was 
held light before the trial. The version in Comm. IV.8.4 presents a more convincing scenario than a 
conversation held right before the trial, since Socrates' dilatory behavior would have been more 
conspicuous to followers like Hermogenes over a longer period o f time. Moreover, it seems forced for 
Socrates to consider such a question right before the trial, and the fact that Socrates is discussing 
another subject would not necessarily cause Hermogenes to reach the conclusion he does. This 
narrative maladroimess can be explained by tlie writer's desire to have an excerpt from Socrates' speech 
follow the Hermogenes conversation, which could only be accomplished by juxtaposing tlie two 
elements temporally. Since, according to Fritz, it is unlikely that an interpolator would have inserted 
an improved version o f this conversation into Comm. IV.8, the priority issue seems to be resolved.
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while they aie quite distinctly separated in the Comm, through the repetition of the 
verb àôiK8Î.^® In general, the Ap. focuses primarily on the accusation (KaTTiyop'qoav, 
àvxlôiKoi), while the Comm, is more concerned with the aiTaignment (ypaij/apevoi, 
Ypa<})fi), the capital nature of the charge (0avdTOu), and the responsibility of the 
prosecutors and the Athenians for their role in the trial (’ABpvaioDS ejceiaav ol 
Ypaxj/dpevoi ktA,.). Gigon (p. 231) is no doubt correct in saying that the Ap. has no 
connection with Comm. 1.2.9-61 since the latter concerns itself more broadly with the 
two indictment charges, and the effect is one of an account written with far less 
immediacy and at a greater distance from the actual events than the Ap., an effect 
considerably enhanced by the somewhat tentative citation of the charges in the former 
(fi pèv yàp ypa(|)'n Kax aw on Totdds tis  fjv).
Ap. §§11-13: [11] 'AkX è y to , & d v ô p e s ,  T o n to  p è v  Trpcàxov © a iip d ^ co  M e X fito u , ô tcp  
Tcotè y v o ù s  ^ y e i  cos è y ®  o h s  i \  rcokis v o p iÇ e i  0 e o \ ) s  où v o p tÇ ® ' é m e t  Q v o v x à  y é  p e  
é v  T o is  K o iv a t s  è o p x a î s  k q i  è tc i x m  6 r ip o 0 i® v  P ® p ® v K a i à X X o i  o i  7 iapaT uy% â- 
v o v x e s  ècopm v k o x  a ù x ô s  M é lr ix o s ,  ei è p o ù À e x o . [12] K a iv c i y e  p f |v  S a i p ô v i a  ticûs 
d v  è y ®  e la < |)é p o ip i X éy ® v  ô x i  0 e o ù  p o t  (j)®vq ( |)a iv 8 x a i c r p p a iv o n a a  ô  u  xpTl 7co i8Îv; 
K ttl y d p  01 ^ 0 ô y y o is  o i® v ® v  k o i  o l  (|)f|pats àv0p® 3X® v % p ® p 8vot <{)®vaîs ôtittod 
x e K p a lp o v x a i .  p p o y x d s  ô è  àp(j)tX é^ 8i x ts  i\ pf] (j)®v8tv t] p ii  p é y t a x o v  o t ® v t a x f |p t o v  
e i v a t ;  f] 6 è  F ln é o t  è v  x<p x p iic o ô t  i é p 8 t a  o ù  k o I  a ù x q  (j)®vfi x à  m p d  x o ù  0 e o ù  ôtayyéXlet; [13] p é v x o i  k g I  xô i r p o e t S e v a t  y e  x ô v  0 e ô v  xô  p é X lo v  k o i  xô  
T cp oo T ip a tvetv  $  P o ù X e x a t , K a t x o ù x o , © cnrep è y ®  (l)'npt, o ù x ®  T td vxes K a t X é y o tx j t  
K o t v o p tÇ o n a tv .  à X X  o l  p è v  o l® v o ù s  x e  K a t (|)fipas K a t  cru p p o X o n s x e  K a t  p d v x e is  
ô v o p d Ç o n a t  x o ù s  T rp o o r ip a iv o v x a s  e t v a t ,  è y ®  ô è  x o ù x o  Ô a tp ô v to v  K aX ® , K a l o t p a t  
o ù x ® s  ô v o p d Ç ® v  K a t àX -T \0éax8pa K a l ô a tc o x e p a  X è y e tv  x® v x o t s  ô p v t a t v  
à v a x t 0 é v x ® v  xf]v x® v 0 e ® v  ô ù v a p tv .  ®s y e  p f |v  o ù  y e ù ô o p a t  K a x à  x o ù  0 e o ù  K a l  
xoùx" 8%® x eK p T ip to v  K a l y à p  x® v <^iX(ûv n o X X o is  ô fi è ^ a y y e lX a s  x à  x o ù  0 e o ù  onppo'üAÆÙpaxa oùôercmEoxe \}/euoàpevos e^dvqv.
Comm. 1.1.2-4: [2] ITp®xov pèv oùv, ®s oùk èvôptÇev oùs i\ nàXis vopiÇet 0eoùs, 
Tcotcp Tcox’ èxpfiaavxo xeKprjpl®; 0ù®v xe yàp (j)avepos fjv ixoA,làKts pèv otKot, o^A-ittKts ôè èm x®v Kotvôv xf|S 7côXe®s p®p®v, Kal pavxtKîrj xp®pevos oùk à^avfjs f]v. ôtex80pù%T)xo yàp ®s a^li^  E®Kpdxr\s xô ôatpôvtov èaux® crripalvetv ô0ev ôfj Kal pàXtoxà pot ôoKOÙotv aùxôv aluàaaaOat Katvà ôatpôvta elc^épeiv. [3] 6 Ô' 
oùôèv Katvôxepov elaé^epe x®v àXXm, ôoot pavxtKf^ v vopiÇovxes ol®vots xe Xp®vxat Kal (j)fipats Kal cmppôA,ots Kal 0'uatats. oùxol xe yàp ÙTcoXapPdvonatv où xoùs ôpvt0as oùôè xoùs dîcavxcôvxas elÔévat xà oup^épovxa xots pavxenopévots, àXXà xoùs 08OÙS ôtà xoùx®v aùxà crripalvetv, KOKetvos ôè oùx®s evôptÇev. [4] 
àXX’ ol pèv irletGxot ôotcrtv ù t c ô  xe x®v ôpvl0®v Kal x®v dixavx®vx®v d7coxpén:ea0al xe Kal TcpoxpéîceaÙat* Z®Kpdxxis ô’ ®cmep èytyv®aK8v, oùx®s ëXeye* xô Ôatpôvtov yàp 8(j)T| oTipaivetv. koI 7coA,lots x®v auvôvx®v TcporjyôpeDe xà pèv Ttoietv, xà Ôè pxi Ttoteîv, ®s xoù ôatpoviox) Trpocyqpaivovxos' Kal xots pèv 7cet0opévots aùx® crovéôepe, xots ôè pfi 7tet0opévots pexèpele.
l^TTie Ap. version would support the view that the two charges were in fact related (see the comment 
on §10). Note that the refutation of the impiety charge is twice as long as that o f the corruption charge 
in theAp. and vice versa in the Comm. (Saauss [1972] 133-34). If the Comm, were in fact written after 
the Ap., this might be explained by the increasing salience o f the corruption-of-the-youth charge in tlie 
years following the trial (see Aeschin. contra Timarch. 173) -
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In both passages four items appear in the same order: Socrates' adherence to 
the state cult, a comparison of his daimonic voice with other forms of divination, a 
justification for Socrates' use of the formulation xo Ôaipôviov, and a proof of its 
efficacy A1 Delebecque (p. 220) notes Xen.'s more direct role in the narrative of the 
Comm, and the fact that, whereas Socrates interrupts his plea in the Ap., Xen. 
lengthens it in the Comm, while adding some considerations of his own. If 
Hermogenes is in fact a Xenophontic persona (see the comment on §2), this might 
well be reflected in Xen.'s more conspicuous presence here.
Again, the setting of each passage plays a key role in how each is presented. 
Socrates addresses his words regarding the issue of the state cult to Meletus directly, 
expressing his incredulity at the nature of the charge and pointing out that his 
orthodoxy was appaænt to everyone, including the prosecutor, if he had ever bothered 
to look. The Comm, passage is more emphatic, laying more stress on the 
conspicuousness of Socrates' religious practices (^avepos qv)i^ and on their 
frequency (7coXA,aKis...7coXA.aKis); the phrase xdls Koivais èopxals in the first passage 
does not appear in the second, which refers to the fact that Socrates performed 
sacrifices at home (oikoi) as well as in public (èm xc5v Ôrjpoalmv Pmpcov and èm xmv 
Koivrov xijs KoXecos pmpmv, respectively). The issue of divination is introduced in the 
Ap. passage with a rhetorical question leading to vaiious examples of religious 
practices comparable with xo ôaipôviov, while Xen. presents the issue more 
deductively in the Comm. 1) by averring that Socrates did indeed practice a form of q 
pavxiKT) and 2) by expressly stating the pavxiKfi/Ôaipôviov equivalence at the outset 
and using examples in support of his conclusion, adducing more examples in the Ap. 
passage. 1"! The distinction between the various media (^Ooyyoi olmvcov, 
àv0pdk®v kxA,.) and the ultimate source of his inspiration (xo ôaipôviov) is made
llpeddersen (pp. 35-36) focuses in particular on the daimonic in comparing the Ap. witli the Comm.: 
...ut aliud sit Apologiae Xenophonteae Saipoviov, aliud Memorabiliwn, cum illo divinum omnino 
quiddam, hoc ipse deus significetur. According to Feddersen, the true nature o f the daimonic is 
somewhat concealed in the Comm., which are more concerned with defending Socrates against tiie 
charge of not participating in the public cult, and which also focus more on refuting the charges o f  
impiety and "scientism" in addition to being more concerned with the issues o f education and service 
{opera).
l^Amim (pp. 55-56) notes that in Comm. 1.1.2 Xen. uses these words to defend Socrates with no 
indication o f any quotation (i.e. as if  they are his own), while in Ap. 11 Socrates uses them himself:
This would consequently place the Ap. in an unfavorable light, hence its priority over the Corntn. In 
general, Amim (p. 56 ff.) finds the Ap. section to be better organized than the corresponding Comm. 
passage, a fact due, according to his argument, to a lack of accuracy caused by the long interval 
between the writing of each work.
^^Cp. Comm. 1.1.10 & 1.1.17. Plato makes no mention of public sacrifices (see Wetzel 390).
"^^ See Appendix C. No mention is made of a private cult in the Ap., and the daimonic is dismissed as 
being nothing new, whereas in the Comm, both are connected with soothsaying (note too tlie reference 
to the Pythian priestess, which anticipates the allusions to Delphi in §§14-15). According to Gigon (pp. 
221-22), the Ap. offers a tighter defense in this respect than the Comm., and he notes further that more 
emphasis is placed on Socrates' piety in the former than in the latter.
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clear in both passages, but whereas the focus in the Ap. passage remains on the 
clairvoyant aspect of Socrates' inner voice (TcpoeiSévai...7cpooTipaiv8 iv....7i:pooTi- 
paivovtas), the Comm, emphasize the apo- and protreptic sides of the phenomenon. 
The ôaipôviov label is justified in the Ap. as being used àXr|6 é0 X8 pa K al Ô0 icÔT8 pa 
than other designations inasmuch as it more accurately expresses "the divine force" (f] 
t®v 08(»v ôùvapis).^^ Finally, the distinction made in the two passages between 
clairvoyance and the apo-/protreptic quality of the daimonic voice is sustained in the 
proofs of its existence, which respectively stress those qualities of the daimonic.
Ap. §17: (Ds Ô8 on paxqv s t c o v o d v  on Ô0K8Î nplv Kal xdô8 x8Kpf|pfC( 8ivai, xo 
moXAons pèv 7coA,lxas x®v àpexfjs è<l)iepév®v, noXkovs 5è ^évmv, 8k Ttdvxœv 
7i:poaip8i00ai èpol ^nvetvai;
Comm, rv.8.11: xmv ô è  Zw K pdxqv y iy v ® 0Kovx®v, o io s  f\v , o l  d p 8xfjs è (j)iép 8 v o i 
7cdvx8S 8X1 K a l v n v  ôrax8À on0i  Tcdvxmv p d l i o x a  7ro0onvx8S 8 K 8 tv o v  cos 
(0(|)8l ip d )x a x o v  o v x a  Tcpos d p8xijs è n : ip é i8 ia v .
This comparison is admittedly more tenuous than the others, but besides the identical 
phrases xrôv dpexfjs é(])i8pév®v and ol dpexijs èôiépevoi, the sense of both passages 
is also quite similar, i.e., Socrates' influence on the community was obvious in the 
manifest interest of viitue-seekers in associating with him. The Comm, refer to
tlie Comm, passage Xen. makes it clear to the reader that sootlisayers were well aware o f tlie 
distinction. As Fritz ([1931] 62) observes; 1st das wôrtlich und in dern Sinne gemeint, als ob die Leute 
glaubten, es sei wirklich der Vogel usw., der aus eigenem Wissen und Willen den Menschen die Zukunft 
anzeige, so ist die Behauptung einfach absurd, and Socrates' reasons for calling tliese phenomena xô 
ôatpôvtov seem strangely ambiguous.
^^See Busse (p. 216), who observes that tlie daimonic is described as a <j)û>vp in the Ap., while this is 
not the case in tlie corresponding Comm, passage. Amim (p. 61) points out tliat, if  there was in fact 
nothing unusual about the daimonic voice, and if it is truly a ôœvn, then any Athenian could have 
perceived it, hence its altered version in tlie Comtn., where the contradictions are diminished or 
removed altogether; in tliis view, the inclusion of the word ôoiviî in the Ap. must be based on 
insufficient information. Frick (p. 68) remarks that, since Xen.'s more Platonic account o f the daimonic 
in Comm. 1.1.3-4 diverges considerably from that in Xen. Ap., the latter account must be fictional. 
Gigon ([1946] 221-22) thinks that the shift in emphasis from oripaiveiv in the Comm, to ôrnvf) and xo 
ôatpôvtov in the Ap. reflects the influence of one of the Socratics, not necessarily Plato. For Fritz 
([1931] 57-61), the crucial words in the Comm, passage are ScoKpdxns Ô’ ©anep èytyvmoKEv, oüxms 
èXeye' xô ôatpôvtov yàp ë<j)Ti oripaivetv, by which Xen. means to say that the manifestation o f the 
daimonic was something other than an audible voice. Fritz (p. 63) accounts for the inconsistencies 
between the corresponding passages by suggesting the existence of a forger: Was in der Apologie steht, 
ist iiberhaupt nur aus einem Mifiverstdndnis der entsprechenden Stelle der Memorabilien zu erkldren. 
Dann aber kann der Verfasser der Apologie nicht Xenophon sein. On this point Richards (p. 108) 
comments, however, that a copyist "would probably have varied less or very much more". For tlie 
nature of the daimonic in general, see Appendix C; for the question of authenticity, see Essay A. 
^^Wetzel (pp. 390-91) believes that Socrates originally said, in accordance with Plato's version, "Etwas 
Gôttliches zeigt mir die Zukunft an", which becomes "die Gottheit" in Ap. 12 and Comm. 1.1.3 ff. 
Wetzel (pp. 395-97) accounts for the differences between the two passages by maintaining that Xen. 
considered the Platonic vereion to be credible, and further maintains that Xen. adopted Plato's use of 
the daimonic simply to disprove Socrates' atheism.
^^See PI. Thg. 128D and Phdr. 242D (see too Amim 63-64 and Wetzel 391 for their treatments o f this 
distinction). That the daimonic voice did not advise any of Socrates’ friends seems confirmed by the 
lack o f a single example in either Xen. or Plato (see Appendix C).
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Tcàvxes, while the Ap. refers specifically to foreigners, a puzzling reference if in fact a 
xenophobic atmosphere prevailed in Athens after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian 
War. The Comm, lay particular stress on the utilitarian benefits of any association 
with Socrates, an important topic of the Comm, in general (seeAp. 34 and my 
comment ad loc.).
Ap. §19: ....<ji) ôè eljcè et xiva otaOa èpoù yeyevriiiévov eùaepoùs àvôoiov 
il èK aaxjipovos ùpptcTqv q eùôiatîot) 7toA.t)Ôà7cavov îi\ [eus] èx pexptoiroxou 
olvô(î)A,t)ya ij èx ^iXotcovou polaxov ij àXkr\s Tcovripâs f|0ovf[s fixTqpévov.
Comm. 1.2.2: Tcrôs oùv aùxôs œv xoioùxos dXlous dv i\ daepeîs ij Tcapavôpous 
lt%vous x] d(|>poôicn.©v dxpaxets ij %pôs xô Tcoveîv paîaxoùs é7üotT]OEv;
The enumeration of opposite traits also appears in Comm. 1.1.16, where they are 
represented as being the objects of Socrates' philosophical investigations (cp. Ap. 16: 
ôxouTüEp ^uviévai xà leyopeva fjP^ dpTjv oùtccotcoxe ôtéletixov Kal Çt]xcôv Kal 
pav0àv®v ô XI èô'üvàp'nv àya0ôv). Xen. elsewhere disputes the claim of "self­
avowed philosophers" that moral decline is impossible, asserting that morality, like 
the maintenance of the body, is in fact a matter of dcncTicjis (see Comm. 1.2.19 & 
1.2.24). The use of the singular in the Ap. passage probably refers indirectly to the 
profligate behavior of Anytus' son in Ap. 29, whose inebriate condition was in fact the 
result of his dissociation from Socrates, and seems in any case to suit the imperative 
elîré ("Name one example!"). The pahs of opposites in this setting and the absolute 
cormption they imply tend towards forensic hyperbole. The adjectives in each 
passage roughly coiTespond to each other, with èx (|)i%07c6vou paXaxov corresponding 
both in meaning and position to Trpôs xô tto v eI v  palaxoùs, and àvôoiov to àaepels. 
The remaining qualities represent a mixture of the general with the specific (ùppioxfis 
and ùôovfjs ù'i^ 'côiaevos versus TcoA.uôàTcavos and olvô(|)lu% in the A/?., and mapdvopor 
versus Xl^vor and àxpaxeis à(|)poôiai®v in the Comm.). All of these qualities, with 
the exception of Tcapdvopoi, explained in Comm. 1.2.9 as refening to Socrates' disdain 
for appointment by lot, center around the theme of èyxpàxEia vs. àxpàxeia. This, 
combined with the mference to Alcibiades in Comm. 1.2.12 as dxpaxecxaxos xe xal 
ùppioxôxaxos and with the parallel acoôpfov/ùppiaxqs juxtaposition in 1.2.19, would 
seem to support the position that Xen. is alluding in both passages to Socrates' 
association with the famous maverick.
Ap. §20: 'PslXà val pà Aï, ë(|)T| ô MéXr|xos, èxelvous oiôa oùs où TtéTreiKas ool 
7cei0ea0at pâXlov q xois yeivapévois. 'OpoA,oy®, (j)àvai xôv Zmxpaxqv, Tcept ye 
TiaiôEias' xoùxo yàp loaotv èpol pepeA.'nKÔs. %epl ôè ùyielas xoïs laxpoîs p â ilov  
ol àv0p®7tor Tcetéovxai ij xoîs yoveùoi’ xal èv xaîs èKKlTiolars ye Tràvxes ôfjTtou ol
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’ABrjvaloi xoîs ôpovipcùxaxa AAyouoi 7tei0ovxai pâXlov f| xoîs TcpocrpKouaiv. où yàp ôf] Kal oxpaxqyoùs aipeîa0e xal Tcpô 7caxép®v xal Trpô àôeA,<f)®v, xal val pà Aia ye ùpeîs Tupô ùpmv aùxôv, oùs âv %epl xôv TcoXeptxôv <j)povip®xàxo'üseivai; Oùx® yàp, <l)dvai xôv MéA,r|xov, ® Zôxpaxes, xal cropôépei xa l voplÇexai,
Comm. 1.2.49-55: [49] 'AXXà Z®KpdxT]S y’, ë(j)Ti ô xaxqyopos, xoùs Tiaxépas 
TCpOTcplaxl^eiv èôiôaoxe, 7rel0®v pèv xoùs cruvôvxas aùx® ooôcoxépons Jioieîv xôv 
7caxép®v, ôdoK®v ôè xaxd vôpov é^eîvai Tiapavoias èlôvxt x a l xôv Tiaxèpa ôf)oai, 
xexpxipl® xoùxcp xpôpevos, ®s xôv dpaBéoxepov ùtcô x o ù  ao(()a>xépox> vôpipov eiri 
ÔeÔéo0ai. [50] Zmxpdxqs ôè xôv pèv dpaOias ëvexa ôeopeùovxa ôixal®s dv x a l 
aùxôv ^exo ôeôéaOai ùtcô x ô v  èTcioxapév®v d px] aùxôs èTclaxaxaf x a l xôv 
xoioùx®v ëvexa TcoXXdxis èoKÔîcei, xi ôia^èpei pavias dpaOia.... [51] àXXà 
Z®Kpdxr|s ye, e^ T] ô xaxfiyopqs, où pôvov xoùs Tcaxépas d&ld x a l xoùs àXXovs 
ouyyeveîs èTcoiei èv dxiplçt eivai Tcapd xoîs éa m ô  crovoùoi, AAy®v ®s oùxe xoùs 
xdpvovxas oùxe xoùs ôixaÇopévoos ol ooyyeveîs ®(})eX,oùaiv, àixà xoùs pèv ol 
laxpol, xoùs ôè ol oovôixeîv èTciaxdpevoi. [52] ë(j)Ti ôè x a l Tcepl xôv <{)lX,®v aùxôv 
AAyeiv ®s oùôèv ô^eXos eùvoos eîvai, el pf] xa l ô^eXelv ôovrjoovxai’ pôvoos ôè 
(jidoxeiv aùxôv d^loos eîvai xipfjs xoùs elôôxas xà Ôéovxa xa l éppT|veùaai 
ôovapèvoos" dvaTcelOovxa oùv xoùs véoos aùxôv, ®s aùxôs eÎT) oo(j)®xaxôs xe xa l 
dXloos Ixavôxaxos Tcoifioai ao(j)OÙs, oùx® ôiaxiéèvat xoùs èaoxô oovôvxas, ôoxe 
pTjÔapoù Tcap’ aùxoîs xoùs àXXovs eîvai Tcpôs éaoxôv. [53] èy® Ô’ aùxôv oîôa pèv 
xa l Tcepl Tcaxèp®v xe xa l xôv àXXm cruyyevôv [xe] xa l Tcepl ôl^Cùv xaùxa îlèyovxa* 
xa l Tcpôs xoùxois ye ôq, ôxi xps è^eXOoùcrps, èv ^ pôvr\ ylyvexai ôpôvxicas, xô 
aôpa xoù olxeioxdxoo dvOpôrcoo xqv xa%loxT|v è^evéyxavxes à^avl^oociv. [54].... 
[55] xaùx’ oùv ëXeyev où xôv pèv Tcaxépa Çôvxa xaxopùxxeiv ôiôdax®v, èaoxôv Ôè 
xaxaxépveiv, àXX' èTciôeixvù®v ôxi xô d^pov dxipôv èaxi TcapexdXei èTcipeXeîoOai 
xoù ®s ôpovipcûxaxov eîvai xa l ôôelipôxaxov, ôtc® s , èdv xe ùtcô Tca'^ôs èdv xe ùtcô 
àÔeXôoù èdv xe ùtc’ àXXox) xivôs poùXxixai xipdaOai, pf] xô olxeîos e iva i Tciaxeù®v 
dpeX.fi, àXXà Tceipdxai, ùô’ ®v dv poùXî]xai xipdoOai, xoùxois ôôéXipos eîvai.
Xen. seems to avoid using the word ôiôdcrxeiv in the first passage, whereas it appears 
frequently in the second, a fact which again seems to be tied to the more immediately 
forensic nature of the Ap., where the emphasis is on proper Tcaiôeia in general, not on 
education motivated by the more mercenary interests of the sophists (see the comment 
on §20). Those affected by Socrates' teaching in the Ap. passage are his followers' 
yeivdpevoi, yôveis, TcpooTjxovxes, Tcaxépes, and dôeX(j)ol; in addition to Tcaxépes and 
àôeX(j)oi, the Comm, passage mentions ouyyeveîs and (j)lXoi. The emphasis in the 
former rests first and foremost on one's family, while the second passage includes 
friendships, comprising, in effect, aU human relationships. Both passages refer to 
Socrates' familiar argument from expertise (cp. Comm. 1.2.9), which he uses to 
address the allegation that he has in some way influenced the Athenian youth, a 
charge to which he readily concedes in both instances. This charge takes on a more 
specific cast in the Comm, passage: According to the xaxifyopos, Socrates believes 
that ignorant fathers should be locked up by their sons, that he alone can make his 
followers ao(j)®xepoi than their fathers, that all relationships should be based strictly 
on the notion of utility, and that Socrates has inculcated these beliefs in his followers. 
As experts, Socrates mentions physicians, politicians, and generals in the Ap., and 
physicians and ol cruvôixeîv èTciaxdpevoi in the Comm, (the latter being a possible
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reference to oi onvayopeùovxes in Ap. 22). The additional allegations are countered 
rather weakly in the Comm.: An allusion is made to Socrates' professed ignorance, a 
short digression is made into the distinction between ignorance and lunacy, and the 
utilitarianism issue is dismissed with the claim that Socrates was simply encouraging 
his followers and their relatives alike to become as mutually useful to each other as 
possible. The use of hyperbole in 1.2.55 (xaux oùv eXeyev où xôv pèv rcaxépa ^ôvxa 
Kaxopùxxeiv ôiôdcxmv kxX.) does little to strengthen this ai'gument. In both 
passages, the focus remains on being or becoming (j)p6vipos, with an additional 
emphasis in the Comm, on the consideration of xipù as a motivation for appropriate 
behavior (summed up nicely in 1.2.55 with the words xô d(})pov ctxipov èoxi).
Chroust ([1957] 17 & 35) believes that Ap. 20 is probably a summary of 
Comm. 1.2.49-55 and that both passages were written as a rebuttal to Polycrates' 
Kaxriyopla (see Essay C). Busse (p. 223) agrees and adds that both Xen. and 
Polycrates probably used Antisthenes as a source, a familial* and apparently 
convenient recourse for Xenophon scholars.
Ap. §22: ’EppfjOri pèv ôqXov ôxi xoùxmv ixXei® ùtcô xe aùxoù xai xôv auvayopeu- 
ôvxmv ôtXmv avx(p.
Comm. IV.8.10: ....xoiaùxa pèv Tcpôs 'Eppoyévrjv xe ôieXé%0r| xal Tcpôs xoùs dXXous.
The Ap. passage is controversial (see my comments ad loc.), and this particular 
juxtaposition of passages requires that the words aùxoù and aùxô in the Ap. passage 
be taken as referring to Heimogenes, not to Socrates. If this interpretation is valid, 
there could be at least a partial identification between the xôv ouvayopeuovxmv (|)iXmv 
aùx(p in the Ap. and the xoùs dXXous in the Comm. If not, then Xen. is introducing 
other, unnamed witnesses for reasons not so easily divined: Is he refemng to the 
followers who accompany Socrates after the conclusion of the trial in the Ap. or even 
to the other Socratic writers mentioned in Ap. 1? Has he included extra witnesses 
(genuine or fictional) to lend the account a greater degree of credibility? Can this 
additional information be seen as another correction which could establish the priority 
of the Ap. over the Comm.1^^
Ap. §25: xoùs ye pqv vécus tiôs dv ôia(j)0eipoipi xapxeplav xai eùxéXeiav 
7cpo080lÇ®v; é(j)’ ois ye pf]v èpyoïs xeîxai Bdvaxos f] Çrjpia, iepoouXiq, 
xoi%®puxiot, dvôpaTüoôlaei, TcôXems TcpoÔocdq, oùô' aùxoi oi dvxlôixoi xoùxmv 
Ttpd^al XI xax èpoù ôctaiv. ôoxe 0aupaaxôv ëpoiye ôoxeî eîvai ÔTcms Tioxè e^dvq ùpîv xoù 0avdxou ëpyov d^iov èpol elpyaapévov.
^^ Delebecque (p. 219) suggests as reasons for the confusion Xen.'s poor memory, fictionalizing, or the 
possibility that few wimesses were left to contradict it.
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Comm. 1.2.62-64: [62] ’Epol pèv 6f] Zmxpdxris xoioûxos cov èôôxei xipfis d^ios eivai 
xfî TcôXei pâXXov -q 0avaxou. xal xaxà xoùs vôpous ôè axojcôv dv xis xoù0’ eùpoi. 
Kaxd ydp xoùs vôpous, èdv xis (jiavepôs yévrixai xXéTixmv i] X cotxoÔu x ô v  -p 
PaXXavxioxopôv x\ xpi%o)puxmv f; dvôpaTtoÔiÇôpevos lepoauXôv, xoùxois 0dvaxôs 
èaxiv f) Ç'npla* cov èxeîvos Ttdvxmv àvèpctwrmv TuXeîaxov d7i8Î%ev. [63] dXXd pf]v xù 
TcôXei ye oùxe TcoXépou xaxcôs ouppdvxos oùxe axdoreœs oùxe TtpoÔocrias oùxe 
dXXou xaxoù oùôevôs Tcconoxe aixios èyévexo* oùÔè pf\v iôla ye oùôéva TcooTcoxe 
dv0p(m©v oùxe dya6ôv dTceaxépTiaev oùxe xaxois TuepiépaXev, àXX oùô’ alxiav 
xôv eipT|pév®v oùÔevôs tccotcox’ êo^e. [64] jtôs oùv dv evo%os eiTj xfî ypadfi; os 
dvxl pèv xoù pù vopiÇeiv 0eoùs, ôs èv xf] ypa^f] èyéypaîcxo, ôavepôs -pv 0epa7ceùmv xoùs 0eoùs pdXiaxa xôv dXXmv dvBpcorcmv, dvxl ôè xoù ôioc(|)0elpeiv xoùs véous, ô ÔT] ô ypa\{/dpevos aùxôv fixiâxo, (jiavepôs fjv xôv cruvôvxmv xoùs Tcovqpds è7Ci0upias 
8%ovxas xoùxmv pèv îtaùmv, xfjs ôè xaXXiaxr|s xal peyaXoTtpeTceaxdxrjs dpexfis, fj Tcô^is xe xal oixoi eù olxoùori, TrpoxpéTrmv èm0upelv xaùxa ôè Jipdxxmv tcôs o ù  peydA.T\s d^ios x^ v xipùs tt\ tcoXci;
The Ap. passage is significantly shorter than its counterpart in the Comm., and besides 
the possibility of later editing (see Busse 223), one should also consider the possibility 
that Xen. included information in the Comm, which he chose to exclude in the Ap. 
since it fell outside the scope of his intended subject (see Ap. 22). Besides the 
references to additional capital crimes in the Comm., Xen. mentions Socrates' 
irreproachable and lawful (xaxd xoùs vopous) behavior, both political and private, 
during the years following the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. Xen. extends 
his defense of Socrates against the indictment charges by again presenting the reader 
with a series of opposites and with Socrates' efforts actually to turn his followers away 
from the very attitudes of which he was accused, an approach which lends the writing 
a greater sense of vehemence and indignation. This is enhanced by the question of 
Socrates' right to acknowledgment for his acts of public service, a question which 
frames the passage and lends it more cohesiveness, whereas the Ap. passage simply 
expresses Socrates' incredulity at the prosecutors' insistence on the ultimate penalty 
when his activities did not coiTespond to any of the official capital crimes.20
Ap. §26: hXX' oùôè pevxoi oxi dôtxms dTcoOvftaxm, Ôid xoùxo petov ôpovqxéov' où 
ydp èpol àXXà xoîs xaxayvoùci xoùxo aio%pôv [ydp] èaxi. 7capapu0eixai ô’ ëxi pe 
xal rïalapT)ÔT|S ô 7capaixA,T]cn,ms èpol xeleuxf|oas' ëxi ydp xal vùv noXv xaA.A,lous ùpvous %apè%exai ’Oôuooéms xoù dÔixms dTcoxxelvavxos aùxôv oiÔ’ ôxi xal èpol papxupfioexai ù tcô  xe xoù èTciôvxos xal ù tcô  x o ù  TcapeXr|%u0ôxos %pôvou ôxi fjôixT]aa pèv oùÔéva Tcôrcoxe oùôè ^ovqpôxepov èTcoiriaa, eùqpyéxouv ôè xoùs èpol ôiaXeyopévous Tcpotxa ôiôdcncmv ô xt èôuvdpriv dya0ôv.
Comm. rV.8.9-10: [9] àXXà pijv ei ye dôlxms dTco0avoùpai, xoîs pèv dôtxms èpè 
dTcoxxetvaoiv aloxpôv dv eiri xoùxo' el ydp xô dôixeiv alo%pôv èoxi, tcôs oùx
2®Cp. Comm. 1.1,1: noXlÔKis èôaùpacra xioi Ttoxè Xôyoïs ’A0rivaim)s ëîieioav o l ypa\|/âpevoi 
Zmxpâxnv (ûs â^ios eîti Bavâxm) xù TcôA-ei. Chroust ([1957] 65-66) notes a discrepancy in the apparent 
distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary criminal proceedings (dyôves xtpiitoi Kal 
àxlprixoi) in the Comm, passage under consideration.
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aloxpôv xal xô dôtxms ôxioûv Tcoieîv; èpol ôè xt aloxpôv xô èxépous pt| ÔùvaoSai 
Tcepl èpoû xà ôtxaia prixs yvmvai pf|xe Tcoiùaai; [10] ôpm ô" ëycoye xal xqv ôô^av 
xmv Tcpoyeyovôxmv dvOpcùjcmv èv xoîs èTciyiyvopévois oùx ôpotav xaxalet%opévT)v 
xmv xe dôiXT)advxmv xal xmv dÔixriOèvxmv. oîôa ô" ôxi xal èym èTCipelletas 
xeu^opai i)n dvOpmrcmv, xal èdv vùv dîcoOdvm, oùx ôpotms xoîs èpè dTcoxxetvatnv 
oîôa ydp del papxupriaeaOai poi ôxi èym fjÔtxTjoa pèv oùôéva namoxe dvOpmitmv 
oùôè xetpm èjcotTiaa, pelxtous Ôè Tcoieîv èîceipmpTjv del xoùs èpol ouvôvxas.
The Comm. passage, through the repetition of the word aloxpôv, seems more 
vituperative than the conesponding Ap. passage: It would seem that Xen. is taking 
pains here to reproach his Athenian readership even more pointedly for its role in the 
execution of Socrates, an approach reflected in the substitution (and virtual omission) 
of the short Palamedes digression with the impersonal ôpm ô' ëyoyye xal xpv ôô^av 
xmv Tcpoyeyovôxmv xxl.2^ and iri the emphasis in the Comm, on Socrates' future 
reputation. The most obvious difference between the two passages is the fact that in 
the Ap. this speech occurs after the sentence has been pronounced, while in the 
Comm. Socrates is made to say these things during his pre-trial conversation with 
Hermogenes, something which gives it a far more speculative quality than its 
counterpait (cp. the phrase àXX oùôè pévxoi Ôxi dÔlxms d7co0vfiaxm with àXkà. pf]v 
81  ye dôlxms à7co0avoùpai).22 The Ap. passage seems to refer more directly to 
Anytus' instrumental role in the trial as described in Ap. 29P  and the issue of 
Socrates' reputation, mentioned in both passages, is also taken up in Ap. 29. In both 
versions Socrates again employs contrasting qualities to assert his innocence (cp. Ap. 
19): In the case of the Ap. passage, he denies ever having wronged anyone or having 
caused anyone to become more worthless, and states further that he has in fact 
benefited his followers by teaching them without charge (see Ap. 16 and PI. Ap. 33A) 
and to the best of his ability.^ "^  In the Comm, passage, Socrates repeats his claim that 
he has never wronged anyone, but the approach is somewhat different in the 
remainder of the passage, i.e., he states that he has never made anyone worse (xelpm) 
and that he has always endeavored to make his associates better (pe^xious). Socrates'
2t According to Amim (p. 51: see too Busse 224), the Palamedes reference in the Ap. shows that it 
precedes the Comm, passage, which generalizes the thought.
22Beyschlag (pp. 515-16) attributes the discrepancy in settings to tlie use of a discrete Socratic t o t i o s  
(i.e. die Weiterbildung eines einmal geprdgten literarischen Typus), while P. Meyer (col. 720) explains 
it as follows: Die Abweichung...ist nicht der Rede wert: Xenophon wollte in den Memorabilien kurz 
sein, aujierdem hdlt er ja  auch, was er dort verspricht: er "sagt, was er von Hermogenes gehdrt".
23'0 jièv àvTip Ô5e xu6p6s, ms péya xt xal xaXov StajtETtpaypevos, Et artExxovE pE. In the 
juxtaposed passages, compare the phrases xoù àôtxms àTtoxxEtvavxos aùxôv and xots pèv àôixms èpè 
àîtoxxEÎvaotv, the latter of which appears twice in the Comm, passage.
2^As Amim (pp. 49-50) points out, the thought that to do wrong is worse than being wronged is echoed 
in PI. Ap. 29B & 30D, with Plato's xaxov being replaced by Xen.'s aloxpôv. Busse (pp. 216 & 221) 
maintains to the contrary that, while the Schutzschrift shows some familiarity with Pl.Ap., Xen. Ap. 
does not.
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statement in the Ap. is noticeably stronger, reflecting the more specific nature of the
work. 25
Ap. §32: ....èpol pèv oùv Ôoxeî 8eo(j)t%oùs poipas xexu%T|xèvai' xoù pèv yàp piou xô 
XaA^Ttmxaxov à7cèX.i7i:e, xôv ôè 0avàxcov xoù paaxou ëxuxsv.
Comm. IV.8.3: xal ttôs dv xis xdürov f\ oùxms à%o0dvot; ti tcoîos dv eiT) Bdvaxos 
KaXXi(ùv î] ôv xdlltoxd xts dTcoBdvoi; t io îo s  ô’ dv yévoixo Bdvaxos 
eùôaipovéaxepos xoù xaXXtoxou; q îtoîos Beoôt^tèoxepos xoù eùÔaipoveaxdxou;
The calm concinnity of the Greek in the Ap. passage, with its succinct contrasts and 
carefully balanced phrasing, is distinctly different in nature from its counterpart in the 
last section of the Comm, which consists of four rhetorical questions, three of which 
are introduced with the anaphoric tto îo s , culminating through a series of comparisons 
in the superlative eùôaipoveoxdxou, which defines Beo^ iX.'qs. The notion of facing 
an easy death and leaving behind a difficult life has been replaced in the second 
passage with a simple equation: ô 08OôiA,t|s Bdvaxos 8ÙÔaipcûv èaxi. Both passages 
represent Xen.'s own thoughts on Socrates’ death and make up part of the encomium 
in each work, facts which invite an even more direct compaiison than elsewhere. If in 
fact the Comm, follow the Ap., it would be tempting to say that Xen. dropped his 
foimer view of Socrates' motives since it did not agree with the Socrates' steadfast 
attitude towards duty (see, for example, PI. Ap. 28E & 3GB); if the opposite is true, it 
would seem that Xen. has abandoned the vague copula in favor of a statement that 
more expressly reflects his thesis concerning Socrates' readiness to die and the 
p8yalT|yopia which resulted from it.26
Ap. §34: ....8t ôè xis xôv dpexqs èôiepévmv ôôEXtpcùxèpm xivl Zmxpdxous 
ouv8yév8xo, èxètvov èyô xôv dvôpa d^iopaxapiaxôxaxov vopri^ co.
Comm. IV.8.11: xôv Ôè Smxpdxqv yiyvmaxôvxcov, oios t\v, oi dpexijs èôièpevoi 
irdvxss ëxi xal vùv ôiax8À,oùai Tcdvxmv pdlraxa %o0oùvx8S èxeîvov, ôs ô(j)8A,ipôxaxov ôvxa Tcpôs dpexps èmpéXsiav. èpol pèv ôf), xoioùxos ôv oîov èyô  ôifiyTjpai, ...ôlxaios ôè ôax8 PA.d7cx8iv pèv pT)Ôè pixpôv priôéva, ô^eA^îv Ôè xd péyiaxa xoùs xpcopevous aùxô...èô6xei....
For a fuller treatment of the ô^éA^ia issue, see the comment on Ap. 34. This receives 
more emphasis in the Comm, passage above (ôôeXrpôxaxov ôvxa ixpôs d p 8 x f |S  
èmpèX8tav and ôôeXèlv ôè xd péyiaxa xoùs xpwpévous aùxô) and is presented in
25 Amim (p. 46) believes that Xen. avoids using Ap. 7-9 in the Comm, because o f its emphasis on his 
willingness to die: In the Comm. Xen. wants rather to stress the fact that Socrates' behavior, which was 
motivated by his daimonic voice, was ultimately to his benefit.
26Amim (pp. 29-30 with examples) believes that Ap. 32-33 is the core from which Comm. IV.8.1-3 
derives.
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both passages as the reward for ol àp8Tf|s é(})i8p8voi 7üàvx8S who chose to associate 
with Socrates (cp. Comm. L2.7-8). A sense of longing is brought out in both passages 
through the adjective a^iopaKapiaxoxaxov and the participle 7co0oûvx8s, 
respectively, and this more personal element returns at the end of Comm. IV.8.11 (8t 
6e xm pfi àpéaxei xaùxa, %apapdXlmv xô àXXcùv fjBos Ttpôs xaùxa oùxm xpivéxm: cp. 
the Ap. quotation above),27 which is preceded by a long series of adjectival 
expressions which find many coiTespondences in the Ap., i.e. 8Ùae(3f|s (cp. Ap. 19), 
ôlxaios (cp. Ap. 5 ,14,16, 18 & 20), èyxpaxris (cp. Ap. 16, 19 & 25), ôpôvipos (cp. 
Ap. 20), aùxapxf|s (cp. Ap. 16 & 18), Ixavôs ôè xal loycp 8l7C8iv X8 xal ôiopiaaaOai 
xà xoiaùxa (cp. Ap. passim), and Ixavôs Ôè xai àXXm ôoxipdaai x8 xai 
àpapxdvovxa èXéy^ai xal 7cpoxpé\|/aa0ai èn’ àp8XT]v xal xaXoxàyaOlav (cp. Ap.
17, 21, 25-26 & 34 for the protreptic effects of Socrates' teaching).
In supposing that the Ap. was written before the longer Socratic writing, it 
becomes possible to consider the former as an embryonic biographical work from 
which the latter derives, that is, as a sort of memoirs-iii-the-making. Two seminal 
themes introduced in the Ap. are taken up and extensively developed by Xen. in the 
Comm., namely, Socrates' beliefs and their often protreptic effect on his followers, 
and his deeply religious nature, both of which are treated at length in order to refute 
the indictment charges as quoted in Ap. 10 and Comm. 1.1.1. Both themes are treated 
together in the Schutzschrift and to a lesser extent in Comm. IV.8, the two sections of 
the work most closely related to the Ap. ; the rest of the work can be seen as dealing 
with particular aspects of the above (e.g. self-discipline, education, filiopiety, 
worship, etc.). Note that at least twelve of the interlocutors mentioned in the Comm. 
are young men, and that a sizeable portion of the Schutzschrift is devoted to a 
response to the specific coiTuption-of-the-youth charges made by Polycrates, i.e., that 
Socrates harbored anti-democratic sentiments, that his teaching created such political 
monsters as Critias and Alcibiades, that he encouraged his charges to question the 
authority of their male relatives, and that he manipulated the words of famous poets 
for his own purposes. The religion theme is treated individually in §§1.4 and IV.3. 
Other points in common between the Ap. and the Comm, include the appearance of 
Hermogenes, who serves as the final interlocutor in Comm. IV.8 and whose role is 
essentially identical with his role in the Ap., the daimonic voice, which receives a
27Amim (p. 30) holds that the final sentence in the Ap. is originally that o f the Comm., which was later 
dropped and replaced. Amim (p. 30), who believes that Ap. 34 is originally the source for IV.8,11, 
notes that the sense o f condolence of the former is replaced with that of Seligpreisung in the latter (p. 
28: see too Edelstein 135-36 for her remarks concerning the concluding tone of each work).
Delebecque (pp. 219-20) observes that in the Comm, it is Xen. who says that Socrates has been missed, 
while Socrates himself mentions this idea of grieving in the Ap.: In the latter Socrates does not say who 
should grieve, while in the former Xen. says tliat he is missed by all those who aspire to virtue, a 
thought which motivates all o f Comm. IV.
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somewhat fuller defense in Comm, LI (see Appendix C), and Socrates' readiness to 
die, an attitude which motivates the Ap. and which is reiterated, with additional stress 
laid on the nobility of his death, in Comm. IV. 8.28
In comparing the two works, the following can be obsei*ved and suggested 
about Xen.'s approach to writing the memoirs: 1) He chose to omit any mention of 
Socrates' peyaliyyopia, presumably because he felt that the subject had been treated 
adequately in the Ap. 2) He retained the Hermogenes figure as a source for Socrates' 
pre-trial remarks; the trial events themselves are not recounted. 3) The entire Comm. 
can be seen as an extended justification of Socrates' life, the basis for which is to be 
found in Ap. 3 (où yap ô o k c ô  ooi àKoXoyéxGQai peXexôv §iap8|3t©K£vat;). 4) The 
important role of the daimonic voice and Socrates' attitude towards death ar*e retained 
essentially unaltered. 5) The two major themes connected in various ways to the 
indictment ar*e treated at greater length in the Comm., while the vituperative and 
confrontational tone of the narration is noticeably softened, undoubtedly to make its 
content more palatable to Xen.'s readership, especially to his Athenian readers. The 
style of Xen.'s presentation is essentially the same in the Comm, as in the Ap: Xen.'s 
narrative voice is present in the defense sections, in his appearance as an interlocutor 
in §1.3, and in his introduction of several dialogues with such formulae as dlôd a:ox8 
aùxôv xoidô8 ôiaA£%08vxa {Comm. III.3.1).2  ^ The use of dialogue, though less 
prominent in the defense sections, is nevertheless similar to the short dialogues in the 
Ap. (i.e. with Hermogenes, Meletus, Apollodorus, and Socrates' followers in general), 
all of which contribute to the characterization of the Socrates figure in general. The 
lack of dialogue in the more expository sections of the Ap. cottesponds to the lack of 
emphasis placed on dialogue in the defense sections of the Comm, and to the narrative 
or direct monologues in §§1.5,1.7, II.4, III.9, IV. 1, and IV.1. Each work closes with a 
short eulogy reminiscent of the Ages.
Finally, there remains the problem of establishing a sequence of publication. 
With the exception of Maier, Beyschlag, and Menzel, there is no one who is willing to 
date any part of the Comm, prior to the Ap.^o Far* more common are such views as
28socrates' |xeyaA,Tiyopia is altogether missing in the two relevant sections o f the Comm., where the 
tone is much gentler and where the Gopupos-inducing statement from tire Ap. regarding the oracle is 
omitted (see Appendices B and D).
2^See Gigon ([1946] 211-12), who describes Xen.'s narrative presence as a typical, formulaic 
component of his Socratica.
^®Maier (p. 16 n. 1: see too Feddersen 36) places the publication of the Ap. between the Schutzschrift 
and IV .8, Beyschlag (pp. 511-12) bases his argument on a number of inconsistencies between the texts 
(e.g. that between Ap. 26 and Comm. IV.8.9-10), and Menzel (p. 7) points out the inconsistency of 
Xen.'s expressions o f surprise at the outcome o f the trial in the Comm, with his pEyaÀTiyopla thesis in 
the Ap. Mahaffy (A History o f  Classical Greek Literature, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1880, 
vol. 2 p. 271) was apparently the first to suggest that it was Xen. himself who appended the Ap. to the 
Comm, (see note 1 above). Wetzel (p. 389) is quite representative of most scholars in assuming that, if 
the Ap. appeared afterwards, it must in fact be a forgery. Comm. IV .8.1, which is a strong statement 
against the assertion that Socrates was obviously lying about his daimonic voice, would, however, 
provide an additional motive for writing tlie Ap.
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those of Wetzel (p. 392), who holds that the Schutzschrift was written after the Ap. 
under the influence of PI. Ap. (see Comm. 1.2.61, for example) and that any deviations 
from the original can be explained as resulting from Platonic influence. There are 
many, however, who, like Maier, feel that Comm. IV.8 represents an actual 
incorporation of exceipts from the Ap. (specifically §§2-10): Schanz,^! for example, 
bases this conclusion on Xen.'s original motives for writing the Ap. (i.e. peya^Tiyopla 
as his principal theme as well as his intention to offer a suitable response to PI. Ap.) 
and on the differences in the texts themselves, e.g. between Ap. 26 and Comm.
I V . 8 . 9 . 3 2
Delebecque's obseiwations (pp. 219-21) offer a balanced solution to the 
problem of priority: He believes 1) that the Ap. precedes the Comm., with the last 
chapter borrowing from the beginning of the Ap. and with the first part boiTOwing 
from the rest, 2) that Comm. IV.8 contains the first seven chapters of the Ap., and 3) 
that there are no essential differences between the two works. In the Ap. Xen. has the 
confidence to attack Anytus and his son but for precision’s sake does not daie to 
wander far from the account gathered from Heimogenes; on the other hand, he has 
more confidence in writing the Comm., speaks in his own name, and no longer 
hesitates to affirm that he has heai'd Hermogenes in person. The Ap. therefore pre­
dates the Comm., and we aie witnessing the development of the Socratic legend, that 
is, Xen. has gradually persuaded himself that he is more of a witness than he actually 
was. In Comm. 1.2 Xen. responds to the coiTuption-of-the-youth charge, and although 
there are some traces of influence from the Ap., the elements are not systematically 
derivative. The former seems to be able to sustain itself until its conclusion, when the 
influence of the Ap, becomes evident again. As noted above, the conclusion of the 
Comm, issues directly from the beginning of theAp.
According to Delebecque, then, the cannibalizing of the Ap. proves its priority 
over the Comm.: The latter encompasses a larger theme, not just the trial, hence the 
dispensability of the foimer. It seems that the Ap. was simply a tentative attempt at 
writing Socratic memoirs, and it is likely that it remained unpublished, which would 
explain why Xen. was able to incorporate its material so freely into the Comm., his 
definitive work on the subject of S o c r a t e s . ^ ^
^^Schanz 84-87 (see too Frick 33-39 and Wetzel 389). See below for other views on the priority 
question.
32a s  opposed to Beyschlag (see above), who uses the same passages to arrive at the opposite 
conclusion.
^^Edelstein (p. 150) states this last point well: Jedenfalls wdre es verstündlicher, dafi die Apologie, die 
nur eine Einzelheit im Verhalten des Sokrates zu einer bestimmten Zeit erkldren will, friiher 
geschrieben ist als die Metnorabilien, die die gesamte PersOnlichkeit in der Aujfassung des Xenophon 
schildem  sollen; dafi der Aiifbau der Veneidigiingsrede, wie Xenophon ihn in der Apologie wiedergab, 
das GerUst bildete zu seiner Gesamtdarstellung des Sokrates, nicht aber umgekehrt. Frick's similar 
argument (p. 81: see too Essay C), namely, that Xen. came to write the Comm, as he became better
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Delebecque's conclusions are certainly attractive, and unless the Ap. is a 
forgery, a conclusion which I am loth to accept because of the many stylistic, 
linguistic, and thematic similarities it shai'es with the Comm., I am most inclined to 
consider the relevant sections in the latter to be an extensive revision of the former 
(with or without the influence of PL Ap.) and to assume the priority of the Ap., which, 
as Delebecque remarks, might never have been intended for publication. On the issue 
of priority, I find Ollier's point (p. 90) particularly cogent: If Xen. in fact wrote the 
Comm, before the Ap., why would he say in the latter (§1) that no previous writer had 
sufficiently treated the motives for Socrates' behavior during the trial? Frick (p. 51) 
also thinks that the Ap. precedes the Comm, (including 1.1-2 & IV.8), a conclusion 
reached by a dizzyingly thorough examination of shaied elements. Wetzel (p. 390) 
bases his observations on the premiss that the Ap. is more precise and therefore 
earlier, while mistakes occur in the Comm., a fact which can only be explained as 
misunderstandings of Socrates' speech caused by the lengthy interval between the two 
periods of composition. Amim (pp. 50-53), who also subscribes to the 
cannibalization theory, obseiwes some stylistic improvements in the Comm, and also 
an emphasis on the ethical purpose of Socrates' activity. In his view, the Comm. 
passage contains its original conclusion, which the added recapitulation drawn from 
the Ap. only weakens, and the conclusion of the Comm, is nothing more than an edited 
exceipt from the Ap. This radical editing indicates in what low regard Xen. held the 
Ap. at this point in his writing career,^^
More general similarities between the Ap. and Comm. ai*e treated in the 
individual comments on each section.
acquainted with Socratic doctrine and borrowed the Ap. more or less wholesale for his purposes, is 
equally appealing in its simplicity.
^^Xen.'s style in general is not, however, characterized by its cohesiveness, and the sketchy, discursive 
quality of bk. IV o f the Comm, easily matches that of the Ap. Yet stylistic considerations i l  point 
towards an expansion of the latter, not to a condensation o f the former.
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Appendix B: A Comparison with Plato’s ’ATtoloyta Zcoxpaxons
Waterfield^ lists the following points of coincidence between Xen.'s and 
Plato's accounts of the events surrounding Socrates' trial:
1) The state charges are identical (Xen. Ap. 10 and PI. Ap. 24B-C),
2) Socrates has not prepared a speech (Xen. Ap. 2 and PI. Ap. 17B-18A),
3) The daimonic indicates that he wül ultimately benefit from the trial (Xen. Ap. 4 
ff. and PI. Ap. 40A-C, 41D),
4) Socrates attributes part of the indictment to the fact that the daimonic 
communicates directly with him (Xen. Ap. 12 ff. and PI. Ap. 31C-D),
5) Socrates thinks that he has reached an opportune point in his life at which to die 
(Xen. Ap. 5 ff. and PI. Ap. 38C, 41C-D),
6) Socrates refers to Chaerephon's consultation of the Delphic oracle (Xen. Ap, 14 
andPl.A/7. 20E-21A),
7) Socrates engages in a dialogue with Meletus in the course of the trial (Xen. Ap.
1 Iff. and Pl.Ap. 24C-28A),
8) Socrates refuses, or all but refuses, to propose a counter-penalty (Xen. Ap. 23 
andPLAp. 36B-37A),
9) Socrates refuses to escape from prison (Xen. Ap. 23 and Cri. passim),
10) Socrates insists that he has never wronged anyone (Xen. Ap. 26 and PI. Ap.
37 A et alibi),
11) Socrates makes some reference to the view that those about to die gain 
prophetic powers (Xen. Ap. 30 and PI. Ap. 39C), and
12) Socrates compaies himself to the legendary hero Palamedes (Xen. Ap. 26 and 
PI. Ap. 41B).
To this can be added the tripartite stracture of the defense speeches per se (see 
below), the animated reaction of the dicasts to parts of Socrates' speech (Xen. Ap. 14- 
15 and PI. Ap. 30C), and Socrates' refusal to kowtow to the jury (Xen. Ap. 23 and PI. 
Ap. 34B-35D, 38D-39B).
It would be possible to apply Burnet and Taylor's argument for the historicity 
of PI. Ap.2 to both dTcoPtoylai and say that neither author would have written anything 
other than what actually happened at the trial because of a potential critical backlash 
from contemporaiy eye-witnesses. This position ultimately stands or falls on the 
relationship of both àTroA-oyiat to other A,6yot ZcoK paxiK oi and on the very nature of
^See Waterfield 30-31, who provides the Platonic references given above (see too Guthrie [1978] 
3:339-40, Breitenbach 1892-93 ff., Toole 6-7, P. Meyer 755-57, and Kennedy 151). PI. Ap. is also 
treated at some length in the three prefatory essays.
2See Burnet (1924) p. 63 ff. and Taylor (1949) pp. 156-57 (see too Amim 7 and Shero 107).
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that genre in general (see Essay C). With this in mind, one could venture to say that, 
with all inconsistencies aside, the information presented in both works may represent 
a more complete picture when combined, with each author having suppressed some of 
the events described for his own literary, philosophical, or even personal reasons.^ 
Guthrie's perspective ([1978] 3:329) is appealing:
If then the accounts of, say, Plato and Xenophon seem to present a different type of man, the chances are that each by itself is not so much wrong as incomplete, that it tends to exaggerate certain genuine traits and minimize others equally 
genuine, and that to get an idea of the whole man we must regard them as complementary.
Briefly, the contents of Xen. Ap. can be described as follows: 1) Socrates' 
thoughts before the trial, 2) abbreviated versions of his speeches at the trial, and 3) his 
behavior after the trial. This larger threefold structure is reflected in Xen.’s 
presentation in the middle portion of the three speeches delivered in the court itself, a 
forai which approximates the tripartite structure of PL Ap. and no doubt the actual 
court proceedings."  ^ Certainly, in a more technical sense the title ’AîioA-oyla can be 
considered a misnomer,^ though the work as a whole conforms to a general rhetorical 
stmcture: According to Feddersen's analysis (pp. 28-31), it begins with an exordium 
(§1) which explains why the work came to be written (the propositid) and how the 
writing will be organized (the partitio);^ the tractatio stretches from §2 to §32, where 
evidence is adduced to prove the proposition^ and §§33-34 make up an epilogus.
^Wetzel (pp. 398-99), for example, believes that three major similaiities (i.e. the tripartite structure, the 
reference to Palamedes, and the prophetic powers o f a doomed man) can be referred to the trial itself, 
and Amim moves from saying that the coinciding points are potentially worthless since they could very 
weU derive from each other (pp. 5-6) to saying that they are undoubtedly historical since neither work 
influenced the otlier (pp. 74-75: see too Oilier 95 and Oldfather 206). I feel that it is in fact possible to 
consider all o f similarities listed above to be potentially historical. (In general, the Xenophon-as-better- 
source movement began with Hegel and was sustained by Zeller and others before it finally lost 
momentum in this century [see Vlastos 99 n. 72]. Frick [p. 68] notes that scholars have been 
accustomed to consider Xenophon ...quasipro quodam Synoptico...res gestas simpliciter narrante, 
Platonem quasi Johannem ingeniose fabulantem numerare.) Perhaps the very fact that Xen. Ap. has 
always seemed more problematical to scholars, making it as it wem a sort o f lectio difficilior in a larger 
sense, should lend it more weight, a point also made by Amim (p. 11: see too Schmid 225 n. 4 on the 
omission o f any reference to Critias and Alcibiades). For an excellent summary of similarities and 
differences between the characterizations o f Socrates in Xen. and Plato, see Rutherford 53 ff.
"^ A tidy summary o f the Ap. appears in Edelstein 139 ff.; for a detailed structural comparison o f  Xen. 
Ap. with PI. Ap., see the outline below. Breitenbach (col. 1892) sees a different tripartite structure 
consisting o f the defense proper, the consolation o f Socrates' followers, and the prophecy concerning 
Anytus and his son. Amim (p. 83) comments that the first speech can also be further sub-divided into 
three parts, with the first part (§§.11-13) concerning impiety, the second (§§14-18) the oracle, and the 
third (§§19-21) the corruption o f the youth.
^See the comment on Title. The conclusion, for example, has nothing to do with Socrates' defense 
speech p er se.
^In this case Tiepl te  tjjs ajcoXoyias x a i Tcepi tâs teXeutns toh piou, a structuring element repeated in 
§22. Xen. tries to summarize the main points after this section, a difficult task without a reliable record 
of what actually transpired at the trial (see Amim 71).
^Note that the refutatio and probatio in this portion are not distinguished as they normally are in 
forensic speeches (Feddersen 28-29) and that §§11-21 and 24-26 are supposedly based on Hermogenes’
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which includes the appropriate ei6os TcaOrixiKov. As for the djcoXoyla proper, there is 
no Ttpooipiov to speak of, and its content can be outlined as follows:
First Charge: Impiety
AifjYTicns: The Nature of Socrates' Daimonic Sign (§§11-13) 
n io n s  (§§13-18)
Second Charge: CoiTuption of the Youth
AifiYqois: The Argument from Expertise (§ 19)
Oiaxis (§§20-21)
’EmA-oyos (§§24-26)
Scholars who criticize the Ap. for its apparent disjointedness should bear in mind 
Xen.'s professed purpose in writing the work (see §22) as well as the possibly 
disjointed quality of Socrates' actual speech.
Plato's Socrates uses rhetorical commonplaces, and his speech generally 
observes standard oratorical stmcture, though the cross-examination of Meletus is 
striking. Kennedy (pp. 150-51) outlines its stmcture as follows: the prooemium (to 
18A6); the statement of the case and a refutation of chai ges, i.e. the narration (18A7 
ff.); a section demonstrating Socrates' character (28A2 ff.); and the peroration (34B6 
ff.).^ In general, both àTroXoylcn are similar in sti'ucture but vastly different in detail, 
a fact which Guthrie ([1978] 4:78 n. 4) attributes to Xen.’s second-hand infoiination 
and his inability to rise to Socratic heights.
Oilier (p. 94) cites as the differences between the two a7coA,oyiai the 
indictment,^ the role of the daimonic, the response to Chaerephon’s question,
Socrates' prophetic powers, the question of a counter-penalty, and Socrates' 
willingness to die. Vrijlandt (pp. 96-97) slights Plato for not having provided a 
suitable defense and in fact attacks him personally as follows:
Defensionem autem nobis non exhibes, Plato.
Socrates tuus non demonstravit se deos patiios colere.Socrates tuus non défendit daenionium suiim. \Socrates tuus hoc quidem loco crimen corruptelae non refellit. ;Socrates tuus adversarium aggreditur, ludibrio habet, semet ipsum autem non Ipurgat. 1
Chroust ([1957] 41) observes that, in general, Xen. tries to absolve Socrates of all j
guilt, while Plato presents him as a man motivated by the highest principles, an |
report, which comprises a significant portion o f the entire work. For another analysis o f Xen. Ap., see 
Stock (pp. 24-26).
8xhis also corresponds to the outline in Phillipson (p. 355); for a more elaborate analysis, see the 
section headings in Burnet's commentary ([1924] 63-171).
^For specific differences, see the comment on §10.
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uncompromising apostle of truth and virtue. Opinions of course vary regarding the 
significance of these differences: Gomperz ([1924] 169-70: see too Amim 6) obseiwes 
that, since Xen. specifically vouches for the authenticity of his aTtoA^ oyla, the charges 
against Socrates, though perhaps malicious and exaggerated, nevertheless have some 
basis in fact; Plato's work, on the hand, is unreliable as a historical source and can be 
considered rather as an idealization and a Denkmal platonischer KunstP  Derenne 
(pp. 160-61), appaiently ignoring the A.6yoi ZoDKpaxiKoi issue and giving priority of 
sequence, to PI. Ap., maintains that there would not be so many differences between 
the two aTcoXoyiai if Plato's work had been considered a faithful witness. Again, I 
feel that the most sensible approach to the problem is simply to consider any 
commonalities between the two works as being potentially historical, and I 
completely agree with Pangle (pp. 18-19) when he states that Plato’s and Xen.’s 
works concerning the trial deal ultimately with the conflict between philosophy and 
civil society, and that in this light any questions about a historical Socrates become 
secondary.
Vander Waerdt aptly observes that, because of the potentially fictional quality 
of both a7ToA,oylai, "we should...see the divergences between these accounts as 
valuable guides in assessing authorial intention" (p. 8) instead of focusing our 
attention on the more dubious question of . historicity. But to what extent can each 
author's intentions be divined?T here are many who, consideiing the opening 
statement in Xen. Ap., see the work primarily as a corrective to PL Ap., and Vander 
Waerdt's statement is quite typical of this view: "My thesis is that Xenophon's 
Apology of Socrates is written directly in reply to Plato in an attempt to reconfigure 
discussion about Socrates' trial in accordance with his own understanding of Socratic 
e t h i c s . "  12 In short, Vander Waerdt (pp. 18-19) believes that Xen. is targeting PI. Ap. 
because it does not offer a forensically effective defense speech and at the same time 
fails to explain why Socrates provoked the jury, a very attractive view indeed if the 
sequence-of-publication issue could be convincingly resolved (see Essay B). In this 
case, speculation might be somewhat more fruitful if confined to a consideration of 
the authors' intended readers: Kennedy (p. 150) quite plausibly believes that Plato 
wrote his work for a larger and different readership, and P. Meyer (coll. 757-58) 
maintains that any significant differences between the two aTcoXoYiai can be
111 Amim (p. 5) performs an interesting logical contortion by stating tliat, if  the events described in PI.
Ap. were historical, they would have tlie greatest claim to consideration.
llp o r  further comments, see the three prefatory essays as well as the comments on §§1 and 22.
12Vander Waerdt 13 (see too ibid., p. 29 & passim, Chroust [1957] 39, and Kennedy 149-50). Amim  
(p. 20) feels that Xen. Ap. should by no means be regarded as a complement to the Platonic work and 
tliat the fact that Socrates' motives for condemnation are less than noble confirms this. All o f these 
views of course pre-suppose tliat Plato influenced Xen. in some way (see, for example, Vander Waerdt
5-6), a presumption based on no conclusive evidence whatsoever and ostensibly on Plato's more 
obvious strengths as a writer.
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explained by differences in purpose - that is, to reach a larger readership, Plato 
focused solely on the actual defense as being more c o m p e l l i n g ,  Meyer (col. 713) 
feels that it is in fact wrong to see Xen. Ap. as a corrective to the Platonic work and 
finds its purpose to be ...dafi Sokrates entschlossen gewesen zu sterben und dafi er bei 
seiner Verteidigung nur Gewicht darauf gelegt habe zu zeigen, wie er subjektiv sich 
keiner Schuld bewufit sei (col. 716), a purpose which it in fact shares with PI. Ap. (col. 
753 ff.). The issue of Socrates' willingness to die is a difficult one (see the comment 
on §5), and although the Platonic Socrates does in fact profess a desire to be 
acquitted, 1"! he nevertheless takes pains to point out to the dicasts that he was nearing 
the end of his life (38C), and in his final speech (40C ff.) he seems in fact quite 
resigned to the prospect of an eminent death,
Them are three possible conclusions: 1) Plato influenced Xen., 2) Platonic 
influence on Xen. cannot be determined, or 3) Xen. influenced Plato. Since specific 
points of comparison are treated below, I will reproduce a few of the more general 
arguments:
1) Platonic Influence on Xen.: This is a popular position which frequently reveals 
some degree of literary bias against Xen. (see Essay C). Breitenbach (col. 1893) 
remarks that the discrepancies between the two works, e.g. the counter-penalty 
and statement that Socrates' friends spoke in his behalf, are no proof that Xen. did 
not consider Plato: He simply improvises on the Platonic material. Many 
scholais^^ believe that Xen. intended to coiTect Plato's inadequate treatment of 
Socrates' jie7 aA.Tiyopla (see Xen. Ap. 1), an inteipretation bolstered by the view 
that Xen. had a shnilai* coiTective purpose in writing his Smp.^ '^  Delebecque (pp. 
208-209: see too Mosley 1142) suggests that Xen. came into contact with the
Nicht "Rechtfertigung des Meisters vor dem gebildeten Publikum" also ist der Zweck der Apologie 
Platons, sondern Erschliefiung des Verstdndnisses fUr das Wesen des M eisters in den weitesten Kreisen 
(idem).
"^^ See PI. Ap. 18E-19A. Xen.'s Socrates is more equivocal: xa l fjv So^av icepl è|iauxoù, xaÙTnv 
âva<l)atv(ûv e i Papuvô xoùs Sixaoxôs, aiptiao^iai xeleuxâv iiôAAov f\ àveÂeuGépcos xô Ç-qv ëxi 
Tupoaaixcôv xepôôvai xôv xoAù xelp© ptov àvxi Gavdxou (§9).
^^Note however, that these statements occiu: after the death sentence has been pronounced, a fact 
which makes Socrates' readiness to die a matter of philosophical conviction, not a matter o f  
convenience as in Xen. Ap  (see Busse 228 and Navia [1984] 57). It is interesting that Breitenbach (col. 
1893) sees no trace o f Socrates' willingness to die in PI. Ap.
^6See Delebecque 217 and Gomperz [1924] 171. Breitenbach (coll. 1892-93), Toole (pp. 5-6), Chroust 
([1957] 39), Geffcken (p. 400), and Schanz (pp. 81-82) provide numerous and quite precise examples 
of Xen.’s corrections, though I must confess tliat the distinction between corrections of and differences 
from Plato remains unclear to me. Kahn (pp. 76-79 & 393-401) believes that Plato had a considerable 
influence on Xen.'s writing, yet although he cites Xen. Ap. along with the rest o f Xen.'s Socratica (p. 
29), he never considers it elsewhere. Kahn concludes in general (p. 393) that "[Xen.'s] use o f Platonic 
texts is essentially superficial, almost cosmetic in nature", and that he "seems to have had no real 
sympathy with Plato's portrayal o f Socrates".
^7see Schmid 225 n. 1 and Lincke 712 ff. (see too Waterfield [p. 220], who finds Platonic influence).
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Platonic works through possible links with the various philosophical schools in 
the Peloponnese, a not implausible suggestion.
2) Indeterminate Influence: The argument for this position is the possibility that 
Xen. based his account on information acquired independently of Plato (for 
example, from Hermogenes, as he states himself in §2).^  ^ Wetzel (p. 70) finds the 
many discrepancies between the two works to be proof that Xen. did not read 
Plato. For Gigon ([1945] 245) and Vrijlandt (pp. 144-45), the differences in 
pmpose rule out any Platonic influence on Xen., and Vrijlandt (p. 146: see too 
Oilier 94) adds that the collective intention expressed in Xen. Ap. 1 is directed 
towards more than one writer and that Plato by no means presents an 
unmegalegorical Socrates {ibid., pp. 146-47). Frick (p. 43 ff.) believes that the 
prosecution was attempting to brand Socrates as a sophist, and that the two parts 
of the indictment represent symptoms of the main problem, i.e. sophism. 
Therefore, since Xen. misses the main motive behind the accusation, it is clear 
that he did not read any written accounts of the trial in which this motive would 
have been clear {ibid., p. 81 n. 1). Amim (p. 69) simply finds no trace of PI. Ap. 
in the Xenophontic dTtoAoyla.i^
3) Xenophontic Influence on Plato: Few have dared to place Xen. Ap. before PI. 
Ap. chronologically, with Vrijlandt {passim) being the most feiwent champion of 
this position.20
I would pæfèr to reduce the three options above to two simple alternatives 
based on Xen.'s remark in Ap. 1:1) Xen. wrote the work independently of Plato's 
influence while being influenced by other writers of aTcoXoyiai, or 2) Xen. was 
influenced by other writers of diroAoylai, including Plato. These alternatives do not 
necessarily imply a sequence of publication since it is possible that Xen. might have 
published his work without ever having consulted Plato's existing version of the 
events surrounding the trial. However, in what follows I intend to consider item-by- 
item the possible motives for the two authors' different descriptions of the trial and, 
wherever it is not entirely obvious, any potential influence on Xen. from Plato and 
other writers of àîcoXoylai.^i
^^See Menzel 6-7. The reader should be reminded once again that the tone o f the Ap. might w ell be 
based on Xen.'s recollections of Socrates himself, allowing, o f course, for a strong Xenophontic cast to 
the narration.
Klement (see bibl.) reacts to Vrijlandt's Xen. Ap./P\. Ap. priority tliesis and concludes that the two 
works developed independently of each other. Unfortunately, since Klement's handwritten thesis is 
illegible, I have been forced to gather this information from his prefatory abstract.
2®See Essay B. Pomeroy (p. 26) also tests some very troubled waters with her tentative statement that 
there is no need to assume that Xen. was copying Plato and that the opposite might in fact be true. 
Kahn (p. 29) believes that Xen. had no influence whatsoever on Plato, but see the latter's supposed 
criticism o f Xen. Cyr. in Lg. 694C ff.
2lM any or all o f these points are also treated in tlie commentary itself.
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1. Xenophon's work is much shorter than Plato's.
Xen.: Xen.'s professed intention (see §§22-23) is not to relate everything that 
occurred at the trial. Perhaps his aTioXoyia was never meant for publication and 
represents instead a collection of notes, a rough draft, or a letter. If influenced by 
Plato's Ap., perhaps he felt dismayed by its superior literary quality and chose to 
approach the trial with a narrower focus.
Plato: Plato's work puiports to give a factual account of everything said at 
Socrates' tiial, hence its greater length.
2. Xen. frames (and interrupts) Hermogenes' report with his own narration, while the 
events themselves are related through another's testimony; Plato's narrative voice 
never intt'udes, and the events and speeches are related as if they are historically 
accurate and the result of first-hand testimony.
Xen.: By presenting his narrative in this way, Xen. is able to lend his account an 
air of authenticity while distancing himself from any responsibility for an accurate 
description of the events related.22 In general, Xen. includes his own voice in order to 
state his purpose in writing, to recapitulate his main points, and to append a short 
tribute to Socrates at the conclusion of the work. Xen.'s voice also appears at the 
beginning and end of the Comm, to offer similai* observations on Socrates' life, whüe 
the two remaining Socratica, the Oec. and Smp., offer brief introductions followed by 
dialogues in which the nanative voice recedes or disappears altogether. In general, 
Xen. emphasizes the personal element in his relationship with Socrates, while Plato, 
though presumably closer to Socrates, de-eraphasizes this aspect to an extreme.
Plato: By Plato's own account he was an eye-witness of events at the trial, and the 
fact that he does not intmde makes his report seem all the more objective. The only 
framing device used by him in his writings concerning the trial appears in the Phd.
3. Xen. 's work contains two distinct speeches delivered in court, Plato's three.
Xen.: Xen. places additional emphasis on Socrates' speeches to his followers both 
before and after the trial and none whatsoever on the counter-penalty, the proposal of 
which his Socrates figure says would be tantamount to an admission of guilt. Perhaps 
Xen. wanted to present Socrates in conversation with his followers in a way 
reminiscent of the Comm. The Socrates figum in each author is given an extra­
procedural speech after the penalty is rendered.
22Consider, too, his use of the impersonal verb Aéyexai in §§27-31. If Xen. really adopted this 
approach, did he possibly seek out Hermogenes as an eye-witness simply to legitimize what he had 
already gathered from otiier sources? And why would Xen. have turned to Plato's potentially fictive 
work when he apparently already had personal access to an eye-witness in Hermogenes? (See Menzel
6-70
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Plato: With the exception of the additional speech, Plato's account is in keeping 
with the established judicial practice of the day. The additional speech in each author 
serves as a vehicle by which to chastise the dicasts responsible for his death and to 
address posterity, while Plato's Socrates, by addressing the dicasts who voted for his 
acquittal, re-establishes the bond with his supporters (cp. Xen.) and discusses the 
after-life in a way which anticipates his discussion of the soul in the Phd.
4. Some scholars (e.g. Wilamowitz and Breitenbach) consider Xen. 's title to be 
inappropriate because o f its impreciseness.
Xen.: There are a limited number of possibilities: Either the title is Xen.'s own, in 
which case he 1) thought that it was a perfectly appropriate title, 2) used the given title 
automatically under the influence of the a7roA,oyiai already in existence, or 3) 
consciously, though inaccurately, entitled it the 'A%oA,OYla ZcoKpdtous so that his 
work would receive attention equal to that given to the already existing aTcoA.oyiai; or 
the title is not his own, in which case 1) the work was originally untitled and received 
a title only on its later publication (see Item 1 above), or 2) its title was altered at a 
later date. The title 'ATcoloyia, if not Xen.'s own, would have been influenced by the 
fact that there were already a number of similarly named curoXoyim in existence.
Plato: PI. Ap. focuses entirely on what Socrates said in his defense and is therefore 
appropriately named.
5. Xen. begins his work by explaining his purpose in writing it and punctuates 
Hermogenes' narrative on three occasions with a description of Socrates' intentions, 
while Plato plunges in médias res.
(See Item 2 above.)
6. Xen. cites his source and mentions other authors of ànoXoyiai; Plato is ostensibly 
his own source.
Xen.: Since Xen. was not present at the trial, he needs to authenticate his account 
by naming a direct source, and he mentions other âTioA-oylai (including Plato's?) in 
order to point out their inadequate treatment of Socrates’ peyaXriyopia. With the 
exception of Hermogenes, Meletus, and Anytus, Xen. mentions no other eye- 
witnesses.25
Plato: Plato obviously does not need to cite any sources for his own personal 
account, but he does include the names of many people who were present at the trial 
and who could have served as independent authorities for the historicity of the events 
as related by him, a point used by Taylor and Burnet, among others, in support of the
23Though mentioned, Chaerephon, at least according to Plato's testimony, was dead at tlie time o f the 
trial.
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reliability of Plato's account (see above). It is difficult to determine what effect, if 
any, other âTcoA-oylai had on Plato's work, if indeed they already existed at the time of 
its publication.
7. Reasons are given for Socrates' unpreparedness: in Xen., a life virtuously lived and 
the dissuasive influence of his daimonic sign; in Plato, his inexperience in forensic 
speaking.
Xen.: Xen. seems more intent on directly rebutting the impiety charge than Plato 
(see Item 12 below), and this section only foreshadows his treatment of the same issue 
in §12 ff. In general, Socrates' unpreparedness underscores his conviction that he has 
led a virtuous life that needs no further justification.
Plato: The Platonic Socrates' hesitation is a rhetorical commonplace which 
provides ample room for irony, a characteristic much in evidence during the first part 
of his defense (a superb example of which occurs in §2 IB).
8. Xen. introduces a pre-trial Socratic "speech” to Hermogenes; Plato begins with the 
ànoXoyia proper.
Xen.: This speech sets the tone (see §10) and introduces the major themes: 
Socrates' virtuous life, his innocence, the importance of the daimonic, the fickleness 
of the Athenian courts, and the opportuneness of death at this point in Socrates' life. 
His relationship and conversation with Heimogenes hearken back to similar 
encounters in the Comm, (see Item 3 above) and lend the Socrates figure more 
rhetorical fjOos.
Plato: Perhaps Plato felt that the events of the trial were so well known that he 
could easily dispense with an introduction, and Socrates' t]0os is more than well 
established through his interaction with the dicasts. The Euthphr. and Cri. also lack 
framing devices (see Item 2 above).
9. Xen.'s first in-trial speech is directed at Meletus; Plato's is addressed to the dicasts 
en masse, and the interrogation of Meletus occurs in the middle of the work.
Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates is concerned with rebutting the charges in the indictment 
one by one, an approach which also forms the basis of the Schutzschrift in the Comm.
Plato: Plato's Socrates begins with a short prooemium followed by a long 
treatment of the old accusers' charges as summarized in 19B. According to him, it is 
these very chaiges, if any, that will lead to his conviction (28A), hence their 
placement in his speech before the less significant rebuttal to the official indictment, 
which he treats almost nonchalantly.
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10. Xen. 's Meletus speech is proportionately longer as compared with Plato's 
treatment.
(See Item 9 above.)
\ \ .  In Xen. Meletus' charges appear in reverse order to those of the Meletus figure in 
Plato.
Since it would seem that Xen. Ap. contains a nearly literal version of the 
indictment (see comment on §10), Plato must have reversed the order of the charges 
for literary reasons, a supposition supported by the off-hand manner in which Socrates 
recapitulates the char ges in 24B-C. Since Plato's Socrates has just finished 
expatiating on the religious motives behind his interminable questioning of his fellow 
citizens, temporarily switching to a more secular* theme perhaps provides a bit of 
variation before the subject returns once again to the question of Socrates' impiety.24
12. Xen. rebuts the impiety charge with references to Socrates' public sacrifices and a 
defense of his daimonic sign while referring to the Delphic oracle as the ultimate 
authority for his wisdom; Plato deals exclusively (and briefly) with the ôaipovia 
Koivd charge by forcing Meletus to admit that at least part (and an inadmissible part, 
as evidenced in his reference to Anaxagoras) of his charge rests on the public's 
longstanding identification of Socrates with the atheistic physicists.
Xen.: Xen. goes out of his way here to identify Socrates' daimonic voice with 
other forms of divination while calling on the jury and Meletus as witnesses to the 
fact that he has participated publicly in the state cults. This directly answers both 
parts of the impiety charge. If influenced by Plato's Ap., it would be difficult to 
explain why Xen. would leave the association of Socrates with the physicists out of 
his own account unless he intended to treat the matter elsewhere {Comm. 1.1.14 and 
IV.7.3-5) or felt that it deserved no further mention.25
Plato: Plato reduces both parts of the impiety charge to one, namely, to a char ge of 
atheism, a simplification justified by Socrates' interpretation of the ambiguous word 
vopiÇeiv as it appears in his own summary of the indictment in 24B (see the comment 
on §10). In short, it becomes a question of whether or not Socrates believes in the 
supernatural. His religious convictions have already been established through his 
divinely inspired mission, however, and by interpreting the indictment in this 
par ticular way he is able to address the question not of his participation in public 
worship but of his belief in gods in general. The words ôaipôvia Kaiva are tlius
24vrijlan(it (pp. 94-95) sees the reversal o f charges as a literary manipulation motivated by Plato's 
intention of subjecting Meletus to Socrates' scorn.
25See Item 28 below. As Fritz correctly notes ([1931] 58-59), the much-cited passage concerning 
Socrates' religious beliefs (Comm. 1.1.4 ff.) has nothing to do witli atheism and shows no Platonic 
influence.
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generalized to mean the supernatural in all its aspects, whether "novel" or not, and in 
any case, Meletus appears to drop this part of his charge when Socrates forces him to 
narrow his accusation to one of atheism only.26
13. /n Xen. the Delphic oracle seiwes as a proof of Socrates' piety and wisdom, and 
the dicasts are challenged to test him as to the truth of its pronouncement; in Plato 
the oracle fulfills the same function while also sejying as the impetus for Socrates' 
mission.
Xen.: Socrates’ humility, not to mention his wit and irony, is altogether missing in 
Xen.'s account, and his connection with the oracle seems to serve both as another 
proof of his piety and as a transition to, and a basis for, his ar gument that no one of 
his demonstrated char acter could possibly corrupt the young. The challenge to the 
dicasts may be considered yet another example of peyaliyyopia, especially since 
Socrates spends so little time (i.e. only one section in the text) dealing with the 
oracle's response directly. Xen.'s intention, unlike Plato's, is to establish the literal 
truth of the oracular* response, not the fact that Socrates was wise through being aware 
of his own ignorance, a distinction perhaps atti*ibutable, if the event is historical, to 
Xen.'s lack of philosophical sophistication.^?
Plato: Here the Socrates figure can not only call upon Apollo as the ultimate 
witness to his wisdom, but he can also use the oracle as a means of justifying his 
unceasing examination of his fellow Athenians: In effect, to stop his questioning 
would be to disobey the god (see 29A, 33C & 37E). On the other hand, Socrates 
confesses in 33C that his elenctic encounters with pompous public figures are a 
source of pleasure for him, an admission which somewhat undermines the professed 
seriousness of his mission. There are in fact some scholars (e.g. Riddell) who would 
like to treat Socrates' entire reference to the Delphic authority as yet another example 
of Socratic irony. 28
26The daimonic is first mentioned only later (31C-D), and although it is clear from tliis passage that it 
appeared in some respect in the indictment, it receives no attention from Socrates when he is dealing 
with the impiety charge per se. This is due, I believe, to its being implicitly included as one particular 
manifestation o f the Saigovia xaivd  mentioned in 24B. According to Wilamowitz ([1919] 1:158), 
who cites this passage and what follows, Plato wished to suggest here that Socrates treated the gods as 
non-existent.
2?Gomperz ([1924] 163) finds few or no traces of a Socratic mission in Xen., while Vander Waerdt 
(pp. 35-37) sees Oec. 6.12-17 as being a parody o f the mission, with the emphasis lying above all on 
the notion o f xaAoxdyaGla (see too Oec. 2.16-18). Vander Waerdt (p. 37 n. 101) remarks that, 
although Xen.'s Socrates is represented as instilling KaAoKdyaGla in his associates, he nowhere 
concerns himself with philosophical instruction more naixowly construed, a fact which perhaps reflects 
Xen.'s hesitation to treat Socrates' deeper pursuits.
28However, Vrijlandt (pp. 83-85), though he considers Socrates’ mission a fiction, fails to find any 
traces of irony in it. Daniel (pp. 84-85) thinks that the Socratic mission is contrived by Plato in order to 
conceal the actual beginnings of his philosophicizing, since an exhaustive and more philosophical 
account would have only confused the dicasts.
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14. The oracle's response is different in each author, as is its interpretation by the 
respective Socrates figure.
Xen.: The response to his question which Chaerephon biings back to Athens from 
Delphi is threefold, i.e., that Socrates has been declared by Apollo to be freer, more 
just, and more temperate than all other men (see Item 19 below). Xen.'s Socrates does 
not doubt the truth of the pronouncement and proceeds in court to prove by specific 
examples that the oracle is indeed correct in its characterization of him. This leads 
immediately to a more general treatment of his wisdom (§§17-18), which leads in turn 
to a proof by probability that no one of his character could possibly coirupt the youth 
(§19).29 While defendants in Athenian courts were not necessarily expected to be 
humble, Socrates does not make any serious effort to diminish the sense of divine 
favor inherent in the oraculai* response or to soften the self-aggrandizement inherent 
in his treatment of it.
Plato: Plato's Socrates is well awaie of the risk of seeming megalegorical as he 
prepares to bring up Chaerephon's report in 20E: xal poi, © âvôpes ’Afirivoloi, pp 
Bopupporpte, pT|Ô’ èàv 56^© ti ùpîv péya léyeiv. He has simply learned from 
Chaerephon that the god has declaied that no one is wiser than he, a report which he 
doubts immediately and uses as the basis for his lifelong inquiry into the nature of 
wisdom (21B-22E) while taking pains to distance himself from the fact that Apollo 
has singled him out as being entirely distinct from other men (23B). Plato's purpose 
in representing Socrates in this light seems to be to establish the fact 1) that he was a 
deeply religious man, 2) that, on the basis of his religious convictions, he was 
prepared to obey, at any price, what he interpreted to be a divine injunction, and 3) 
that his humility would not allow him to accept the claim that he was in any sense 
wiser than anyone else. Admittedly, a more sophisticated view of Socrates' apparent 
naïveté in this section might easily lead one to conclude that he is speaking ironically 
here (see Item 13 above), but in either case, Socrates' unique position as a philosopher 
remains, that is, he is still the only one among the Athenians who is awaie of his own 
mortal ignorance (see Items 13 and 21).
15. In Xen. Socrates rebuts the corruption-of-the-youth charge by establishing his 
wisdom and challenging Meletus to produce living proof of this charge, although his
29 As Vander Waerdt (pp. 40-41) comments, the Xenophontic Socrates' wisdom rests not on his 
professed ignorance but on more positive traits such as xaAaxâyaGla and aco^poowq. Vander 
Waerdt, who finds evidence o f Platonic influence in Xen. Ap., believes tliat Xen. rejects the Platonic 
Socrates' profession o f ignorance as being forensically disadvantageous: Besides failing to identify 
ignorance with wisdom, Xen.'s Socrates often gives his associates moral advice and admits in Xen. Ap. 
20 to a special concern with the art of education. Montuori (pp. 69-70) Lists the four main differences 
between the two accounts as follows: In Xen. Ap. 1) the oracle was uttered in the presence o f many 
people, 2) Socrates does not call upon Chaerecrates to corroborate his account, 3) the report elicits a 
thorubic reaction from the dicasts, and 4) the response itself is threefold. Montuori concludes from this 
that Xen. and Plato were in fact describing two separate incidents or fictions (p. 73).
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position seems weakened at least temporarily by his response to Meletus' question 
concerning education; in Plato Socrates forces Meletus by a series of leading 
questions into a reductio ad absurdum^o and asserts his qualifications as an educator 
by comparing himself to publicly acknowledged experts in other areas.
Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates was well known for his criticism of the democracy and in 
particular of its practice of choosing certain public officials by sortition instead of 
considering their individual qualifications (see Comm. 1.2.9 and Arist. Rh. 1393B3 
ff.). As regards education in paiticular, this criticism miiTors that of Socrates in PI.
Ap. 25A-B. The confession of Xen.'s Socrates that he does indeed believe that one 
should follow the advice of qualified experts over that of one's parents and kinsmen, 
though well founded on logical principles, would only cause the dicasts to consider 
Socrates a persistent threat to the conservative post-junra democracy. In keeping with 
the prevalent tone of his speech Socrates professes to be such an expert, another factor 
which could only contribute to his final condemnation. Xen.’s approach here is again 
less sophisticated than Plato’s (see Item 13 above) and avoids, as is true of his 
Socratica in general, an elenctic exchange leading to a contradiction on the part of the 
interlocutor.
Plato: Whereas Xen.'s examples of experts include doctors, public speakers, and 
generals, Plato's Socrates refers to horse-training only, a fitting example since Plato is 
here concerned with the education of the young, not, as in Xen.'s case, with obedience 
to one's close relatives. Conversely, horses are not humans, and Socrates' relentless 
baiting of Meletus, his questionable argument that no one would intentionally ruin his 
own community by corrupting the youth (as if there were no other reasons for 
imparting counter-cultural doctrines), and the cursory treatment of the impiety chai'ge 
in general are all indicative of the supreme disdain with which Plato's Socrates 
responds throughout to the official indictment. Meletus' accusation that Socrates 
teaches atheism to the young seems once again to allude indirectly to Socrates’ pre­
amnesty association with the physicists.
16. Socrates in both works challenges Meletus to produce living proof of his charges.
Xen.: This challenge appeal's directly in response to Meletus' coiTuption-of-the- 
youth chai'ge and is followed by the latter's reply that he does in fact know of some 
people whom Socrates has persuaded to heed his advice over that of their parents and 
kinsmen. The specific examples of vice cited in this section are treated at length in 
the Comm., and the mention of dipsomania here anticipates Socrates' prophecy
^^Phillipson (p. 306 ff.) is one of the few who do not believe that Meletus was ensnared during the 
cross-examination. Vrijlandt (p. 94) remarks that Xen.'s Soc. gives the reader a clear answer to the 
corruption question, while Plato's figure says nothing of substance about education, merges botli 
charges, and fails to address the issue o f tlie Saipovia tcaiva.
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concerning Anytus' son in §30. In Xen. Ap. Socrates' challenge is weakened 
considerably by the fact that Meletus is in a position to produce victims of Socrates' 
corrupting influence (see Item 14 above).
Plato: Plato's Socrates offers this challenge to Meletus in a later part of his speech 
(33CD) and not in the context of his rebuttal to the official indictment. While he does 
not address the particular nature of the coiTuption, he does lend his challenge more 
forcefulness by pointing out individuals in the audience, both the "victims" of his 
influence and their relatives who, if anyone, would have more than sufficient cause to 
blame Socrates. Meletus does not reply, and Socrates takes his silence to be a tacit 
admission of the groundlessness of the accusation.
17. Xen. 's Socrates twice states that the capital charge is unjustified.
Xen.: By twice refening to the statutory capital offenses, Xen.'s Socrates is 
obviously emphasizing the injustice of the proposed penalty and bringing the 
accusers’ motives (that is, whether they originate in personal hostility or in an interest 
for the public's welfare) into question. However, since it was possible to propose a 
milder penalty after the verdict, the accusers no doubt wished initially to seek the 
hai'shest penalty possible in an effort either to cow Socrates or, if he remained 
intractable, to force him after the verdict to propose a relatively harsher counter­
penalty (such as banishment: see PI. Ap. 37B-C) which the jury would accept.
Plato: Plato's Socrates alludes to the inappropriateness of the proposed death 
penalty (25E-26A) by reducing the possible options to two, i.e., that he had not been 
responsible for corrupting the youth or that he had done so unintentionally, in which 
case the proper course of action for Meletus would have been to speak with him in 
private instead of pressing charges.
18. Meletus speaks only once in Xen.; he continues to respond reluctantly to Socrates' 
questioning in Plato.
Xen.: Xen.'s Meletus is first referred to in §11, and his speech continues to be 
directed towards the dicasts until §19, where Meletus is addressed directly, who 
speaks for the first and last time, chai'ging Socrates with causing his followers to 
disobey their paients. It is quite possible that this dialogue actually continued during 
the trial (see §22), but if, as Xen. says in the same section, his puipose was simply to 
show that Socrates did everything within his power to prove his innocence, no 
purpose would have been seiwed by prolonging the exchange, especially if it 
resembled the one-sided exchange described by Plato (see immediately below). If, 
however, the a7toA.oyia genre already included many fictional elements, there would 
have been much to be gained by enhancing the potential rhetorical and dramatic
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qualities of any forensic dycov between the two antagonists. This is altogether missing 
in Xen.'s account.
Plato: Meletus appears in the middle of Plato's work (24C-27D) as the reluctant 
victim of Socrates' êÀ€y%o&3i His responses resemble those of other Platonic 
interlocutors in that he is compelled to choose one of several alternatives offered by 
Socrates, and the fact that the prosecution has warned the dicasts to beware of 
Socrates' speaking skills (17 A) more than explains Meletus' reluctance to engage 
Socrates in a public dialogue. On the single occasion on which Meletus does take the 
initiative by indirectly associating Socrates with the teachings of Anaxagoras (26D), 
he simply reveals that he is completely defenseless against Socrates' dialectical skills. 
Plato’s Socrates makes short work of him by invariably leading him to self- 
contradictions, a fact which does not so much show that Socrates is innocent of the 
recorded chai'ges as that Meletus is a hapless fool who is not qualified to render 
judgment in such matters. Socrates' approach to his defense reflects the cuixent 
rhetorical trend towards ad hominem attacks and an approach based more on 
arguments of probability than on concrete evidence, as in Socrates' reference to the 
improbability of his intentionally trying to ruin his own community (and ultimately 
himself) by coiTupting its youth (25D-E).
19. The dicasts interrupt Socrates' address twice in Xen. and once in Plato.
Xen.: The dicasts respond emotionally on two occasions in Xen.: when Socrates 
claims in §13 that he is privy to an unerring source of insphation from the gods and 
when he discloses in §15 that the Delphic oracle has proclaimed that no one is freer 
(éXeuGeptoTepov), more just (ôiKaiÔTepov), or more temperate (aco(l)povéoT£pov) 
than he. Both examples of Gopupos occur in response to Socrates' revelations, a mood 
which Socrates attempts to dispel by referring to the oracle's response to Lycurgus, a 
reference which, however, could only have had the opposite effect. (It should be 
obseiwed in general that Socrates' peya^Tiyopia does not at all imply any sense of 
falsehood in what he says to the court, but rather the way in which he chooses to 
respond to the charges brought against him.)
Plato: In 21A Socrates anticipates an emotional outburst in reaction to the oracle's 
response by asking the dicasts to remain calm. Although the verb Gopupeiv is also 
applied to Meletus in 27B, it refers here to the dicasts only inasmuch as they are asked 
by Socrates not to allow Meletus to inteiTupt his interrogation with irrelevant answers. 
The only actual intenuption occurs in 30C (pf) GopupTioriTe K.T.X.), where Socrates
Riddell (pp. xxiv-xxv) comments that the two most important points, the argument against the 
general prejudice and tlie more personal justification of Socrates' activities, straddle tlie less important 
confrontation with Meletus, which receives less attention because it is comparatively hnmaterW to the 
larger issues.
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expresses his refusal to comply with any sentence passed by the court whereby his 
philosophical activities would be in any way limited. His readiness to die is the 
ultimate proof of his conviction that he is innocent of his accusers' charges and that 
the philosophical way of life is fully justified. That this interruption occurs at the 
emotional climax of his speech is therefore quite appropriate.
20. The two accounts of the daiinonic vary.
See Appendix C. Let it be observed in the meantime that Xen.'s account of the 
daimonic differs mainly from Plato's in that he describes it as being both pro- and 
apotreptic. Xen. goes to great lengths in the Ap. (§§12-13) to compare it to other 
forms of divination, while Plato's Socrates mentions its influence in keeping him out 
of politics and its silence during the court proceedings, the absence of which he 
interprets in a positive way. It is clear from both authors (see Xen. Ap. 12 , Comm.
1.1.2-5, and PI. Ap. 31C-D) that Socrates' accusers included a reference to the 
daimonic in their deposition submitted to the King Archon.
21. Both Socrates figures examine the claims of the oracle differently, with Plato's 
Socrates tmning his examination into a life-long mission.
Xen.: For Xen.'s Socrates, the oracle's pronouncement seems to provide him with 
an opportunity to review his life and his relationship with his fellow citizens, while 
relating Chaerephon's report to the dicasts serves structurally as a starting point from 
which to enumerate his many virtues; the report itself could generally be considered 
an affirmation of, or justification for, Socrates' philosophical activities. Considering 
the Delphic oracle's pro-Persian and -Spartan history, I find it difficult, however, to 
believe that the announcement of Apollo's response would alone be sufficient to win 
over an Athenian juiy, and this might account for Socrates' immediate offer to 
interpret the words of the oracle secularly, i.e. in a way which is divorced from any 
connection with the Delphic god (§15: opcos ôè npets prjÔè tout elKfj niioTenmyce T(p 
0£^). Socrates' lengthy, self-aggrandizing examination of the oracular response can 
be described as an example of peyal-pyopia.^^
Plato: The most conspicuous problem in considering the Platonic Socrates' 
examination of the oracle is the discrepancy between Socrates' belief in the oracle and 
his desire to test its validity; a second problem concerns his determination to continue 
his mission long after his wisdom (i.e. the awareness of his own ignorance) has been
^^Vander Waerdt (p. 34) believes that the Platonic Socrates' mission is replaced in Xen. Ap. 16 by the 
description of a life-long search intended to suppress any reference to Socrates' philosophical 
development and to his past career as a natural philosopher, and to avoid any questions about Socrates’ 
heterodoxy. See Edelstein 138-50 for a more general discussion.
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established.33 Yet other questions arise at this point: Are we really to believe that 
Socrates only began to test his fellow citizens after learning of the cryptic words from 
Delphi? If so, does this mark a clear break with his background as the madcap 
physicist depicted in the Clouds or soberly described in Phd. 96A-100A and Comm. 
1.1.14, rV.7.3-5? Is Socrates speaking ironically when he says that he has continued 
his mission out of "obedience to the god" (37E-38A: èdvre y dp Xéyco ou  rtp 6ecp 
àît£i0eîv mûr' èoriv koi ôià roûr’ àôûvarov fi<Jü%iav dyEiv, où 7t£la£a0é pot cbs 
£tp(ov£'i)op£v(p)? Or are we to assume that he has acted in a genuine attempt, in a 
way reminiscent of his exetactic successor Diogenes the Cynic and motivated perhaps 
by a deep sense of disillusionment, to find a truly wise man?34
22. Xen. includes a reference to Lycurgus.
Surely, this could only have been taken to be an offensive remark, since Socrates 
is in effect saying to his peers the dicasts, "Indeed, I've been ranked among the sages, 
gentlemen, but at least I'm not god-like." Combined with the reference to a pro- 
Spartan oracle (see Item 21), any mention of the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus would 
have been particularly maladroit on Socrates' part and not consistent with any serious 
effort to win an acquittal from the democrats. On the other hand, it might have been 
better received by any pro-Spartans sitting among the jurors, and the possible allusion 
to Lycurgus' role as a vopo0£Tqs might have been intended to appeal to a society 
traditionally riven by factional strife.
23, Both accounts include references to Socrates' acquaintances as potential (or 
actual) witnesses to his innocence and character in general.
Xen.: These references in Xen. include Xen. himself, Hermogenes, anonymous 
friends who would be prepared to attest to the existence of the daimonic sign, the late 
Chaerephon (see PI. Ap. 21 A), Socrates' acquaintances and followers in general, 
Apollodorus and Socrates' more immediate followers in particular, and by implication 
those who are unwilling to step forward and testify in support of the coiTuption-of-
33Taylor ([1932] 139-40) describes the goals o f Socrates' mission as a knowledge o f existence as it 
really is and an ability to distinguish between good and evil, that is, So^a must be replaced with 
knowledge. For Socrates, immortality is equivalent to divinity, and his mission to tend to the soul, 
which is divine, can therefore be seen as an attempt to gain a sort o f immortality (ibid. 138-39). In 
general, in PI. Ap. the oracle could be considered a starting-point for living life well, in Xen. Ap. an 
acknowledgment o f a life well lived.
3^See the comments on §§14-15. If an identification of the voice of Apollo with the daimonic voice 
were possible, it would perhaps be easier to explain Socrates' motives for continuing his mission, 
tliough the daimonic's purely apotreptic role would have to be explained more adequately. Note that 
the divine mission o f the Platonic Socrates is based not on the daimonic sign but on the oracle's 
response to Chaerephon's query (see Gomperz [1924] 163). Vrijlandt (p. 85) offers a possible 
explanation, i.e., that Plato was fully aware that Socrates' life was directed by the daimonic and that he 
exaggerated this and conflated it with the oracle to offer an embellished image to his fellow citizens: 
inde igitur Socratis divinitatem originem traxisse.
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the-youth charge. In general, Xen. seems to be laying emphasis on Socrates' 
relationship with various individuals, e.g. with Xen. himself as his acquaintance and 
admirer, with Hermogenes and Apollodorus as members of his circle, and with 
Chaerephon, an appai*ently well-known figure in Athens (PI. Ap. 20E). In this way 
Xen. again seems to be attempting to preserve the anecdotal, conversational quality 
characteristic of the Comm., whereas Plato’s approach seems to consist in stressing the 
fact that Socrates commanded the respect and affection of entire portions of the 
Athenian citizenry, a fact emphasized all the more by their actual presence at his trial 
(see immediately below).
Plato: Plato does not use Xen.’s personal framing device, but the fact that he 
includes his own name in two significant passages (34A & 38B) is at least some 
indication of the intimacy felt by him towai'ds his mentor. Although the Xenophontic 
Socrates' acquaintances aie mentioned more frequently throughout the narrative, the 
Platonic Socrates’ exhaustive citation of names in court (33D-34A) and the address to 
his supporters after the trial have a decidedly dramatic, even poignant effect and, if 
historically accurate, were presumably directed quite specifically towards winning an 
acquittal.
24. Xen.'s reference to Socrates' self-restraint (§§16-18) can be compared with 
Plato's to his poverty (23B-C).
Xen.: In Xen. Socrates' pursuit of philosophy has led to self-restraint and an 
ability to rely on the pleasures of his soul, the material manifestation of which is the 
type of poverty described more explicitly in Comm. IV.2.37 and Oec. 2.1 ff.35 
Socrates' poverty does not come up directly in Xen. Ap.\ Its existence is simply 
implied in his inability to pay back his friends (§17: èyco •qKiori av e%oipi %pfi|iaTa 
àvTiôiÔôvai).
Plato: Socrates' poverty and the accusation of having accepted fees are each 
mentioned at least twice in Plato and once in connection with each other (31B-C). It 
should be borne in mind that in both works Socrates' poverty is a physical proof of an 
adherence to principles, not of his actual innocence with respect to the prosecutors' 
char ges, though Plato’s Socrates elevates both his poverty and his disobedience to a 
higher plane by invoking the notion of a divine mission.
25. Xen. 's Socrates refers to disobeying one's parents, and Plato's to challenging 
authority in general.
Xen.: Xen. not only brings up disobedience but has his Socrates figure defend it 
strongly on the grounds that education is one of his particular* interests and that an
^^Gigon ([1946] 245) notes Xen.’s more positive perception of Socrates' poverty.
176
expert's opinion should override that of any family member. Xen.’s approach in 
conceding this point to the prosecution is similar* to that of the Schutzschrift, where he 
in essence admits that Polycrates' claims are at least partially justified while doing his 
best to explain Socrates’ real motives in acting as he did.36
Plato: Plato's Socrates not only directly challenges the heliastic authority by 
saying that he would not obey any restriction on his philosophical activities if so 
imposed as a sentence, but he also concludes his speech by making a thinly veiled 
threat to the court in which he speaks of his young successors as potential 
malcontents. In addition, Socrates accounts for his unpopularity by pointing out the 
effect that his methods have had on the sons of wealthy fathers (23C). Yet he 
vehemently denies ever having taught anyone anything (33A: éy® ôè ÔiôàcncaXos pèv 
oûôevôs TwonoTE èyevôpTiv), much less any esoteric doctrine (33B: e l ôè rls <})ti0 i nap 
èp-oû TccûTcoré t i  jxaSetv tj àKoûaai lôiçt on pf| xai oi ctA^ Xoi navres, eu rare on  o ù k  
âXT|0f) Xéyet), and he refuses to take any responsibility for the actions of his followers 
(loc. cit.), an apparent reference to such notorious figures as Alcibiades, Critias, and 
Charmides. I maintain that Plato’s account differs from Xen.'s in emphasis, not in 
substance, and that the dramatically personal invitation of the Platonic Socrates to the 
relatives of his followers to come for*war*d and denounce him agrees in essence with 
the justification of Socrates’ influence on the young which appears in Xen. Ap.
26. Both accounts agree on Socrates' reasons for refusing to propose a counter- 
penalty, though Plato's version differs in other respects. Plato's Socrates is given a 
short speech here; Xen. 's is not.
Xen.: Xen. provides two reasons for Socrates’ refusal to propose a counter­
penalty: 1) he considers it to be an opportune time to bring his life to an end, and 2) to 
propose a counter-penalty would be equivalent to admitting guilt for his actions. It is 
possible to draw the simple conclusion that the two reasons given are in fact related 
and that Socrates was held in contempt of court for refusing to suggest a counter­
penalty, which in turn led to the court's decision to have him executed because of the 
lack of any alternative. Socrates refuses to allow his friends to stand surety for him, 
nor does he allow himself to be persuaded to flee Athens. Xen. Ap. is generally 
chaiacterized by its brevity, but it seems quite appropriate in this case: According to 
this version, counter-penalty was proposed, and Socrates' principles were such that 
there was no need for further discussion of the matter. Xen.'s description of Socrates'
3^Unlike Xen., Plato nowhere seems to concern himself witli Polycrates in his writings, perhaps 
because he did not want to be associated witli the views of the Antistlienians, or perhaps he felt that 
Polycrates did not merit a response or, conversely, that most o f Polycrates' accusations were true and 
could not be denied (Chroust [1957] 214-15). See Essay C for a lengthy treatment of Polycrates.
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behavior at this point in the proceedings is fully consistent within itself, while Plato's 
contradictory account is indeed difficult to explain (see immediately below).
Plato: According to Plato's Socrates, the proposal of a counter-penalty would be 
equally self-incriminating (37B: 7te7C8io|iiévos ôf] èy® piriôéva àÔiKeîv %o%loû ôé® 
épauTÔv ye àÔiKfioeiv Kai Kaf épauTOÛ èpeîv amôs ®s ct^iôs elp-i Toû KaKoû Kai 
îi|if|aeo0ai roiomou t i v o s  èpcrurcp), a statement which follows his cyiTrjais proposal 
and makes it clear that the latter is to be understood ironically. (The absence of this 
first proposal in Xen. Ap. is particularly puzzling since it would supply such an 
excellent example of peyaA-qyopia.) But how does one explain the subsequent 
proposals? Socrates' total property was valued at very little (see Oec. 2.3, where it is 
assessed at five minae), and he obviously could not be expected to liquidate all of his 
assets and leave his wife and three children without any means whatsoever. Are the 
fines, then, to be considered another example of Socratic levity? Perhaps the first fine 
of one mina (valued at approximately $4,000+ when based on the American minimum 
wage of $5.00 per hour and the fact that fifth-century Athenian stoneworkers were 
paid one drachma per day for their work on the Erechtheum) could be so interpreted, 
but the second fine of thiity minae (approximately $120,000+ by the same standard) 
was a considerable amount of money.^  ^ At the moment, I see no way of reconciling 
this last, obviously serious proposal with Socrates' earlier statement unless he had 
given up his case as being already lost and yielded to his friends' importunity out of 
respect for their feelings. Unfortunately, the vague explanation in 38B (ei pèv yap fiv 
poi xpfipaw, éxipTiaàpTiv av %pT|pdx®v ooa êp ellov  èKxeioeiv, oûôèv yàp dv 
èpxàpqv) offers no help towards explaining the contradiction.^^
27. Both authors mention Socrates' refusal to live elsewhere but with different reasons 
attributed to the respective Socrates figures: In Xen., the prospect o f an imminent 
death dissuades him from escaping; in Plato, banishment would entail not being able 
to continue his divine mission.
Xen.: Xen. mentions escape in §23, where he humorously refers to the 
unlikelihood of his escaping death.in another country. The daimonic is mentioned as
3^For the seriousness o f die Platonic Socrates' final counter-penalty offer, see Riddell xix, Brickhouse 
& Smith (1989) 225-30, and also Reeve 172-73, who observes that Socrates is explicit in saying that he 
is paying as much as he can afford (see PI. Ap. 38A-B). In PI. Ep. 361E thirty minae is mentioned as 
being a good-sized dowry.
3^See the comment on §23. There have been various unconvincing attempts to explain tliis 
discrepancy between the two accounts: According to Chroust ([1957] 40: see too Oldfather 209), it is 
possible that the clerk only noted the Prytaneum proposal and failed to note the counter-penalty during 
all o f the uproar that ensued: This would account for its omission in Xen. Edelstein (p. 145 n. 13) 
believes that Plato's Socrates agreed to propose the counter-penalty because he knew that it would not 
be taken seriously by the dicasts. Oilier (pp. 94-95) offers a similar conjecture: Socrates' first proposal 
was ironic, and tlie second was presented so off-handedly that it could not have been taken seriously.
In this light, Xen.’s account therefore remains true to the spirit, if  not the letter, o f Socrates' actual 
words. For other views on this matter, see the comment on §23.
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discouraging him from prepaiing a formal defense, and this, combined with 
considerations of his advanced age, leads him to conclude that he has come upon an 
appropriate occasion for ending his life. There are of course some general similarities 
with the Cri. (see, for example, 53D-E), but even if Xen. was influenced here by 
Plato, any closer comparison would be necessarily tenuous unless Plato's personified 
Laws could be compared somehow with the apotreptic influence of the Xenophontic 
Socrates' daimonic sign.
Plato: Continuing his philosophical mission is the principal concern of Plato’s 
Socrates and rales out any thought of accepting a sentence of banishment. The only 
point in common between the two authors is the fact that Socrates' actions in both 
cases are motivated and sanctioned by religious considerations, in the one case by the 
daimonic sign and in the other by Socrates' interpretation of the Delphic oracle. Both 
positions can only result in the death penalty.
28. In Xen. Socrates does not address the charges of the earlier accusers.
Xen.: To resolve this problem, it is necessary first to look at Xen.'s own 
statements concerning the purpose of his work, i.e., that he intends to explain 
Socrates' peya^riyopia (§1) and that Socrates did everything within his power to 
prove his innocence (§22). It is quite possible that the additional statement which 
appears in §22, i.e., that Xen. does not feel compelled to relate everything that 
occurred at the trial, refers implicitly to such omissions as this one, though it is 
noteworthy that this disclaimer appears after the Meletus dialogue and not before it so 
as to coiTespond to Plato's sequence of events. As it stands, it would more obviously 
apply to an omission of the lengthy self-vindication section in PI. Ap. (see next item). 
There is in fact no hint (except perhaps for the references to "free instraction" in §26 
and to the positive influence on Anytus' son in §29) of Socrates' physicist/sophist 
background in Xen. Ap., and this can only be accounted for by reasoning 1) that it did 
not seem immediately relevant to Xen. because it was not explicitly megalegorical, 2) 
that it was never actually discussed in court and is therefore a Platonic invention, or 3) 
that he had an inadequate account of the trial as his source.39
Plato: Plato's Socrates makes short work of the physicist/sophist charges and 
moves quickly to a broader treatment of the ill will that his activities have engendered
39w etzel (pp. 73-75) suggests that Xen. was simply too young at the time to be aware o f Aristophanes 
and the cases of Anaxagoras and Protagoras; by the time he was older, the city was at war, and he was 
occupied with other matters. Posterity preserves the anti-sophistic nature o f the trial in Aeschin. contra 
Titnarch. 173 and Plu. CaLMa. 23, and according to Wetzel, the fact that Xen. was unaware o f this 
anti-sophistic aspect of the trial further invalidates the historicity of Xen. Ap. 10-26. Vander Waerdt 
(pp. 32-33) believes that Xen. was well aware o f the charges o f the "old accusers" (see Oec. 6.12-17, 
Smp. 6.6-8, and Comm. 1.1.11-16: see too Delebecque 208) but omitted tliem from Xen. Ap. to avoid 
calling Socrates' piety into question. The emphasis on KaioKayaOla in the Dec., on the other hand, 
can be seen as a definite response to Aristophanes’ earlier charges (ibid., p. 38).
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in the community. He deals with these prejudices at some length since, as he says in 
28A, it is precisely these accusations and the prevailing opinion against him, if 
anything, which will lead to his being convicted. In general, Socrates chooses to 
concentrate more positively on his divine mission and the vindication of his life's 
work rather than on the more negative charges represented by the specific accusations, 
both past and present.
29. In Xen. Socrates' self-vindication speech appears as part of his treatment of the 
Delphic oracle and during his dialogue with Meletus; in Plato it appears after the 
Meletus dialogue.
Xen.: In Xen. Socrates’ self-vindication (§§17-21) appears directly in response to 
the Delphic pronouncement, a fact which, though not coixesponding to a divine 
mission, nevertheless lends his activities the quality of being sanctioned by a god. 
Again, the Xenophontic Socrates' much shorter justification of his actions (a few 
strands of which also occur in his response to the jury after the final verdict in §§24- 
26) may perhaps be accounted for by the disclaimer in §22, though a fuller tieatment 
would have lent more support to the statement that Socrates did everything within his 
power to prove his innocence.
Plato: The brief allusion to the oracle in PI. Ap. 28E links, as it does in Xen. Ap., 
Socrates' self-vindication in 28D-35D directly to his divine mission. Generally, the 
impression left by Socrates in PI. Ap. is that the prosecution's charges are trivial and 
that after quickly dismissing them he can move to the more important work of 
justifying his life as a philosopher, which is far more extensive than Xen.'s treatment 
of the same subject. Plato’s account, if true, seems to coiTespond more directly to his 
Socrates' professed desire to win an acquittal (37A-B).
30. In Xen. Socrates rebukes the dicasts after the penalty is rendered and consoles his 
followers after the trial; in Plato Socrates does both while waiting to be led away. In 
general, there are a considerable number of similarities between the relevant sections 
in both authors.
Xen.: Xen.'s Socrates does not himself provide a reason for the verdict, though 
Xen. ascribes it solely to his peyaXriyopia. Socrates addresses the two indictment 
charges again briefly while asserting that his self-esteem has in no way been 
diminished by the conviction; he further adds for the second time that the decision to 
execute him is unprecedented if one compares his alleged wrong-doing with the 
statutory capital offenses in Athens. This section is similar to its Platonic counterpart 
in its rebuke of the jury and in the reference to posterity, and in spite of its purely 
negative tone, this speech seems to be addressed to the entire jury, not to one part of it 
as in Plato. Xen.'s Socrates refers to Palamedes to emphasize the injustice of the
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conviction and the opinion of generations to come, while Plato mentions him more 
briefly as being someone with whom he will be able to compare experiences in the 
after-life, provided that such an after-life exists. Xen.'s reflections on Anytus outside 
the court seem to represent a more individualized continuation of his more general 
rebuke in §§24-26, and the same holds true for his Homeric prophecy concerning 
Anytus' son. Socrates' tone here could only be described as vindictive, while Plato's 
Socrates eventually softens his tone, saying that he bears no ill will towards any of the 
dicasts, although their own motives in convicting him were certainly less than well 
intentioned. Xen. consoles his followers after the trial by focusing on the mortality of 
all humans and on the timeliness of his own death; he also tries to lift their spirits with 
the jest he makes to Apollodorus. There is no mention of the daimonic sign, though 
the prophecy concerning Anytus' son serves a similar purpose (see too §32: épol pèv 
oûv Ô0K8Î 6 8 0 (|)tXoûs polpas x8 xn%T|K8 vat). Socrates is described on leaving the 
court as Kai oppacn xal axfipaxi Kai PaSiGgaxi <|)aiôpôs (§27), a description of 
confidence similar in tone to the Platonic Socrates' closing words to his supporters 
among the dicasts. Xen.'s naixative voice appears at the conclusion of Xen. Ap. to 
confirm Socrates’ prophecy concerning Anytus and to reiterate his assertion that 
Socrates' p8 yaA,T|yopia can be explained by his readiness to die. Finally, Xen.'s 
remarks on Socrates' consistent fortitude under duress can be compared with the 
Platonic Socrates’ assertion that no good man can be harmed.
Plato: The post-conviction speech in Plato is much longer than Xen.'s, and the fact 
that Socrates no longer treats any of the indictment charges gives it a distinct tone of 
resignation, albeit optimistic resignation, to his fate. The overall effect of the Platonic 
Socrates’ speech is one of addressing Athens (and its succeeding generations) in 
general, including for the moment its constituent groups of enemies and admirers. It 
is interesting that Socrates deals at some length with what he considers to be the real 
reason for his conviction, i.e. his refusal to resort to a demonstrative appeal for mercy, 
a point treated at some length earlier (34B ff.); it is also noteworthy that Plato’s 
Socrates admits that the conviction is pointless since his life is almost over (38C), a 
remark reminiscent of Xen.'s general thesis. The rebuke concludes with a Homeric 
prophecy (cp. the Anytus prophecy in Xen. Ap. 30) about the possible retribution of 
his followers and with an admonishment of the government for putting innocent 
people to death, a remark intended, perhaps, to be a stinging comparison with such 
practices under the recent junta. Socrates then turns to address those who voted for 
his acquittal, a section which coixesponds roughly to Xen. Ap. 27-28 and which some 
scholars consider to be a Platonic fiction. However, there are enough similarities 
between the relevant sections to support the view that Socrates addressed his
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supporters in some capacity after the proceedings, whether in court or notri  ^ He 
discusses the nature of death at length in a way reminiscent of the Phd. and adds a 
note of levity (cp. Socrates' quip in Xen. Ap. 28) by saying that he intends to subject 
the great figures in the after-life to his eXeyxos, knowing that there will be no danger 
there of the death penalty. The reference to his daimonic sign, missing in Xen., 
supports his previous claim that his actions have been sanctioned by the gods.
Finally, his reference to his sons adds a personal touch reminiscent of the conclusion 
of Xen. Ap. and surely meant by Plato to be contrasted with Socrates' earlier refusal to 
drag his children before the court to win the pity of the dicasts.
Outlines of both dîtoA-oylat appear in juxtaposition on the following pages.
^^Moreover, the argument that the historical Socrates could not have delivered a speech 
similar to the speech placed in his mouth by Plato because it did not conform to judicial 
procedure is invalid for the simple reason tliat the trial was already over and that Socrates 
explicitly states in 39E that he is waiting for the officials to complete their business: o i 
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Appendix C: Socrates' Daimonic Sign and Its Relevance to the Charge of Impiety
1) On the Daimonic
To Saip-oviov is an abstract neuter substantive formed from the adjective 
ôai|iôvios,-ct,-ov, formed in turn from the noun Ôaip-cov, which applies either to a 
Geos or to an inferior spiritual being and refers in particular to its dealings with 
humans;  ^ this meaning obtains from Homer to Plato (Riddell 109). Throughout the 
following discussion it will be important to bear in mind the abstract, adjectival 
quality of the term to Ôaipôviov and the fact that, though Plutarch and the 
Neoplatonist commentators come to make an explicit connection between to 
ôaipôviov and Saipoves in their discourses, neither Xen. nor Plato treats the former 
as a truly distinct entity.^ Since the adjective ôaipôvios has no direct equivalent in 
English, I have chosen to render to ôaipôvtov as "the daimonic" 1) to preserve its 
original meaning, 2) to retain the important abstract quality of the articular 
construction, and 3) through an alternative spelling, to rid the teim of the unwelcome 
connotations inherent in the derivative English word "demonic".^
2) Its Use in Xen.
The passages relevant to an explanation of to Ôaipôviov in Xen. are as 
follows: Ap. 4-5, 12-15, Comm. 1.1.2-5,1.1.9,1.1.12,1.1.15,1.2.58,1.3.4-5,1.4.2,
1.4.10,1.4.15,1.4.18, IV.3.12-15, IV.7.10, IV.8.1, IV.8.5-6, IV.8.11, Smp. %.5,Ages. 
5.4, Eq. 11.13, and HG VI.4.3, VII.4.3. These include all nouns, adjectives, verbs, 
and adverbs deriving from the noun ôaipcov (with the exception of the words xaivà 
ôaipôvia as quoted in the indictment, which will be treated below) and also any
^See, for example, PL Smp. 202D-203A, where the daimonic realm is described as occupying an 
intermediate position between the realms o f gods and men.
^To Saipoviov as a substantive appears in the Septuagint, for example, where it seems to be used as a 
diminutive o f 5at|i©v (see Burnet [1924] 16). Beckman (p. 77) explains tlie vagueness of the term to  
Saifioviov as being due to Socrates' philosophical agnosticism: In this sense it becomes a hunch or 
intuition, but one originating not in Socrates' own psyche but in tlie transcendent "beyond", and its 
vagueness corresponds to his professed ignorance about "higher" matters. Joyal (p. 42) refers the 
vagueness of the term to Socrates himself: "The inference [regarding tlie various terms used in tlie 
early Socratic works to describe Socrates' sign] presents us with a Socrates who, because he knows 
only tliat his sign is not a 6aipoiv but does not know what it actually is, relies unswervingly upon a set 
of vague phrases and circumlocutions - a pattern o f linguistic behaviour appropriate for the sceptical 
Socrates whom we recognize from numerous Platonic dialogues and from early sources as well." 
Maier's remark (p. 462) also bears some consideration: ...offenbar spricht sich in der Wahl der 
Bezeichmmg "Ddmonisches" etwas von der Ironie aus, mit der der M eister den Nimbus des 
Wundermannes von sichfernzuhalten wujite. Maier adds (p. 463) that Socrates' devotion to philosophy 
was surely in large part due to his unwavering faith in the daimonic.
^Aaipoves tended to be personified less clearly than 9eoi, hence the former’s later negative 
development (see More 43). I notice that Reeve also uses the term "daimonic"; for the articular 
construction, see Friedlander 1:33.
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usages which generally contribute towards an understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. In Xen. words deriving from Saipcov appear in various forms as follows: 
ôaipôviov as a neuter (Ages. 5.4 and Comm. 1.1.9) and ôaipôvios as a masculine 
adjective {Comm. 1.2.58), SaipovicuxctTa as an adverb {HG VII.4.3), and the infinitive 
ôaipovâv {Comm. 1.1.9); to Ôaipôviov as such appears in HG VI.4.3, Smp. 8.5, Ap. 4, 
13, and Comm. 1.1.2,1.1.4,1.4.2,1.4.10, IV.3.14, IV.8.1, IV.8.5. Synonyms or near 
equivalents are ti Ôaipôviov {Eq. 11.13 and Comm. 1.3.5), ôaipôvia {Comm. 1.1.12 
and Ap. 12), ôaipoves {Ap. 14), to OeXov {Comm. 1.4.18, IV.3.14), tà Oeîa {Comm.
I.1.15), 0e6s {Comm. 1.1.5), oi 0eoi {Comm. 1.1.15, TV.3.13, IV.8.11), 0eoû ((irnvf;
{Ap. 12), tà  tob 08OÛ auppou^^upata {Ap. 13), f) tmv Gerôv yvcopri {Comm.. IV.8.11), 
m o  0GOÛ (jjarvopeva {Comm. 1.1.5), tà  m o  tmv 0emv oripaivopsva {Comm. 1.3.4), i\ 
TTQpà trôv 0eœv auppouX.ia {Comm. 1.3.4), crupPouXoi {Comm. 1.4.15), and pavtiKti 
{Comm. 1.1.2, IV.7.10). Finally, examples of verbs which appeai" in conjunction with 
to Saipoviov and related constructions include dyeiv {HG 6.4.3), KcoXueiv {Eq.
II.13), èvavtioÛ00ai {Ap. 4), crripaiveiv {Ap. 12), and Tcpocrripaiveiv {Ap. 13).
Aaipoviov and its derivatives are used genericaUy in Comm. 1.1.9 and 1.1.12
as well as in Socrates' dialogue with Aristodemus {Comm. 1.4.2,1.4.10),while the 
precise nature of this broader conception of the divine is treated at length in Socrates' 
dialogue with Euthydemus in Comm. IV.3.12-15, a discussion which describes 1) the 
gods' unsolicited influence on Socrates' actions (§12: el ye pT\5e èîcepoyccûpevoi m o  
oov [oi 0eoi] Trpocrqpaivo'uoi aoi à te %pf] îioielv Kai à pf;), 2) the fact that the gods 
should be worshipped on the basis of their works, not on any expectation of 
witnessing an actual epiphany (§13: àXX è^ apK-rj aoi tà  epya aûtcov ôpcôvti 
oepéaOai xal upâv toùs 0eous), 3) the gods' invisibility (§13), 4) the belief that the 
soul partakes of the divine and rules in us invisibly (§14: àXkà pf]v k q I  àv0p(mou ye 
V'bX'H» eiTiep ti xai àXXo tmv àvGptmivcûv, tob 0etou pete%ei, oti pèv paaiXebei 
èv iqpîv, (j)avep6v, ôpâtai ôè obô' abtf|),^ and 5) the corollary belief that one should 
not disdain the invisible but honor to ôaipôviov on the basis of its manifest power
^Gomperz ([1924] 151) divides the religious views o f tlie divine as expressed by tlie Xenophontic 
Socrates into three categories: die oberste Gottheit {Comm. 1.4.2,1V.3.14-15 and HG VI.4.3), die 
Gottheit {Comm. 1.4.17-18, II.3.18-19 and Oec. 7.22-31), and die Gdtter {Comm. 1.4.11,1.4.14,1.4.16, 
1.4.18, IV.3.3, IV.3.12-13 & IV.3.15-17).
^See Phd. 79E-80A. It is characteristic of Xen. {Comm. IV.3.14) tliat he describes the single godhead 
in domestic terms (tctôe 5è tà  p éyiata  olxovopmv). Note too tliat, if  the human soul is to tlie body 
what this all-encompassing principle is to the cosmos, and if the soul does in fact partake o f tlie divine 
principle (both o f which ideas are expressed in the same passage), it is a small step indeed from Xen.'s 
Greek conception of the divine to the Vedic unification of the Atman with Brahman, a view which first 
emerges in occidental thought in the writings of Plotinus (see H. Storig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der  
Philosophie [2nd éd.], Frankfurt, 1990, p. 205).
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(§§14-15: à XPB Ktttavoobvta \n\ Kata(})pov8Îv tmv àopcttcov, àkX 8k tcûv 
yiyvopévcûv tT|v Sbvapiv abxdav KatapccvSdvovxa xipâv xô Ôatpôviov).
One meaning of Saipoviov and related words in Xen. seems to refer to the 
intervention of an external, supernatural force to account for inexplicable actions or 
incidents. Examples of this usage include the following: 1) The reaction of the 
Spaitan assembly to Prothous' strange and unaccountable proposal that Cleombrotus 
disband the army is explained by the fact that events were being influenced by xô 
ôaipôviov (HG VI.4.3: f] ô’ exKlriaia aKouaaaa xabxa exsivov pèv ô^^uapèiv 
liyfioaxo" TjÔTi yàp, ms ëoiK8, xô ôaipôviov fîy8v). 2) Lycomedes' unforeseen death 
caused by disembarking where the enemy happened to be standing guaid is described 
adverbially as ôaipovimxaxa (HG VII.4.3: xai ÀuKoprjÔTis xaûxa Tcpàxxmv, àrcimv 
’A0f|VT]0ev Ôaipovicôxaxa à 7 c o 0 v f |< 7 K 8 i  k x A,.). 3) The reader's success in 
horsemanship is guaianteed unless xi ôaipôviov intervenes (Eq. 11.13: xl exi 
èpîtoômv xouxcp pf] obxi...8Ùôoxip8Îv Ôè aùxôv èv xp iTtmKfj, îjv pfj xi ôaipôviov 
Kro^ in^ ;).^  4) A similar example explains how any failure resultmg from the adoption 
of Socrates' exemplaiy lifestyle could only be due to the intervention of the daimonic 
(Comm. 1.3.5: xp(hp8vos av xis [xi] ôialxr] xabxri], 8i pf[ xi ôaipôviov eiri,
0appaA,éms xai da(j)Ct^ ®s Ôiàyoi). 5) In a related passage Xen. puns on this usage by 
having his Socrates figure say that anyone who does not recognize the daimonic 
influence on human affairs is "jinxed", i.e., is paradoxically the victim of such an 
influence (Comm. 1.1.9: xoùs ôè px|Ôèv xmv xoiouxmv oiopevous eivai ôaipôviov, 
àXXà Ttàvxa xijs àv0p(mivT)s yvmpxjs, Ôaipovâv éi^ r\). 6) This usage is also 
represented in the controversial II. passage (quoted in Comm. 1.2.58) which Socrates 
allegedly used as a justification for class distinctions. Here Odysseus addresses 
individual leaders and troops of the Greek army with the vocative ôaipôvi’ as they 
race towards the ships after Agamemnon’s ill-advised attempt to test his men by 
suggesting that they sail home. In all of these examples, the sense of xô ôaipôviov 
perhaps most closely approximates that of the Old-English word wierd (with an added 
element of xuxt]).
Examples of the specifically beneficial influence of the daimonic include the 
following: 1) Xen. describes Agesilaus' common sense as ôaipôviov and contrasts 
ôaipôviov with àv0pccm:ivov (Ages. 5.4). 2) The intervention of xô Ôaipôviov in 
Socrates' life is described as a type of divination, and its advice always proves to be 
true (Ap. 13: Kai yàp xmv ôtA^ mv jtollols ôf] è^àyyeiXas xà xob 0eob
®Cp. Oec. 2,18 (on Critobulus' potential success): et oo i 6 Geos pi) evavTioixo.
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cruppouAebpata obôeTcowcoTe \|/8U0àpevos è(f)àvT|v). 3) For this reason, Socrates 
always put complete faith in ôaipôvia  as opposed to àv0pcém:iva {Comm. 1.3.4: Tcavxa 
xav0pcc>7civa ÙTcepetopa Tcpos xf\v Tcapà xmv 0emv cruppouXiav) and never acted 
without the approval o f the gods {Comm. IV.8.11: eboepfis pèv ouxms [fiv] mox8 
pTjSèv aveu xf|s xmv 08mv yvmpTis Tcoieiv). 4) Socrates considered the divine (xo 
08tov) to be ubiquitous in its influence on human affairs, and this ubiquity 
encouraged moral behavior on the part o f his followers {Comm. 1.4.18-19: yvmoei xo 
08ÎOV oxi XO0OÛXOV Kai X010ÛXÔV èaxiv mo0' apa Tiavxa ôpâv Kai m vxa  aK0U8iv 
Kai Tcavxaxob Tcapewai Kai apa rcdvxmv è m p 8 lè i0 0 a i. èpoi pèv obv xabxa 
Xéymv...[ZmKpàxT|s] xoùs cruvôvxas èÔÔK8i Tcoieîv...a7C8X8o0ai xmv àvooimv X8 Kai 
àÔlKmv Kai aloxpmv).
The influence of the daimonic on Socrates is specifically linked by Xen. with 
divination (f] pavxiKri): 1) His Socrates figure makes this claim himself, and Xen. 
links this personal foim of divination directly to the indictment {Comm. 1.1.2: 
Ôi8xe0pùXx|xo yàp ms <j)aiT| XmKpdxris xo ôaipôviov èanxm oripaiveiv ô08v ôf) Kai 
pdXicxd poi ÔOKOÙOIV aùxôv alxidaao0ai Kaivd ôaipôvia 8lo(|)ép8iv). 2) Xen. 
adds in a related passage {Comm. IV.8.1) that the fact that Socrates was convicted 
does not in any way disprove the effect of the daimonic on his life. 3) In general, 
Socrates advised others to take up divination, by means of which they would always 
be able to divine the intentions of the gods through omens {Comm. IV.7.10). 4) The 
gods who communicate these signs are omnipresent, even in our thoughts {Comm.
1.1.19: SmKpdxTjS Ôè itdvxa pèv f^yeîxo 08oùs elôévai, xd X8 ^yôpeva Kai 
itpaxxôpeva Kai xà oiyf) pouAeuôpeva), and such media as birds, voices, etc. simply 
serve as means of communication between the daimonic and human realms {Ap. 13 
and Smp. 4.48).^ Socrates' obedience to these signs has already been noted {Comm. 
4.8.11), and the uniqueness of his daimonic sign is stressed elsewhere {Comm. 
IV.3.12). Socrates referred others to divination only in aieas beyond human 
understanding {Comm. 1.1.6-9), though he was also known occasionally to give them 
the benefit of his own divine intimations {Comm. 1.1.4). All in all, xo Ôaipôviov in 
Xen. can best be considered a type of private oracle.^
^In Comm. IV.3.14 tliunder and otiier natural phenomena are called iwrnpexai xc5v 0ec5v.
^See Taylor (1932) 43. For Gompeiz ([1924] 157-58) the daimonic is eine neue Art derM antik, ein 
von jeder heiligen Stdtte, von alter priesterlichen Vermittlung, alien allgemein anerkannten Vorzeichen 
Privatorakel. Maximus o f Tyre (8.1 ff.) compares tô Saipoviov witli oracular divination and 
maintains that Socrates' virtuous character made him particularly susceptible to divination in general. 
See too Plu. De genio Soc. 588D-E.
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The influence of the daimonic on the Xenophontic Socrates can be described 
as being both apo- and protreptic (see, for example. Comm. 1.4.15: oxav rcépTccoaiv [oi 
0eot], mcmep cru <|)T]s Ttépireiv amobs, ouppobAous o xt xpf] Jtoielv koi pf] xcoielv), 
and in his associations with other people this can result in his offering supematurally 
influenced advice to his friends in some cases {Comm. 1.1.4: Kai tcoXXois xmv 
ouvovxmv 7iporiyôp£i)8 xà pèv 7coi8Îv, xà ôè pfj Tcoieîv, ms xob ôaipovlou 
Ttpocrripaivovxos: cp. Ap. 13)  ^ and also cause him to remain aloof in others {Comm.
II. 6.8: Tcpmxov pèv, e^ T], xà Jtapà xmv 0emv èîci0K87cxéov, 8i oupPoulebouoiv abxov 
Ôilov 7ioi8ia0ai: cp. Smp. 8.5, where Antisthenes chides Socrates for ignoring him: 
xo ôaipôviov Tcpoôaai^ôpevos ob ôiaXéyxi poi).^® Despite the repeated statement 
that xo ôaipôviov also has a protreptic effect on Socrates' judgment, Xen. describes 
no specific incident in which a dhectly protreptic influence either on Socrates or his 
associates is in evidence, something which biings Xen.'s account much closer to 
Plato's purely apotreptic description. In general, the daimonic's function in Xen. is to 
pronounce upon a proposed course of action, either in the interest of Socrates or of his 
friends, and upon the expediency, not necessarily the morality, of such decisions.
The voice of the daimonic during the events leading up to his trial is decidedly 
apotreptic: After first stating that having led a virtuous life is his best defense {Ap. 3), 
Socrates then goes on to tell Hermogenes that the daimonic has opposed him twice 
while preparing to organize a formal speech {Ap. 4: Kai ôis r\b'r\ èTiixeip'noavxôs pou 
0KO7C8ÎV 7C8pi xf\s ÔTco^oylas èvavxiobxai poi xô ôaipôviov: cp. Comm. IV.8.5-6), 
and that he interprets this inteiwention in a positive way {Ap. 5: -q 0aupaaxôv 
vopi(^8is 81 Kai xm 08m ÔoKsi èpè péXxiov èivai Tjôri xeA^uxâv;).^  ^ The indictment 
is quoted {Ap. 10: cp. Comm. 1.1.1), and Socrates then proceeds to rebut the specific 
impiety charge by referring to his public worship of the state gods and by equating the 
individualized voice he perceives (which, as he says, he more accurately calls xô 
ôaipôviov) with other forms of divination relying on the interpretation of sounds, in
^See An. 111.1.4-6 and Comm. 1.1.6 for its presumed effect on Socrates in encouraging Xen. to join the 
expedition o f Cyrus (see too Smp. 4.5, where Socrates states that seers often cannot foretell what will 
happen to themselves, though they can do so for others). In considering Socrates' advice to Xen., 
Cicero {Div. 1.54) seems obliquely to connect xô ôaipôviov with the Delphic Apollo. Cicero's source 
seems to have been Antipater of Tarsus, an ascription which would indicate a Stoic interest in Socrates' 
sign (see Maier 453 n. 4).
^®Plato, while not denying the effect of Socrates' voice on the lives o f his associates (with the pseudo- 
Platonic exception of Thg. 128D ff.), offers nothing to support this idea (see Gomperz [1924] 160 n. 1). 
llR iddell 111-12 (see too Gundert 520 & 525, McPherran 190, and Bumet [1924] 127).
1 ^ Oldfather (pp. 205-206) notes that Xen.’s and Plato’s accounts o f the apotreptic role o f the daimonic 
in Socrates’ approach to the trial essentially agree and tlierefore support the argument, first suggested 
by Maximus o f Tyre (3.5-8), for Socrates' silence during the proceedings.
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particular, of those made by birds, humans, thunder, and the Delphic god {Ap. 12- 
13). As conclusive evidence he offers the fact that any advice given to friends that 
was inspired by the daimonic has always proved to be true {Ap. 13), and after the 
dicasts' inteiTuption he continues by saying that Chaerephon's report concerning the 
Delphic oracle is yet further evidence that he is honored by Saipoves {Ap. 14).
Xen. argues elsewhere {Comm. 1.1.5) for the authenticity of Socrates' daimonic voice 
by demonstrating that his reputation would have suffered if it had proved false.
3) Its Use in Plato
The passages relevant to an explanation of the concept xo ôaipôviov as it 
appears in Plato aie as follows: Ap. 270, 31C-D, 40A-C, 41D, Euthphr. 3B, Euthd. 
272E, R. 382E, 4960, Phdr. 242B-0, Smp. 202D-203A, Tht. 151 A, Ale. 1 103A-B, 
and Thg. 1 2 8 D - 1 3 1 A.^  ^ The formulation xo ôaipôviov per se appears in Ap. 40A, R. 
382E, Euthphr. 3B, Smp. 202D, and Tht. 151 A, and the adjective ôaipôvios in any 
form can be taken generally, as in Xen., to mean "daimonic".Synonyms or neai* 
equivalents of xo Ôaipôviov are represented by the following examples: r\ xob 
Ôaipoviou ôbvapis {Ale. 1 103A and Thg. 129E), xo cnipeiov {Ap. 41D and Thg. 
129D), xo 81CO0ÔS 0T1P8Î0 V {Ap. 400), xo ôaipôviov (rqpeiov {R. 4960), xo eimOos 
crr|p8iov xo ôaipôviov {Euthd. 272E, Phdr. 242B, and Thg. 129B), (jicovri {Phdr. 2420 
and Thg. 128D ff.), f] ôtovT] f] xob ôaipoviou (Jhg. 128D), xi ôaipôviov èvavximpa 
{Ale. 1 103A), ôaipôvia...ixpaypaxa {Ap. 270), 6 08Ôs {Thg. 130E), xo xob 08ob 
crrjpeiov {Ap. 40A), xi 08iq poipq7cap87rôp8vov...ôaipôviov {Thg. 128D), xo 08iov 
{Thg. 130E), 08ÎÔV XI Kai ôaipôviov {Ap. 310-D), xà 08Îa {Euthphr. 3B), and 
fi„.8l(jo0ma poi pavxiKT] f\ xob ôaipoviou...iruKvq {Ap. 40A). Examples of verbs 
associated with these designations include yiyveaOai {R. 4960), èjcloxeiv {Phdr. 
2420), àK0U8iv (as applied to Socrates' perception of xiva ôœvfjv in Phdr. 2420),
l^Fritz ([1931] 57) paraphrases as follows: Wie die andern Leute zwar sagen: 'ein Vogel hat mich 
gewarnt', so sagte auch Sokrates zwar: 'das ôaipôviov hat mich gewarnt', meinte aber: 'ein Gott hat 
mich durch das ôaipôviov gewarnt'. Compare the English usage: "A little birdie told me."
Plu. D e genio Soc. 589E-F Simmias reports that an oracle once told Socrates' father Sophroniscus 
to give his son little guidance while he was growing up, from which Simmias concludes that Socrates 
had his own internal guide.
^^Hie Thg. and Ale. should, o f course, be approached with caution because o f their possibly spurious 
nature, though their supposed origins in the Academy make them worth at least some consideration. 
Joyal (p. 56) believes that these two dialogues were instrumental in the eventual transformation of  
Socrates' divine sign into a tutelary Ôa'ipcov, and that any untraditional elements can be considered 
misinterpretations o f the relevant Platonic passages.
*^^ See Gomperz (1924) 158-60. Aaipôvios can be explained as denoting a connection with a divine 
agency and to ôaipôviov as denoting sometimes the agency and sometimes the agent itself. Plato's use 
o f ôaipôviov is sometimes adjectival, sometimes elliptically substantival, while Xen. restricts himself 
to a substantival usage only (see Riddell 109-110 and Vlastos 280-81).
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èâv  {Phdr. 242C), Gpàxxeiv {Phdr. 242C), aTcoxpéjceiv {Ap. 41C), ÔTCOKCoAueiv {Tht. 
151A), èvavxioûaBai {Aie. 1 103B), Geiq jioipq mapéneoGai {Thg. 128D: also cited 
above), crruiaiveiv (Jhg. 128D), ôiaKCûîibeiv (Jhg. 129D), croAXapPaveaGai {Thg. 
129D), ctTcxeoBai {Thg. 129E), and èKpeîv (TTzg. 130E).
Plato's Socrates describes his inner voice as having originated during his 
childhood {Ap. 3ID: èpoi Ôè t o u t ’ e o t i v  è k  Ttaiôôs àp^àpevov, ôcûvfi xts 
ytyvopèvT)),^  ^and he mentions its uniqueness elsewhere {R. 496C: f |  yàp tcou xivi 
àXAcp 1] oûôevi xmv epTcpooGev yéyovev)4^ It affects both action and speech (see Ap. 
40B) and is further described as occurring to him frequently {Euthphr. 3B: oxi Ôf] où 
xô ôaipôviov ôîîs aauxm èKàoxoxe yiyveoGai), even with respect to quite trivial 
matters {Ap. 40A: f]...pavxiKf] r\ xoû ôaipoviou...Ttàvu tcukvti àei f]v Kai Tcdvu èm  
apiKpoîs èvavxioupévrj: cp. Comm. IV.8.11, where Socrates is said never to have 
acted without the approval of the gods); this seems to account for the more trivial 
occuiTences presented in Euthd. 272E (preceding the arrival of Euthydemus et al.) and 
in Phdr. 242B-C (where the daimonic compels Socrates to recant his earlier speech on 
Love).^^ As in Xen., xô Ôaipôviov is directly related to divination {Phdr. 242C: elpl 
Ôf] ouv pavxis pèv, où Tcdvu ôè aTtouôaîos k xX.: see too Ap. 40A), and the author of 
the Thg. takes this relationship one step further by having Theages finally suggest an 
attempt to conciliate Socrates' sign (oripeiov) by traditional means of worship (e.g. 
sacrifices), a suggestion to which Socrates surprisingly assents {Thg. 130E-131A).^9 
Plato uses the word ôaipmv in the sense of the Latin genius, or personal attendant, in 
Lg. 730A, Phd. 107D ff., and Ti. 90A but never confuses it with ôaipôviov (see 
Riddell 109-110 and Apul. Soe. 15), and it is clear from other passages (e.g. Ap. 31C, 
Phdr, 242B, Euthd. 272E, and Tht. 151 A) that ôaipôviov does not describe a distinct 
entity.
In Plato XÔ ôaipôviov is strictly apo-, not protreptic, and the daimonic in this 
respect seems to involve itself frequently in Socrates' educational mission,^^
^^See too Thg. 128D. Joyal (pp. 43-44) believes that tiiis passage contributed to the later 
transformation of Socrates’ sign into a tutelary Saipcov (see note 15 above).
^^Riddell (p. I l l )  observes that the Xenophontic Socrates also appears to believe tliat, whereas he is 
unique in possessing this gift, tlie gods’ ëpya are manifest to aU (see Comm. IV.3.12-13). 
l^There are no counterparts to these passages in Xen., and I agree witli Burnet's observation ([1924] 
16) that Plato on the whole treats the daimonic "quite lightly, and even ironically" in comparison with 
Xen. See Phillipson (p. 91) and Maier (p. 457) for further comments on differences in tone.
^®Note the similar idea inherent in tlie facetious use of ac|)oaicoaa)pat in Phdr. 242B: Kai rtva <|)0)vnv 
ëôo^ev aùxôQsv âKOÛoai, ti pe oùk èçt àniévai jrp'iv dv à(|)0aicôacûpai.
^^Friedlander 36. Guthrie ([1978] 3:404) sums up his explanation of the phenomenon by saying that 
Socrates was aware of a special, direct relationship existing between himself and divine forces, and 
that an important function o f the daimonic was that it made Socrates' educational activities a matter of 
genuine vocation.
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especially in determining his associations with particular pupils (Jht. 151 A: èviois 
pèv xô yiyvôpevôv poi Ôaipôviov àîroKCûAùei ouveivai, èvlois ôè éq: see too Ale. I 
103A-B for its role in keeping Socrates from forming a relationship with the young 
Alcibiades22). This aspect of the daimonic receives a great deal of attention in 
Pseudo-Plato's Thg. 129E, where Socrates describes xô Ôaipôviov as being averse to 
some associations, neutral towards others, and encouraging (i.e. protreptic) towards 
still others. Of those who associate with him, some improve permanently, while 
others improve only temporarily, including a certain Aristides, whose progress was in 
fact directly proportional to his actual physical proximity to Socrates, whose 
influence on his followers here verges on the mystical or thaumaturgical {Thg. 129E- 
130E: cp. Tht. 151 A: xai Ttdliv ouxoi èmôiôôaoi). The author's account in the Thg. 
resembles Xen.'s in that the daimonic is also described as exerting a dissuasive 
influence on Socrates' followers (128D).23 Socrates' Apolitie is also explained in Ap. 
31C-D by the apotreptic intervention of his inner voice: ÔTipooiq ôè où xoApœ 
àvapaivmv eis xô tcXùGos xô ùpéxepov oupPouAeueiv xf\ tcôà,8i. xoùxou ôè aïxiôv 
éaxiv...ôxi poi 08ÎÔV xi kqx Ôaipôviov ylyv8xai.24 The guiding voice of the 
daimonic is conspicuously silent during Socrates' trial, a fact which he interprets to 
mean that his conviction has been sanctioned by the divine will {Ap. 40A-C &
4 ID),25 and we may also infer the apotreptic influence of the daimonic in such 
passages as Cri. 54E (Adam [1891] xxiii).
22Among others, Taylor ([1926] 522-23) considers Ale. I to be spurious and the role of xô ôaipôviov in 
103A to be decidedly un-Platonic (see note 15 above).
23 Although it seems to partake more of the later magical "demon" idea (note, for example, its near­
personification through the author's choice of verbs), xô ôaipôviov as described in Thg. 128D ff. comes 
closest, on the whole, to Xen.'s account (Gomperz [1924] 158 n. 3). The autlior o f tlie Thg. goes on to 
mention specific examples of Socrates’ failed efforts to influence others, including his attempts to 
discomage an athlete from participating in the Nemean Games (128D-129A) and to detain an 
acquaintance about to commit a murder (129 A-C), and of his predictions about tlie disasters resulting 
from the military campaigns in Sicily (129C-D) and Ionia (129D) (see Plu. D e genio Soc. 581D-E). 
Cicero {Div. 1.54), apparently using Antipater and various unnamed Ubri Socraticorum  as sources (see 
note 9 above), also discusses the role o f Socrates' apotreptic voice in his warning Crito about an eye 
injury which the latter suffered soon afterwards and in Socrates' refusal to turn down a particular road 
because of the threat o f danger while accompanying Laches after the defeat at Delium. Plutarch {De 
genio Soc. 580D-F) mentions an incident in which Socrates' voice prevented him from getting knocked 
down by a group of muddy pigs. Gigon ([1947] 165-66) comments tliat Socrates' sign might in fact 
have concerned itself with such ludicrous events as these, and that Plato downplayed it because he 
found it antitlietical to his own philosophy.
2^See R. 496C ff. and the practically identical wording in Thg. 128D. The daimonic sign's warning 
was o f course amply justified by the Arginusae and Leon affairs.
25vrijlandt (p. 68) has a considerable number of misgivings concerning the role o f  the daimonic sign 
in PI. Ap., including tlie following concerning its absence throughout the trial: D eos enirn turn monere 
homines cum tnonendo eos adiuvare non iam possunt, credibile non est. Gundert (p. 527) offers the 
following explanation: ...nitr weil [Sokrates das Gottliche] in der Wahrheit seines Fragens so 
gegenwdrtig ist, dafi es ihn in keiner Aporie verldfit, hôrt er seine Stimme auch da, wo der eigene
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4) Its Nature
By comparing the descriptions of xo Ôaipôviov as they appear in Xen. and 
Plato, the following general conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the 
daimonic's influence on Socrates: It is associated with the divine and with 
divination,26 and it uniquely signals its intimations to Socrates alone by means of a 
voice which either dissuades him (as in Plato)27 or advises him both apo- and 
protrepticaUy (as in Xen.), which advice he follows without exception.2^  In short, the 
daimonic voice could be explained as a sudden sense, before caiTying a purpose into 
effect, of the benefit of abandoning it or, according to Xen., of the expediency of 
abandoning it or following through with it, as the case may be;29 the action is then 
subjected to an independent justification on the basis of the intervention. To 
ôaipôviov could be described in a general sense as a spiritual guide (Guthrie [1978] 
3:402), under the influence of which death no longer seemed to be a great adversity to 
Socrates as he faced his final crisis (see Comm. IV.8.6, Xen. Ap. 4-5, and PI. Ap. 4GB- 
C).
Logos versagt, und kann er sich aufsie so verlassen, dafi ihm sogar ihr Schweigen die gottliche 
FUhrung bezeugt (see too Brickliouse & Smith [1989] 237 ff, for their comments). In Comm. IV.8.1 
Xen. quite vehemently defends the daimonic's role in events at the trial, and this prompts Gigon 
([1946] 234) to see the entire Ap. as being a reaction to ttie following assertion: Wenn das Daimonion 
eine gottliche Realitdt gewesen wdre, so hdtte es Sokrates vor diesem Tode bewahrt.
26Riddell (p. I l l )  notes, however, that Socrates' experience differs from divination in that the 
daimonic's intimations occur to him spontaneously, that is, without his actively seeking tliem.
^^In keeping with Plato’s account, Cicero {Div. 1.54) defines it as a signum...mali alicuius inpendentis, 
and Apuleius {Soc. 19) observes that x6 ôaipôviov could not have been a true omen since Socrates also 
would have received positive encouragement from it. Bumet ([1924] 16-17) remarks that in Plato 
dreams, as opposed to tlie daimonic phenomenon, sometimes give Socrates positive advice (see Phd. 
60E), an important function of dreams which appears as early as Homer. Proclus {in Ale. 81) explains 
the apotreptic nature of Socrates’ sign as being peculiar to Socrates, and the fact that it appears to him 
only (see Xen. Ap. 13, Comm. IV.3.12, and R. 496C) can be taken as a sign o f divine favor (Gomperz 
[1924] 161-62).
2^See Comm. 1.3.4 and PI. Ap. 29b. Riddell (pp. 115-16) has attempted to resolve the discrepancy 
between Plato and Xen. by pointing out tliat the apotreptic function of the daimonic, equivalent to an 
act o f judgment, would be its most conspicuous feature, while any protreptic quality would coincide 
with Socrates' existing intention and be little noticeable; Gomperz ([1924] 160 n. 1) suggests tliat the 
apotreptic sign might have been expressed by Socrates in a protreptic way (see Comm. 1.1.4). I feel 
that any contradiction between the two accounts quickly disappears if, like Socrates in PI. Ap. 40A  ff., 
one interprets the silence of tlie daimonic voice to be a protreptic sign. (This would also explain the 
problematical use of èçt in Tht. 151 A.) Moreover, since there is m fact no example in either author of 
the sign's protreptic influence, each Socrates figure must be considered in any given situation involving 
daimonic influence to bear full responsibility for the results o f his actions.
29see Riddell 113. In describing the mantic aspect o f Socrates' voice, Plutarch compares the daimonic 
influence on Socrates to a sympathetic vibration and tiie tipping o f a balanced beam {De genio Soc. 
580F-581A & 589C-D, respectively).
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Xen.'s and Plato's accounts of the daimonic agree in that they both describe a 
divine sign, a voice^® that dissuades Socrates from speaking or acting in a certain way 
(see PI. Ap. 40B), and a phenomenon closely related to divination. The precise nature 
of the daimonic is unclear in both authors, but from Xen. Ap. 14, Comm. 1.4.14, 
IV.3.12, R. 496C, Ap. 31C, and Phdr. 242B it seems clear (in spite of such words as 
àKoûaat in the Phdr. passage) that it is not so much a particular sound as an 
individual phenomenon which only Socrates experiences.Apuleius (Soc. 19) points 
out that Socrates could not have based his actions on a human voice since he heard 
the voice in remote areas (as in Phdr. 242B) and since he never attaches a particular 
person's name to it. Plutarch {De genio Soc. 581A-B) perhaps whimsically suggests 
through his character Polymnis (and on the supposed authority of Terpsion of 
Megara) that t o  ôaipôviov was a sneeze. Xen.'s and Plato's testimonies belie this, 
and if it was in fact a sneeze, there clearly never would have been any question as to 
its nature (Gomperz [1924] 160 n. 1). In 588C-D of the same dialogue, Plutarch has 
Simmias the Theban say that Socrates discounted visual revelations altogether,^  ^and 
that the daimonic influence on him must therefore be considered a mental perception 
or a voice to which Socrates was especially susceptible because of his general 
detachment from the corporeal side of his nature.^  ^ This entirely coiTesponds with 
the accounts in Xen. and Plato, neither of whom, despite the appeaiance of cyripeiov 
and similar words, describes it in a specifically visual way.
Brickhouse and Smith ([1994] 189-94: see too McPherran 175 ff.) point out 
the apparent contradiction between Socrates' belief in divination (manifested by his 
inner voice) and the strict rationalism which he expresses in such passages as Cri. 
46B.34 The authors' position is that Socrates considered divination to be an 
independent sphere, and that he would always follow divination in preference to 
ratiocination in cases of conflict, a practice supported by his religious beliefs in 
general. They note that t o  ôaipôviov opposes him only when he is about to take
^^Professor Halliwell has kindly pointed out to me the related importance o f the verb aKoueiv {Cri. 
54D) in reference to Socrates’ perception o f the personified Laws. References to an actual voice 
appear in PM r. 242C, Thg. 128D ff., and Xen. Ap. 12-13, a phenomenon which Phillipson (p. 97) 
describes as an auditory hallucination.
3lSee Amim (p. 56 ff.) who also believes tliat the concept o f a silent, inner voice would have seemed 
contr adictory to the Greeks at that time since the term <|Kovii by its very nature referred to something 
literally audible.
22See Comm. IV.3.13 ff., where Socrates insists on the invisibility of the divine.
^^Plutarch's Simmias character describes this sound as a deity's voiceless message (588E), and he 
elaborates on this by saying that à sound is to the sense of hearing what a higher being’s intellect is to 
the human mind (588E-589A), See below for the similar views of the Neoplatonists.
^'^See Hackforth 94. Lincke (p. 709) feels that the Socratic concept o f avOptoTtivT) yvcojiti {die 
Denkfreiheit) is in fact completnented by Socrates' belief in the influence of the daimonic.
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action, not while he is simply considering it.^  ^ The voice does not necessarily 
intervene when Socrates is acting without forethought but often seems to manifest 
itself after due deliberation (so-called "trumping"). Socrates invariably obeys the 
voice but sometimes attempts subsequently to deteimine why its opposition was 
beneficial. In general, Socrates' certainty about his voice's beneficial guidance may 
be partly a product of reason, but the voice itself remains beyond the realm of reason: 
It simply says "Stop".36 viastos (pp. 283-87) takes issue with Brickhouse and Smith's 
notion of "tmmping", stating that Socrates would have been unwilling to accept any 
daimonic prompting "if it had offered counsel obnoxious to his moral reason". In 
short, Socrates' faith never trumped his reason. If my conclusions below about the 
daimonic sign are true, however, any trumping quality could be ascribed to the 
subconscious considerations surrounding any given decision (processes which, 
though subconscious, are by their very nature of a rationalizing quality) which would 
suddenly ovenide other considerations at the critical moment of decision. Deriving 
ultimately from his own personal values as developed by that particular point in time, 
such intuitive promptings would therefore necessarily conform to Socrates' moral 
reason, whether he consciously attempted to rationalize them afterwards or not. 
Viastos also notes quite appropriately that the issue, raised by Brickhouse and Smith, 
of the extent to which Socrates was actually committed to any given decision before 
the sign intervened is a very sticky one indeed.
Later ancient authors, in particular the Neoplatonists, equated t o  ôaipôviov, 
as depicted in the earlier Socratica, with a Ôaipcov, transforming it, in effect, from an 
abstraction into a concrete e n t i t y . I t  is important to remember in considering these 
commentators that, although ôaipoves indeed appear in the Platonic dialogues, Plato
^^In other words, the daimonic does not contribute to form a purpose but pronounces judgment on a 
purpose already formed, that is, it acts as a reflexive judgment on purposed actions but does not 
motivate them (Riddell 116). Viastos (pp. 282-83) points out quite rightly that the daimonic sign is not 
to be taken as a "revelation", since this term implies an imnediate understanding of the reasons behind 
its intervention,
^^In general, see Galaxidorus’ similar observation about this contradiction in Socrates' nature in Piu.
D e genio Soc. 580A-B; in a later passage (581B-C) Polymnis remarks that the daimonic influence on 
Socrates was not in keeping with his otherwise determined, unspontaneous personality. See too 
Apuleius {Soc. 17-18), who represents divination and wisdom as distinct spheres through examples 
drawn from Homer.
^^See, for example, Max.Tyr. 9 passim. In the treatise De deo Socratis, which concerns itself 
primarily with the nature o f Saijioves and applies this to Socrates' case specifically, Apuleius describes 
the daimonic influence in such a way that it resembles one of the guardian ôaipoves as they appear in 
the Phd., although they serve not merely as psychopomps but as true guardians o f individual human 
souls (§15: cp. Plu. De genio Soa  589F-592E & 593D-294A). Gigon ([1947] 164) and loyal (pp. 55- 
56) believe that the Academy began to associate Socrates’ daimonic sign with 6ai|xoves as early as 
Xenocrates, For specific references in later autliors to the identification o f Socrates' daimonic sign 
with a ôat|iQ)v, see Joyal (pp. 39-40).
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himself never makes such an explicit connection with t o  Saipoviov.^* Xen., on the 
other hand, connects the daimonic influence on Socrates directly with batjxoves on 
one occasion by having his Socrates figure point out to the dicasts in Ap. 14 
(immediately after the explanation of his daimonic phenomenon) that the oracle's 
pronouncement shows that he is further honored by ôctipoves (aye ôi) aKonaaTe xal 
aXXa, iva e t i  jaaXXov oi pooÀôpevot ùpmv a T c ia T W c n  t ^  è p è  T e T i p f j a O a i  m o  
5aip.ôv(ùv), an interesting remark which may indicate at least some connection 
between the Delphic Apollo and Socrates' inner voice.^  ^ The later writers conceived 
of the human soul as occupying an intermediate position between the mundane realm 
(as represented by the body) and the supernal (as represented by the gods), and as a 
result the human soul is especially susceptible to the intervention of Ôatpoves, which 
occupy a similarly intennediate position in the cosmic hierarchy, Proclus and 
others attribute any daimonic influence to an indwelling spiritual presence that was 
not perceived by the senses, but by the conscience." !^
A partial explanation of t o  ôaipôviov is possibly suggested by reference to the 
work of Julian Jaynes, whose theory of bicamerality is based inter alia on the mental 
processes of the Homeric heroes (primarily of those in the //.). According to 
J a y n e s , mankind's intellectual development as represented by the figures in Homer 
was at that time in a "bicameral" stage when the individual was still egoless and the
^^Although TO Saijj-oviov is never referred to as a ôai|icov in die early sources, Joyal (p. 55) maintains 
that "it is exactly as a personal, tutelary, allotted, and active Saipcov Üiat it was conceived at an early 
date" and finds this conception in a nascent form even in the writings o f Plato and Xen. (Note too &at, 
if  F. Solmsen [RE'^  5 col. 1734] is correct in saying that Arist. Rh. 1398A incorporates part o f  
Theodectes' ’AïioXoyia ZcoKpctTous, then the latter seems also to have treated the daimonic in some 
capacity.) That Saipoves were long considered to have some influence on individual lives is clear 
from such adjectives as eùôatpav and KaKoôalpcûv.
^^Xen.'s Socrates is undoubtedly attempting here to personify the 5aip6via cited in the indictment in 
order to make the association with Delphi. Gomperz ([1924] 167 n. 1) identifies the voice o f the oracle 
directly with t o  Ôaipôviov (see too Phillipson 290 and McPherran 138), while Gundert (p. 517) 
remarks that the Platonic Socrates reacts in the same way to both the daimonic sign and die Delphic 
pronouncement, that is, he subjects each to some form of interpretation and then acts accordingly. It is 
also worth noting that Heraclitus (ff. 14 Marcovich) uses the verb cnipaivEiv in referring to the Delphic 
Apollo. See note 11 above.
40See Cic. Div. 1.54, Apul. Soc. 6, Plu. D e genio Soc. 593A, Max.Tyr. 8.8 ff., and Prod, in Ale. 83-84. 
Proclus (§84) speaks of a tripartite division o f tlie universe into o w ia ,  Suvapis, and èvépyeia  
(corresponding to gods, ôaipoves, and humans, respectively), making the ô w a p is  the sphere of 
daimonic intervention. A hierarchical conception of 5aipoves is suggested as early as Heraclitus (fr.
92 Mai’covich): dvfip vqirios TiKotioe %pos Saipovos/oKtoairep Jtais Tcpôs àvSpôs.
"!!See Prod. In Ale. 80. Olympiodorus (m Ale. 23 Creuzer) speaks of this conscience as influencing 
the human soul, hence its existence as something distinct from it
"!2jaynes 72. Jaynes' ideas, though independently formed (p. 71 n. 1), are quite similar to those of 
Snell (chh, 1-2). This topic has been treated more recently by C. GiU {Personality in Greek Epic, 
Tragedy, and Philosophy, Oxford, 1996, ch. 1) in the context of the relationship between Homeric 
deliberation and Greek philosophical thinking.
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gods were objectifications or projections of human consciousness: "Volition, 
planning, initiative is [ /^c] organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' 
to the individual," so that the Mycenaean heroes become, according to this theory, 
"noble automatons"/^ In short, bicameral societies existed at a time "when every 
kingdom was in essence a theocracy and every man the slave of voices heard 
whenever novel situations occuiTed" (p. 83). Jaynes further traces the developing use 
in Greek literature of certain words (e.g. Gnpos"!"!) which in Homer are thought of as 
relating to objective parts of the environment or of the body, not as pertaining to the 
mind and its functions, and the increasingly abstract nature of these words as they 
develop indicates the breakdown of the bicameral mind as the individual begins to 
project the stress resulting from some decision or conflict onto a particular emotion 
and/or part of the body affected by such stress (p. 257 ff.). In later Greek literature 
the gods consequently recede into the background, and abstractions of every kind, e.g. 
time and justice, move into the foreground as the non-conscious bicameral mind 
continues to break down."!^  Jaynes observes that seers and omens are the hallmarks of 
this process (p. 273) and states elsewhere that "a more primitive solution [to the 
breakdown], and one that antedates consciousness as well as paralleling it through 
history, is that complex of behaviors called divination," which he defines as an 
attempt "to divine the speech of the now silent gods" (p. 236). In a related passage 
Jaynes describes "spontaneous" divination, which "differs from the...preceding types 
only by being unconstrained and free from any particular medium....The outcomes of 
the undertaking or the intentions of a god ai'e thus read out from whatever object the 
diviner happens to see or heai'.""!^  Jaynes also makes some interesting remarks 
concerning schizophrenia, which he defines as a sort of vestigial bicamerality (p.
404). Auditory hallucinations are described as occuning both to psychotics and to 
normal people under stress as follows: "If we are correct in assuming that
"!^Jaynes 75. See Snell (p. 40): Vor allem echte, eigene Entscheidungen des Menschen kennt Homer 
noch nicht, auch in den Überîegungsszenen spielt deshalb das Eingreifen der G dtter solche Rolle (see 
p. 50 ff. for specific examples from Homer). Snell (pp. 11-12) adopts a somewhat different approach 
to tlie issue of non-consciousness in the Mycenaeans: Wenn im Folgenden etwa behaiiptet wird, die 
homerischen Menschen hdtten keinen Geist, keine S eek  und infolgedessen auch sehr viel anderes noch 
nicht gekannt, ist also nicht gemeint, die homerischen Menschen hdtten sich noch nicht freiien oder 
nicht an etwas denken kdnnen und so fort, was absurd wdre.
"!"!See Snell (pp. 25-42) for his treatment o f the words 0U|iôs, and voos in Homer.
"!^Jaynes 272 ff. Jaynes (pp. 288-92) explains tlie invention of soul (and therefore of dualism), for 
example, as progressing from 1) the Homeric concept of vimxh as "livingness" to 2) the concept o f an 
after-life to 3) the notion o f soul (vous) as distinct from body (see Snell 35-36). Gundert (p. 521 ff.) 
finds the origin o f tlie daimonic sign in tlie Platonic Socrates' perception o f the soul.
"!^Jaynes 244. Cp. the distinction made between professional and natural divination in Plu. De genio 
Soc. 593C-D and Cic. Div. 1.14 ff.
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schizophrenic hallucinations are similar to the guidance of gods in antiquity, then 
there should be some common physiological instigation in both instances. This, I 
suggest, is simply stress....During the eras of the bicameral mind, we may suppose 
that the stress threshold for hallucinations was much, much lower than in either 
normal people or schizophrenics today....It has now been clearly established that 
decision-making...is precisely what stress is" (p. 93). Schizophrenics are also prone 
to hear inner voices: "Sometimes [the schizophrenic] feels he has been honored by 
this gift, singled out by divine forces, elected and glorified, and this even when the 
voice reproaches him bitterly, even when it is leading him to death" (p. 95). Finally, 
Jaynes remarks that, if his theory holds true, then there should be no evidence of 
individuals being negatively labeled as "insane" prior to the complete breakdown of 
the bicameral mind in that particular* society, and he supports this by citing Phdr.
244A, where Plato calls insanity a divine gift."!^
Whatever the value of the bicamerality theory, much of what has been said 
accords nicely with the descriptions of Socrates' daimonic phenomenon."!  ^ Without 
going into any extensive psychological speculations about its nature,"!^  I think that it 
is safe to draw the following conclusion based on Jaynes' ideas: Socrates' inner voice 
is described in Euthphr. 3B and Ap. 40A as occurring to him very frequently, even 
when the matter at hand is quite trivial, and its occunence is always linked with some 
sort of conscious (or subconscious, as I take it to be in Eiithd. 272E and Phdr. 242B- 
C) decision-making process. I consider it to be at least plausible, therefore, that 
Socrates lived during a period in history when certain mental phenomena were still 
attributed to an external spiritual source and, in this particular case, to an 
individualized source which Socrates chose to designate carefully with the abstract 
formulation t o  Saipoviov to distinguish it from other, more specific (and to him less 
credible) types of public divination (see Xen. Ap. 12-13). Moreover, since the voice
"!^Jaynes 405-406. Jaynes also refers here to the original meaning of the Greek word napavoia, which 
he interprets as meaning literally "of two minds" and generally "insanity" in a neutral sense.
"!^ lt is interesting to note that Jaynes never once alludes to Socrates in support o f his arguments. 
Interesting too is the fact tliat Plutarch {De genio Soc. 580C), Apuleius {Soc. 1, 17-18, 20 ,24), and 
Maximus of Tyre (8.5-6) do in fact compare Socrates' sign with the Homeric gods. Maximus (8.6) 
qualifies his compaiison by pointing out that, whereas the Homeric gods are manifold, Socrates' 
Saipoviov is 6V k o i  àTcXoûv k q i  I ô ic o t ik ô v  k q i  5Ti)i,otiKÔv.
"!^Gomperz ([1924] 163), for example, no doubt quite appropriately describes to ôaijiôviov as a 
Bewufitseinsspaltung. Taylor ([1932] 44 ff.) is o f the opinion that Socrates' daimonic sign and his 
moments of self-absorption are characteristics o f a visionary, and it is tempting to compare his sign 
with his trances (see PI. Smp. 175 A-B, 220b-d) and with other similar, non-specific forms o f temporary 
"possession" represented by poetico-religious inspiration (see, for example, PL Ap. 22B-C, Ion passim. 
Men. 99C, Ti. 71E-72A, and PM r. 244A ff.) and by temporary loss of judgment {HG  Vl.4.3 and 
Comm. 1.1.9).
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is so closely associated with decision-making, it seems likely that it would coirespond 
to what we would call a "voice of conscience" or, to rid it of any moral implications, a 
"voice of judgment". Beckman (p. 76) observes that the daimonic voice would seem 
to resemble our voice of conscience but for the fact that it is confined to future 
contingencies, nor does it always have to do with judgments of moral value.^ )^
Riddell (pp. 113-17) calls the voice an act of judgment of a highly trained mind while 
raising the following difficulties: 1) Socrates first became aware of the voice in 
childhood, and 2) the accounts in the Phdr. and Euthd. have nothing to do with 
judgment. He adds, however, that in all other cases the results of Socrates’ 
daimonically based decisions lead to good results by a chain of means, not of 
accidents, and chooses Xen.'s more consistent account of to ôaipôviov while 
attributing the inconsistencies in Plato to artistic license. Riddell further explains its 
associations with divination and the divine by saying that the voice was the result of a 
rational mind^! and is to be considered as Socrates' designation for the unanalyzed 
processes of thought and judgment: In short, Socrates spoke of his "mental processes 
as human up to the point where he could still follow them,-beyond that as divine."
These seemingly conflicting views, which do not take the subconscious 
sufficiently into account, can be resolved and simplified as follows: I consider 
Socrates' daimonic voice to encompass the functions of both judgment and 
conscience, depending on the circumstances of its occurrence. This objectified 
"voice" becomes apparent to all human beings as soon as they have mastered 
language to the extent that they aie aware of their own thoughts, i.e., during 
c h i ld h o o d .^ 2  The anomalous incidents in the Phdr. and Euthd. can be explained as 
sudden acts of judgment by comparing them to similar mental phenomena such as the 
so-called "Eureka phenomenon" (the Germans' Aha-Erlebnis), which occurs as the 
result of a sudden synthesis of subconscious thought processes.Sim ilarly, 
Beckman's objection to considering Socrates' voice as a voice of conscience seems 
iiTelevant if one considers that Socrates might well have been considering future 
contingencies while rapidly (and subconsciously) weighing the moral implications of
^(^Recall that the Neoplatonist writers relate the daimonic voice to conscience (see above).
^^Maximus of Tyre (8.3) calls Socrates' daimonic sign p o v o v  o ù  Tfj yv(6pTi a ù x o ù  d v a K S K p a p e v o v .  
^^See Xen. Ap. 16 and PI. Ap. 3 Id. I am not afraid to make a bold generalization and say that we have 
aU experienced an "inner voice" at one time or another, especially during the process o f making 
decisions large or small: Among recent religious figures, Gandhi comes to mind (see L. Fischer, The 
Life ofM ahattna Gandhi [New York 1950] 264,284, 302-303), and a number o f people have 
suggested to me the well-known example of Joan o f Arc.
^^Noted too by Snell (pp. 51-52): Auch uns verschwindet das Bewujitsein, selbst etwas getan zu haben, 
wenn w ir an Vergangenes zurUckdenken, und wir fragen uns etwa: wie katn m ir nur der Plan, der 
Gedanke dazu ?
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a particular decision to be made in the immediate present. I feel that these general 
conclusions, combined with that drawn from Jaynes' bicamerality theory above, 
provide a workable interpretation of to Saipoviov and similar usages as applied to 
Socrates in Xen. and Plato.
5) Its Relevance to the Charge of Impiety
The impiety charge against Socrates as it appeal’s in the versions given by 
Xen. {Comm. 1.1.1) and Diogenes Laertius (2.40) reads as follows: à Ô i K e î  Z c o K p c (T r |s  
obs pèv T) TcoXis vopl^ei Oeous où vopiÇcûv, STepa 5è Kaivà ôaipôvta  ei0(t)épcov.^'!
It is beyond question that the Kaivà Saipovia mentioned in the indictment refer 
specifically to to ôaipôviov as used by the Socrates figurc in each author,^  ^and the 
question ultimately becomes one of detemining the prosecutors' motives in phrasing 
their charge in such a way.^  ^ 1 maintain that the answer to this question hinges on 
the intentional vagueness of the accusation, which depends not only on the nebulous 
foiTnulation KOivà Saipovia,^"  ^but also on the lack of any clear distinction in 
contemporary Greek between the uses of the nouns Geos and ôaipcûv and between the
^^^Diogenes' version differs from Xen.'s only in its use of the verb eicrr|Yelo0ai instead o f eia(j)épeiv. 
The indictment is cited elsewhere in PI. Ap. 24B-C and Xen. Ap. 10-11 (see too Socrates' allusion to 
the indictment in Euthphr. 3B: <j)Tiai yap [ M é X,t |t o s ] pe tioitittiv  e i v q i  0emv, k q i  as k q i v o o s  TtoiobvTa 
0EOÙS T0ÙS 6’ apxalons on vopiÇovta E y p a v a x o  Tonxav aùxâv ë v E K a ,  a s (j)Ticnv).
^^See Wilamowitz (1919) 2:51, E. Derenne 153-54, Friedlânder 33; Riddell 109; and Arnim 56 ff. The 
relevant passages are PI. Ap. 31C-D ( p o t  0 ê i ô v  x i  k q i  S a i p o v i o v  y i y v e x a i ,  o Sfi k o I  è v  xr) y p a #  
è T ü iK a p t p ô â v  MÉXnxos è y p â v | / a x o ) ,  Euthphr. 3B ( a s  o n v  K a i v o x o p o n v x o s  o o n  r tE p t  x a  0 E i a  y é y p a i t x a i  
x a n x r iv  x f iv  ypa{j)Tiv, k q i  a s  S i a p a X â v  5 t) e p x e x a i  els x 6  S i K a a x q p t o v ,  s lô à s  ô x i  e ù 8 i d p o A ,a  x à  
x o i a n x a  ix p ô s  x o ù s  7ïoA,X.oùs), and Comm 1.1.2 (Ô iE X E 0p n X T ixo  y à p  às ((«atn  Z a K p â x n s  x 6  ô a i p ô v i o v  
è a t ) x 0  a n p c t i v E i v  ô 0 e v  5i t\ k q i  p à X t o x â  p o t  S o K o n o t v  a ù x ô v  a l x t d a a a 0 a t  K o t v à  S a t p ô v t a  
E to ( |)É p E tv ) . With tliese passages in mind, it seems all the more surprising that Plato's Socrates would 
speak so casually in court about his daimonic sign (see Vrijlandt 66).
^^In his Varia Socratica Taylor offers three counter-arguments regarding tlie supposed importance of 
the daimonic voice to the prosecution: 1) Plato’s Socrates says nothing about tlie daimonic during the 
part o f the Ap. dealing wiüi impiety but brings it up incidentally in 31C. This would seem to refute 
Xen.'s claim that it made up part o f the prosecution’s brief (p. 11). 2) Socrates seeks to justify his 
abstention from politics by attributing it to his sign, which proves that the jurors would not have seen 
anything offensive in it: If it had in fact played any part in Meletus' accusation, the language o f Plato’s 
Socrates would be ridiculous (p. 13). 3) The fact that Aristophanes does not burlesque Socrates' sign 
would seem to indicate that it had nothing to do with the imputation o f impiety (p. 157).
^^It is irrelevant whether the form is singular or plural. Socrates admits to hearing and acting on the 
advice o f a unique ô a i p ô v i o v ,  which the prosecution quite naturally turns into tlie plural in its ypa<j)f| 
by stating that "Socrates is guilty of introducing novel ô a i p ô v i a  [into the polis]". Reeve (p. 76) 
believes that tlie plural is used in the indictment because it refers specifically to K a i v à  ô a i p ô v i a  
T i p d y p a x a  (see PI. Ap. 27C), that is, "to the doings o f a daimon, to its utterances, visitations, and 
pronouncements". Hackforth (pp. 69-70) suggests that tlie prosecution perhaps merged x ô  ô a i p ô v i o v  
with the gods of the Ionian physicists (see Reeve 76), and it is also tempting to consider whether or not 
the "other gods" mentioned in Phd. 63B are somehow related to the indictment. According to two late 
sources (J. Ap. 2.267 and Serv. A. 8.187), kainotheism was proscribed by law (see Parker 214-15 & ch. 
9 passim); on the ambiguity of the term K a i v à  Ô a i p ô v i a ,  see Parker 203, Derenne 154-55, and 
McPherran 135.
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uses of any neuter substantives formed from the derivative adjectives Oeios and 
Saipovios. The word 0e6s had already been used abstractly by some of the 
Presocratics (e.g. Diogenes of Apollonia) to describe certain cosmic principles/^ 
while to Oeiov in a similar sense appears as early as Anaximander.^  ^ Forms of, and 
derivatives from, Oeos and ôaipwv aie used interchangeably in the Xen. and Plato 
passages concerned with Socrates’ sign, (^! and even the distinction between each noun 
and its corresponding neuter substantive often becomes unclear.^! The use of the 
phrase xaivà ôaijiôvia therefore allowed the prosecution to exploit the rich 
ambiguity of the word Saipoviov, which to a dicast's eai* would have ranged in 
meaning from an abstract concept of the Divine (as in Socrates' philosophical sense of 
the word) to the notion of a definite, though unnamed, e n t i t y . Qn the other hand, 
the vague adjectival quality of the word would have been of equal value to Socrates in 
his defense against the accusation that it represented a new god,^  ^and a more specific
^^See the parody of his and others' ideas in Nu. 223 ff.
^^Jaeger (1947) 31. To Gelov also appears in Hdt. 1.32 and 3.108, and xô ôaipôviov in a similar sense 
in 5.87. Gomperz ([1924] 151) translates xô Geiov (as it appears, for example, in Phd. 81 A, R. 61 IE, 
Phdr. 242C, and Ep. 315C) as die Gottheit and remarks that Plato in this sense rarely calls it xô 
ôaipôviov (but see R. 382E: IlavxTi dpa àvi/euôès xô ôaipôviôv xe Kai xô 0eiov.
^% over ([1974] 138) translates 0eôs as "god", Ôalpmv as "deity", and ôaipôvios as "supematural".
To Proclus ( m  Ale. 7 8 - 7 9 )  and other Neoplatonists» tlie difference between a Ô a lp m v  and a 0 e ô s  was of  
course simply one of degree.
^!por examples, see the passages cited immediately after headings n  and III above, e.g. PI. Ap. 27C ff. 
(Ôaipôvia —> ôaipovEs), Euthphr. 3B (ôaipôvia —> 0Eot), Euthyd. 272D-E (0eôs —> ôaipôviov). 
Comm. IV.3.14-15 ( 0 e io v  —> Ôaipôviov), Xen. Ap. 4-5 (ôaipôviov —> 0 e ô s ) ,  etc. Gomperz ([1924] 
160) partly secularizes die daimonic as it appears in Plato as follows: Aus diesen Stellen erhellt nicht 
nur, daJ5 in Platons echten Schriften der Ausdruck 'das Daimonion' nicht die Gottheit, vielmehr das 
dem Sokrates 'widerfahrende' gOttliche Zeichen, die wunderbare Stimtne, bedeutet, vielmehr auch, dafi 
hier dieses gOttliche Zeichen zu keiner bestimmten Gottheit in Beziehung gesetzt wird: insbesondere 
heijit die wunderbare Stimtne nirgends, wie bei Xenophon, die Stimme Gottes, und nur ganz vereinzelt 
findet sichAp. 40a die Wendung 'Gottes Zeichen'. In the case of Xen., Gomperz (pp. 154-57) 
demonstrates the predominantly Xenophontic conception of xô Ôaipôviov as "God" by considering the 
following passages: Comm. 1.1.2 ff., IV.3.12, IV.3.14-15, IV.8.1, Ap. 4 ff., 12 ff., Oec. 2.18, Smp. 8.5, 
and PI. Ap. 21B, 21E. From an opposite perspective, Riddell (p. I l l )  states that, with the exception of 
Ap. 12, all o f Xen.’s uses indicate diat it was simply a medium of communication. All o f diis appears 
to me to be a matter o f degree, however, and the fact that both Xen. and Plato frequently connect the 
influence o f xô ôaipôviov with divination in general renders both arguments academic.
^^See Phillipson 289 and Viastos 280-81 (see too Euthphr. 3B, where this ambiguity is 
acknowledged). The prosecution's at least partial interpretation of Socrates' sign as an entity was not 
revived until later (see note 37 above). McPherran (p. 138) believes that the fact that there could be no 
outside check on Socrates' daimonic sign might have caused some dicasts to associate it with black 
magic. Note too that Xen. himself seems to equate xa iva  Ôaipôvia with xa ivo i Ôaipoves in Ap. 24. 
^^Guthrie (1978) 3:402 n. 1. A. Ferguson (pp. 174-75) believes diat Socrates' daimonic sign was an 
object o f attack for the following reasons: 1) It could be represented as a private and unique means of 
access to a private deity; 2) it thereby set aside the normal means of access to, and indeed consideration 
of, the regular deities; 3) it could be represented as the initiator of measures against the democracy, 
which accounts for Socrates’ explanation o f his Apolitie in PI. Ap. 3 ID; and 4) it consequently afforded 
Anytns and his colleagues excellent legal grounds for an action intended to drive Socrates out of the 
city. Ferguson further notes (p. 174) that the arguments of Xen. concerning xô ôaipôviov attempt to
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charge would have been impossible for the prosecution to prove in light of Socrates' 
public observance of the state cults (see Comm. 1.1.2 and Xen. Ap. 11, 24).^ "!
And yet, if we translate Kaivà Saipovia as "religious novelties or 
innovations", the accusation, because or in spite of its inherent vagueness, seems fully 
justified, especially in consideration of such passages as R. 496C, where its 
uniqueness to Socrates is emphasized. This vagueness would perhaps help to explain 
his seeming elusiveness in playing on the ambiguity of voptÇsiv^^ and in relating the 
chai’ge to Anaxagoras and atheism (PI. Ap. 26D ff.) in his efforts to reveal Meletus' 
obfuscating tactics (or simply to arrive at a more precise understanding of the 
accusation against him). Paradoxically, in disproving an iiTelevant atheism charge, 
Socrates was in fact confirming the existing prejudice against him inasmuch as he 
was no closer to a precise explanation of to ôaipôviov at the end of his speech than 
he was at the beginning.^  ^ Xen.'s Socrates presents a more cogent argument by 
directly comparing it to standard and well-accepted fonns of divination, and Gigon 
nicely sums up the case in Socrates' favor by saying that the daimonic phenomenon 
simply represented eine reine gottliche Kraft with no name and no cult which could 
have competed with others. As such, it is inconceivable that it could have represented 
anything genuinely criminal.
show 1) tliat, since it was a man tic sign, there was no private deity involved, and 2) that Socrates’ 
information was intended for public, not private, purposes. Taylor ([1911] 22-23) believes that the 
daimonic sign might have been associated witli the Pythagorean 'AnàXkm  TitepPopeios, in which 
case it would have taken on a sinister significance if it was able to be connected witii a foreign cult (see 
too McPherran 135).
^"^Gomperz ([1924] 152) ventures the opinion that, although Socrates (at least according to Xen.) did in 
fact sacrifice publicly, this might have been his indirect way of honoring x6 Ôaipôviov (see Comm.
1.3.1, IV .3.16, IV.6.4); this would also apply to his perception of the Delphic god. Gigon ([1924] 25) 
comments that, although "the introduction o f new gods" can only mean the institution o f all new cults 
to the detriment o f the state religion, we are not to imagine Socrates establishing a cult for his daimonic 
sign and sacrificing to it on an altar at home, and Parker (p. 216) notes that Plato (Lg. 909D-910D) 
disapproved o f tlie establishment o f private slirines. Mik^son (p. 65) comments that, since ôaipoves 
normally did not have cults, it is unlikely that the dicasts would necessarily have made such an 
association.
^^Pl. Ap. 27B ff.; note too that Ôaipôvia in 27C clearly means Ôaipôvia Ttpdypaxa (see Burnet [1924] 
114 and note 57 above). The interpretation o f the phrase Beons on vopi^cov in the indictment has a 
long history, and I follow Parker (p. 201 n. 8) here in finding its meaning "poised between a reference 
to 'custom'...and 'belief". According to Xen., the best way of showing reverence towards tlie divine 
principle, or xô ôaipôviov, is to respect the vôpos of each polis (see Comm. IV .3.15-17).
^^Gomperz ([1924] 168-69) believes that Plato’s Socrates brings up the oracle in his defense speech for 
the purpose of suppressing the negative implications o f xô Ôaipôviov, and that the changing uses o f the 
word Geos in reference to the oracle support this.
^^Gigon (1947) 25-26. K. Joël (vol. 1 p. 74) nicely sums up the thought as follows: [Sokrates] 
entthronte nicht die gottliche Schicksalsmacht, erfand sie nur in der eigenen Brust wieder und hing ihr 
dort mit intensiver Glüubigkeit an.
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Appendix D: The Problem of Meyalpyopia
Y8Ypà(j)acîi pèv oùv jcepl xomoi) Kal dXloi Kai Tcavxes GTO%ov xps peyalTiyoplas 
aùxoù" ^  Kal Sfj^ov oxi x<S ov u  oùxcos epppOp ùtio ZcoKpaxoDs. aXX oxi pôp 
èam œ  pyeixo aipexcoxepov e iv a i xoù plot) Odvaxov, xoùxo où Ôieaaôpviaav' 
mcxe à(|)poveoxépa aùxoù (jiaivexai e iv a i p peyaXriyopla. {Ap. 1)
Thus Xen. accounts for Socrates' behavior in court as described in the Ap., according 
to which there cannot have been any doubt in Xen.'s mind that the dicasts were fully 
justified in sentencing Socrates to death.! The word peyalpyopta has been translated 
in many ways: as "proud tone" by Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 6 ), as "intrepidity" 
and "proud and inflexible conduct" by Chroust ([1957] 18), as Socratis vera animi 
magnitudo and superbia by Vrijlandt (pp. 23 & 26), as "arrogant tone" by Waterfield 
(p. 41), as "high-mindedness" by Gray (p. 136), and so forth. The word itself derives 
from the roots peyaXxi- and dyop- and refers literally to "talking big" at a public 
gathering, and in §32 Xen. uses the verb peYaA-ùveiv reflexively as being 
synonymous in meaning.^
! Stone (p. 181 ff.) implies that Socrates was surprised at the close fiist vote in PI. Ap. because he could 
not help but acknowledge his own arrogance.
^Examples of the word peyalTcyopta and related forms as they appear in Xen. are given below.
As connected witli the possibility of a divine motivation:
- An. VI.3.18: k q i  6 Geos locos ayei omcos, os xoùs |ieyaX.i]yopfiaavxas ms ixXéov ôpovoùvxas 
xa7teivé5oai poùXexai, fiM-ôs 5è xoùs à%ô xmv Geôv àp%opévous évxipoxépous éxelvmv Kaxa0xf\oai.
As connected with boasting in general:
- Cyr. IV.4.2: o i  5è [ a ix p â X m x o i ]  Ô ix iy o ù v x o  à  x è ï ïO iT ia a v  K a i  m s à v S p e t m s  Ë K a o x a  
. . .é |a .e y a A ,-n y ô p o w .
- Ibid. Vn.1.17: xoiaùxa Ô’ èpeyaXiiyôpei [ô Kùpos], pe^Xoùoiis xfjs pctxns ylyveoGai" 
dXlms S’où p â la  peyainyopos ijv.
- Ages. 8.2: qKioxa ô’ mv oios peya^Tiyopeiv ôpms x(Sv éiiaivoùvxmv aùxoùs où Papéms 
ÙKooev ['AyeoDiaos], qyoùpevos pidjixeiv où5èv aùxoùs, ÙJiiaxveioGai Sè âvôpas dyaGoùs 
ëoeoGai.
MeyaÀùveoGai in the sense of "to demonstrate self-aggrandizing behavior" (cp. eauxov peyaXùveiv in 
Ap. 32) appears in Comm. III.6.3, Oec. 21.4 (to be contrasted with peyaA,oyvmpoves in ibid. 21.8), HG 
VII. 1.24, Hier. 2.17, Ages, 10.2, and Lac. 8.2, where it has distinctly negative connotations, while the 
more common péya (jipoveiv has a more ambiguous meaning (see Smp. 3.8 ff., for example).
None of these forms appears in Plato, who uses the phrase péya X,éyeiv to express the related 
idea o f making a claim tliat cannot be so easily corroborated:
PI. Ap. 20E: PÙ GopuPùmytE, pii8' èàv 5ô^m xi ùpîv péya léy e iv .
Other examples from Plato follow:
Phd. 95B: ’QyaGé, ë({)Ti ô ZmKpâxns, pi) péya Xéye, pi) xis fipîv paoKavia nepixpéij/^ xov Xôyov 
xôv péXkovxa ëaeoGai. (Cp. An. VI.3.18 above.)
Phdr. 260D (as placed in the mouth of Rhetoric personified): xo5e 5’ oùv péya Xéym, ms aveu  
époù x$ xà ôvxa elôôxi oùôév xi pàXlov ëoxai jieiGeiv xéxvq.
Lg. 653A: A 0. Toùxou yàp, ms ye èym xojràÇm xà vùv, ëaxiv èv x0 ènixriôeùpaxi xoùxm KaXms 
KoxopGoupévtp 0 mxnpla. KA. M éya Xéyeis.
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A problem arises from the motives which Xen. ascribes to his Socrates figure. 
In effect, Xen. is saying that Socrates treated the prospect of a death sentence lightly 
since he was all too aware of his own senescence and of the fact that he had reached 
the height of his reputation: In this light his peya^riyopla becomes, if not purposeful, 
then at least a manifestation of his attitude at the time of his trial.3 The problem is 
compounded by the characterizations of Socrates in the other Socratica (most notably 
in the Comm, and in Plato passim), which generally present a less self-aggrandizing 
Socrates than the one who appears in the Ap."^  As Navia remarks ([1984] 61 & 52), it
Other instances o f its usage appearing within a century prior or subsequent to Xen. Ap. include the 
following:
A. Th. 565-67 (the chorus describing the enemy):
(ieydXa peya^nYÔpmv KXùovxes àvoalmv àvôpmv, el 0eoi Geol, 
xoùaô' oX-éaeiov èv yçc.
E. HF  353-56 (the chorus speaking to lolaus): 
et où péy' aùxeis, ëxepoi 
ocû Ttiéov où péXovxat 
^eiv’ <àn:’> ’ApyôGev êXGcôv, 
peyaXJiyopiaioi 6' èpàs (j)pévas où (j)oPnoeis.
E. Ph. 182-184:
Népeoi Kal Aiôs papùppopoi ppovxai 
Kapaùviôv xe (jxns aiGaXôev, où xoi 
peyaXayoplav ùjcepâvopa KoipiÇeis.
Chrysipp.Stoic. ap. Plu. De Stoic, repugn. 1038C: moTiep x^ Ail trpocrriKei aepvùveaGai éô’ aùxcp 
xe K a l  x0 picû  K a l  péya ôpoveîv K a i ,  ei 5eî oùxcos eiTteiv, ùyauxeveiv K a l  KOpâv K a l  
peyaXriyopeiv, à^lms pioùvxi peyaXnyoplas, oùxco xois àyaGois Ttâai xaûxa TXpocrqKei, Kax oùôèv îcpoexopévois ù î tô  x o ù  Aiôs.
Forms o f the word peyaXqyopla appear in such later authors as Appian, Cassius Dio, Dionysius o f  
Halicarnassus, Lucian, Plutarch, and the Christian writers, and the term gradually acquires die less 
negative notion o f "magniloquence" as a secondary meaning.
^Derenne (p. 184) sums up Socrates' role in his conviction as follows: Socrate fiit condamné à mort, 
mais il est incontestable que la responsabilité du verdict retombe en grande partie sur sa conduite 
provocante devant le tribunal. Croiset (vol. 4  p. 364) connects Xen.'s p eyalq yopla  thesis witli the 
Xenophontic concept of cô^éleia (see too the comment on §34): Cette idée générale est bien celle 
qu'on pouvait atteruire de Xénophon, et elle est développée tout à fa it selon son esprit, avec cette 
préoccupation (parfois mesquine) de l'utilité, qui est souvent sa marque dans les choses morales.
Vrijlandt (p. 22) attempts to reconcile any inconsistencies with such general assertions as ...Ultro  
elicere datnnationem et lacessere indices in animo [Socratis] non erat and ...Apologia fiebat cannen 
quo suas ipse laudes cecinit. Kaibel (p. 581 n. 1: see too Schmitz 226) sees no similiarities whatsoever 
among the relevant Socratica, while Nickel (p. 81) sees the Ap. as supplying a specifically 
psychological complement to other accounts o f the trial. Pangle (p. 32 ff.) maintains that at least some 
o f the statements in the Ap. can be seen as exaggerations of those made in Xen.'s other Socratic 
writings. Derenne (p. 167) poses a rhetorical question: Mais est-ce une raison pour prétendre que 
Socrate, devant le tribunal, n'a pu se comporter d'une façon moins polie que d'ordinaire?  and 
Sandbach (p. 478) represents a similar view: "This bragging hardly rings true, put in the mouth o f  one 
who was a by-word for self-deprecation; it is what Xenophon, convinced o f Socrates' piety and 
goodness, would have said on his belialf; perhaps he even persuaded himself that this is how his hero 
must have spoken." Chroust ([1957] 182: see too Brickhouse & Smith [1989] 207) quite rightly notes 
that the expected response o f any brave man to trumped-up charges would be irony and condescension, 
and one can assume that, even in seeking an acquitted, Socrates undoubtedly would have angered at 
least some o f tlie dicasts. As Chroust remarks elsewhere ([1957] 4), tlie problem with tlie extremes in 
characterization brings Xen.'s objectivity into question, and GutM e ([1978] 3:339) criticizes Xen. for 
having contributed to the prevailing feelings against Socrates in later ages by depicting him as self-
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is in any case unjustified to dismiss Xen.'s explanation of Socrates' peyalTiyopia 
simply because it does not make him an ideal martyr, and since Socrates is generally 
portrayed as being respectful of Athens and its institutions, Xen.'s version of his 
behavior needs to be. examined carefully.
The passages in the Ap. in which Socrates' |ieyaA,T|Y0 pia is apparent are as 
follows: §5 (Socrates as a nonpareil of virtue), §13 (Socrates' special access to the 
divine will), §14 (Chaerephon's report of the Delphic pronouncement), §15 (the 
comparison with Lycurgus), §§16-18 (an enumeration of Socrates' virtues in proof of 
the oracle), §§2 0 - 2 1  (Socrates' pre-eminent position as an instiller of virtue), §23 (his 
refusal to grovel or to propose a counter-penalty), §24 (his reproval of those who 
voted against him), §27 (his lighthearted bearing immediately after the trial), §29 (the 
certainty of his future reputation), §30 (his prophetic ability vis-à-vis Any tus' son),^ 
and §32 (Xen.'s re-statement of his peyaXTiyopia argument). It can be seen, then, that 
Socrates' arrogance does indeed provide a major structuring element in the Ap., a fact 
which leads Schmitz to conclude that it is a patchwork forgery consisting of a 
foundation of components gathered from the Comm, and roughly held together by the 
general theme of peyaX,T|yopia, which plays no role in the latter work.^ There are 
many explanations given for Socrates' behavior: Oilier (p. 98) feels that Xen.’s own 
indignation, expressed with a soldier’s frankness, manifests itself in an exaggerated 
foim (namely, as peyaXiiyopla) in his account of the trial. Another position (see 
Oldfather 208) is that Socrates could not have helped but point out the absurdity of 
being tried by men who, like Meletus, had never concerned themselves with ethical 
matters: This attitude was mistaken for aiTogance. Pangle  ^ finds the cause of 
Socrates' behavior in his intention to appear neither impious nor unjust (see §§22-23), 
i.e., Socrates intended to appear in a favorable light by “talking big”. Vrijlandt (p. 22)
righteous and smug. He certainly affected Maier in this way, who with obvious irritation describes 
Xen.'s Socrates figure (p. 6) as dieser aufdringliche Pedant, dieser philisterhafte Schulmeister, dieser 
langweilige Tugendspiegel und unertrdgliche Tugendschwützer.
^Breitenbach (col. 1891), who holds that the Anytus section has nothing to do with peyaX.nyopia but 
with the personal reasons for his attack on Socrates, nevertheless does not take into account Socrates' 
ability to predict the future, a quality which heightens his superhuman characterization and gives him a 
sort o f Pythian quality foreshadowed in §12.
^Schmitz 227-28 (see too Appendix A). Schmitz believes that all that is truly important in the Ap. 
derives from the Comm., with the overlay having been added by a later archaizing writer who had 
mastered the relevant style (cp. Quintus Curtius and Dio Chrysostom); such imitators betray themselves 
through rhetorical exaggeration, represented in the Ap. by the theme o f jieyaX,'nYopla. Gray (pp. 137- 
38), who believes in the work's authenticity, also believes that Xen.'s interest in presenting Socrates' 
arrogance as appropriate was driven by contemporary rhetorical theory (see Arist. Rh. 1408A and Isoc. 
13.16-17), while Vander Waerdt (p. 21) believes that the omission of any mention o f peyaA.qyopla in 
Comm. IV.8 indicates that it was was not in fact an integral part o f Xen.'s rhetorical approach to 
composing the Ap. Pangle (p. 21) thinks that, since peyaXiryopla receives no mention there, his 
willingness to die does not in itself seem to provide a sufficient motive for his arrogance towards the 
dicasts.
^See Pangle (p. 23), who also comments (ibid. 20) that Socrates' motives are not entirely selfish in the 
Ap. (consider, for example, his concern for his friends in §§7 & 27-28).
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accounts for Socrates’ arrogance and magniloquence by surmising that, since he was 
near the end of his life, he was not in a position to change his character, i.e., he could 
only continue to speak freely, as he always had.
The fact that Socrates was forced to defend himself in a judicial setting was 
crucial to the nature of his defense. In general, Socrates' conversancy with small 
groups would have done little to prepare him for a day in court, and his dialectical 
skills would have been ill-suited to the occasion.^ Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 41 
& 44) also observe that any ironical statement or "pridefully defiant" behavior on 
Socrates' part would have interfered with the jurors’ objectivity and the performance 
of their lawful duty to ascertain the truth, a frequent lapse in Athenian judicial 
proceedings which Socrates expressly censures,^ and that it was neither irony nor 
arrogance that led to his conviction but rather his insistence "upon offering a defense 
designed to suit the law, justice, and piety" {ibid. 236). They add that, although 
Socrates' non-conciliatory approach might have appealed to many to be "big talk", 
this big talk was not mere boasting, since he always offered reasons for his 
behavior.!! Finally, it should be kept in mind that the fact that Socrates refused to 
bend before the dicasts does not mean that he participated aggressively in his own 
condemnation {idem).
Specific coiTespondences between the two aTcoJioyiai include the following:
1) The Oracle'. This would have been a delicate subject in any case, and the two 
accounts vary quite drastically in the way in which it is presented to the jury. 
Before he mentions the oracle, the Platonic Socrates begs the jury not to get upset 
if he seems péya Jiéyeiv (20E), whereas the Xenophontic Socrates' introductory 
remark can only be described as extremely provocative: ’A ye 5fi axoucaxe xal 
àXka, Iva exi paXXov ol povXopevoi ùpcùv àTCiaxcocn, xô èpè xexipfÎ0 0 ai m o  
ôaipôvcov (§14). Wetzel (pp. 402-403) feels that Plato's efforts to mitigate the 
peyaXriyopia inherent in the report of the oracle is evidence for its original force
^See Finley 62, Reeve 155-58, and Oldfather 206-207. Socrates' rhetorical subtlety in PI. Ap. is in 
keeping with his disingenuously proclaimed lack of forensic skills (Bonner 177).
^See the comment on Ap. 23. Socrates' intention to obey the law appears clearly in PI. Ap. 19A (opcos 
xow o pÈv iTO) ÔÎIT1 x$  0e® (j)t^ov, x<^  ÔÈ voptp Tceiaxéov x a i àjio^oyTjxéov), and Socrates as presented 
in the Cri. believes that the laws derive their validity from the gods and cannot be questioned. 
Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 38) note that Socrates’ professed efforts to abide by the law seem  
contradicted by PI. Ap. 29D (’Eyà ùpâs, <5 dvÔpes 'Aôrivatoi, àoTtâÇopat pèv K a l  <|nXü&, jteloopai Sè 
pâXXov x$ 0eep f) ùpiv, K a l  ëcoaîiep dv épJE véo) K a l  oiôs xe c5, où p f) jtaùacùpai <j)iX.oao<t)0v).
!®The role of public ^Govos in Socrates' conviction also cannot be ignored. Beyschlag (p. 514) 
remarks that this element is understated in Plato (see PI. Ap. 18D, 28A and Euthphr. 3D) but brought to 
the fore in Xen. Ap. 14 & 32.
ÜBrickhouse & Smith [1989] 236-37. Amim (pp. 16-17) remarks that every megalegorical remark 
made by Plato's Socrates is mitigated by his consideration of what is ultimately in Atliens' best interest. 
Note too that on several occasions (see Ap. 20E & 37A) Socrates tells the dicasts not to misinterpret his 
words.
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and for its a^pocrnvri in the eyes of those present at the trial. The ensuing 
Oopupos here and elsewhere in Xen. and Plato can be considered a sort of
peyaÀTiyopia index.! 2
2) The Dialogue with Meletus: Brickhouse and Smith ([1989] 41) point out quite 
rightly that Socrates' irony at the trial involved a decided risk since, with the 
exception of his dialogue with Meletus, there was no real intercourse between 
Socrates and anyone else during the entire process. Again, Socrates was 
completely out of his element in a forensic setting, and his characteristic irony 
could have been easily misconstrued without the benefit of a genuine dialogue.!^ 
Xen.'s Socrates uses the occasion as yet another opportunity to extol his own 
virtues, while Plato's figure seems strikingly caustic.
3) Socrates' Refusal to Kowtow: This is presented by the Platonic Socrates as 
being contrary to the spirit of the law (35B-D), to the Xenophontic Socrates as 
being contrai-y to the actual letter of the law (see Comm. IV.4.4). In general, 
Socrates' attitude towards the law (see Comm. IV.4 passim) at least partly explains 
his behavior in court, and his refusal to plead for his life could also be considered 
megalegorical (see Gigon [1946] 217 and Hackforth 17-18).
4) The npmaveXov Proposal: The omission of this proposal in Xen. Ap. is quite 
curious if one considers its potential megalegorical impact on the dicasts, while 
Comm. 1.2.64 seems to echo the Platonic version of the event. Wilamowitz 
maintains that the fact that Socrates actually made this counter-proposal is 
confirmed by the second vote and by the fact that, if it is a piece of Platonic 
fiction, it could only have been injurious to his master’s memory.!"!
Although the aiTOgant tone of the Xenophontic Socrates is quite striking, the 
Socrates figure as depicted by Plato is by no means self-effacing. !^  Kennedy (p. 150) 
remarks that "success in court demanded the observance of certain rhetorical 
conventions, of which the most important was the establishment of a sympathetic 
rapport between speaker and audience". The main similarity between the two 
drcoXoylai consists in the fact that neither figure observes this convention (see
!2See the comment on §14 (see too Amim [p. 15] for his remarks).
!^Bumet ([1911] Iv-lvi) describes Socrates' character as an "entiiusiasm tempered by irony". Aristotle 
{EN  1127B) comments as follows on Socrates' irony: 01 Ôè eipcoves è m  xô eZaxxov XéyovxEs 
X ap iéo x ep o i pèv  xà <{ialvovxai (où  y à p  KÉpôons ëv e x a  ôoKOùai X,éyeiv, àXXà ct)eùyovxes xô 
ôyKTipôv)' jiàX iaxa 5è  K al oùxoi xà ëvôo^a àTrapvoùvxai, o îov  K al ZcoKpdxris è n o ie i . For modem  
considerations of Socrates' irony, see Viastos passim  and Brickhouse & Smith (1989) 39-41. Contrary 
to Viastos, D. Morrison ([1987] 10 ff.) finds quite a few instances of irony and paradox in Xen.'s 
Socrates figure, whereas Cliroust ([1955] 62) adopts an intermediate position on this question. 
!"!Wilamowitz (1919) 2:50 (see too Chroust [1957] 67, Beyschlag 514, and my comment ad loc.). 
!^011ier (pp. 97-98) sees in the Platonic Socrates an occasional fierté dédaigneuse, though it is 
important to note (see Delebecque 217) that his peyaA,Tiyopla makes its first appeaiance at the end of 
his first speech.
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Breitenbach 1893 and P. Meyer 755), and it is clear that Socrates' behavior as 
represented would have seemed to many, as to Xen. and others, to be àôpoveaxépa.!^ 
The main difference between the accounts concerns Socrates' attitude towards his 
impending death: Xen. justifies Socrates' peyalTiYopla by saying that he was ready to 
die because he wanted to avoid senility, whereas Plato says that he did not want to 
live any longer if he had to curtail his philosophical mission. This, as Walton (p. 290) 
comments, makes Socrates' overweening tone in Xen. deliberate, in Plato 
unintentional, and if Socrates seems more arrogant in Xen. Ap., it is because he is 
lacking the Platonic Socrates' subtle i r o n y .
In considering this aspect of Socrates' personality, it is important to distinguish 
among such traits as aiTOgance, irony, petulance, etc., distinctions which become 
easily bluiTed. Vrijlandt (pp. 3-26) cites an abundance of examples of Socrates' 
negative characteristics gathered from Plato, Xen., and other sources,am ong which 
the following seem the most illustrative for our purposes:
Audacity
Comm. 1.2.49-55: The issues of filiopiety and utilitarianism
Nu. 247-48: The traditional gods as no longer relevant (cp. 1. 365 ff.)
Bluntness
Comm. 1.2.30: Critias' porcine lust
Ibid. 1.3.7: Comparison of gluttons with Circe's pigs
Ibid. 1.3.11-13: Harsh words to Xen. and Critobulus about lechery
Ibid. 1.6.13: Comparison of sophists with whores^^
Ibid. n.1.15: Harsh remarks about Aristippus' cosmopolitanism 
Ibid. ni. 13.3-6: Demonstrations of patently contradictory behavior in his 
acquaintances
!^See Shero 111. There is no evidence, however, to support Shero's assertion that Socrates was not 
trying to win an acquittal, only evidence that he was not willing to win one by compromising his 
values. In any case, it is clear tliat, because of their vagueness, he was in no position to deny the 
charges.
!^See Shero (p. 109), who observes elsewhere (p. I l l )  that the general tone of PL Ap. certainly makes 
it the more idealized o f the two cutokoytai. Edelstein (p. 153) cites the following examples of 
Socrates' arrogance in Plato: Chrm. 169C, Euthd. 291B, 297B, Grg. 461C, 482D, 483A, 517C, Hp.Mi. 
373B, Men. 80A-B, Phlb. 20A, R. 333C, 337E, 487B-C, and Tht. 169A; to these I would add Cri. 52C 
( a t  ôè tore jxèv ÉKaAAcoTEiÇo'U 6s o ù k  âyavaKTWv e i Ôéoi xeSvâvai ae, àXkà Tipoû, 6s ë<})Tia0a, Tcpô 
Tfjs ôuyns 0âvaTov). For specific instances in PL Ap., see Vrijlandt's findings below and P. Meyer 754- 
55.
!^The üiformation contained in the fragments of Aristoxenus' biography o f Socrates are interesting if 
not apocryphal (see Vrijlandt 3-4). The relevant fragments are as follows: Fr. 54B (Wehrli ed.): [6 yap 
’Apioxo^evos E$T|,] oxe ôè [ZffiKpaxps] imo xoù 7rd0ons xonxou, ôeivqv elvat xqv
àaxnpo<5Ùvriv. o ù ô e v ô s  yàp o ù x e  ovopaxos àixéxeafiai o ù x e  Ttpàypaxos. Fr. 55: Socrates is described 
as being àTtaiÔEwos Kai àpa0hs Kai àKÔXaoxos. Fr. 56: énEi xoi k o I  ZoïKpdxriv aùxà xaùxà ônaiv 
’Apiaxô^evos, 6s (f)ùaei ysyovEi xpa%ùs els ôpyf)v, Kai ô t iô x e  KpaxT|0EÎn 7tà0Ei, Ôià Ttàoris ào%iipoaùvns èpàôiÇev.
!^D. Morrison ([1987] 10) notes that each Socrates figure is more savage when dealing with 
professional sophists and otlier strangers than with his associates.
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Ibid. rv.1.5; Strong language about those who disdain education 
Ibid. TV.2.22-23: The ignorant as àvôpàiroôa 
Ibid. rv.5.11: Self-indulgence as bestial behavior
Phdr. 258E-259A: Hedonists as àvSpaîcoôôôets (see ibid. 238E & 252A, PI. Smp.
183A, Grg. 49IE, Ly. 208B, and Tht. 172C-D for similar examples)
PL Ap. 38C: Prediction of future ill will caused by the death sentence
Ibid. 41D: Censure of his accusers
Disdain
Comm. 1.1.9-16: For scientists
Ibid. 1.2.6: For those who accept fees for their teaching
Ibid. 1.3.4: For those who ignore the divine will
PI. Ap. 35A: For those who beg for mercy from the court
Ale. 7 118B: For politicians who are not properly educated
Haughtiness and Condescension
Comm. rV.4.9: Towards his interlocutors in general
Nu. 102: âXàÇovas [auvovxas] in reference to Socrates' students
Ibid. 140: Haughty behavior of a particular student
Ibid. 223: m'ô-ppepe (addressed by Socrates to Stiepsiades)
Ibid. 224: àvxipoXœ (addressed by Stiepsiades to Socrates)
Callias ap. D.L. 2.18: A. Ti S-p où oépvrj xal ôpovets oùxco péya;
B. "E^eoxt yàp poi* EcoKpàxps yàp àixios.
Hostility Caused by Socrates' Behavior
See Comm. IV.2.39-40, ibid. IV.4.9 Tht. 151C, and PL Ap. 21E, 23A, 24A, 31C, 
37C-D 
Indignation
PL Ap. 18B-C (towards the "old accusers")
Ibid. 19C (towards his portrayal in Nu.)
Insolent Looks
Nu. 361-62: Socrates' looks inteipreted as superciliousness 
PL Smp. 215B: Compared with Marsyas 
Ibid. 22IB: The retreat at Potidaea 
Irony
PL Ap. 20D: K a l locos p è v  Ôô^ co x io l v  ù p ô v  T calÇ eiv ...
Sarcasm 2Q
Comm, n.2.7 (regarding Lamprocles' behavior towards Xanthippe)
Ibid. rV.2.4-6 (regarding Euthydemus' callow attitude)
20To this category I would add Comm. IV.4.6-8 (regarding Socrates' responses to Hippias' needling).
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Pl. Ap. 17A (regarding the accusers' persuasive brief)2i 
Self-Aggrandizement
Comm. 1.6.6-10, ibid. IV.4.11, and Grg. 52 ID ff.
Snideness and Derision
See Comm. 1.2.32: Comparison of Critias with a bad shepherd 
Ibid. rV.4.9: Derisive tieatment of elenctic "victims" (cp. 1.4.1)
PI. Smp. 219C: Belittlement of Alcibiades' looks
PI. Ap. 33C: Admission that it is not altogether unpleasant to subject people to his 
8^Y%os
Ibid. 40C: "No one is executed in Hades for practicing philosophy."
Stubbornness
PI. Ap. 29D ff.: Refusal to give up his divine mission
Vrijlandt's examples, some of which seem rather forced, have been re-aixanged into 
English categories which ai’e entimly my own, while he himself employs such Latin 
terms as superbia, magniloquentia, iactantia, duritia, iraciindia, and acerbitas, using 
superbia alone to translate peyaXpyopia, which in my opinion would only include the 
categories "haughtiness" and "self-aggrandizement" above. From his analysis of these 
and other passages, Vrijlandt (p. 26) comes to the following conclusions about 
Socrates’ arrogance:
I. Socrates non semper erat hoino elegans et urbanus, sed saepe diirus, incultus, superbus, acerbus, mordax.
II. Xenophon in Apologia sua nobis veram superbiam at magniloquentiam dedit et verum Socratem.
III. Plato nobis hominem divinum sedfictum ante oculos posuit, cuius superbia 
quoque inhumana et prope divina, languida et contra veritatem est.
In short, Vrijlandt accounts for Socrates’ peyalpyopia by challenging the opinion 
held by most scholars that it was uncharacteristic of him to behave in such a 
manner. 22 According to this perspective, Socrates was indeed arrogant.
2 !fg r  totamApologiam Socrates iudlces alloquitur benevole tanquam discipulos quibus persuadera  
conatur - non item accusatores cf. 24D  (Vrijlandt 25). Vrijlandt supports this statement by pointing out 
the Platonic Socrates' use o f the didactic oKé\|/aa0e, for example. Bonner (p. 170) remarks that not 
calling the jurors SiKaaxai before the sentence was passed does not reveal any bias on Socrates' part, 
since he could not have been aware of tlie verdict. There was also a great amount o f diversity in 
addressing jury members.
22Derenne (p. 168) seems at least partly to concur by saying that the Socrates tliat we receive in the 
Platonic dialogues is stylized, and that anyone so familiar with all walks of life would undoubtedly 
have had a coarser side to his nature. (See, for example, D.L. 2.18-19 for Socrates' supposed 
stoneworking background. Derenne's view represents a class bias, o f course.) Stone (ch. 14), who 
would undoubtedly agree with the opinions expressed by Vrijlandt and Derenne, states unequivocally 
that Socrates intentionally provoked the jury to pass the death sentence and adduces Socrates' so-called 
callous treatment of Xanthippe in Phd. 59E ff. as a prime, though astonishingly weak, example o f his 
insensitivity.
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Perhaps a clue to Socrates' behavior can be found in his attitude to the re­
established democracy. Although Taylor ([1911] 1) has reminded us that the very 
comic writers who attacked Socrates for his wayward views also consistently attacked 
key figures in the democracy themselves, the strongest prirm facie argument in favor 
of his anti-democratic proclivities is the fact that he was surrounded by young 
noblemen who openly professed their admiration for Sparta, as did he (see Cri. 52E, 
Prt. 342A ff., Hp.Ma. 283A ff., and Comm. n i.5 .14-28: see too Ar. Av. 1281).23 
Potentially anti-democratic inclinations in Socrates are to be found in Comm. 1.2.9-11, 
1.2.56-61, m.7.6, PI. Ap. 32B-C, 40B, Pit. 300E, and Prt. 319B-320C.24 Hackforth 
(pp. 118-120) believes that the reasons given for Socrates' Apolitie in PI. Ap. 40B 
must reflect Plato's attitude, not Socrates', since the latter would not have been so anti­
democratic in the 40's (see, for example, his encouragement of Channides to enter 
politics in Comm, in.7), and that Plato must have conceived his hatied of democracy 
during the democratic tenor of 410-405. According to Taylor ([1932] 150-52), it is in 
fact Socrates who is against democracy since the multitude has no knowledge of the 
good, and Taylor accordingly attributes the harsher opinions in the Grg. and R. to 
Socrates and the milder in the Pit. and Lg. to Plato. Gomperz ([1924] 133) adopts a 
more extreme position in this matter by stating that Xen.'s short response to the charge 
that Socrates taught his followers to despise the constitution (see Comnt. 1.2.9 ff.) 
shows that it was in fact tiue and that he was probably in favor of overthrowing the 
democracy by legal, non-violent means. Socrates' opposition to appointment by lot 
was well known (see Comm. 1.2.9, Pit. 297E ff., Arist. Rh. 1393B3 ff., and D.L.
6.8),25 as was his disdain for the democracy's emphasis on material wealth (with its 
necessarily banausic basis) over the examination of one's soul, its abuse of legal 
institutions during the trial of the Arginusae admirals, its ability to be swayed by self- 
abasing emotional displays made by defendants ad misericordiam, etc.
There is, however, nothing to suggest that Socrates was anything other than a 
law-abiding citizen, and it would be the easiest solution to attribute the tone 
represented in the two aTroXoylcn as resulting from a sense of righteous indignation: 
Socrates, after a long life engaged in the constant political dialectic which 
characterizes a healthy democracy, was now facing the prospect of being himself 
subjected to that very fickleness which had been the object of his pointed criticism for
2^D. Rankin ([1987] passim) believes that tlie real reason behind the accusation against Socrates was 
his association with certain oligarchs, and that, by rehabilitating his pro-oligarchic image, Xen. and 
Plato were also rehabilitating their own.
24stone (chh. 1-9) provides many examples of what he considers to be Socrates' anti-democratic 
sentiments. Xen. goes to considerable lengths to counter this notion (see, for example. Comm. IV .4.16 
ff. and Oec. 9.14).
25Reeve (p. 104) notes, however, tliat Socrates himself was appointed by lot on several occasions.
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so many yeai's/^ Defenders of Socrates in this respect^? quite rightly point out that 
Socrates' dissenting views on unbridled democracy were essential for its own 
development and self-definition, the full awareness of which is reflected in his 
comparison of himself in PI. Ap. to a stinging horsefly. As Higgins (p. 42) observes: 
"Socrates dies because he has lived his life with an earnestness which most men find 
excessive and instating."
25see Higgins (p. 41): "Socrates in the Apology does not compromise, for to do so would be to pervert 
the meaning o f his life and to make him little better than the perverters of justice who attack him." 
Blumenthal (p. 173) compares Socrates' actions to the McCarthyist "un-American activities" m the 
aftermath o f the Korean War.
2^See, for example. Popper (p. 160): “Socrates’ criticism was a democratic one, and indeed of the kind 
that is the very life o f democracy"; see too Montgomery (p. 13): “Socrates was loyal in the deepest 
sense to the democratic ideals, for it is in the last analysis the Socratic challenge to man’s irrationalism 
which offers the ultimate protection to those who would freely seek the Good Life.” Vander Waerdt 
(pp. 17 & 22), who considers Socrates' attitude as an "act o f benefaction" intended to benefit his fellow  
citizens and as the result o f a conception of justice which differed fundamentally from that o f the polis, 
states elsewhere (p. 25) that Socrates' "strategy of jiieyaXTtyopta at his trial is one to be judged by its 
benefit not merely to his immediate audience, but to posterity". See too Reeve 102 and Brickhouse & 
Smith (1989) 79 ff.
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